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Book III

I.--Julius Caesar, holding the election as dictator, was himself
appointed consul with Publius Servilius; for this was the year in which
it was permitted by the laws that he should be chosen consul. This
business being ended, as credit was beginning to fail in Italy, and the
debts could not be paid, he determined that arbitrators should be
appointed: and that they should make an estimate of the possessions and
properties [of the debtors], how much they were worth before the war,
and that they should be handed over in payment to the creditors. This he
thought the most likely method to remove and abate the apprehension of
an abolition of debt, the usual consequence of civil wars and
dissensions, and to support the credit of the debtors. He likewise
restored to their former condition (the praetors and tribunes first
submitting the question to the people) some persons condemned for
bribery at the elections, by virtue of Pompey's law, at the time when
Pompey kept his legions quartered in the city (these trials were
finished in a single day, one judge hearing the merits, and another
pronouncing the sentences), because they had offered their service to
him in the beginning of the civil war, if he chose to accept them;
setting the same value on them as if he had accepted them, because they
had put themselves in his power. For he had determined that they ought
to be restored, rather by the judgment of the people, than appear
admitted to it by his bounty: that he might neither appear ungrateful in
repaying an obligation, nor arrogant in depriving the people of their
prerogative of exercising this bounty.

II.--In accomplishing these things, and celebrating the Latin festival,
and holding all the elections, he spent eleven days; and having resigned
the dictatorship, set out from the city, and went to Brundisium, where
he had ordered twelve legions and all his cavalry to meet him. But he
scarcely found as many ships as would be sufficient to transport fifteen
thousand legionary soldiers and five hundred horse. This [the scarcity
of shipping] was the only thing that prevented Caesar from putting a
speedy conclusion to the war. And even these troops embarked very short
of their number, because several had fallen in so many wars in Gaul, and
the long march from Spain had lessened their number very much, and a
severe autumn in Apulia and the district about Brundisium, after the
very wholesome countries of Spain and Gaul, had impaired the health of
the whole army.

III.--Pompey having got a year's respite to provide forces, during which
he was not engaged in war, nor employed by an enemy, had collected a
numerous fleet from Asia, and the Cyclades, from Corcyra, Athens,
Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia, and Egypt, and had given
directions that a great number should be built in every other place. He
had exacted a large sum of money from Asia, Syria, and all the kings,
dynasts, tetrarchs, and free states of Achaia; and had obliged the
corporations of those provinces, of which he himself had the government,
to count down to him a large sum.

IV.--He had made up nine legions of Roman citizens; five from Italy,
which he had brought with him; one veteran legion from Sicily, which
being composed of two, he called the Gemella; one from Crete and
Macedonia, of veterans who had been discharged by their former generals,
and had settled in those provinces; two from Asia, which had been levied
by the activity of Lentulus. Besides he had distributed among his
legions a considerable number, by way of recruits, from Thessaly,
Boeotia, Achaia, and Epirus: with his legions he also intermixed the
soldiers taken from Caius Antonius. Besides these, he expected two
legions from Syria, with Scipio; from Crete, Lacedaemon, Pontus, Syria,
and other states, he got about three thousand archers, six cohorts of
slingers, two thousand mercenary soldiers, and seven thousand horse; six
hundred of which, Deiotarus had brought from Gaul; Ariobarzanes, five
hundred from Cappadocia. Cotus had given him about the same number from
Thrace, and had sent his son Sadalis with them. From Macedonia there
were two hundred, of extraordinary valour, commanded by Rascipolis; five
hundred Gauls and Germans; Gabinius's troops from Alexandria, whom Aulus
Gabinius had left with king Ptolemy, to guard his person. Pompey, the
son, had brought in his fleet eight hundred, whom he had raised among
his own and his shepherds' slaves. Tarcundarius, Castor and Donilaus had
given three hundred from Gallograecia: one of these came himself, the
other sent his son. Two hundred were sent from Syria by Comagenus
Antiochus, whom Pompey rewarded amply. The most of them were archers. To
these were added Dardanians, and Bessians, some of them mercenaries;
others procured by power and influence: also, Macedonians, Thessalians,
and troops from other nations and states, which completed the number
which we mentioned before.

V.--He had laid in vast quantities of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt,
Crete, Cyrene, and other countries. He had resolved to fix his winter
quarters at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and the other sea-ports, to hinder
Caesar from passing the sea: and for this purpose had stationed his
fleet along the sea-coast. The Egyptian fleet was commanded by Pompey,
the son: the Asiatic, by Decimus Laelius, and Caius Triarius: the
Syrian, by Caius Cassius: the Rhodian, by Caius Marcellus, in
conjunction with Caius Coponius; and the Liburnian, and Achaian, by
Scribonius Libo, and Marcus Octavius. But Marcus Bibulus was appointed
commander-in-chief of the whole maritime department, and regulated every
matter. The chief direction rested upon him.

VI.--When Caesar came to Brundisium, he made a speech to the soldiers:
"That since they were now almost arrived at the termination of their
toils and dangers, they should patiently submit to leave their slaves
and baggage in Italy, and to embark without luggage, that a greater
number of men might be put on board: that they might expect everything
from victory and his liberality." They cried out with one voice, "he
might give what orders he pleased, that they would cheerfully fulfil
them." He accordingly set sail the fourth day of January, with seven
legions on board, as already remarked. The next day he reached land,
between the Ceraunian rocks and other dangerous places; meeting with a
safe road for his shipping to ride in, and dreading all other ports
which he imagined were in possession of the enemy, he landed his men at
a place called Pharsalus, without the loss of a single vessel.

VII.--Lucretius Vespillo and Minutius Rufus were at Oricum, with
eighteen Asiatic ships, which were given into their charge by the orders
of Decimus Laelius: Marcus Bibulus at Corcyra, with a hundred and ten
ships. But they had not the confidence to dare to move out of the
harbour; though Caesar had brought only twelve ships as a convoy, only
four of which had decks; nor did Bibulus, his fleet being disordered and
his seamen dispersed, come up in time: for Caesar was seen at the
continent before any account whatsoever of his approach had reached
those regions.

VIII.--Caesar, having landed his soldiers, sent back his ships the same
night to Brundisium, to transport the rest of his legions and cavalry.
The charge of this business was committed to lieutenant Fufius Kalenus,
with orders to be expeditious in transporting the legions. But the ships
having put to sea too late, and not having taken advantage of the night
breeze, fell a sacrifice on their return. For Bibulus, at Corcyra, being
informed of Caesar's approach, hoped to fall in with some part of our
ships, with their cargoes, but found them empty; and having taken about
thirty, vented on them his rage at his own remissness, and set them all
on fire: and, with the same flames, he destroyed the mariners and
masters of the vessels, hoping by the severity of the punishment to
deter the rest. Having accomplished this affair, he filled all the
harbours and shores from Salona to Oricum with his fleets. Having
disposed his guard with great care, he lay on board himself in the depth
of winter, declining no fatigue or duty, and not waiting for
reinforcements, in hopes that he might come within Caesar's reach.

IX.--But after the departure of the Liburnian fleet, Marcus Octavius
sailed from Illyricum with what ships he had to Salona; and having
spirited up the Dalmatians, and other barbarous nations, he drew Issa
off from its connection with Caesar; but not being able to prevail with
the council of Salona, either by promises or menaces, he resolved to
storm the town. But it was well fortified by its natural situation, and
a hill. The Roman citizens built wooden towers, the better to secure it;
but when they were unable to resist, on account of the smallness of
their numbers, being weakened by several wounds, they stooped to the
last resource, and set at liberty all the slaves old enough to bear
arms; and cutting the hair off the women's heads, made ropes for their
engines. Octavius, being informed of their determination, surrounded the
town with five encampments, and began to press them at once with a siege
and storm. They were determined to endure every hardship, and their
greatest distress was the want of corn. They, therefore, sent deputies
to Caesar, and begged a supply from him; all other inconveniences they
bore by their own resources, as well as they could: and after a long
interval, when the length of the siege had made Octavius's troops more
remiss than usual, having got an opportunity at noon, when the enemy
were dispersed, they disposed their wives and children on the walls, to
keep up the appearance of their usual attention; and forming themselves
into one body, with the slaves whom they had lately enfranchised, they
made an attack on Octavius's nearest camp, and having forced that,
attacked the second with the same fury; and then the third and the
fourth, and then the other, and beat them from them all: and having
killed a great number, obliged the rest and Octavius himself to fly for
refuge to their ships. This put an end to the blockade. Winter was now
approaching, and Octavius, despairing of capturing the town, after
sustaining such considerable losses, withdrew to Pompey, to Dyrrachium.

X.--We have mentioned that Vibullius Rufus, an officer of Pompey's, had
fallen twice into Caesar's power; first at Corfinium, and afterwards in
Spain. Caesar thought him a proper person, on account of his favours
conferred on him, to send with proposals to Pompey: and he knew that he
had an influence over Pompey. This was the substance of his proposals:
"That it was the duty of both, to put an end to their obstinacy, and
forbear hostilities, and not tempt fortune any further; that sufficient
loss had been suffered on both sides, to serve as a lesson and
instruction to them, to render them apprehensive of future calamities,
by Pompey, in having been driven out of Italy, and having lost Sicily,
Sardinia, and the two Spains, and one hundred and thirty cohorts of
Roman citizens, in Italy and Spain: by himself, in the death of Curio,
and the loss of so great an army in Africa, and the surrender of his
soldiers in Corcyra. Wherefore, they should have pity on themselves, and
the republic: for, from their own misfortunes, they had sufficient
experience of what fortune can effect in war. That this was the only
time to treat of peace; when each had confidence in his own strength,
and both seemed on an equal footing. Since, if fortune showed ever so
little favour to either, he who thought himself superior, would not
submit to terms of accommodation; nor would he be content with an equal
division, when he might expect to obtain the whole. That, as they could
not agree before, the terms of peace ought to be submitted to the senate
and people in Rome. That in the meantime, it ought to content the
republic and themselves, if they both immediately took oath in a public
assembly, that they would disband their forces within the three
following days. That having divested themselves of the arms and
auxiliaries, on which they placed their present confidence, they must
both of necessity acquiesce in the decision of the people and senate. To
give Pompey the fuller assurance of his intentions, he would dismiss all
his forces on land, even his garrisons.

XI.--Vibullius, having received this commission from Caesar, thought it
no less necessary to give Pompey notice of Caesar's sudden approach,
that he might adopt such plans as the circumstance required, than to
inform him of Caesar's message; and therefore continuing his journey by
night as well as by day, and taking fresh horses for despatch, he posted
away to Pompey, to inform him that Caesar was marching towards him with
all his forces. Pompey was at this time in Candavia, and was on his
march from Macedonia to his winter quarters in Apollonia and Dyrrachium;
but surprised at the unexpected news, he determined to go to Apollonia
by speedy marches, to prevent Caesar from becoming master of all the
maritime states. But as soon as Caesar had landed his troops, he set off
the same day for Oricum: when he arrived there, Lucius Torquatus, who
was governor of the town by Pompey's appointment, and had a garrison of
Parthinians in it, endeavoured to shut the gates and defend the town,
and ordered the Greeks to man the walls, and to take arms. But as they
refused to fight against the power of the Roman people, and as the
citizens made a spontaneous attempt to admit Caesar, despairing of any
assistance, he threw open the gates, and surrendered himself and the
town to Caesar, and was preserved safe from injury by him.

XII.--Having taken Oricum, Caesar marched without making any delay to
Apollonia. Staberius the governor, hearing of his approach, began to
bring water into the citadel, and to fortify it, and to demand hostages
of the town's people. But they refuse to give any, or to shut their
gates against the consul, or to take upon them to judge contrary to what
all Italy and the Roman people had judged. As soon as he knew their
inclinations, he made his escape privately. The inhabitants of Apollonia
sent ambassadors to Caesar, and gave him admission into their town.
Their example was followed by the inhabitants of Bullis, Amantia, and
the other neighbouring states, and all Epirus: and they sent ambassadors
to Caesar, and promised to obey his commands.

XIII.--But Pompey having received information of the transactions at
Oricum and Apollonia, began to be alarmed for Dyrrachium, and
endeavoured to reach it, marching day and night. As soon as it was said
that Caesar was approaching, such a panic fell upon Pompey's army,
because in his haste he had made no distinction between night and day,
and had marched without intermission, that they almost every man
deserted their colours in Epirus and the neighbouring countries; several
threw down their arms, and their march had the appearance of a flight.
But when Pompey had halted near Dyrrachium, and had given orders for
measuring out the ground for his camp, his army even yet continuing in
their fright, Labienus first stepped forward and swore that he would
never desert him, and would share whatever fate fortune should assign to
him. The other lieutenants took the same oath, and the tribunes and
centurions followed their example: and the whole army swore in like
manner. Caesar, finding the road to Dyrrachium already in the possession
of Pompey, was in no great haste, but encamped by the river Apsus, in
the territory of Apollonia, that the states which had deserved his
support might be certain of protection from his out-guards and forts;
and there he resolved to wait the arrival of his other legions from
Italy, and to winter in tents. Pompey did the same; and pitching his
camp on the other side of the river Apsus, collected there all his
troops and auxiliaries.

XIV.--Kalenus, having put the legions and cavalry on board at
Brundisium, as Caesar had directed him, as far as the number of his
ships allowed, weighed anchor: and having sailed a little distance from
port, received a letter from Caesar, in which he was informed, that all
the ports and the whole shore was occupied by the enemy's fleet: on
receiving this information he returned into the harbour, and recalled
all the vessels. One of them, which continued the voyage and did not
obey Kalenus's command, because it carried no troops, but was private
property, bore away for Oricum, and was taken by Bibulus, who spared
neither slaves nor free men, nor even children; but put all to the
sword. Thus the safety of the whole army depended on a very short space
of time and a great casualty.

