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Chapter 28


Lord Roberts had now been six weeks in the capital, and British troops
had overrun the greater part of the south and west of the Transvaal,
but in spite of this there was continued Boer resistance, which flared
suddenly up in places which had been nominally pacified and disarmed.
It was found, as has often been shown in history, that it is easier to
defeat a republican army than to conquer it. From Klerksdorp, from
Ventersdorp, from Rustenburg, came news of risings against the newly
imposed British authority. The concealed Mauser and the bandolier were
dug up once more from the trampled corner of the cattle kraal, and the
farmer was a warrior once again. Vague news of the exploits of De Wet
stimulated the fighting burghers and shamed those who had submitted.
A letter was intercepted from the guerilla chief to Cronje's son, who
had surrendered near Rustenburg. De Wet stated that he had gained two
great victories and had fifteen hundred captured rifles with which to
replace those which the burghers had given up. Not only were the
outlying districts in a state of revolt, but even round Pretoria the
Boers were inclined to take the offensive, while both that town and
Johannesburg were filled with malcontents who were ready to fly to
their arms once more.

Already at the end of June there were signs that the Boers realised
how helpless Lord Roberts was until his remounts should arrive. The
mosquitoes buzzed round the crippled lion. On June 29th there was an
attack upon Springs near Johannesburg, which was easily beaten off by
the Canadians. Early in July some of the cavalry and mounted infantry
patrols were snapped up in the neighbourhood of the capital. Lord
Roberts gave orders accordingly that Hutton and Mahon should sweep the
Boers back upon his right, and push them as far as Bronkhorst Spruit.
This was done on July 6th and 7th, the British advance meeting with
considerable resistance from artillery as well as rifles. By this
movement the pressure upon the right was relieved, which might have
created a dangerous unrest in Johannesburg, and it was done at the
moderate cost of thirty-four killed and wounded, half of whom belonged
to the Imperial Light Horse. This famous corps, which had come across
with Mahon from the relief of Mafeking, had, a few days before, ridden
with mixed feelings through the streets of Johannesburg and past, in
many instances, the deserted houses which had once been their
homes. Many weary months were to pass before the survivors might
occupy them. On July 9th the Boers again attacked, but were again
pushed back to the eastward.

It is probable that all these demonstrations of the enemy upon the
right of Lord Roberts's extended position were really feints in order
to cover the far-reaching plans which Botha had in his mind. The
disposition of the Boer forces at this time appears to have been as
follows: Botha with his army occupied a position along Delagoa railway
line, further east than Diamond Hill, whence he detached the bodies
which attacked Hutton upon the extreme right of the British position
to the south-east of Pretoria. To the north of Pretoria a second
force was acting under Grobler, while a third under Delarey had been
despatched secretly across to the left wing of the British, north-west
of Pretoria. While Botha engaged the attention of Lord Roberts by
energetic demonstrations on his right, Grobler and Delarey were to
make a sudden attack upon his centre and his left, each point being
twelve or fifteen miles from the other. It was well devised and very
well carried out; but the inherent defect of it was that, when
subdivided in this way, the Boer force was no longer strong enough to
gain more than a mere success of outposts.

De la Rey's attack was delivered at break of day on July 11th at
Uitval's Nek, a post some eighteen miles west of the capital. This
position could not be said to be part of Lord Roberts's line, but
rather to be a link to connect his army with Rustenburg. It was
weakly held by three companies of the Lincolns with two others in
support, one squadron of the Scots Greys, and two guns of 0 battery
R.H.A. The attack came with the first grey light of dawn, and for
many hours the small garrison bore up against a deadly fire, waiting
for the help which never came. All day they held their assailants at
bay, and it was not until evening that their ammunition ran short and
they were forced to surrender. Nothing could have been better than the
behaviour of the men, both infantry, cavalry, and gunners, but their
position was a hopeless one. The casualties amounted to eighty killed
and wounded. Nearly two hundred were made prisoners and the two guns
were taken.

