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The Wasp Credited with the Honeycomb

No man, I imagine, would object more strongly than Euphorion to
communistic principles in relation to material property, but with regard
to property in ideas he entertains such principles willingly, and is
disposed to treat the distinction between Mine and Thine in original
authorship as egoistic, narrowing, and low. I have known him, indeed,
insist at some expense of erudition on the prior right of an ancient, a
medieval, or an eighteenth century writer to be credited with a view or
statement lately advanced with some show of originality; and this
championship seems to imply a nicety of conscience towards the dead. He
is evidently unwilling that his neighbours should get more credit than
is due to them, and in this way he appears to recognise a certain
proprietorship even in spiritual production. But perhaps it is no real
inconsistency that, with regard to many instances of modern origination,
it is his habit to talk with a Gallic largeness and refer to the
universe: he expatiates on the diffusive nature of intellectual
products, free and all-embracing as the liberal air; on the
infinitesimal smallness of individual origination compared with the
massive inheritance of thought on which every new generation enters; on
that growing preparation for every epoch through which certain ideas or
modes of view are said to be in the air, and, still more metaphorically
speaking, to be inevitably absorbed, so that every one may be excused
for not knowing how he got them. Above all, he insists on the proper
subordination of the irritable self, the mere vehicle of an idea or
combination which, being produced by the sum total of the human race,
must belong to that multiple entity, from the accomplished lecturer or
populariser who transmits it, to the remotest generation of Fuegians or
Hottentots, however indifferent these may be to the superiority of their
right above that of the eminently perishable dyspeptic author.

Euphorion himself, if a particular omission of acknowledgment were
brought home to him, would probably take a narrower ground of
explanation. It was a lapse of memory; or it did not occur to him as
necessary in this case to mention a name, the source being well
known--or (since this seems usually to act as a strong reason for
mention) he rather abstained from adducing the name because it might
injure the excellent matter advanced, just as an obscure trade-mark
casts discredit on a good commodity, and even on the retailer who has
furnished himself from a quarter not likely to be esteemed first-rate.
No doubt this last is a genuine and frequent reason for the
non-acknowledgment of indebtedness to what one may call impersonal as
well as personal sources: even an American editor of school classics
whose own English could not pass for more than a syntactical shoddy of
the cheapest sort, felt it unfavourable to his reputation for sound
learning that he should be obliged to the Penny Cyclopaedia, and
disguised his references to it under contractions in which _Us. Knowl._.
took the place of the low word _Penny_. Works of this convenient stamp,
easily obtained and well nourished with matter, are felt to be like rich
but unfashionable relations who are visited and received in privacy, and
whose capital is used or inherited without any ostentatious insistance
on their names and places of abode. As to memory, it is known that this
frail faculty naturally lets drop the facts which are less flattering to
our self-love--when it does not retain them carefully as subjects not to
be approached, marshy spots with a warning flag over them. But it is
always interesting to bring forward eminent names, such as Patricius or
Scaliger, Euler or Lagrange, Bopp or Humboldt. To know exactly what has
been drawn from them is erudition and heightens our own influence, which
seems advantageous to mankind; whereas to cite an author whose ideas may
pass as higher currency under our own signature can have no object
except the contradictory one of throwing the illumination over his
figure when it is important to be seen oneself. All these reasons must
weigh considerably with those speculative persons who have to ask
themselves whether or not Universal Utilitarianism requires that in the
particular instance before them they should injure a man who has been of
service to them, and rob a fellow-workman of the credit which is due to
him.