XV.--Bibulus, as has been observed before, lay with his fleet near
Oricum, and as he debarred Caesar of the liberty of the sea and
harbours, so he was deprived of all intercourse with the country by
land; for the whole shore was occupied by parties disposed in different
places by Caesar. And he was not allowed to get either wood or water, or
even anchor near the land. He was reduced to great difficulties, and
distressed with extreme scarcity of every necessary; insomuch that he
was obliged to bring, in transports from Corcyra, not only provisions,
but even wood and water; and it once happened that, meeting with violent
storms, they were forced to catch the dew by night which fell on the
hides that covered their decks; yet all these difficulties they bore
patiently and without repining, and thought they ought not to leave the
shores and harbours free from blockade. But when they were suffering
under the distress which I have mentioned, and Libo had joined Bibulus,
they both called from on ship-board to Marcus Acilius and Statius
Marcus, the lieutenants, one of whom commanded the town, the other the
guards on the coast, that they wished to speak to Caesar on affairs of
importance, if permission should be granted them. They add something
further to strengthen the impression that they intended to treat about
an accommodation. In the meantime they requested a truce, and obtained
it from them; for what they proposed seemed to be of importance, and it
was well known that Caesar desired it above all things, and it was
imagined that some advantage would be derived from Bibulus's proposals.

XVI.--Caesar having set out with one legion to gain possession of the
more remote states, and to provide corn, of which he had but a small
quantity, was at this time at Buthrotum, opposite to Corcyra. There
receiving Acilius and Marcus's letters, informing him of Libo's and
Bibulus's demands, he left his legion behind him, and returned himself
to Oricum. When he arrived, they were invited to a conference. Libo came
and made an apology for Bibulus, "that he was a man of strong passion,
and had a private quarrel against Caesar, contracted when he was aedile
and praetor; that for this reason he had avoided the conference, lest
affairs of the utmost importance and advantage might be impeded by the
warmth of his temper. That it now was and ever had been Pompey's most
earnest wish, that they should be reconciled, and lay down their arms;
but they were not authorized to treat on that subject, because they
resigned the whole management of the war, and all other matters, to
Pompey, by order of the council. But when they were acquainted with
Caesar's demands, they would transmit them to Pompey, who would conclude
all of himself by their persuasions. In the meantime, let the truce be
continued till the messengers could return from him; and let no injury
be done on either side." To this he added a few words of the cause for
which they fought, and of his own forces and resources.

XVII.--To this, Caesar did not then think proper to make any reply, nor
do we now think it worth recording. But Caesar required "that he should
be allowed to send commissioners to Pompey, who should suffer no
personal injury; and that either they should grant it, or should take
his commissioners in charge, and convey them to Pompey. That as to the
truce, the war in its present state was so divided, that they by their
fleet deprived him of his shipping and auxiliaries; while he prevented
them from the use of the land and fresh water; and if they wished that
this restraint should be removed from them, they should relinquish their
blockade of the seas, but if they retained the one, he in like manner
would retain the other; that nevertheless, the treaty of accommodation
might still be carried on, though these points were not conceded, and
that they need not be an impediment to it." They would neither receive
Caesar's commissioners, nor guarantee their safety, but referred the
whole to Pompey. They urged and struggled eagerly to gain the one point
respecting a truce. But when Caesar perceived that they had proposed the
conference merely to avoid present danger and distress, but that they
offered no hopes or terms of peace, he applied his thoughts to the
prosecution of the war.

XVIII.--Bibulus, being prevented from landing for several days, and
being seized with a violent distemper from the cold and fatigue, as he
could neither be cured on board, nor was willing to desert the charge
which he had taken upon him, was unable to bear up against the violence
of the disease. On his death, the sole command devolved on no single
individual, but each admiral managed his own division separately, and at
his own discretion. Vibullius, as soon as the alarm, which Caesar's
unexpected arrival had raised, was over, began again to deliver Caesar's
message in the presence of Libo, Lucius Lucceius, and Theophanes, to
whom Pompey used to communicate his most confidential secrets. He had
scarcely entered on the subject when Pompey interrupted him, and forbade
him to proceed. "What need," says he, "have I of life or Rome, if the
world shall think I enjoy them by the bounty of Caesar; an opinion which
can never be removed whilst it shall be thought that I have been brought
back by him to Italy, from which I set out." After the conclusion of the
war, Caesar was informed of these expressions by some persons who were
present at the conversation. He attempted, however, by other means to
bring about a negotiation of peace.

XIX.--Between Pompey's and Caesar's camp there was only the river Apsus,
and the soldiers frequently conversed with each other; and by a private
arrangement among themselves, no weapons were thrown during their
conferences. Caesar sent Publius Vatinius, one of his lieutenants, to
the bank of the river, to make such proposals as should appear most
conducive to peace; and to cry out frequently with a loud voice
[asking], "Are citizens permitted to send deputies to citizens to treat
of peace? a concession which had been made even to fugitives on the
Pyrenean mountains, and to robbers, especially when by so doing they
would prevent citizens from fighting against citizens." Having spoken
much in humble language, as became a man pleading for his own and the
general safety, and being listened to with silence by the soldiers of
both armies, he received an answer from the enemy's party that Aulus
Varro proposed coming the next day to a conference, and that deputies
from both sides might come without danger, and explain their wishes, and
accordingly a fixed time was appointed for the interview. When the
deputies met the next day, a great multitude from both sides assembled,
and the expectations of every person concerning this subject were raised
very high, and their minds seemed to be eagerly disposed for peace.
Titus Labienus walked forward from the crowd, and in submissive terms
began to speak of peace, and to argue with Vatinius. But their
conversation was suddenly interrupted by darts thrown from all sides,
from which Vatinius escaped by being protected by the arms of the
soldiers. However, several were wounded; and among them Cornelius
Balbus, Marcus Plotius, and Lucius Tiburtius, centurions, and some
privates; hereupon Labienus exclaimed, "Forbear, then, to speak any more
about an accommodation, for we can have no peace unless we carry
Caesar's head back with us."

XX.--At the same time in Rome, Marcus Caelius Rufus, one of the
praetors, having undertaken the cause of the debtors, on entering into
his office, fixed his tribunal near the bench of Caius Trebonius, the
city praetor, and promised if any person appealed to him in regard to
the valuation and payment of debts made by arbitration, as appointed by
Caesar when in Rome, that he would relieve them. But it happened, from
the justice of Trebonius's decrees and his humanity (for he thought that
in such dangerous times justice should be administered with moderation
and compassion), that not one could be found who would offer himself the
first to lodge an appeal. For to plead poverty, to complain of his own
private calamities, or the general distresses of the times, or to assert
the difficulty of setting the goods to sale, is the behaviour of a man
even of a moderate temper; but to retain their possessions entire, and
at the same time acknowledge themselves in debt, what sort of spirit,
and what impudence would it not have argued! Therefore nobody was found
so unreasonable as to make such demands. But Caelius proved more severe
to those very persons for whose advantage it had been designed; and
starting from this beginning, in order that he might not appear to have
engaged in so dishonourable an affair without effecting something, he
promulgated a law, that all debts should be discharged in six equal
payments, of six months each, without interest.

XXI.--When Servilius, the consul, and the other magistrates opposed him,
and he himself effected less than he expected, in order to raise the
passions of the people, he dropped it, and promulgated two others; one,
by which he remitted the annual rents of the houses to the tenants, the
other, an act of insolvency: upon which the mob made an assault on Caius
Trebonius, and having wounded several persons, drove him from his
tribunal. The consul Servilius informed the senate of his proceedings,
who passed a decree that Caelius should be removed from the management
of the republic. Upon this decree, the consul forbade him the senate;
and when he was attempting to harangue the people, turned him out of the
rostrum. Stung with the ignominy and with resentment, he pretended in
public that he would go to Caesar, but privately sent messengers to
Milo, who had murdered Clodius, and had been condemned for it; and
having invited him into Italy, because he had engaged the remains of the
gladiators to his interest, by making them supple presents, he joined
him, and sent him to Thurinum to tamper with the shepherds. When he
himself was on his road to Casilinum, at the same time that his military
standards and arms were seized at Capua, his slaves seen at Naples, and
the design of betraying the town discovered: his plots being revealed,
and Capua shut against him, being apprehensive of danger, because the
Roman citizens residing there had armed themselves, and thought he ought
to be treated as an enemy to the state, he abandoned his first design,
and changed his route.

XXII.--Milo in the meantime despatched letters to the free towns,
purporting that he acted as he did by the orders and commands of Pompey,
conveyed to him by Bibulus: and he endeavoured to engage in his interest
all persons whom he imagined were under difficulties by reason of their
debts. But not being able to prevail with them, he set at liberty some
slaves from the work-houses, and began to assault Cosa in the district
of Thurinum. There having received a blow of a stone thrown from the
wall of the town which was commanded by Quintus Pedius with one legion,
he died of it; and Caelius having set out, as he pretended for Caesar,
went to Thurii, where he was put to death as he was tampering with some
of the freemen of the town, and was offering money to Caesar's Gallic
and Spanish horse, which he had sent there to strengthen the garrison.
And thus these mighty beginnings, which had embroiled Italy, and kept
the magistrates employed, found a speedy and happy issue.

XXIII.--Libo having sailed from Oricum, with a fleet of fifty ships,
which he commanded, came to Brundisium, and seized an island, which lies
opposite to the harbour; judging it better to guard that place, which
was our only pass to sea, than to keep all the shores and ports blocked
up by a fleet. By his sudden arrival, he fell in with some of our
transports, and set them on fire, and carried off one laden with corn;
he struck great terror into our men, and having in the night landed a
party of soldiers and archers, he beat our guard of horse from their
station, and gained so much by the advantage of situation, that he
despatched letters to Pompey, that if he pleased he might order the rest
of the ships to be hauled upon shore and repaired; for that with his own
fleet he could prevent Caesar from receiving his auxiliaries.

XXIV.--Antonius was at this time at Brundisium, and relying on the
valour of his troops, covered about sixty of the long-boats belonging to
the men-of-war with penthouses and bulwarks of hurdles, and put on board
them select soldiers; and disposed them separately along the shore: and
under the pretext of keeping the seamen in exercise, he ordered two
three-banked galleys, which he had built at Brundisium, to row to the
mouth of the port. When Libo saw them advancing boldly towards him, he
sent five four-banked galleys against them, in hopes of intercepting
them. When these came near our ships, our veteran soldiers retreated
within the harbour. The enemy, urged by their eagerness to capture them,
pursued them unguardedly; for instantly the boats of Antonius, on a
certain signal, rowed with great violence from all parts against the
enemy; and at the first charge took one of the four-banked galleys, with
the seamen and marines, and forced the rest to flee disgracefully. In
addition to this loss, they were prevented from getting water by the
horse which Antonius had disposed along the sea-coast. Libo, vexed at
the distress and disgrace, departed from Brundisium, and abandoned the

XXV.--Several months had now elapsed, and winter was almost gone, and
Caesar's legions and shipping were not coming to him from Brundisium,
and he imagined that some opportunities had been neglected, for the
winds had at least been often favourable, and he thought that he must
trust to them at last. And the longer it was deferred, the more eager
were those who commanded Pompey's fleet to guard the coast, and were
more confident of preventing our getting assistance: they receive
frequent reproofs from Pompey by letter, that as they had not prevented
Caesar's arrival at the first, they should at least stop the remainder
of his army: and they were expecting that the season for transporting
troops would become more unfavourable every day, as the winds grew
calmer. Caesar, feeling some trouble on this account, wrote in severe
terms to his officers at Brundisium, [and gave them orders] that as soon
as they found the wind to answer, they should not let the opportunity of
setting sail pass by, if they were even to steer their course to the
shore of Apollonia: because there they might run their ships on ground.
That these parts principally were left unguarded by the enemy's fleet,
because they dare not venture too far from the harbour.

XXVI.--They [his officers], exerting boldness and courage, aided by the
instructions of Marcus Antonius, and Fufius Kalenus, and animated by the
soldiers strongly encouraging them, and declining no danger for Caesar's
safety, having got a southerly wind, weighed anchor, and the next day
were carried past Apollonia and Dyrrachium, and being seen from the
continent, Quintus Coponius, who commanded the Rhodian fleet at
Dyrrachium, put out of the port with his ships; and when they had almost
come up with us, in consequence of the breeze dying away, the south wind
sprang up afresh, and rescued us. However, he did not desist from his
attempt, but hoped by the labour and perseverance of his seamen to be
able to bear up against the violence of the storm; and although we were
carried beyond Dyrrachium, by the violence of the wind, he nevertheless
continued to chase us. Our men, taking advantage of fortune's kindness,
for they were still afraid of being attacked by the enemy's fleet, if
the wind abated, having come near a port, called Nymphaeum, about three
miles beyond Lissus, put into it (this port is protected from a
south-west wind, but is not secure against a south wind); and thought less
danger was to be apprehended from the storm than from the enemy. But as
soon as they were within the port, the south wind, which had blown for
two days, by extraordinary good luck veered round to the south-west.

XXVII.--Here one might observe the sudden turns of fortune. We who, a
moment before, were alarmed for ourselves, were safely lodged in a very
secure harbour: and they who had threatened ruin to our fleet, were
forced to be uneasy on their own account: and thus, by a change of
circumstances, the storm protected our ships, and damaged the Rhodian
fleet to such a degree, that all their decked ships, sixteen in number,
foundered, without exception, and were wrecked: and of the prodigious
number of seamen and soldiers, some lost their lives by being dashed
against the rocks, others were taken by our men: but Caesar sent them
all safe home.

XXVIII.--Two of our ships, that had not kept up with the rest, being
overtaken by the night, and not knowing what port the rest had made to,
came to an anchor opposite Lissus. Otacilius Crassus, who commanded
Pompey's fleet, detached after them several barges and small craft, and
attempted to take them. At the same time, he treated with them about
capitulating, and promised them their lives if they would surrender. One
of them carried two hundred and twenty recruits, the other was manned
with somewhat less than two hundred veterans. Here it might be seen what
security men derive from a resolute spirit. For the recruits, frightened
at the number of vessels, and fatigued with the rolling of the sea; and
with sea-sickness, surrendered to Otacilius, after having first received
his oath, that the enemy would not injure them; but as soon as they were
brought before him, contrary to the obligation of his oath, they were
inhumanly put to death in his presence. But the soldiers of the veteran
legion, who had also struggled, not only with the inclemency of the
weather, but by labouring at the pump, thought it their duty to remit
nothing of their former valour: and having protracted the beginning of
the night in settling the terms, under pretence of surrendering, they
obliged the pilot to run the ship aground: and having got a convenient
place on the shore, they spent the rest of the night there, and at
daybreak, when Otacilius had sent against them a party of the horse, who
guarded that part of the coast, to the number of four hundred, besides
some armed men, who had followed them from the garrison, they made a
brave defence, and having killed some of them, retreated in safety to
our army.