On the same day that De la Rey made his COUP at Uitval's Nek, Grobler
had shown his presence on the north side of the town by treating very
roughly a couple of squadrons of the 7th Dragoon Guards which had
attacked him. By the help of a section of the ubiquitous 0 battery and
of the 14th Hussars, Colonel Lowe was able to disengage his cavalry
from the trap into which they had fallen, but it was at the cost of
between thirty and forty officers and men killed, wounded, or taken.
The old 'Black Horse' sustained their historical reputation, and
fought their way bravely out of an almost desperate situation, where
they were exposed to the fire of a thousand riflemen and four guns.

On this same day of skirmishes, July 11th, the Gordons had seen some
hot work twenty miles or so to the south of Uitval's Nek. Orders had
been given to the 19th Brigade (Smith-Dorrien's) to proceed to
Krugersdorp, and thence to make their way north. The Scottish Yeomanry
and a section of the 78th B.F.A. accompanied them. The idea seems to
have been that they would be able to drive north any Boers in that
district, who would then find the garrison of Uitval's Nek at their
rear. The advance was checked, however, at a place called
Dolverkrantz, which was strongly held by Boer riflemen. The two guns
were insufficiently protected, and the enemy got within short range of
them, killing or wounding many of the gunners. The lieutenant in
charge, Mr. A. J. Turner, the famous Essex cricketer, worked the gun
with his own hands until he also fell wounded in three places. The
situation was now very serious, and became more so when news was
flashed of the disaster at Uitval's Nek, and they were ordered to
retire. They could not retire and abandon the guns, yet the fire was
so hot that it was impossible to remove them. Gallant attempts were
made by volunteers from the Gordons -- Captain Younger and other brave
men throwing away their lives in the vain effort to reach and to
limber up the guns. At last, under the cover of night, the teams were
harnessed and the two field-pieces successfully removed, while the
Boers who rushed in to seize them were scattered by a volley. The
losses in the action were thirty-six and the gain nothing. Decidedly
July 11th was not a lucky day for the British arms.

It was well known to Botha that every train from the south was
bringing horses for Lord Roberts's army, and that it had become
increasingly difficult for De Wet and his men to hinder their arrival.
The last horse must win, and the Empire had the world on which to
draw. Any movement which the Boers would make must be made at once,
for already both the cavalry and the mounted infantry were rapidly
coming back to their full strength once more. This consideration must
have urged Botha to deliver an attack on July 16th, which had some
success at first, but was afterwards beaten off with heavy loss to the
enemy. The fighting fell principally upon Pole-Carew and Hutton, the
corps chiefly engaged being the Royal Irish Fusiliers, the
New-Zealanders, the Shropshires, and the Canadian Mounted Infantry.
The enemy tried repeatedly to assault the position, but were beaten
back each time with a loss of nearly a hundred killed and wounded.
The British loss was about sixty, and included two gallant young
Canadian officers, Borden and Birch, the former being the only son of
the minister of militia. So ended the last attempt made by Botha upon
the British positions round Pretoria. The end of the war was not yet,
but already its futility was abundantly evident. This had become more
apparent since the junction of Hamilton and of Buller had cut off the
Transvaal army from that of the Free State. Unable to send their
prisoners away, and also unable to feed them, the Freestaters were
compelled to deliver up in Natal the prisoners whom they had taken at
Lindley and Roodeval. These men, a ragged and starving battalion,
emerged at Ladysmith, having made their way through Van Reenen's
Pass. It is a singular fact that no parole appears on these and
similar occasions to have been exacted by the Boers.

Lord Roberts, having remounted a large part of his cavalry, was ready
now to advance eastward and give Botha battle. The first town of any
consequence along the Delagoa Railway is Middelburg, some seventy
miles from the capital. This became the British objective, and the
forces of Mahon and Hamilton on the north, of. Pole-Carew in the
centre, and of French and Hutton to the south, all converged upon
There was no serious resistance, though the weather was abominable,
and on July 27th the town was in the hands of the invaders. From that
date until the final advance to the eastward French held this advanced
post, while Pole-Carew guarded the railway line. Rumours of trouble
in the west had convinced Roberts that it was not yet time to push his
advantage to the east, and he recalled Ian Hamilton's force to act for
a time upon the other side of the seat of the war. This excellent
little army, consisting of Mahon's and Pilcher's mounted infantry, M
battery R.H.A., the Elswick battery, two 5-in. and two 4.7 guns, with
the Berkshires, the Border Regiment, the Argyle and Sutherlands, and
the Scottish Borderers, put in as much hard work in marching and in
fighting as any body of troops in the whole campaign.