After all, however, it must be admitted that hardly any accusation is
more difficult to prove, and more liable to be false, than that of a
plagiarism which is the conscious theft of ideas and deliberate
reproduction of them as original. The arguments on the side of acquittal
are obvious and strong:--the inevitable coincidences of contemporary
thinking; and our continual experience of finding notions turning up in
our minds without any label on them to tell us whence they came; so that
if we are in the habit of expecting much from our own capacity we accept
them at once as a new inspiration. Then, in relation to the elder
authors, there is the difficulty first of learning and then of
remembering exactly what has been wrought into the backward tapestry of
the world's history, together with the fact that ideas acquired long ago
reappear as the sequence of an awakened interest or a line of inquiry
which is really new in us, whence it is conceivable that if we were
ancients some of us might be offering grateful hecatombs by mistake, and
proving our honesty in a ruinously expensive manner. On the other hand,
the evidence on which plagiarism is concluded is often of a kind which,
though much trusted in questions of erudition and historical criticism,
is apt to lead us injuriously astray in our daily judgments, especially
of the resentful, condemnatory sort. How Pythagoras came by his ideas,
whether St Paul was acquainted with all the Greek poets, what Tacitus
must have known by hearsay and systematically ignored, are points on
which a false persuasion of knowledge is less damaging to justice and
charity than an erroneous confidence, supported by reasoning
fundamentally similar, of my neighbour's blameworthy behaviour in a case
where I am personally concerned. No premisses require closer scrutiny
than those which lead to the constantly echoed conclusion, "He must have
known," or "He must have read." I marvel that this facility of belief on
the side of knowledge can subsist under the daily demonstration that the
easiest of all things to the human mind is _not_ to know and _not_ to
read. To praise, to blame, to shout, grin, or hiss, where others shout,
grin, or hiss--these are native tendencies; but to know and to read are
artificial, hard accomplishments, concerning which the only safe
supposition is, that as little of them has been done as the case admits.
An author, keenly conscious of having written, can hardly help imagining
his condition of lively interest to be shared by others, just as we are
all apt to suppose that the chill or heat we are conscious of must be
general, or even to think that our sons and daughters, our pet schemes,
and our quarrelling correspondence, are themes to which intelligent
persons will listen long without weariness. But if the ardent author
happen to be alive to practical teaching he will soon learn to divide
the larger part of the enlightened public into those who have not read
him and think it necessary to tell him so when they meet him in polite
society, and those who have equally abstained from reading him, but wish
to conceal this negation and speak of his "incomparable works" with that
trust in testimony which always has its cheering side.

Hence it is worse than foolish to entertain silent suspicions of
plagiarism, still more to give them voice, when they are founded on a
construction of probabilities which a little more attention to everyday
occurrences as a guide in reasoning would show us to be really
worthless, considered as proof. The length to which one man's memory can
go in letting drop associations that are vital to another can hardly
find a limit. It is not to be supposed that a person desirous to make an
agreeable impression on you would deliberately choose to insist to you,
with some rhetorical sharpness, on an argument which you were the first
to elaborate in public; yet any one who listens may overhear such
instances of obliviousness. You naturally remember your peculiar
connection with your acquaintance's judicious views; but why should
_he_? Your fatherhood, which is an intense feeling to you, is only an
additional fact of meagre interest for him to remember; and a sense of
obligation to the particular living fellow-struggler who has helped us
in our thinking, is not yet a form of memory the want of which is felt
to be disgraceful or derogatory, unless it is taken to be a want of
polite instruction, or causes the missing of a cockade on a day of
celebration. In our suspicions of plagiarism we must recognise as the
first weighty probability, that what we who feel injured remember best
is precisely what is least likely to enter lastingly into the memory of
our neighbours. But it is fair to maintain that the neighbour who
borrows your property, loses it for a while, and when it turns up again
forgets your connection with it and counts it his own, shows himself so
much the feebler in grasp and rectitude of mind. Some absent persons
cannot remember the state of wear in their own hats and umbrellas, and
have no mental check to tell them that they have carried home a
fellow-visitor's more recent purchase: they may be excellent
householders, far removed from the suspicion of low devices, but one
wishes them a more correct perception, and a more wary sense that a
neighbours umbrella may be newer than their own.