XXIX.--After this action, the Roman citizens, who resided at Lissus, a
town which Caesar had before assigned them, and had carefully fortified,
received Antony into their town, and gave him every assistance.
Otacilius, apprehensive for his own safety, escaped out of the town, and
went to Pompey. All his forces, whose number amounted to three veteran
legions, and one of recruits, and about eight hundred horse, being
landed, Antony sent most of his ships back to Italy, to transport the
remainder of the soldiers and horse. The pontons, which are a sort of
Gallic ships, he left at Lissus with this object, that if Pompey,
imagining Italy defenceless, should transport his army thither (and this
notion was spread among the common people), Caesar might have some means
of pursuing him; and he sent messengers to him with great despatch, to
inform him in what part of the country he had landed his army, and what
number of troops he had brought over with him.

XXX.--Caesar and Pompey received this intelligence almost at the same
time; for they had seen the ships sail past Apollonia and Dyrrachium.
They directed their march after them by land; but at first they were
ignorant to what part they had been carried; but when they were informed
of it, they each adopted a different plan; Caesar, to form a junction
with Antonius as soon as possible, Pompey, to oppose Antonius's forces
on their march to Caesar, and, if possible, to fall upon them
unexpectedly from ambush. And the same day they both led out their
armies from their winter encampment along the river Apsus; Pompey,
privately by night; Caesar, openly by day. But Caesar had to march a
longer circuit up the river to find a ford. Pompey's route being easy,
because he was not obliged to cross the river, he advanced rapidly and
by forced marches against Antonius, and being informed of his approach,
chose a convenient situation, where he posted his forces; and kept his
men close within camp, and forbade fires to be kindled, that his arrival
might be the more secret. An account of this was immediately carried to
Antonius by the Greeks. He despatched messengers to Caesar, and confined
himself in his camp for one day. The next day Caesar came up with him.
On learning his arrival, Pompey, to prevent his being hemmed in between
two armies, quitted his position, and went with all his forces to
Asparagium, in the territory of Dyrrachium, and there encamped in a
convenient situation.

XXXI.--During these times, Scipio, though he had sustained some losses
near mount Amanus, had assumed to himself the title of imperator, after
which he demanded large sums of money from the states and princes. He
had also exacted from the tax-gatherers two years' rents that they owed;
and enjoined them to lend him the amount of the next year, and demanded
a supply of horse from the whole province. When they were collected,
leaving behind him his neighbouring enemies, the Parthians (who shortly
before had killed Marcus Crassus, the imperator, and had kept Marcus
Bibulus besieged), he drew his legions and cavalry out of Syria; and
when he came into the province, which was under great anxiety and fear
of the Parthian war, and heard some declarations of the soldiers, "That
they would march against an enemy, if he would lead them on; but would
never bear arms against a countryman and consul"; he drew off his
legions to winter quarters to Pergamus, and the most wealthy cities, and
made them rich presents: and in order to attach them more firmly to his
interest, permitted them to plunder the cities.

XXXII.--In the meantime, the money which had been demanded from the
province at large, was most rigorously exacted. Besides, many new
imposts of different kinds were devised to gratify his avarice. A tax of
so much a head was laid on every slave and child. Columns, doors, corn,
soldiers, sailors, arms, engines, and carriages, were made subject to a
duty. Wherever a name could be found for anything, it was deemed a
sufficient reason for levying money on it. Officers were appointed to
collect it, not only in the cities, but in almost every village and
fort: and whosoever of them acted with the greatest rigour and
inhumanity, was esteemed the best man, and best citizen. The province
was overrun with bailiffs and officers, and crowded with overseers and
tax-gatherers; who, besides the duties imposed, exacted a gratuity for
themselves; for they asserted, that being expelled from their own homes
and countries, they stood in need of every necessary; endeavouring by a
plausible pretence to colour the most infamous conduct. To this was
added the most exorbitant interest, as usually happens in times of war;
the whole sums being called in, on which occasion they alleged that the
delay of a single day was a donation. Therefore, in those two years, the
debt of the province was doubled: but notwithstanding, taxes were
exacted, not only from the Roman citizens, but from every corporation
and every state. And they said that these were loans, exacted by the
senate's decree. The taxes of the ensuing year were demanded beforehand
as a loan from the collectors, as on their first appointment.

XXXIII.--Moreover, Scipio ordered the money formerly lodged in the
temple of Diana at Ephesus, to be taken out with the statues of that
goddess which remained there. When Scipio came to the temple, letters
were delivered to him from Pompey, in the presence of several senators,
whom he had called upon to attend him; [informing him] that Caesar had
crossed the sea with his legions; that Scipio should hasten to him with
his army, and postpone all other business. As soon as he received the
letter, he dismissed his attendants, and began to prepare for his
journey to Macedonia; and a few days after set out. This circumstance
saved the money at Ephesus.

XXXIV.--Caesar, having effected a junction with Antonius's army, and
having drawn his legion out of Oricum, which he had left there to guard
the coast, thought he ought to sound the inclination of the provinces,
and march farther into the country; and when ambassadors came to him
from Thessaly and Aetolia, to engage that the states in those countries
would obey his orders, if he sent a garrison to protect them, he
despatched Lucius Cassius Longinus, with the twenty-seventh, a legion
composed of young soldiers, and two hundred horse, to Thessaly: and
Caius Calvisius Sabinus, with five cohorts, and a small party of horse,
into Aetolia. He recommended them to be especially careful to provide
corn, because those regions were nearest to him. He ordered Cneius
Domitius Calvinus to march into Macedonia with two legions, the eleventh
and twelfth, and five hundred horse; from which province, Menedemus, the
principal man of those regions, on that side which is called the Free,
having come as ambassador, assured him of the most devoted affection of
all his subjects.

XXXV.--Of these Calvisius, on his first arrival in Aetolia, being very
kindly received, dislodged the enemy's garrisons in Calydon and
Naupactus, and made himself master of the whole country. Cassius went to
Thessaly with his legion. As there were two factions there, he found the
citizens divided in their inclinations. Hegasaretus, a man of
established power, favoured Pompey's interest. Petreius, a young man of
a most noble family, warmly supported Caesar with his own and his
friends' influence.

XXXVI.--At the same time, Domitius arrived in Macedonia: and when
numerous embassies had begun to wait on him from many of the states,
news was brought that Scipio was approaching with his legions, which
occasioned various opinions and reports; for in strange events, rumour
generally goes before. Without making any delay in any part of
Macedonia, he marched with great haste against Domitius; and when he was
come within about twenty miles of him, wheeled on a sudden towards
Cassius Longinus in Thessaly. He effected this with such celerity, that
news of his march and arrival came together; for to render his march
expeditious, he left the baggage of his legions behind him at the river
Haliacmon, which divides Macedonia from Thessaly, under the care of
Marcus Favonius, with a guard of eight cohorts, and ordered him to build
a strong fort there. At the same time, Cotus's cavalry, which used to
infest the neighbourhood of Macedonia, flew to attack Cassius's camp, at
which Cassius being alarmed, and having received information of Scipio's
approach, and seen the horse, which he imagined to be Scipio's, he
betook himself to the mountains that environ Thessaly, and thence began
to make his route towards Ambracia. But when Scipio was hastening to
pursue him, despatches overtook him from Favonius, that Domitius was
marching against him with his legions, and that he could not maintain
the garrison over which he was appointed, without Scipio's assistance.
On receipt of these despatches, Scipio changed his designs and his
route, desisted from his pursuit of Cassius, and hastened to relieve
Favonius. Accordingly, continuing his march day and night, he came to
him so opportunely, that the dust raised by Domitius's army, and
Scipio's advanced guard, were observed at the same instant. Thus, the
vigilance of Domitius saved Cassius, and the expedition of Scipio,

XXXVII--Scipio, having stayed for two days in his camp, along the river
Haliacmon, which ran between him and Domitius's camp, on the third day,
at dawn, led his army across a ford, and having made a regular
encampment the day following, drew up his forces in front of his camp.
Domitius thought he ought not to show any reluctance, but should draw
out his forces and hazard a battle. But as there was a plain six miles
in breadth between the two camps, he posted his army before Scipio's
camp; while the latter persevered in not quitting his entrenchment.
However, Domitius with difficulty restrained his men, and prevented
their beginning a battle; the more so as a rivulet with steep banks,
joining Scipio's camp, retarded the progress of our men. When Scipio
perceived the eagerness and alacrity of our troops to engage, suspecting
that he should be obliged the next day, either to fight, against his
inclination, or to incur great disgrace by keeping within his camp,
though he had come with high expectation, yet by advancing rashly, made
a shameful end; and at night crossed the river, without even giving the
signal for breaking up the camp, and returned to the ground from which
he came, and there encamped near the river, on an elevated situation.
After a few days, he placed a party of horse in ambush in the night,
where our men had usually gone to forage for several days before. And
when Quintus Varus, commander of Domitius's horse, came there as usual,
they suddenly rushed from their ambush. But our men bravely supported
their charge, and returned quickly every man to his own rank, and in
their turn, made a general charge on the enemy: and having killed about
eighty of them, and put the rest to flight, retreated to their camp with
the loss of only two men.

XXXVIII.--After these transactions, Domitius, hoping to allure Scipio to
a battle, pretended to be obliged to change his position through want of
corn, and having given the signal for decamping, advanced about three
miles, and posted his army and cavalry in a convenient place, concealed
from the enemy's view. Scipio being in readiness to pursue him, detached
his cavalry and a considerable number of light infantry to explore
Domitius's route. When they had marched a short way, and their foremost
troops were within reach of our ambush, their suspicions being raised by
the neighing of the horses, they began to retreat: and the rest who
followed them, observing with what speed they retreated, made a halt.
Our men, perceiving that the enemy had discovered their plot, and
thinking it in vain to wait for any more, having got two troops in their
power, intercepted them. Among them was Marcus Opimius, general of the
horse, but he made his escape: they either killed or took prisoners all
the rest of these two troops, and brought them to Domitius.

XXXIX.--Caesar, having drawn his garrisons out of the sea-ports, as
before mentioned, left three cohorts at Oricum to protect the town, and
committed to them the charge of his ships of war, which he had
transported from Italy. Acilius, as lieutenant-general, had the charge
of this duty and the command of the town; he drew the ships into the
inner part of the harbour, behind the town, and fastened them to the
shore, and sank a merchant-ship in the mouth of the harbour to block it
up; and near it he fixed another at anchor, on which he raised a turret,
and faced it to the entrance of the port, and filled it with soldiers,
and ordered them to keep guard against any sudden attack.

XL.--Cneius, Pompey's son, who commanded the Egyptian fleet, having got
intelligence of these things, came to Oricum, and weighed up the ship,
that had been sunk, with a windlass, and by straining at it with several
ropes, and attacked the other which had been placed by Acilius to watch
the port with several ships, on which he had raised very high turrets,
so that fighting as it were from an eminence, and sending fresh men
constantly to relieve the fatigued, and at the same time attempting the
town on all sides by land, with ladders and his fleet, in order to
divide the force of his enemies, he overpowered our men by fatigue, and
the immense number of darts, and took the ship, having beat off the men
who were put on board to defend it, who, however, made their escape in
small boats; and at the same time he seized a natural mole on the
opposite side, which almost formed an island over against the town. He
carried over land, into the inner part of the harbour, four galleys, by
putting rollers under them, and driving them on with levers. Then
attacking on both sides the ships of war which were moored to the shore,
and were not manned, he carried off four of them, and set the rest on
fire. After despatching this business, he left Decimus Laelius, whom he
had taken away from the command of the Asiatic fleet, to hinder
provisions from being brought into the town from Biblis and Amantia, and
went himself to Lissus, where he attacked thirty merchantmen, left
within the port by Antonius, and set them on fire. He attempted to storm
Lissus, but being delayed three days by the vigorous defence of the
Roman citizens who belonged to that district, and of the soldiers which
Caesar had sent to keep garrison there, and having lost a few men in the
assault, he returned without effecting his object.

XLI.--As soon as Caesar heard that Pompey was at Asparagium, he set out
for that place with his army, and having taken the capital of the
Parthinians on his march, where there was a garrison of Pompey's, he
reached Pompey in Macedonia, on the third day, and encamped beside him;
and the day following, having drawn out all his forces before his camp,
he offered Pompey battle. But perceiving that he kept within his
trenches, he led his army back to his camp, and thought of pursuing some
other plan. Accordingly, the day following, he set out with all his
forces by a long circuit, through a difficult and narrow road to
Dyrrachium; hoping, either that Pompey would be compelled to follow him
to Dyrrachium, or that his communication with it might be cut off,
because he had deposited there all his provisions and mat['e]riel of
war. And so it happened; for Pompey, at first not knowing his design,
because he imagined he had taken a route in a different direction from
that country, thought that the scarcity of provisions had obliged him to
shift his quarters; but having afterwards got true intelligence from his
scouts, he decamped the day following, hoping to prevent him by taking a
shorter road; which Caesar suspecting might happen, encouraged his
troops to submit cheerfully to the fatigue, and having halted a very
small part of the night, he arrived early in the morning at Dyrrachium,
when the van of Pompey's army was visible at a distance, and there he

XLII.--Pompey, being cut off from Dyrrachium, as he was unable to effect
his purpose, took a new resolution, and entrenched himself strongly on a
rising ground, which is called Petra, where ships of a small size can
come in, and be sheltered from some winds. Here he ordered a part of his
men-of-war to attend him, and corn and provisions to be brought from
Asia, and from all the countries of which he kept possession. Caesar,
imagining that the war would be protracted to too great a length, and
despairing of his convoys from Italy, because all the coasts were
guarded with great diligence by Pompey's adherents; and because his own
fleets, which he had built during the winter, in Sicily, Gaul, and
Italy, were detained; sent Lucius Canuleius into Epirus to procure corn;
and because these countries were too remote, he fixed granaries in
certain places, and regulated the carriage of the corn for the
neighbouring states. He likewise gave directions that search should be
made for whatever corn was in Lissus, the country of the Parthini, and
all the places of strength. The quantity was very small, both from the
nature of the land (for the country is rough and mountainous, and the
people commonly import what grain they use); and because Pompey had
foreseen what would happen, and some days before had plundered the
Parthini, and having ravaged and dug up their houses, carried off all
the corn, which he collected by means of his horse.