The renewal of the war in the west had begun some weeks before, but
was much accelerated by the transference of De la Rey and his burghers
to that side. There is no district in the Transvaal which is better
worth fighting for, for it is a fair country side, studded with
farmhouses and green with orange-groves, with many clear streams
running through it. The first sign of activity appears to have been
on July 7th, when a commando with guns appeared upon the hills above
Rustenburg. Hanbury Tracy, commandant of Rustenburg, was suddenly
confronted with a summons to surrender. He had only 120 men and one
gun, but he showed a bold front. Colonel Houldsworth, at the first
whisper of danger, had started from Zeerust with a small force of
Australian bushmen, and arrived at Rustenburg in time to drive the
enemy away in a very spirited action. On the evening of July 8th
Baden-Powell took over the command, the garrison being reinforced by
Plumer's command.

The Boer commando was still in existence, however, and it was
reinforced and reinvigorated by Delarey's success at Uitval's Nek. On
July 18th they began to close in upon Rustenburg again, and a small
skirmish took place between them and the Australians. Methuen's
division, which had been doing very arduous service in the north of
the Free State during the last six weeks, now received orders to
proceed into the Transvaal and to pass northwards through the
disturbed districts en route for Rustenburg, which appeared to be the
storm centre. The division was transported by train from Kroonstad to
Krugersdorp, and advanced on the evening of July 18th upon its
mission, through a bare and fire-blackened country. On the 19th Lord
Methuen manoeuvred the Boers out of a strong position, with little
loss to either side. On the 21st he forced his way through Olifant's
Nek, in the Magaliesberg range, and so established communication with
Baden-Powell, whose valiant bushmen, under Colonel Airey, had held
their own in a severe conflict near Magato Pass, in which they lost
six killed, nineteen wounded, and nearly two hundred horses. The
fortunate arrival of Captain FitzClarence with the Protectorate
Regiment helped on this occasion to avert a disaster. The force, only
300 strong, without guns, had walked into an ugly ambuscade, and only
the tenacity and resource of the men enabled them ever to extricate

Although Methuen came within reach of Rustenburg, he did not actually
join hands with Baden-Powell. No doubt he saw and heard enough to
convince him that that astute soldier was very well able to take care
of himself. Learning of the existence of a Boer force in his rear,
Methuen turned, and on July 29th he was back at Frederickstad on the
Potchefstroom-Krugersdorp railway. The sudden change in his plans was
caused doubtless by the desire to head off De Wet in case he should
cross the Vaal River. Lord Roberts was still anxious to clear the
neighbourhood of Rustenburg entirely of the enemy; and he therefore,
since Methuen was needed to complete the cordon round De Wet, recalled
Hamilton's force from the east and despatched it, as already
described, to the west of Pretoria.

Before going into the details of the great De Wet hunt, in which
Methuen's force was to be engaged, I shall follow Hamilton's division
across, and give some account of their services. On August 1st he set
out from Pretoria for Rustenburg. On that day and on the next he had
brisk skirmishes which brought him successfully through the
Magaliesberg range with a loss of forty wounded, mostly of the
Berkshires. On the 5th of August he had made his way to Rustenburg
and drove off the investing force. A smaller siege had been going on
to westward, where at Elands River another Mafeking man, Colonel Hore,
had been held up by the burghers. For some days it was feared, and
even officially announced, that the garrison had surrendered. It was
known that an attempt by Carrington to relieve the place on August 5th
had been beaten back, and that the state of the country appeared so
threatening that he had been compelled, or had imagined himself to be
compelled, to retreat as far as Mafeking, evacuating Zeerust and
Otto's Hoop, abandoning the considerable stores which were collected
at those places. In spite of all these sinister indications the
garrison was still holding its own, and on August 16th it was relieved
by Lord Kitchener.