True, some persons are so constituted that the very excellence of an
idea seems to them a convincing reason that it must be, if not solely,
yet especially theirs. It fits in so beautifully with their general
wisdom, it lies implicitly in so many of their manifested opinions, that
if they have not yet expressed it (because of preoccupation) it is
clearly a part of their indigenous produce, and is proved by their
immediate eloquent promulgation of it to belong more naturally and
appropriately to them than to the person who seemed first to have
alighted on it, and who sinks in their all-originating consciousness to
that low kind of entity, a second cause. This is not lunacy, nor
pretence, but a genuine state of mind very effective in practice, and
often carrying the public with it, so that the poor Columbus is found to
be a very faulty adventurer, and the continent is named after Amerigo.
Lighter examples of this instinctive appropriation are constantly met
with among brilliant talkers. Aquila is too agreeable and amusing for
any one who is not himself bent on display to be angry at his
conversational rapine--his habit of darting down on every morsel of
booty that other birds may hold in their beaks, with an innocent air, as
if it were all intended for his use, and honestly counted on by him as a
tribute in kind. Hardly any man, I imagine, can have had less trouble in
gathering a showy stock of information than Aquila. On close inquiry you
would probably find that he had not read one epoch-making book of modern
times, for he has a career which obliges him to much correspondence and
other official work, and he is too fond of being in company to spend his
leisure moments in study; but to his quick eye, ear, and tongue, a few
predatory excursions in conversation where there are instructed persons,
gradually furnish surprisingly clever modes of statement and allusion on
the dominant topic. When he first adopts a subject he necessarily falls
into mistakes, and it is interesting to watch his gradual progress into
fuller information and better nourished irony, without his ever needing
to admit that he has made a blunder or to appear conscious of
correction. Suppose, for example, he had incautiously founded some
ingenious remarks on a hasty reckoning that nine thirteens made a
hundred and two, and the insignificant Bantam, hitherto silent, seemed
to spoil the flow of ideas by stating that the product could not be
taken as less than a hundred and seventeen, Aquila would glide on in the
most graceful manner from a repetition of his previous remark to the
continuation--"All this is on the supposition that a hundred and two
were all that could be got out of nine thirteens; but as all the world
knows that nine thirteens will yield," &c.--proceeding straightway into
a new train of ingenious consequences, and causing Bantam to be regarded
by all present as one of those slow persons who take irony for
ignorance, and who would warn the weasel to keep awake. How should a
small-eyed, feebly crowing mortal like him be quicker in arithmetic than
the keen-faced forcible Aquila, in whom universal knowledge is easily
credible? Looked into closely, the conclusion from a man's profile,
voice, and fluency to his certainty in multiplication beyond the
twelves, seems to show a confused notion of the way in which very common
things are connected; but it is on such false correlations that men
found half their inferences about each other, and high places of trust
may sometimes be held on no better foundation.

It is a commonplace that words, writings, measures, and performances in
general, have qualities assigned them not by a direct judgment on the
performances themselves, but by a presumption of what they are likely to
be, considering who is the performer. We all notice in our neighbours
this reference to names as guides in criticism, and all furnish
illustrations of it in our own practice; for, check ourselves as we
will, the first impression from any sort of work must depend on a
previous attitude of mind, and this will constantly be determined by the
influences of a name. But that our prior confidence or want of
confidence in given names is made up of judgments just as hollow as the
consequent praise or blame they are taken to warrant, is less commonly
perceived, though there is a conspicuous indication of it in the
surprise or disappointment often manifested in the disclosure of an
authorship about which everybody has been making wrong guesses. No doubt
if it had been discovered who wrote the 'Vestiges,' many an ingenious
structure of probabilities would have been spoiled, and some disgust
might have been felt for a real author who made comparatively so shabby
an appearance of likelihood. It is this foolish trust in prepossessions,
founded on spurious evidence, which makes a medium of encouragement for
those who, happening to have the ear of the public, give other people's
ideas the advantage of appearing under their own well-received name,
while any remonstrance from the real producer becomes an each person who
has paid complimentary tributes in the wrong place.