XLIII.--Caesar, on being informed of these transactions, pursued
measures suggested by the nature of the country. For round Pompey's
camps there were several high and rough hills. These he first of all
occupied with guards, and raised strong forts on them. Then drawing a
fortification from one fort to another, as the nature of each position
allowed, he began to draw a line of circumvallation round Pompey; with
these views; as he had but a small quantity of corn, and Pompey was
strong in cavalry, that he might furnish his army with corn and other
necessaries from all sides with less danger: secondly, to prevent Pompey
from foraging, and thereby render his horse ineffectual in the
operations of the war; and thirdly, to lessen his reputation, on which
he saw he depended greatly, among foreign nations, when a report should
have spread throughout the world that he was blockaded by Caesar, and
dare not hazard a battle.

XLIV.--Neither was Pompey willing to leave the sea and Dyrrachium,
because he had lodged his mat['e]riel there, his weapons, arms, and
engines; and supplied his army with corn from it by his ships: nor was
he able to put a stop to Caesar's works without hazarding a battle,
which at that time he had determined not to do. Nothing was left but to
adopt the last resource, namely, to possess himself of as many hills as
he could, and cover as great an extent of country as possible with his
troops, and divide Caesar's forces as much as possible; and so it
happened: for having raised twenty-four forts, and taken in a compass of
fifteen miles, he got forage in this space, and within this circuit
there were several fields lately sown, in which the cattle might feed in
the meantime. And as our men, who had completed their works by drawing
lines of communication from one fort to another, were afraid that
Pompey's men would sally out from some part, and attack us in the rear;
so the enemy were making a continued fortification in a circuit within
ours to prevent us from breaking in on any side, or surrounding them on
the rear. But they completed their works first; both because they had a
greater number of men, and because they had a smaller compass to
enclose. When Caesar attempted to gain any place, though Pompey had
resolved not to oppose him with his whole force or to come to a general
engagement; yet he detached to particular places slingers and archers,
with which his army abounded, and several of our men were wounded, and
filled with great dread of the arrows; and almost all the soldiers made
coats or coverings for themselves of hair cloths, tarpaulins, or raw
hides to defend them against the weapons.

XLV.--In seizing the posts, each exerted his utmost power: Caesar, to
confine Pompey within as narrow a compass as possible; Pompey, to occupy
as many hills as he could in as large a circuit as possible, and several
skirmishes were fought in consequence of it. In one of these, when
Caesar's ninth legion had gained a certain post, and had begun to
fortify it; Pompey possessed himself of a hill near to and opposite the
same place, and endeavoured to annoy the men while at work; and as the
approach on one side was almost level, he first surrounded it with
archers and slingers, and afterwards by detaching a strong party of
light infantry, and using his engines, he stopped our works: and it was
no easy matter for our men at once to defend themselves, and to proceed
with their fortifications. When Caesar perceived that his troops were
wounded from all sides, he determined to retreat and give up the post;
his retreat was down a precipice, on which account they pushed on with
more spirit, and would not allow us to retire, because they imagined
that we resigned the place through fear. It is reported that Pompey said
that day in triumph to his friends about him, "That he would consent to
be accounted a general of no experience, if Caesar's legions effected a
retreat without considerable loss from that ground into which they had
rashly advanced."

XLVI.--Caesar, being uneasy about the retreat of his soldiers, ordered
hurdles to be carried to the further side of the hill, and to be placed
opposite to the enemy, and behind them a trench of a moderate breadth to
be sunk by his soldiers under shelter of the hurdles: and the ground to
be made as difficult as possible. He himself disposed slingers in
convenient places to cover our men in their retreat. These things being
completed, he ordered his legions to file off. Pompey's men insultingly
and boldly pursued and chased us, levelling the hurdles that were thrown
up in the front of our works, in order to pass over the trench. Which as
soon as Caesar perceived, being afraid that his men would appear not to
retreat, but to be repulsed, and that greater loss might be sustained,
when his men were almost half way down the hill, he encouraged them by
Antonius, who commanded that legion, ordered the signal of battle to be
sounded, and a charge to be made on the enemy. The soldiers of the ninth
legion suddenly closing their files threw their javelins, and advancing
impetuously from the low ground up the steep, drove Pompey's men
precipitately before them, and obliged them to turn their backs; but
their retreat was greatly impeded by the hurdles that lay in a long line
before them, and the pallisadoes which were in their way, and the
trenches that were sunk. But our men being contented to retreat without
injury, having killed several of the enemy, and lost but five of their
own, very quietly retired, and having seized some other hills somewhat
on this side of that place, completed their fortifications.

XLVII.--This method of conducting a war was new and unusual, as well on
account of the number of forts, the extent and greatness of the works,
and the manner of attack and defence, as on account of other
circumstances. For all who have attempted to besiege any person, have
attacked the enemy when they were frightened or weak, or after a defeat;
or have been kept in fear of some attack, when they themselves have had
a superior force both of foot and horse. Besides, the usual design of a
siege is to cut off the enemy's supplies. On the contrary, Caesar, with
an inferior force, was enclosing troops sound and unhurt, and who had
abundance of all things. For there arrived every day a prodigious number
of ships, which brought them provisions: nor could the wind blow from
any point that would not be favourable to some of them. Whereas, Caesar,
having consumed all the corn far and near, was in very great distress,
but his soldiers bore all with uncommon patience. For they remembered
that they lay under the same difficulties last year in Spain, and yet by
labour and patience had concluded a dangerous war. They recollected too
that they had suffered an alarming scarcity at Alesia, and a much
greater at Avaricum, and yet had returned victorious over mighty
nations. They refused neither barley nor pulse when offered them, and
they held in great esteem cattle, of which they got great quantities
from Epirus.

XLVIII.--There was a sort of root, called chara, discovered by the
troops which served under Valerius. This they mixed up with milk, and it
greatly contributed to relieve their want. They made it into a sort of
bread. They had great plenty of it: loaves made of this, when Pompey's
men upbraided ours with want, they frequently threw among them to damp
their hopes.

XLIX.--The corn was now beginning to ripen, and their hope supported
their want, as they were confident of having abundance in a short time.
And there were frequently heard declarations of the soldiers on guard,
in discourse with each other, that they would rather live on the bark of
the trees, than let Pompey escape from their hands. For they were often
told by deserters, that they could scarcely maintain their horses, and
that their other cattle was dead: that they themselves were not in good
health from their confinement within so narrow a compass, from the
noisome smell, the number of carcasses, and the constant fatigue to
them, being men unaccustomed to work, and labouring under a great want
of water. For Caesar had either turned the course of all the rivers and
streams which ran to the sea, or had dammed them up with strong works.
And as the country was mountainous, and the valleys narrow at the
bottom, he enclosed them with piles sunk in the ground, and heaped up
mould against them to keep in the water. They were therefore obliged to
search for low and marshy grounds, and to sink wells, and they had this
labour in addition to their daily works. And even these springs were at
a considerable distance from some of their posts, and soon dried up with
the heat. But Caesar's army enjoyed perfect health and abundance of
water, and had plenty of all sorts of provisions except corn; and they
had a prospect of better times approaching, and saw greater hopes laid
before them by the ripening of the grain.

L.--In this new kind of war, new methods of managing it were invented by
both generals. Pompey's men, perceiving by our fires at night, at what
part of the works our cohorts were on guard, coming silently upon them
discharged their arrows at random among the whole multitude, and
instantly retired to their camp: as a remedy against which our men were
taught by experience to light their fires in one place, and keep guard
in another.

* * * * *

LI.--In the meantime, Publius Sylla, whom Caesar at his departure had
left governor of his camp, came up with two legions to assist the
cohort; upon whose arrival Pompey's forces were easily repulsed. Nor did
they stand the sight and charge of our men, and the foremost falling,
the rest turned their backs and quitted the field. But Sylla called our
men in from the pursuit, lest their ardour should carry them too far,
but most people imagine, that if he had consented to a vigorous pursuit,
the war might have been ended that day. His conduct however does not
appear to deserve censure; for the duties of a lieutenant-general and of
a commander-in-chief are very different; the one is bound to act
entirely according to his instructions, the other to regulate his
conduct without control, as occasion requires. Sylla, being deputed by
Caesar to take care of the camp, and having rescued his men, was
satisfied with that, and did not desire to hazard a battle (although
this circumstance might probably have had a successful issue), that he
might not be thought to have assumed the part of the general. One
circumstance laid the Pompeians under great difficulty in making good a
retreat: for they had advanced from disadvantageous ground, and were
posted on the top of a hill. If they attempted to retire down the steep,
they dreaded the pursuit of our men from the rising ground, and there
was but a short time till sunset: for in hopes of completing the
business, they had protracted the battle almost till night. Taking
therefore measures suited to their exigency, and to the shortness of the
time, Pompey possessed himself of an eminence, at such a distance from
our fort, that no weapon discharged from an engine could reach him. Here
he took up a position, and fortified it, and kept all his forces there.

LII.--At the same time, there were engagements in two other places; for
Pompey had attacked several forts at once, in order to divide our
forces; that no relief might be sent from the neighbouring posts. In one
place, Volcatius Tullus sustained the charge of a legion with three
cohorts, and beat them off the field. In another, the Germans, having
sallied over our fortifications, slew several of the enemy, and
retreated safe to our camp.

LIII.--Thus six engagements having happened in one day, three at
Dyrrachium, and three at the fortifications, when a computation was made
of the number of slain, we found that about two thousand fell on
Pompey's side, several of them volunteer veterans and centurions. Among
them was Valerius, the son of Lucius Flaccus, who as praetor had
formerly had the government of Asia, and six military standards were
taken. Of our men, not more than twenty were missing in all the action.
But in the fort, not a single soldier escaped without a wound; and in
one cohort, four centurions lost their eyes. And being desirous to
produce testimony of the fatigue they underwent, and the danger they
sustained, they counted to Caesar about thirty thousand arrows which had
been thrown into the fort; and in the shield of the centurion Scaeva,
which was brought to him, were found two hundred and thirty holes. In
reward for this man's services both to himself and the republic, Caesar
presented to him two hundred thousand pieces of copper money, and
declared him promoted from the eighth to the first centurion. For it
appeared that the fort had been in a great measure saved by his
exertions; and he afterwards very amply rewarded the cohorts with double
pay, corn, clothing, and other military honours.

LIV.--Pompey, having made great additions to his works in the night, the
following days built turrets, and having carried his works fifteen feet
high, faced that part of his camp with mantlets; and after an interval
of five days, taking advantage of a second cloudy night, he barricaded
all the gates of his camp to hinder a pursuit, and about midnight
quietly marched off his army, and retreated to his old fortifications.

LV.--Aetolia, Acarnania, and Amphilochis, being reduced, as we have
related, by Cassius Longinus, and Calvisius Sabinus, Caesar thought he
ought to attempt the conquest of Achaia, and to advance farther into the
country. Accordingly, he detached Fufius thither, and ordered Quintus
Sabinus and Cassius to join him with their cohorts. Upon notice of their
approach, Rutilius Lupus, who commanded in Achaia, under Pompey, began
to fortify the Isthmus, to prevent Fufius from coming into Achaia.
Kalenus recovered Delphi, Thebes, and Orchomenus, by a voluntary
submission of those states. Some he subdued by force, the rest he
endeavoured to win over to Caesar's interest, by sending deputies round
to them. In these things, principally, Fufius was employed.

LVI.--Every day afterwards, Caesar drew up his army on a level ground,
and offered Pompey battle, and led his legions almost close to Pompey's
camp; and his front line was at no greater distance from the rampart
than that no weapons from their engines could reach it. But Pompey, to
save his credit and reputation with the world, drew out his legions, but
so close to his camp that his rear lines might touch the rampart, and
that his whole army, when drawn up, might be protected by the darts
discharged from it.

LVII.--Whilst these things were going forward in Achaia and at
Dyrrachium, and when it was certainly known that Scipio was arrived in
Macedonia, Caesar, never losing sight of his first intention, sends
Clodius to him, an intimate friend to both, whom Caesar, on the
introduction and recommendation of Pompey, had admitted into the number
of his acquaintance. To this man he gave letters and instructions to
Pompey, the substance of which was as follows: "That he had made every
effort towards peace, and imputed the ill success of those efforts to
the fault of those whom he had employed to conduct those negotiations:
because they were afraid to carry his proposals to Pompey at an improper
time. That Scipio had such authority, that he could not only freely
explain what conduct met his approbation, but even in some degree
enforce his advice, and govern him [Pompey] if he persisted in error;
that he commanded an army independent of Pompey, so that besides his
authority, he had strength to compel; and if he did so, all men would be
indebted to him for the quiet of Italy, the peace of the provinces, and
the preservation of the empire." These proposals Clodius made to him,
and for some days at the first appeared to have met with a favourable
reception, but afterwards was not admitted to an audience; for Scipio
being reprimanded by Favonius, as we found afterwards when the war was
ended, and the negotiation having miscarried, Clodius returned to

LVIII.--Caesar, that he might the more easily keep Pompey's horse
enclosed within Dyrrachium, and prevent them from foraging, fortified
the two narrow passes already mentioned with strong works, and erected
forts at them. Pompey perceiving that he derived no advantage from his
cavalry, after a few days had them conveyed back to his camp by sea.
Fodder was so exceedingly scarce that he was obliged to feed his horses
upon leaves stripped off the trees, or the tender roots of reeds
pounded. For the corn which had been sown within the lines was already
consumed, and they would be obliged to supply themselves with fodder
from Corcyra and Acarnania, over a long tract of sea; and as the
quantity of that fell short, to increase it by mixing barley with it,
and by these methods support their cavalry. But when not only the barley
and fodder in these parts were consumed, and the herbs cut away, when
the leaves too were not to be found on the trees, the horses being
almost starved, Pompey thought he ought to make some attempt by a sally.