This stand at Brakfontein on the Elands River appears to have been one
of the very finest deeds of arms of the war. The Australians have
been so split up during the campaign, that though their valour and
efficiency were universally recognised, they had no single exploit
which they could call their own. But now they can point to Elands
River as proudly as the Canadians can to Paardeberg. They were 500 in
number, Victorians, New South Welshmen, and Queenslanders, the latter
the larger unit, with a corps of Rhodesians. Under Hore were Major
Hopper of the Rhodesians, and Major Toubridge of the Queenslanders.
Two thousand five hundred Boers surrounded them, and most favourable
terms of surrender were offered and scouted. Six guns were trained
upon them, and during 11 days 1,800 shells fell within their
lines. The river was half a mile off, and every drop of water for man
or beast had to come from there. Nearly all their horses and 75 of
the men were killed or wounded. With extraordinary energy and
ingenuity the little band dug shelters which are said to have exceeded
in depth and efficiency any which the Boers have devised. Neither the
repulse of Carrington, nor the jamming of their only gun, nor the
death of the gallant Annett, was sufficient to dishearten them. They
were sworn to die before the white flag should wave above them. And so
fortune yielded, as fortune will when brave men set their teeth, and
Broadwood's troopers, filled with wonder and admiration, rode into the
lines of the reduced and emaciated but indomitable garrison. When the
ballad-makers of Australia seek for a subject, let them turn to Elands
River, for there was no finer resistance in the war. They will not
grudge a place in their record to the 130 gallant Rhodesians who
shared with them the honours and the dangers of the exploit.

On August 7th Ian Hamilton abandoned Rustenburg, taking Baden-Powell
and his men with him. It was obviously unwise to scatter the British
forces too widely by attempting to garrison every single town. For
the instant the whole interest of the war centred upon De Wet and his
dash into the Transvaal. One or two minor events, however, which
cannot be fitted into any continuous narrative may be here introduced.

One of these was the action at Faber's Put, by which Sir Charles
Warren crushed the rebellion in Griqualand. In that sparsely
inhabited country of vast distances it was a most difficult task to
bring the revolt to a decisive ending. This Sir Charles Warren, with
his special local knowledge and interest, was able to do, aud the
success is doubly welcome as bringing additional honour to a man who,
whatever view one may take of his action at Spion Kop, has grown grey
in the service of the Empire. With a column consisting mainly of
colonials and of yeomanry he had followed the rebels up to a point
within twelve miles of Douglas. Here at the end of May they turned
upon him and delivered a fierce night attack, so sudden and so
strongly pressed that much credit is due both to General and to troops
for having repelled it. The camp was attacked on all sides in the
early dawn. The greater part of the horses were stampeded by the
firing, and the enemy's riflemen were found to be at very close
quarters. For an hour the action was warm, but at the end of that time
the Boers fled, leaving a number of dead behind them. The troops
engaged in this very creditable action, which might have tried the
steadiness of veterans, were four hundred of the Duke of Edinburgh's
volunteers, some of Paget's horse and of the 8th Regiment Imperial
Yeomanry, four Canadian guns, and twenty-five of Warren's Scouts.
Their losses were eighteen killed and thirty wounded. Colonel Spence,
of the volunteers, died at the head of his regiment. A few days
before, on May 27th, Colonel Adye had won a small engagement at Kheis,
some distance to the westward, and the effect of the two actions was
to put an end to open resistance. On June 20th De Villiers, the Boer
leader, finally surrendered to Sir Charles Warren, handing over two
hundred and twenty men with stores, rifles, and ammunition. The last
sparks had for the time been stamped out in the colony.

There remain to be mentioned those attacks upon trains and upon the
railway which had spread from the Free State to the Transvaal. On
July 19th a train was wrecked on the way from Potchefstroom to
Krugersdorp without serious injury to the passengers. On July 31st,
however, the same thing occurred with more murderous effect, the train
running at full speed off the metals. Thirteen of the Shropshires
were killed and thirty-seven injured in this deplorable affair, which
cost us more than many an important engagement. On August 2nd a train
coming up from Bloemfontein was derailed by Sarel Theron and his gang
some miles south of Kroonstad. Thirty-five trucks of stores were
burned, and six of the passengers (unarmed convalescent soldiers) were
killed or wounded. A body of mounted infantry followed up the Boers,
who numbered eighty, and succeeded in killing and wounding several of

On July 21st the Boers made a determined attack upon the railhead at a
point thirteen miles east of Heidelberg, where over a hundred Royal
Engineers were engaged upon a bridge. They were protected by three
hundred Dublin Fusiliers under Major English. For some hours the
little party was hard pressed by the burghers, who had two
field-pieces and a pom-pom. They could make no impression, however,
upon the steady Irish infantry, and after some hours the arrival of
General Hart with reinforcements scattered the assailants, who
succeeded in getting their guns away in safety.