Hardly any kind of false reasoning is more ludicrous than this on the
probabilities of origination. It would be amusing to catechise the
guessers as to their exact reasons for thinking their guess "likely:"
why Hoopoe of John's has fixed on Toucan of Magdalen; why Shrike
attributes its peculiar style to Buzzard, who has not hitherto been
known as a writer; why the fair Columba thinks it must belong to the
reverend Merula; and why they are all alike disturbed in their previous
judgment of its value by finding that it really came from Skunk, whom
they had either not thought of at all, or thought of as belonging to a
species excluded by the nature of the case. Clearly they were all wrong
in their notion of the specific conditions, which lay unexpectedly in
the small Skunk, and in him alone--in spite of his education nobody
knows where, in spite of somebody's knowing his uncles and cousins, and
in spite of nobody's knowing that he was cleverer than they thought him.

Such guesses remind one of a fabulist's imaginary council of animals
assembled to consider what sort of creature had constructed a honeycomb
found and much tasted by Bruin and other epicures. The speakers all
started from the probability that the maker was a bird, because this was
the quarter from which a wondrous nest might be expected; for the
animals at that time, knowing little of their own history, would have
rejected as inconceivable the notion that a nest could be made by a
fish; and as to the insects, they were not willingly received in society
and their ways were little known. Several complimentary presumptions
were expressed that the honeycomb was due to one or the other admired
and popular bird, and there was much fluttering on the part of the
Nightingale and Swallow, neither of whom gave a positive denial, their
confusion perhaps extending to their sense of identity; but the Owl
hissed at this folly, arguing from his particular knowledge that the
animal which produced honey must be the Musk-rat, the wondrous nature of
whose secretions required no proof; and, in the powerful logical
procedure of the Owl, from musk to honey was but a step. Some
disturbance arose hereupon, for the Musk-rat began to make himself
obtrusive, believing in the Owl's opinion of his powers, and feeling
that he could have produced the honey if he had thought of it; until an
experimental Butcher-bird proposed to anatomise him as a help to
decision. The hubbub increased, the opponents of the Musk-rat inquiring
who his ancestors were; until a diversion was created by an able
discourse of the Macaw on structures generally, which he classified so
as to include the honeycomb, entering into so much admirable exposition
that there was a prevalent sense of the honeycomb having probably been
produced by one who understood it so well. But Bruin, who had probably
eaten too much to listen with edification, grumbled in his low kind of
language, that "Fine words butter no parsnips," by which he meant to say
that there was no new honey forthcoming.

Perhaps the audience generally was beginning to tire, when the Fox
entered with his snout dreadfully swollen, and reported that the
beneficent originator in question was the Wasp, which he had found much
smeared with undoubted honey, having applied his nose to it--whence
indeed the able insect, perhaps justifiably irritated at what might seem
a sign of scepticism, had stung him with some severity, an infliction
Reynard could hardly regret, since the swelling of a snout normally so
delicate would corroborate his statement and satisfy the assembly that
he had really found the honey-creating genius.

The Fox's admitted acuteness, combined with the visible swelling, were
taken as undeniable evidence, and the revelation undoubtedly met a
general desire for information on a point of interest. Nevertheless,
there was a murmur the reverse of delighted, and the feelings of some
eminent animals were too strong for them: the Orang-outang's jaw dropped
so as seriously to impair the vigour of his expression, the edifying
Pelican screamed and flapped her wings, the Owl hissed again, the Macaw
became loudly incoherent, and the Gibbon gave his hysterical laugh;
while the Hyaena, after indulging in a more splenetic guffaw, agitated
the question whether it would not be better to hush up the whole affair,
instead of giving public recognition to an insect whose produce, it was
now plain, had been much overestimated. But this narrow-spirited motion
was negatived by the sweet-toothed majority. A complimentary deputation
to the Wasp was resolved on, and there was a confident hope that this
diplomatic measure would tell on the production of honey.

George Eliot