LIX.--In the number of Caesar's cavalry were two Allobrogians, brothers,
named Roscillus and Aegus, the sons of Abducillus, who for several years
possessed the chief power in his own state; men of singular valour,
whose gallant services Caesar had found very useful in all his wars in
Gaul. To them, for these reasons, he had committed the offices of
greatest honour in their own country, and took care to have them chosen
into the senate at an unusual age, and had bestowed on them lands taken
from the enemy, and large pecuniary rewards, and from being needy had
made them affluent. Their valour had not only procured them Caesar's
esteem, but they were beloved by the whole army. But presuming on
Caesar's friendship, and elated with the arrogance natural to a foolish
and barbarous people, they despised their countrymen, defrauded their
cavalry of their pay, and applied all the plunder to their own use.
Displeased at this conduct, their soldiers went in a body to Caesar, and
openly complained of their ill usage; and to their other charges added,
that false musters were given in to Caesar, and the surcharged pay
applied to their own use.

LX.--Caesar, not thinking it a proper time to call them to account, and
willing to pardon many faults, on account of their valour, deferred the
whole matter, and gave them a private rebuke, for having made a traffic
of their troops, and advised them to expect everything from his
friendship, and by his past favours to measure their future hopes. This,
however, gave them great offence, and made them contemptible in the eyes
of the whole army. Of this they became sensible, as well from the
reproaches of others, as from the judgment of their own minds, and a
consciousness of guilt. Prompted then by shame, and perhaps imagining
that they were not liberated from trial, but reserved to a future day,
they resolved to break off from us, to put their fortune to a new
hazard, and to make trial of new connections. And having conferred with
a few of their clients, to whom they could venture to entrust so base an
action, they first attempted to assassinate Caius Volusenus, general of
the horse (as was discovered at the end of the war), that they might
appear to have fled to Pompey after conferring an important service on
him. But when that appeared too difficult to put in execution, and no
opportunity offered to accomplish it, they borrowed all the money they
could, as if they designed to make satisfaction and restitution for what
they had defrauded: and having purchased a great number of horses, they
deserted to Pompey along with those whom they had engaged in their plot.

LXI.--As they were persons nobly descended and of liberal education, and
had come with a great retinue, and several cattle, and were reckoned men
of courage, and had been in great esteem with Caesar, and as it was a
new and uncommon event, Pompey carried them round all his works, and
made an ostentatious show of them, for till that day, not a soldier,
either horse or foot, had deserted from Caesar to Pompey, though there
were desertions almost every day from Pompey to Caesar: but more
commonly among the soldiers levied in Epirus and Aetolia, and in those
countries which were in Caesar's possession. But the brothers, having
been acquainted with all things, either what was incomplete in our
works, or what appeared to the best judges of military matters to be
deficient, the particular times, the distance of places, and the various
attention of the guards, according to the different temper and character
of the officer who commanded the different posts, gave an exact account
of all to Pompey.

LXII.--Upon receiving this intelligence, Pompey, who had already formed
the design of attempting a sally, as before mentioned, ordered the
soldiers to make ozier coverings for their helmets, and to provide
fascines. These things being prepared, he embarked on board small boats
and row galleys by night, a considerable number of light infantry and
archers, with all their fascines, and immediately after midnight, he
marched sixty cohorts drafted from the greater camp and the outposts, to
that part of our works which extended towards the sea, and were at the
farthest distance from Caesar's greater camp. To the same place he sent
the ships, which he had freighted with the fascines and light-armed
troops; and all the ships of war that lay at Dyrrachium; and to each he
gave particular instructions: at this part of the lines Caesar had
posted Lentulus Marcellinus, the quaestor, with the ninth legion, and as
he was not in a good state of health, Fulvius Costhumus was sent to
assist him in the command.

LXIII.--At this place, fronting the enemy, there was a ditch fifteen
feet wide, and a rampart ten feet high, and the top of the rampart was
ten feet in breadth. At an interval of six hundred feet from that there
was another rampart turned the contrary way, with the works lower. For
some days before, Caesar, apprehending that our men might be surrounded
by sea, had made a double rampart there, that if he should be attacked
on both sides, he might have the means in defending himself. But the
extent of the lines, and the incessant labour for so many days, because
he had enclosed a circuit of seventeen miles with his works, did not
allow time to finish them. Therefore the transverse rampart which should
make a communication between the other two, was not yet completed. This
circumstance was known to Pompey, being told to him by the Allobrogian
deserters, and proved of great disadvantage to us. For when our cohorts
of the ninth legion were on guard by the sea-side, Pompey's army arrived
suddenly by break of day, and their approach was a surprise to our men,
and at the same time, the soldiers that came by sea cast their darts on
the front rampart; and the ditches were filled with fascines: and the
legionary soldiers terrified those that defended the inner rampart, by
applying the scaling ladders, and by engines and weapons of all sorts,
and a vast multitude of archers poured round upon them from every side.
Besides, the coverings of oziers, which they had laid over their
helmets, were a great security to them against the blows of stones which
were the only weapons that our soldiers had. And therefore, when our men
were oppressed in every manner, and were scarcely able to make
resistance, the defect in our works was observed, and Pompey's soldiers,
landing between the two ramparts, where the work was unfinished,
attacked our men in the rear, and having beat them from both sides of
the fortification, obliged them to flee.

LXIV.--Marcellinus, being informed of this disorder, detached some
cohorts to the relief of our men, who seeing them flee from the camp,
were neither able to persuade them to rally at their approach, nor
themselves to sustain the enemy's charge. And in like manner, whatever
additional assistance was sent, was infected by the fears of the
defeated, and increased the terror and danger. For retreat was prevented
by the multitude of the fugitives. In that battle, when the eagle-bearer
was dangerously wounded, and began to grow weak, having got sight of our
horse, he said to them, "This eagle have I defended with the greatest
care for many years, at the hazard of my life, and now in my last
moments restore it to Caesar with the same fidelity. Do not, I conjure
you, suffer a dishonour to be sustained in the field, which never before
happened to Caesar's army, but deliver it safe into his hands." By this
accident the eagle was preserved, but all the centurions of the first
cohorts were killed, except the principal.

LXV.--And now the Pompeians, after great havoc of our troops, were
approaching Marcellinus's camp, and had struck no small terror into the
rest of the cohorts, when Marcus Antonius, who commanded the nearest
fort, being informed of what had happened, was observed descending from
the rising ground with twelve cohorts. His arrival checked the
Pompeians, and encouraged our men to recover from their extreme
affright. And shortly after, Caesar having got notice by the smoke from
all the forts, which was the usual signal on such occasions, drafted off
some cohorts from the outposts, and went to the scene of action. And
having there learnt the loss he had sustained, and perceiving that
Pompey had forced our works, and had encamped along the coast, so that
he was at liberty to forage, and had a communication with his shipping,
he altered his plan for conducting the war, as his design had not
succeeded, and ordered a strong encampment to be made near Pompey.

LXVI.--When this work was finished, Caesar's scouts observed that some
cohorts, which to them appeared like a legion, were retired behind the
wood, and were on their march to the old camp. The situation of the two
camps was as follows: a few days before, when Caesar's ninth legion had
opposed a party of Pompey's troops, and were endeavouring to enclose
them, Caesar's troops formed a camp in that place. This camp joined a
certain wood, and was not above four hundred paces distant from the sea.
Afterwards, changing his design for certain reasons, Caesar removed his
camp to a small distance beyond that place; and after a few days, Pompey
took possession of it, and added more extensive works, leaving the inner
rampart standing, as he intended to keep several legions there. By this
means, the lesser camp included within the greater, answered the purpose
of a fort and citadel. He had also carried an entrenchment from the left
angle of the camp to the river, about four hundred paces, that his
soldiers might have more liberty and less danger in fetching water. But
he too, changing his design for reasons not necessary to be mentioned,
abandoned the place. In this condition the camp remained for several
days, the works being all entire.

LXVII.--Caesar's scouts brought him word that the standard of a legion
was carried to this place. That the same thing was seen he was assured
by those in the higher forts. This place was half a mile distant from
Pompey's new camp. Caesar, hoping to surprise this legion, and anxious
to repair the loss sustained that day, left two cohorts employed in the
works to make an appearance of entrenching himself, and by a different
route, as privately as he could, with his other cohorts amounting to
thirty-three, among which was the ninth legion, which had lost so many
centurions, and whose privates were greatly reduced in number, he
marched in two lines against Pompey's legion and his lesser camp. Nor
did this first opinion deceive him. For he reached the place before
Pompey could have notice of it; and though the works were strong, yet
having made the attack with the left wing, which he commanded in person,
he obliged the Pompeians to quit the rampart in disorder. A barricade
had been raised before the gates, at which a short contest was
maintained, our men endeavouring to force their way in, and the enemy to
defend the camp; Titus Pulcio, by whose means we have related that Caius
Antonius's army was betrayed, defending them with singular courage. But
the valour of our men prevailed, and having cut down the barricade, they
first forced the greater camp, and after that the fort which was
enclosed within it: and as the legion on its repulse had retired to
this, they slew several defending themselves there.

LXVIII.--But Fortune, who exerts a powerful influence as well in other
matters, as especially in war, effects great changes from trifling
causes, as happened at this time. For the cohorts on Caesar's right
wing, through ignorance of the place, followed the direction of that
rampart, which ran along from the camp to the river, whilst they were in
search of a gate, and imagined that it belonged to the camp. But when
they found that it led to the river, and that nobody opposed them, they
immediately climbed over the rampart, and were followed by all our

LXIX.--In the meantime Pompey, by the great delay which this occasioned,
being informed of what had happened, marched with the fifth legion,
which he called away from their work to support his party; and at the
same time his cavalry were advancing up to ours, and an army in order of
battle was seen at a distance by our men who had taken possession of the
camp, and the face of affairs was suddenly changed. For Pompey's legion,
encouraged by the hope of speedy support, attempted to make a stand at
the Decuman gate, and made a bold charge on our men. Caesar's cavalry,
who had mounted the rampart by a narrow breach, being apprehensive of
their retreat, were the first to flee. The right wing, which had been
separated from the left, observing the terror of the cavalry, to prevent
their being overpowered within the lines, were endeavouring to retreat
by the same way as they burst in; and most of them, lest they should be
engaged in the narrow passes, threw themselves down a rampart ten feet
high into the trenches; and the first being trodden to death, the rest
procured their safety and escaped over their bodies. The soldiers of the
left wing, perceiving from the rampart that Pompey was advancing, and
their own friends fleeing, being afraid that they should be enclosed
between the two ramparts, as they had an enemy both within and without,
strove to secure their retreat the same way they came. All was disorder,
consternation, and flight; insomuch that, when Caesar laid hold of the
colours of those who were running away, and desired them to stand, some
left their horses behind, and continued to run in the same manner;
others through fear even threw away their colours, nor did a single man
face about.

LXX.--In this calamity, the following favourable circumstance occurred
to prevent the ruin of our whole army, viz., that Pompey suspecting an
ambuscade (because, as I suppose, the success had far exceeded his
hopes, as he had seen his men a moment before fleeing from the camp),
durst not for some time approach the fortification; and that his horse
were retarded from pursuing, because the passes and gates were in
possession of Caesar's soldiers. Thus a trifling circumstance proved of
great importance to each party; for the rampart drawn from the camp to
the river, interrupted the progress and certainty of Caesar's victory,
after he had forced Pompey's camp. The same thing, by retarding the
rapidity of the enemy's pursuit, preserved our army.

LXXI.--In the two actions of this day, Caesar lost nine hundred and
sixty rank and file, several Roman knights of distinction, Felginas
Tuticanus Gallus, a senator's son; Caius Felginas from Placentia; Aulus
Gravius from Puteoli; Marcus Sacrativir from Capua; and thirty-two
military tribunes and centurions. But the greatest part of all these
perished without a wound, being trodden to death in the trenches, on the
ramparts and banks of the river by reason of the terror and flight of
their own men. Pompey, after this battle, was saluted Imperator; this
title he retained, and allowed himself to be addressed by it afterwards.
But neither in his letters to the senate, nor in the fasces, did he use
the laurel as a mark of honour. But Labienus, having obtained his
consent that the prisoners should be delivered up to him, had them all
brought out, as it appeared, to make a show of them, and that Pompey
might place a greater confidence in him who was a deserter; and calling
them fellow soldiers, and asking them in the most insulting manner
whether it was usual with veterans to flee, ordered them to be put to
death in the sight of the whole army.

LXXII.-Pompey's party were so elated with confidence and spirit at this
success, that they thought no more of the method of conducting the war,
but thought that they were already conquerors. They did not consider
that the smallness of our numbers, and the disadvantage of the place and
the confined nature of the ground occasioned by their having first
possessed themselves of the camp, and the double danger both from within
and without the fortifications, and the separation of the army into two
parts, so that the one could not give relief to the other, were the
cause of our defeat. They did not consider, in addition, that the
contest was not decided by a vigorous attack, nor a regular battle; and
that our men had suffered greater loss from their numbers and want of
room, than they had sustained from the enemy. In fine, they did not
reflect on the common casualties of war; how trifling causes, either
from groundless suspicions, sudden affright, or religious scruples, have
oftentimes been productive of considerable losses; how often an army has
been unsuccessful either by the misconduct of the general, or the
oversight of a tribune; but as if they had proved victorious by their
valour, and as if no change could ever take place, they published the
success of the day throughout the world by reports and letters.