At the beginning of August it must be confessed that the general
situation in the Transvaal was not reassuring. Springs near
Johannesburg had in some inexplicable way, without fighting, fallen
into the hands of the enemy. Klerksdorp, an important place in the
south-west, had also been reoccupied, and a handful of men who
garrisoned it had been made prisoners without resistance. Rustenburg
was about to be abandoned, and the British were known to be falling
back from Zeerust and Otto's Hoop, concentrating upon Mafeking. The
sequel proved however, that there was no cause for uneasiness in all
this. Lord Roberts was concentrating his strength upon those objects
which were vital, and letting the others drift for a time. At present
the two obviously important things were to hunt down De Wet and to
scatter the main Boer army under Botha. The latter enterprise must
wait upon the former, so for a fortnight all operations were in
abeyance while the flying columns of the British endeavoured to run
down their extremely active and energetic antagonist.

At the end of July De Wet had taken refuge in some exceedingly
difficult country near Reitzburg, seven miles south of the Vaal
River. The operations were proceeding vigorously at that time against
the main army at Fouriesberg, and sufficient troops could not be
spared to attack him, but he was closely observed by Kitchener and
Broadwood with a force of cavalry and mounted infantry. With the
surrender of Prinsloo a large army was disengaged, and it was obvious
that if De Wet remained where he was he must soon be surrounded. On
the other hand, there was no place of refuge to the south of him.
With great audacity he determined to make a dash for the Transvaal, in
the hope of joining hands with De la Rey's force, or else of making
his way across the north of Pretoria, and so reaching Botha's army.
President Steyn went with him, and a most singular experience it must
have been for him to be harried like a mad dog through the country in
which he had once been an honoured guest. De Wet's force was
exceedingly mobile, each man having a led horse, and the ammunition
being carried in light Cape carts.

In the first week of August the British began to thicken round his
lurking-place, and De Wet knew that it was time for him to go. He
made a great show of fortifying a position, but it was only a ruse to
deceive those who watched him. Travelling as lightly as possible, he
made a dash on August 7th at the drift which bears his own name, and
so won his way across the Vaal River, Kitchener thundering at his
heels with his cavalry and mounted infantry. Methuen's force was at
that time at Potchefstroom, and instant orders had been sent to him to
block the drifts upon the northern side. It was found as he
approached the river that the vanguard of the enemy was already across
and that it was holding the spurs of the hills which would cover the
crossing of their comrades. By the dash of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers
and the exertions of the artillery ridge after ridge was carried, but
before evening De Wet with supreme skill had got his convoy across,
and had broken away, first to the eastward and then to the north. On
the 9th Methuen was in touch with him again, and the two savage little
armies, Methuen worrying at the haunch, and De Wet snapping back over
his shoulder, swept northward over the huge plains. Wherever there was
ridge or kopje the Boer riflemen staved off the eager pursuers. Where
the ground lay flat and clear the British guns thundered onwards and
fired into the lines of wagons. Mile after mile the running fight was
sustained, but the other British columns, Broadwood's men and
Kitchener's men, had for some reason not come up. Methuen alone was
numerically inferior to the men he was chasing, but he held on with
admirable energy and spirit. The Boers were hustled off the kopjes
from which they tried to cover their rear. Twenty men of the
Yorkshire Yeomanry carried one hill with the bayonet, though only
twelve of them were left to reach the top.

De Wet trekked onwards during the night of the 9th, shedding wagons
and stores as he went. He was able to replace some .of his exhausted
beasts from the farmhouses which he passed. Methuen on the morning of
the 10th struck away to the west, sending messages back to Broadwood
and Kitchener in the rear that they should bear to the east, and so
nurse the Boer column between them. At the same time he sent on a
messenger, who unfortunately never arrived, to warn Smith-Dorrien at
Bank Station to throw himself across De Wet's path. On the 11th it was
realised that De Wet had succeeded, in spite of great exertions upon
the part of Smith-Dorrien's infantry, in crossing the railway line,
and that he had left all his pursuers to the south of him. But across
his front lay the Magaliesberg range. There are only three passes,
the Magato Pass, Olifant's Nek, and Commando Nek. It was understood
that all three were held by British troops. It was obvious,
therefore, that if Methuen could advance in such a way as to cut De
Wet off from slipping through to the west he would be unable to get
away. Broadwood and Kitchener would be behind him, and Pretoria, with
the main British army, to the east.

Methuen continued to act with great energy and judgment. At three
A.M. on the 12th be started from Fredericstadt, and by 5 P.M. on
Tuesday he had done eighty miles in sixty hours. The force which
accompanied him was all mounted, 1,200 of the Colonial Division (1st
Brabant's, Cape Mounted Rifles, Kaifrarian Rifles, and Border Horse),
and the Yeomanry with ten guns. Douglas with the infantry was to
follow behind, and these brave fellows covered sixty-six miles in
seventy-six hours in their eagerness to be in time. No men could have
made greater efforts than did those of Methuen, for there was not one
who did not appreciate the importance of the issue and long to come to
close quarters with the wily leader who had baffled us so long.

On the 12th Methuen's van again overtook De Wet's rear, and the old
game of rearguard riflemen on one side, and a pushing artillery on the
other, was once more resumed. All day the Boers streamed over the
veldt with the guns and the horsemen at their heels. A shot from the
78th battery struck one of De Wet's guns, which was abandoned and
captured. Many stores were taken and much more, with the wagons which
contained them, burned by the Boers. Fighting incessantly, both
armies traversed thirty-five miles of ground that day.

It was fully understood that Olifant's Nek was held by the British, so
Methuen felt that if he could block the Magato Pass all would be
well. He therefore left De Wet's direct track, knowing that other
British forces were behind him, and he continued his swift advance
until he had reached the desired position. It really appeared that at
last the elusive raider was in a corner. But, alas for fallen hopes,
and alas for the wasted efforts of gallant men! Olifant's Nek had
been abandoned and De Wet had passed safely through it into the plains
beyond, where De la Rey's force was still in possession. In vain
Methuen's weary column forced the Magato Pass and descended into
Rustenburg. The enemy was in a safe country once more. Whose the
fault, or whether there was a fault at all, it is for the future to
determine. At least unalloyed praise can be given to the Boer leader
for the admirable way in which he had extricated himself from so many
dangers. On the 17th,. moving along the northern side of the
mountains, he appeared at Commando Nek on the Little Crocodile River,
where he summoned Baden-Powell to surrender, and received some chaff
in reply from that light-hearted commander. Then, swinging to the
eastward, he endeavoured to cross to the north of Pretoria. On the
19th he was heard of at Hebron. Baden-Powell and Paget had, however,
already barred this path, and De Wet, having sent Steyn on with a
small escort, turned back to the Free State. On the 22nd it was
reported that, with only a handful of his followers, he had crossed
the Magaliesberg range by a bridlepath and was riding southwards.
Lord Roberts was at last free to turn his undivided attention upon

Two Boer plots had been discovered during the first half of August,
the one in Pretoria and the other in Johannesburg, each having for its
object a rising against the British in the town. Of these the former,
which was the more serious, involving as it did the kidnapping of Lord
Roberts, was broken up by the arrest of the deviser, Hans Cordua, a
German lieutenant in the Transvaal Artillery. On its merits it is
unlikely that the crime would have been met by the extreme penalty,
especially as it was a question whether the AGENT PROVOCATEUR had not
played a part. But the repeated breaches of parole, by which our
prisoners of one day were in the field against us on the next, called
imperatively for an example, and it was probably rather for his broken
faith than for his hare-brained scheme that Cordua died. At the same
time it is impossible not to feel sorrow for this idealist of
twenty-three who died for a cause which was not his own. He was shot
in the garden of Pretoria Gaol upon August 24th. A fresh and more
stringent proclamation from Lord Roberts showed that the British
Commander was losing his patience in the face of the wholesale return
of paroled men to the field, and announced that such perfidy would in
future be severely punished. It was notorious that the same men had
been taken and released more than once. One man killed in action was
found to have nine signed passes in his pocket. It was against such
abuses that the extra severity of the British was aimed.

Arthur Conan Doyle