LXXIII.--Caesar, disappointed in his first intentions, resolved to
change the whole plan of his operations. Accordingly, he at once called
in all out-posts, gave over the siege, and collecting his army into one
place, addressed his soldiers and encouraged them "not to be troubled at
what had happened, nor to be dismayed at it, but to weigh their many
successful engagements against one disappointment, and that, too, a
trifling one. That they ought to be grateful to Fortune, through whose
favour they had recovered Italy without the effusion of blood; through
whose favour they had subdued the two Spains, though protected by a most
warlike people under the command of the most skilful and experienced
generals: through whose favour they had reduced to submission the
neighbouring states that abounded with corn: in fine, that they ought to
remember with what success they had been all transported safe through
blockading fleets of the enemy, which possessed not only the ports, but
even the coasts: that if all their attempts were not crowned with
success, the defects of Fortune must be supplied by industry; and
whatever loss had been sustained, ought to be attributed rather to her
caprices than to any faults in him: that he had chosen a safe ground for
the engagement, that he had possessed himself of the enemy's camp; that
he had beaten them out, and overcome them when they offered resistance;
but whether their own terror or some mistake, or whether Fortune herself
had interrupted a victory almost secured and certain, they ought all now
to use their utmost efforts to repair by their valour the loss which had
been incurred; if they did so, their misfortunes would turn to their
advantage, as it happened at Gergovia, and those who feared to face the
enemy would be the first to offer themselves to battle.

LXXIV.--Having concluded his speech, he disgraced some standard-bearers,
and reduced them to the ranks; for the whole army was seized with such
grief at their loss, and with such an ardent desire of repairing their
disgrace, that not a man required the command of his tribune or
centurion, but they imposed each on himself severer labours than usual
as a punishment, and at the same time were so inflamed with eagerness to
meet the enemy, that the officers of the first rank, sensibly affected
at their entreaties, were of opinion that they ought to continue in
their present posts, and commit their fate to the hazard of a battle.
But, on the other hand, Caesar could not place sufficient confidence in
men so lately thrown into consternation, and thought he ought to allow
them time to recover their dejected spirits; and having abandoned his
works, he was apprehensive of being distressed for want of corn.

LXXV.--Accordingly, suffering no time to intervene but what was
necessary for a proper attention to be paid to the sick and wounded, he
sent on all his baggage privately in the beginning of the night from his
camp to Apollonia, and ordered them not to halt till they had performed
their journey; and he detached one legion with them as a convoy. This
affair being concluded, having retained only two legions in his camp; he
marched the rest of his army out at three o'clock in the morning by
several gates, and sent them forward by the same route; and in a short
space after, that the military practice might be preserved, and his
march known as late as possible, he ordered the signal for decamping to
be given; and setting out immediately, and following the rear of his own
army, he was soon out of sight of the camp. Nor did Pompey, as soon as
he had notice of his design, make any delay to pursue him; but with a
view to surprise them whilst encumbered with baggage on their march, and
not yet recovered from their fright, he led his army out of his camp,
and sent his cavalry on to retard our rear; but was not able to come up
with them, because Caesar had got far before him, and marched without
baggage. But when we reached the river Genusus, the banks being steep,
their horse overtook our rear, and detained them by bringing them to
action. To oppose whom, Caesar sent his horse, and intermixed with them
about four hundred of his advanced light troops, who attacked their
horse with such success, that having routed them all, and killed
several, they returned without any loss to the main body.

LXXVI.--Having performed the exact march which he had proposed that day,
and having led his army over the river Genusus, Caesar posted himself in
his old camp opposite Asparagium; and kept his soldiers close within the
entrenchments; and ordered the horse, who had been sent out under
pretence of foraging, to retire immediately into the camp, through the
Decuman gate. Pompey, in like manner, having completed the same day's
march, took post in his old camp at Asparagium; and his soldiers, as
they had no work (the fortifications being entire), made long
excursions, some to collect wood and forage; others, invited by the
nearness of the former camp, laid up their arms in their tents, and
quitted the entrenchments in order to bring what they had left behind
them, because the design of marching being adopted in a hurry, they had
left a considerable part of their waggons and luggage behind. Being thus
incapable of pursuing, as Caesar had foreseen, about noon he gave the
signal for marching, led out his army, and doubling that day's march, he
advanced eight miles beyond Pompey's camp; who could not pursue him,
because his troops were dispersed.

LXXVII.--The next day Caesar sent his baggage forward early in the
night, and marched off himself immediately after the fourth watch: that
if he should be under the necessity of risking an engagement, he might
meet a sudden attack with an army free from incumbrance. He did so for
several days successively, by which means he was enabled to effect his
march over the deepest rivers, and through the most intricate roads
without any loss. For Pompey, after the first day's delay, and the
fatigue which he endured for some days in vain, though he exerted
himself by forced marches, and was anxious to overtake us, who had got
the start of him, on the fourth day desisted from the pursuit, and
determined to follow other measures.

LXXVIII.--Caesar was obliged to go to Apollonia, to lodge his wounded,
pay his army, confirm his friends, and leave garrisons in the towns. But
for these matters, he allowed no more time than was necessary for a
person in haste. And being apprehensive for Domitius, lest he should be
surprised by Pompey's arrival, he hastened with all speed and
earnestness to join him; for he planned the operations of the whole
campaign on these principles: that if Pompey should march after him, he
would be drawn off from the sea, and from those forces which he had
provided in Dyrrachium, and separated from his corn and magazines, and
be obliged to carry on the war on equal terms; but if he crossed over
into Italy, Caesar, having effected a junction with Domitius, would
march through Illyricum to the relief of Italy; but if he endeavoured to
storm Apollonia and Oricum, and exclude him from the whole coast, he
hoped, by besieging Scipio, to oblige him, of necessity, to come to his
assistance. Accordingly, Caesar despatching couriers, writes to
Domitius, and acquaints him with his wishes on the subject: and having
stationed a garrison of four cohorts at Apollonia, one at Lissus, and
three at Oricum, besides those who were sick of their wounds, he set
forward on his march through Epirus and Acarnania. Pompey, also,
guessing at Caesar's design, determined to hasten to Scipio, that if
Caesar should march in that direction, he might be ready to relieve him;
but that if Caesar should be unwilling to quit the sea-coast and
Corcyra, because he expected legions and cavalry from Italy, he himself
might fall on Domitius with all his forces.

LXXIX.--For these reasons, each of them studied despatch, that he might
succour his friends, and not miss an opportunity of surprising his
enemies. But Caesar's engagements at Apolloma had carried him aside from
the direct road. Pompey had taken the short road to Macedonia, through
Candavia. To this was added another unexpected disadvantage, that
Domitius, who for several days had been encamped opposite Scipio, had
quitted that post for the sake of provisions, and had marched to
Heraclea Sentica, a city subject to Candavia; so that fortune herself
seemed to throw him in Pompey's way. Of this, Caesar was ignorant up to
this time. Letters likewise being sent by Pompey through all the
provinces and states, with an account of the action at Dyrrachium, very
much enlarged and exaggerated beyond the real facts, a rumour had been
circulated, that Caesar had been defeated and forced to flee, and had
lost almost all his forces. These reports had made the roads dangerous,
and drawn off some states from his alliance: whence it happened, that
the messengers despatched by Caesar, by several different roads to
Domitius, and by Domitius to Caesar, were not able by any means to
accomplish their journey. But the Allobroges, who were in the retinue of
Aegus and Roscillus, and who had deserted to Pompey, having met on the
road a scouting party of Domitius; either from old acquaintance, because
they had served together in Gaul, or elated with vain glory, gave them
an account of all that had happened, and informed them of Caesar's
departure, and Pompey's arrival. Domitius, who was scarce four hours'
march distant, having got intelligence from these, by the courtesy of
the enemy, avoided the danger, and met Caesar coming to join him at
Aeginium, a town on the confines of and opposite to Thessaly.

LXXX.--The two armies being united, Caesar marched to Gomphi, which is
the first town of Thessaly on the road from Epirus. Now, the
Thessalians, a few months before, had of themselves sent ambassadors to
Caesar, offering him the free use of everything in their power, and
requesting a garrison for their protection. But the report, already
spoken of, of the battle at Dyrrachium, which it had exaggerated in many
particulars, had arrived before him. In consequence of which,
Androsthenes, the praetor of Thessaly, as he preferred to be the
companion of Pompey's victory, rather than Caesar's associate in his
misfortunes, collected all the people, both slaves and freemen, from the
country into the town and shut the gates, and despatched messengers to
Scipio and Pompey "to come to his relief, that he could depend on the
strength of the town, if succour was speedily sent; but that it could
not withstand a long siege." Scipio, as soon as he received advice of
the departure of the armies from Dyrrachium, had marched with his
legions to Larissa: Pompey was not yet arrived near Thessaly. Caesar
having fortified his camp, ordered scaling ladders and pent-houses to be
made for a sudden assault, and hurdles to be provided. As soon as they
were ready, he exhorted his soldiers, and told them of what advantage it
would be to assist them with all sorts of necessaries if they made
themselves masters of a rich and plentiful town: and, at the same time,
to strike terror into other states by the example of this, and to effect
this with speed, before auxiliaries could arrive. Accordingly, taking
advantage of the unusual ardour of the soldiers, he began his assault on
the town at a little after three o'clock on the very day on which he
arrived, and took it, though defended with very high walls, before
sunset, and gave it up to his army to plunder, and immediately decamped
from before it, and marched to Metropolis, with such rapidity as to
outstrip any messenger or rumour of the taking of Gomphi.

LXXXI.--The inhabitants of Metropolis, at first influenced by the same
rumours, followed the same measures, shut the gates and manned their
walls. But when they were made acquainted with the fate of the city of
Gomphi by some prisoners, whom Caesar had ordered to be brought up to
the walls, they threw open their gates. As he preserved them with the
greatest care, there was not a state in Thessaly (except Larissa, which
was awed by a strong army of Scipio's), but on comparing the fate of the
inhabitants of Metropolis with the severe treatment of Gomphi, gave
admission to Caesar, and obeyed his orders. Having chosen a position
convenient for procuring corn, which was now almost ripe on the ground,
he determined there to wait Pompey's arrival, and to make it the centre
of all his warlike operations.

LXXXII.--Pompey arrived in Thessaly a few days after, and having
harangued the combined army, returned thanks to his own men, and
exhorted Scipio's soldiers, that as the victory was now secured, they
should endeavour to merit a part of the rewards and booty. And receiving
all the legions into one camp, he shared his honours with Scipio,
ordered the trumpet to be sounded at his tent, and a pavilion to be
erected for him. The forces of Pompey being thus augmented, and two such
powerful armies united, their former expectations were confirmed, and
their hopes of victory so much increased, that whatever time intervened
was considered as so much delay to their return into Italy: and whenever
Pompey acted with slowness and caution, they used to exclaim, that it
was the business only of a single day, but that he had a passion for
power, and was delighted in having persons of consular and praetorian
rank in the number of his slaves. And they now began to dispute openly
about rewards and priesthoods, and disposed of the consulate for several
years to come. Others put in their claims for the houses and properties
of all who were in Caesar's camp, and in that council there was a warm
debate, whether Lucius Hirrus, who had been sent by Pompey against the
Parthians, should be admitted a candidate for the praetorship in his
absence at the next election; his friends imploring Pompey's honour to
fulfil the engagements which he had made to him at his departure, that
he might not seem deceived through his authority: whilst others,
embarked in equal labour and danger, pleaded that no individual ought to
have a preference before all the rest.

LXXXIII.--Already Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus Spinthur, in their
daily quarrels about Caesar's priesthood, openly abused each other in
the most scurrilous language. Lentulus urging the respect due to his
age, Domitius boasting his interest in the city and his dignity, and
Scipio presuming on his alliance with Pompey. Attius Rufus charged
Lucius Afranius before Pompey with betraying the army in the action that
happened in Spain, and Lucius Domitius declared in the council that it
was his wish that, when the war should be ended, three billets should be
given to all the senators who had taken part with them in the war, and
that they should pass sentence on every single person who had stayed
behind at Rome, or who had been within Pompey's garrisons and had not
contributed their assistance in the military operations; that by the
first billet they should-have power to acquit, by the second to pass
sentence of death, and by the third to impose a pecuniary fine. In
short, Pompey's whole army talked of nothing but the honours or sums of
money which were to be their rewards, or of vengeance on their enemies;
and never considered how they were to defeat their enemies, but in what
manner they should use their victory.

LXXXIV.--Corn being provided, and his soldiers refreshed, and a
sufficient time having elapsed since the engagement at Dyrrachium, when
Caesar thought he had sufficiently sounded the disposition of his
troops, he thought that he ought to try whether Pompey had any intention
or inclination to come to a battle. Accordingly he led his troops out of
the camp, and ranged them in order of battle, at first on their own
ground, and at a small distance from Pompey's camp: but afterwards for
several days in succession he advanced from his own camp, and led them
up to the hills on which Pompey's troops were posted, which conduct
inspired his army every day with fresh courage. However he adhered to
his former purpose respecting his cavalry, for as he was by many degrees
inferior in number, he selected the youngest and most active of the
advanced guard, and desired them to fight intermixed with the horse, and
they by constant practice acquired experience in this kind of battle. By
these means it was brought to pass that a thousand of his horse would
dare, even on open ground, to stand against seven thousand of Pompey's,
if occasion required, and would not be much terrified by their number.
For even on one of those days he was successful in a cavalry action, and
killed one of the two Allobrogians who had deserted to Pompey, as we
before observed, and several others.

LXXXV.--Pompey, because he was encamped on a hill, drew up his army at
the very foot of it, ever in expectation, as may be conjectured, that
Caesar would expose himself to this disadvantageous situation. Caesar,
seeing no likelihood of being able to bring Pompey to an action, judged
it the most expedient method of conducting the war, to decamp from that
post, and to be always in motion: with this hope, that by shifting his
camp and removing from place to place, he might be more conveniently
supplied with corn, and also, that by being in motion he might get some
opportunity of forcing them to battle, and might by constant marches
harass Pompey's army, which was not accustomed to fatigue. These matters
being settled, when the signal for marching was given, and the tents
struck, it was observed that shortly before, contrary to his daily
practice, Pompey's army had advanced farther than usual from his
entrenchments, so that it appeared possible to come to an action on
equal ground. Then Caesar addressed himself to his soldiers, when they
were at the gates of the camp, ready to march out. "We must defer," says
he, "our march at present, and set our thoughts on battle, which has
been our constant wish; let us then meet the foe with resolute souls. We
shall not hereafter easily find such an opportunity." He immediately
marched out at the head of his troops.

LXXXVI.--Pompey also, as was afterward known, at the unanimous
solicitation of his friends, had determined to try the fate of a battle.
For he had even declared in council a few days before that, before the
battalions came to battle, Caesar's army would be put to the rout. When
most people expressed their surprise at it, "I know," says he, "that I
promise a thing almost incredible; but hear the plan on which I proceed,
that you may march to battle with more confidence and resolution. I have
persuaded our cavalry, and they have engaged to execute it, as soon as
the two armies have met, to attack Caesar's right wing on the flank, and
enclosing their army on the rear, throw them into disorder, and put them
to the rout, before we shall throw a weapon against the enemy. By this
means we shall put an end to the war, without endangering the legions,
and almost without a blow. Nor is this a difficult matter, as we far
outnumber them in cavalry." At the same time he gave them notice to be
ready for battle on the day following, and since the opportunity which
they had so often wished for was now arrived, not to disappoint the
opinion generally entertained of their experience and valour.

LXXXVII.--After him Labienus spoke, as well to express his contempt of
Caesar's forces, as to extol Pompey's scheme with the highest encomiums.
"Think not, Pompey," says he, "that this is the army which conquered
Gaul and Germany; I was present at all those battles and do not speak at
random on a subject to which I am a stranger: a very small part of that
army now remains, great numbers lost their lives, as must necessarily
happen in so many battles, many fell victims to the autumnal pestilence
in Italy, many returned home, and many were left behind on the
continent. Have you not heard that the cohorts at Brundisium are
composed of invalids? The forces which you now behold, have been
recruited by levies lately made in Hither Spain, and the greater part
from the colonies beyond the Po; moreover, the flower of the forces
perished in the two engagements at Dyrrachium." Having so said, he took
an oath, never to return to his camp unless victorious; and he
encouraged the rest to do the like. Pompey applauded his proposal, and
took the same oath; nor did any person present hesitate to take it.
After this had passed in the council they broke up full of hopes and
joy, and in imagination anticipated victory; because they thought that
in a matter of such importance, no groundless assertion could be made by
a general of such experience.

LXXXVIII.--When Caesar had approached near Pompey's camp, he observed
that his army was drawn up in the following manner:--On the left wing
were the two legions delivered over by Caesar at the beginning of the
disputes in compliance with the senate's decree, one of which was called
the first, the other the third. Here Pompey commanded in person. Scipio
with the Syrian legions commanded the centre. The Cilician legion in
conjunction with the Spanish cohorts, which we said were brought over by
Afranius, were disposed on the right wing. These Pompey considered his
steadiest troops. The rest he had interspersed between the centre and
the wing, and he had a hundred and ten complete cohorts; these amounted
to forty-five thousand men. He had besides two cohorts of volunteers,
who having received favours from him in former wars, flocked to his
standard: these were dispersed through his whole army. The seven
remaining cohorts he had disposed to protect his camp, and the
neighbouring forts. His right wing was secured by a river with steep
banks; for which reason he placed all his cavalry, archers, and
slingers, on his left wing.

LXXXIX.--Caesar, observing his former custom, had placed the tenth
legion on the right, the ninth on the left, although it was very much
weakened by the battles at Dyrrachium. He placed the eighth legion so
close to the ninth, as to almost make one of the two, and ordered them
to support one another. He drew up on the field eighty cohorts, making a
total of twenty-two thousand men. He left two cohorts to guard the camp.
He gave the command of the left wing to Antonius, of the right to P.
Sulla, and of the centre to Cn. Domitius: he himself took his post
opposite Pompey. At the same time, fearing, from the disposition of the
enemy which we have previously mentioned, lest his right wing might be
surrounded by their numerous cavalry, he rapidly drafted a single cohort
from each of the legions composing the third line, formed of them a
fourth line, and opposed them to Pompey's cavalry, and, acquainting them
with his wishes, admonished them that the success of that day depended
on their courage. At the same time he ordered the third line, and the
entire army not to charge without his command: that he would give the
signal whenever he wished them to do so.

XC.--When he was exhorting his army to battle, according to the military
custom, and spoke to them of the favours that they had constantly
received from him, he took especial care to remind them "that he could
call his soldiers to witness the earnestness with which he had sought
peace, the efforts that he had made by Vatinius to gain a conference
[with Labienus], and likewise by Claudius to treat with Scipio, in what
manner he had exerted himself at Oricum, to gain permission from Libo to
send ambassadors; that he had been always reluctant to shed the blood of
his soldiers, and did not wish to deprive the republic of one or other
of her armies." After delivering this speech, he gave by a trumpet the
signal to his soldiers, who were eagerly demanding it, and were very
impatient for the onset.

XCI.--There was in Caesar's army a volunteer of the name of Crastinus,
who the year before had been first centurion of the tenth legion, a man
of pre-eminent bravery. He, when the signal was given, says, "Follow me,
my old comrades, and display such exertions in behalf of your general as
you have determined to do: this is our last battle, and when it shall be
won, he will recover his dignity, and we our liberty." At the same time
he looked back to Caesar, and said, "General, I will act in such a
manner to-day, that you will feel grateful tome living or dead." After
uttering these words he charged first on the right wing, and about one
hundred and twenty chosen volunteers of the same century followed.

XCII.--There was so much space left between the two lines, as sufficed
for the onset of the hostile armies: but Pompey had ordered his soldiers
to await Caesar's attack, and not to advance from their position, or
suffer their line to be put into disorder. And he is said to have done
this by the advice of Caius Triarius, that the impetuosity of the charge
of Caesar's soldiers might be checked, and their line broken, and that
Pompey's troops remaining in their ranks, might attack them while in
disorder; and he thought that the javelins would fall with less force if
the soldiers were kept in their ground, than if they met them in their
course; at the same time he trusted that Caesar's soldiers, after
running over double the usual ground, would become weary and exhausted
by the fatigue. But to me Pompey seems to have acted without sufficient
reason: for there is a certain impetuosity of spirit and an alacrity
implanted by nature in the hearts of all men, which is inflamed by a
desire to meet the foe. This a general should endeavour not to repress,
but to increase; nor was it a vain institution of our ancestors, that
the trumpets should sound on all sides, and a general shout be raised;
by which they imagined that the enemy were struck with terror, and their
own army inspired with courage.

XCIII.--But our men, when the signal was given, rushed forward with
their javelins ready to be launched, but perceiving that Pompey's men
did not run to meet their charge, having acquired experience by custom,
and being practised in former battles, they of their own accord
repressed their speed, and halted almost midway, that they might not
come up with the enemy when their strength was exhausted, and after a
short respite they again renewed their course, and threw their javelins,
and instantly drew their swords, as Caesar had ordered them. Nor did
Pompey's men fail in this crisis, for they received our javelins, stood
our charge, and maintained their ranks: and having launched their
javelins, had recourse to their swords. At the same time Pompey's horse,
according to their orders, rushed out at once from his left wing, and
his whole host of archers poured after them. Our cavalry did not
withstand their charge: but gave ground a little, upon which Pompey's
horse pressed them more vigorously, and began to file off in troops, and
flank our army. When Caesar perceived this, he gave the signal to his
fourth line, which he had formed of the six cohorts. They instantly
rushed forward and charged Pompey's horse with such fury, that not a man
of them stood; but all wheeling about, not only quitted their post, but
galloped forward to seek a refuge in the highest mountains. By their
retreat the archers and slingers, being left destitute and defenceless,
were all cut to pieces. The cohorts, pursuing their success, wheeled
about upon Pompey's left wing, whilst his infantry still continued to
make battle, and attacked them in the rear.

XCIV.--At the same time Caesar ordered his third line to advance, which
till then had not been engaged, but had kept their post. Thus, new and
fresh troops having come to the assistance of the fatigued, and others
having made an attack on their rear, Pompey's men were not able to
maintain their ground, but all fled, nor was Caesar deceived in his
opinion that the victory, as he had declared in his speech to his
soldiers, must have its beginning from those six cohorts which he had
placed as a fourth line to oppose the horse. For by them the cavalry
were routed; by them the archers and slingers were cut to pieces; by
them the left wing of Pompey's army was surrounded, and obliged to be
the first to flee. But when Pompey saw his cavalry routed, and that part
of his army on which he reposed his greatest hopes thrown into
confusion, despairing of the rest, he quitted the field, and retreated
straightway on horseback to his camp, and calling to the centurions,
whom he had placed to guard the praetorian gate, with a loud voice, that
the soldiers might hear: "Secure the camp," says he, "defend it with
diligence, if any danger should threaten it; I will visit the other
gates, and encourage the guards of the camp." Having thus said, he
retired into his tent in utter despair, yet anxiously waiting the issue.

XCV.--Caesar having forced the Pompeians to flee into their
entrenchment, and thinking that he ought not to allow them any respite
to recover from their fright, exhorted his soldiers to take advantage of
fortune's kindness, and to attack the camp. Though they were fatigued by
the intense heat, for the battle had continued till mid-day, yet, being
prepared to undergo any labour, they cheerfully obeyed his command. The
camp was bravely defended by the cohorts which had been left to guard
it, but with much more spirit by the Thracians and foreign auxiliaries.
For the soldiers who had fled for refuge to it from the field of battle,
affrighted and exhausted by fatigue, having thrown away their arms and
military standards, had their thoughts more engaged on their further
escape than on the defence of the camp. Nor could the troops who were
posted on the battlements long withstand the immense number of our
darts, but fainting under their wounds, quitted the place, and under the
conduct of their centurions and tribunes, fled, without stopping, to the
high mountains which joined the camp.

XCVI.--In Pompey's camp you might see arbours in which tables were laid,
a large quantity of plate set out, the floors of the tents covered with
fresh sods, the tents of Lucius Lentulus and others shaded with ivy, and
many other things which were proofs of excessive luxury, and a
confidence of victory, so that it might readily be inferred that they
had no apprehensions of the issue of the day, as they indulged
themselves in unnecessary pleasures, and yet upbraided with luxury
Caesar's army, distressed and suffering troops, who had always been in
want of common necessaries. Pompey, as soon as our men had forced the
trenches, mounting his horse, and stripping off his general's habit,
went hastily out of the back gate of the camp, and galloped with all
speed to Larissa. Nor did he stop there, but with the same despatch
collecting a few of his flying troops, and halting neither day nor
night, he arrived at the sea-side, attended by only thirty horse, and
went on board a victualling barque, often complaining, as we have been
told, that he had been so deceived in his expectation, that he was
almost persuaded that he had been betrayed by those from whom he had
expected victory, as they began the flight.

XCVII.--Caesar having possessed himself of Pompey's camp, urged his
soldiers not to be too intent on plunder, and lose the opportunity of
completing their conquest. Having obtained their consent, he began to
draw lines round the mountain. The Pompeians distrusting the position,
as there was no water on the mountain, abandoned it, and all began to
retreat towards Larissa; which Caesar perceiving, divided his troops,
and ordering part of his legions to remain in Pompey's camp, sent back a
part to his own camp, and taking four legions with him, went by a
shorter road to intercept the enemy: and having marched six miles, drew
up his army. But the Pompeians observing this, took post on a mountain
whose foot was washed by a river. Caesar having encouraged his troops,
though they were greatly exhausted by incessant labour the whole day,
and night was now approaching, by throwing up works cut off the
communication between the river and the mountain, that the enemy might
not get water in the night. As soon as the work was finished, they sent
ambassadors to treat about a capitulation. A few senators who had
espoused that party, made their escape by night.

XCVIII.--At break of day, Caesar ordered all those who had taken post on
the mountain, to come down from the higher grounds into the plain, and
pile their arms. When they did this without refusal, and with
outstretched arms, prostrating themselves on the ground, with tears,
implored his mercy: he comforted them and bade them rise, and having
spoken a few words of his own clemency to alleviate their fears, he
pardoned them all, and gave orders to his soldiers that no injury should
be done to them, and nothing taken from them. Having used this
diligence, he ordered the legions in his camp to come and meet him, and
those which were, with him to take their turn of rest, and go back to
the camp; and the same day went to Larissa.

XCIX.--In that battle, no more than two hundred privates were missing,
but Caesar lost about thirty centurions, valiant officers. Crastinus,
also, of whom mention was made before, fighting most courageously, lost
his life by the wound of a sword in the mouth; nor was that false which
he declared when marching to battle: for Caesar entertained the highest
opinion of his behaviour in that battle, and thought him highly
deserving of his approbation. Of Pompey's army, there fell about fifteen
thousand; but upwards of twenty-four thousand were made prisoners: for
even the cohorts which were stationed in the forts, surrendered to
Sylla. Several others took shelter in the neighbouring states. One
hundred and eighty stands of colours, and nine eagles, were brought to
Caesar. Lucius Domitius, fleeing from the camp to the mountains, his
strength being exhausted by fatigue, was killed by the horse.

C.--About this time, Decimus Laelius arrived with his fleet at
Brundisium and in the same manner as Libo had done before, possessed
himself of an island opposite the harbour of Brundisium. In like manner,
Valimus, who was then governor of Brundisium, with a few decked barques,
endeavoured to entice Laelius's fleet, and took one five-benched galley
and two smaller vessels that had ventured farther than the rest into a
narrow part of the harbour: and likewise disposing the horse along the
shore, strove to prevent the enemy from procuring fresh water. But
Laelius having chosen a more convenient season of the year for his
expedition, supplied himself with water brought in transports from
Corcyra and Dyrrachium, and was not deterred from his purpose; and till
he had received advice of the battle in Thessaly, he could not be forced
either by the disgrace of losing his ships, or by the want of
necessaries, to quit the port and islands.

CI.--Much about the same time, Cassius arrived in Sicily with a fleet of
Syrians, Phoenicians, and Cilicians: and as Caesar's fleet was divided
into two parts, Publius Sulpicius the praetor commanding one division at
Vibo near the straits, Pomponius the other at Messana, Cassius got into
Messana with his fleet before Pomponius had notice of his arrival, and
having found him in disorder, without guards or discipline, and the wind
being high and favourable, he filled several transports with fir, pitch,
and tow, and other combustibles, and sent them against Pomponius's
fleet, and set fire to all his ships, thirty-five in number, twenty of
which were armed with beaks: and this action struck such terror, that
though there was a legion in garrison at Messana, the town with
difficulty held out, and had not the news of Caesar's victory been
brought at that instant by the horse stationed along the coast, it was
generally imagined that it would have been lost, but the town was
maintained till the news arrived very opportunely; and Cassius set sail
from thence to attack Sulpicius's fleet at Vibo, and our ships being
moored to the land, to strike the same terror, he acted in the same
manner as before. The wind being favourable, he sent into the port about
forty ships provided with combustibles, and the flame catching on both
sides, five ships were burnt to ashes. And when the fire began to spread
wider by the violence of the wind, the soldiers of the veteran legions,
who had been left to guard the fleet, being considered as invalids,
could not endure the disgrace, but of themselves went on board the ships
and weighed anchor, and having attacked Cassius's fleet, captured two
five-banked galleys, in one of which was Cassius himself; but he made
his escape by taking to a boat. Two three-banked galleys were taken
besides. Intelligence was shortly after received of the action in
Thessaly, so well authenticated, that the Pompeians themselves gave
credit to it; for they had hitherto believed it a fiction of Caesar's
lieutenants and friends. Upon which intelligence Cassius departed with
his fleet from that coast.

CII.--Caesar thought he ought to postpone all business and pursue
Pompey, whithersoever he should retreat; that he might not be able to
provide fresh forces, and renew the war; he therefore marched on every
day, as far as his cavalry were able to advance, and ordered one legion
to follow him by shorter journeys. A proclamation was issued by Pompey
at Amphipolis, that all the young men of that province, Grecians and
Roman citizens, should take the military oath; but whether he issued it
with an intention of preventing suspicion, and to conceal as long as
possible his design of fleeing farther, or to endeavour to keep
possession of Macedonia by new levies, if nobody pursued him, it is
impossible to judge. He lay at anchor one night, and calling together
his friends in Amphipolis, and collecting a sum of money for his
necessary expenses, upon advice of Caesar's approach, set sail from that
place, and arrived in a few days at Mitylene. Here he was detained two
days, and having added a few galleys to his fleet he went to Cilicia,
and thence to Cyprus. There he is informed that, by the consent of all
the inhabitants of Antioch and Roman citizens who traded there, the
castle had been seized to shut him out of the town; and that messengers
had been despatched to all those who were reported to have taken refuge
in the neighbouring states, that they should not come to Antioch; that
if they did that, it would be attended with imminent danger to their
lives. The same thing had happened to Lucius Lentulus, who had been
consul the year before, and to Publius Lentulus a consular senator, and
to several others at Rhodes, who having followed Pompey in his flight,
and arrived at the island, were not admitted into the town or port; and
having received a message to leave that neighbourhood, set sail much
against their will; for the rumour of Caesar's approach had now reached
those states.

CIII.--Pompey, being informed of these proceedings, laid aside his
design of going to Syria, and having taken the public money from the
farmers of the revenue, and borrowed more from some private friends, and
having put on board his ships a large quantity of brass for military
purposes, and two thousand armed men, whom he partly selected from the
slaves of the tax farmers, and partly collected from the merchants, and
such persons as each of his friends thought fit on this occasion, he
sailed for Pelusium. It happened that king Ptolemy, a minor, was there
with a considerable army, engaged in war with his sister Cleopatra, whom
a few months before, by the assistance of his relations and friends, he
had expelled from the kingdom; and her camp lay at a small distance from
his. To him Pompey applied to be permitted to take refuge in Alexandria,
and to be protected in his calamity by his powerful assistance, in
consideration of the friendship and amity which had subsisted between
his father and him. But Pompey's deputies having executed their
commission, began to converse with less restraint with the king's
troops, and to advise them to act with friendship to Pompey, and not to
think meanly of his bad fortune. In Ptolemy's army were several of
Pompey's soldiers, of whom Gabinius had received the command in Syria,
and had brought them over to Alexandria, and at the conclusion of the
war had left with Ptolemy the father of the young king.

CIV.--The king's friends, who were regents of the kingdom during the
minority, being informed of these things, either induced by fear, as
they afterwards declared, lest Pompey should corrupt the king's army,
and seize on Alexandria and Egypt; or despising his bad fortune, as in
adversity friends commonly change to enemies, in public gave a
favourable answer to his deputies, and desired him to come to the king;
but secretly laid a plot against him, and despatched Achillas, captain
of the king's guards, a man of singular boldness, and Lucius Septimius a
military tribune to assassinate him. Being kindly addressed by them, and
deluded by an acquaintance with Septimius, because in the war with the
pirates the latter had commanded a company under him, he embarked in a
small boat with a few attendants, and was there murdered by Achillas and
Septimius. In like manner, Lucius Lentulus was seized by the king's
order, and put to death in prison.

CV.--When Caesar arrived in Asia, he found that Titus Ampius had
attempted to remove the money from the temple of Diana at Ephesus; and
for this purpose had convened all the senators in the province that he
might have them to attest the sum, but was interrupted by Caesar's
arrival, and had made his escape. Thus, on two occasions, Caesar saved
the money of Ephesus. It was also remarked at Elis, in the temple of
Minerva, upon calculating and enumerating the days, that on the very day
on which Caesar had gained his battle, the image of Victory which was
placed before Minerva, and faced her statue, turned about towards the
portal and entrance of the temple; and the same day, at Antioch in
Syria, such a shout of an army and sound of trumpets was twice heard,
that the citizens ran in arms to the walls. The same thing happened at
Ptolemais; a sound of drums too was heard at Pergamus, in the private
and retired parts of the temple, into which none but the priests are
allowed admission, and which the Greeks call Adyta (the inaccessible),
and likewise at Tralles, in the temple of Victory, in which there stood
a statue consecrated to Caesar; a palm-tree at that time was shown that
had sprouted up from the pavement, through the joints of the stones, and
shot up above the roof.

CVI.--After a few days' delay in Asia, Caesar, having heard that Pompey
had been seen in Cyprus, and conjecturing that he had directed his
course into Egypt, on account of his connection with that kingdom, set
out for Alexandria with two legions (one of which he ordered to follow
him from Thessaly, the other he called in from Achaia, from Fufius, the
lieutenant-general) and with eight hundred horse, ten ships of war from
Rhodes, and a few from Asia. These legions amounted but to three
thousand two hundred men; the rest, disabled by wounds received in
various battles, by fatigue and the length of their march, could not
follow him. But Caesar, relying on the fame of his exploits; did not
hesitate to set forward with a feeble force, and thought that he would
be secure in any place. At Alexandria he was informed of the death of
Pompey: and at his landing there, heard a cry among the soldiers whom
the king had left to garrison the town, and saw a crowd gathering
towards him, because the fasces were carried before him; for this the
whole multitude thought an infringement of the king's dignity. Though
this tumult was appeased, frequent disturbances were raised for several
days successively, by crowds of the populace, and a great many of his
soldiers were killed in all parts of the city.

CVIL--Having observed this, he ordered other legions to be brought to
him from Asia, which he had made up out of Pompey's soldiers; for he was
himself detained against his will, by the etesian winds, which are
totally unfavourable to persons on a voyage from Alexandria. In the
meantime, considering that the disputes of the princes belonged to the
jurisdiction of the Roman people, and of him as consul, and that it was
a duty more incumbent on him, as in his former consulate a league had
been made with Ptolemy the late king, under sanction both of a law, and
a decree of the senate, he signified that it was his pleasure, that king
Ptolemy, and his sister Cleopatra, should disband their armies, and
decide their disputes in his presence by justice, rather than by the

CVIII.--A eunuch named Pothinus, the boy's tutor, was regent of the
kingdom on account of his youthfulness. He at first began to complain
amongst his friends, and to express his indignation, that the king
should be summoned to plead his cause: but afterwards, having prevailed
on some of those whom he had made acquainted with his views to join him,
he secretly called the army away from Pelusium to Alexandria, and
appointed Achillas, already spoken of, commander-in-chief of the forces.
Him he encouraged and animated by promises both in his own and the
king's name, and instructed him both by letters and messages how he
should act. By the will of Ptolemy the father, the elder of his two sons
and the more advanced in years of his two daughters were declared his
heirs, and for the more effectual performance of his intention, in the
same will he conjured the Roman people by all the gods, and by the
league which he had entered into at Rome, to see his will executed. One
of the copies of his will was conveyed to Rome by his ambassadors to be
deposited in the treasury, but the public troubles preventing it, it was
lodged with Pompey: another was left sealed up, and kept at Alexandria.

CIX.--Whilst these things were debated before Caesar, and he was very
anxious to settle the royal disputes as a common friend and arbitrator;
news was brought on a sudden that the king's army and all his cavalry
were on their march to Alexandria. Caesar's forces were by no means so
strong that he could trust to them, if he had occasion to hazard a
battle without the town. His only resource was to keep within the town
in the most convenient places, and get information of Achillas's
designs. However he ordered his soldiers to repair to their arms; and
advised the king to send some of his friends, who had the greatest
influence, as deputies to Achillas and to signify his royal pleasure.
Dioscorides and Serapion, the persons sent by him, who had both been
ambassadors at Rome, and had been in great esteem with Ptolemy the
father, went to Achillas. But as soon as they appeared in his presence,
without hearing them, or learning the occasion of their coming, he
ordered them to be seized and put to death. One of them, after receiving
a wound, was taken up and carried off by his attendants as dead: the
other was killed on the spot. Upon this, Caesar took care to secure the
king's person, both supposing that the king's name would have great
influence with his subjects, and to give the war the appearance of the
scheme of a few desperate men, rather than of having been begun by the
king's consent.

CX.--The forces under Achillas did not seem despicable, either for
number, spirit, or military experience; for he had twenty thousand men
under arms. They consisted partly of Gabinius's soldiers, who were now
become habituated to the licentious mode of living at Alexandria, and
had forgotten the name and discipline of the Roman people, and had
married wives there, by whom the greatest part of them had children. To
these was added a collection of highwaymen and free-booters, from Syria,
and the province of Cilicia, and the adjacent countries. Besides several
convicts and transports had been collected: for at Alexandria all our
runaway slaves were sure of finding protection for their persons on the
condition that they should give in their names, and enlist as soldiers:
and if any of them was apprehended by his master, he was rescued by a
crowd of his fellow soldiers, who being involved in the same guilt,
repelled, at the hazard of their lives, every violence offered to any of
their body. These by a prescriptive privilege of the Alexandrian army,
used to demand the king's favourites to be put to death, pillage the
properties of the rich to increase their pay, invest the king's palace,
banish some from the kingdom, and recall others from exile. Besides
these, there were two thousand horse, who had acquired the skill of
veterans by being in several wars in Alexandria. These had restored
Ptolemy the father to his kingdom, had killed Bibulus's two sons; and
had been engaged in war with the Egyptians; such was their experience in
military affairs.

CXI.--Full of confidence in his troops, and despising the small number
of Caesar's soldiers, Achillas seized Alexandria, except that part of
the town which Caesar occupied with his troops. At first he attempted to
force the palace; but Caesar had disposed his cohorts through the
streets, and repelled his attack. At the same time there was an action
at the port: where the contest was maintained with the greatest
obstinacy. For the forces were divided, and the fight maintained in
several streets at once, and the enemy endeavoured to seize with a
strong party the ships of war; of which fifty had been sent to Pompey's
assistance, but after the battle in Thessaly had returned home. They
were all of either three or five banks of oars, well equipped and
appointed with every necessary for a voyage. Besides these, there were
twenty-two vessels with decks, which were usually kept at Alexandria, to
guard the port. If they made themselves masters of these, Caesar being
deprived of his fleet, they would have the command of the port and whole
sea, and could prevent him from procuring provisions and auxiliaries.
Accordingly that spirit was displayed, which ought to be displayed when
the one party saw that a speedy victory depended on the issue, and the
other their safety. But Caesar gained the day, and set fire to all those
ships, and to others which were in the docks, because he could not guard
so many places with so small a force; and immediately he conveyed some
troops to the Pharos by his ships.

CXIL--The Pharos is a tower on an island, of prodigious height, built
with amazing works, and takes its name from the island. This island
lying over against Alexandria forms a harbour; but on the upper side it
is connected with the town by a narrow way eight hundred paces in
length, made by piles sunk in the sea, and by a bridge. In this island
some of the Egyptians have houses, and a village as large as a town; and
whatever ships from any quarter, either through mistaking the channel,
or by the storm, have been driven from their course upon the coast, they
constantly plunder like pirates. And without the consent of those who
are masters of the Pharos, no vessels can enter the harbour, on account
of its narrowness. Caesar being greatly alarmed on this account, whilst
the enemy were engaged in battle, landed his soldiers, seized the
Pharos, and placed a garrison in it. By this means he gained this point,
that he could be supplied without danger with corn and auxiliaries: for
he sent to all the neighbouring countries, to demand supplies. In other
parts of the town, they fought so obstinately, that they quitted the
field with equal advantage, and neither were beaten (in consequence of
the narrowness of the passes); and a few being killed on both sides,
Caesar secured the most necessary posts, and fortified them in the
night. In this quarter of the town was a wing of the king's palace, in
which Caesar was lodged on his first arrival, and a theatre adjoining
the house which served as for citadel, and commanded an avenue to the
port and other docks. These fortifications he increased during the
succeeding days, that he might have them before him as a rampart, and
not be obliged to fight against his will. In the meantime Ptolemy's
younger daughter, hoping the throne would become vacant, made her escape
from the palace to Achillas, and assisted him in prosecuting the war.
But they soon quarrelled about the command, which circumstance enlarged
the presents to the soldiers, for each endeavoured by great sacrifices
to secure their affection. Whilst the enemy was thus employed, Pothinus,
tutor to the young king, and regent of the kingdom, who was in Caesar's
part of the town, sent messengers to Achillas, and encouraged him not to
desist from his enterprise, nor to despair of success; but his
messengers being discovered and apprehended, he was put to death by
Caesar. Such was the commencement of the Alexandrian war.

Julius Caesar

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