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Book I

I.--When Caesar's letter was delivered to the consuls, they were with
great difficulty, and a hard struggle of the tribunes, prevailed on to
suffer it to be read in the senate; but the tribunes could not prevail,
that any question should be put to the senate on the subject of the
letter. The consuls put the question on the regulation of the state.
Lucius Lentulus the consul promises that he will not fail the senate and
republic, "if they declared their sentiments boldly and resolutely, but
if they turned their regard to Caesar, and courted his favour, as they
did on former occasions, he would adopt a plan for himself, and not
submit to the authority of the senate: that he too had a means of
regaining Caesar's favour and friendship." Scipio spoke to the same
purport, "that it was Pompey's intention not to abandon the republic, if
the senate would support him; but if they should hesitate and act
without energy, they would in vain implore his aid, if they should
require it hereafter."

II.--This speech of Scipio's, as the senate was convened in the city,
and Pompey was near at hand, seemed to have fallen from the lips of
Pompey himself. Some delivered their sentiments with more moderation, as
Marcellus first, who in the beginning of his speech, said, "that the
question ought not to be put to the senate on this matter, till levies
were made throughout all Italy, and armies raised under whose protection
the senate might freely and safely pass such resolutions as they thought
proper": as Marcus Calidius afterwards, who was of opinion, "that Pompey
should set out for his province, that there might be no cause for arms:
that Caesar was naturally apprehensive as two legions were forced from
him, that Pompey was retaining those troops, and keeping them near the
city to do him injury": as Marcus Rufus, who followed Calidius almost
word for word. They were all harshly rebuked by Lentulus, who
peremptorily refused to propose Calidius's motion. Marcellus, overawed
by his reproofs, retracted his opinion. Thus most of the senate,
intimidated by the expressions of the consul, by the fears of a present
army, and the threats of Pompey's friends, unwillingly and reluctantly
adopted Scipio's opinion, that Caesar should disband his army by a
certain day, and should he not do so, he should be considered as acting
against the state. Marcus Antonius, and Quintus Cassius, tribunes of the
people, interposed. The question was immediately put on their
interposition. Violent opinions were expressed: whoever spoke with the
greatest acrimony and cruelty, was most highly commended by Caesar's

III.--The senate having broken up in the evening, all who belonged to
that order were summoned by Pompey. He applauded the forward, and
secured their votes for the next day; the more moderate he reproved and
excited against Caesar. Many veterans, from all parts, who had served in
Pompey's armies, were invited to his standard by the hopes of rewards
and promotions. Several officers belonging to the two legions, which had
been delivered up by Caesar, were sent for. The city and the Comitium
were crowded with tribunes, centurions, and veterans. All the consuls'
friends, all Pompey's connections, all those who bore any ancient enmity
to Caesar, were forced into the senate house. By their concourse and
declarations the timid were awed, the irresolute confirmed, and the
greater part deprived of the power of speaking their sentiments with
freedom. Lucius Piso, the censor, offered to go to Caesar: as did
likewise Lucius Roscius, the praetor, to inform him of these affairs,
and require only six days' time to finish the business. Opinions were
expressed by some to the effect that commissioners should be sent to
Caesar to acquaint him with the senate's pleasure.

IV.--All these proposals were rejected, and opposition made to them all,
in the speeches of the consul, Scipio, and Cato. An old grudge against
Caesar and chagrin at a defeat actuated Cato. Lentulus was wrought upon
by the magnitude of his debts, and the hopes of having the government of
an army and provinces, and by the presents which he expected from such
princes as should receive the title of friends of the Roman people, and
boasted amongst his friends, that he would be a second Sylla, to whom
the supreme authority should return. Similar hopes of a province and
armies, which he expected to share with Pompey on account of his
connection with him, urged on Scipio; and moreover, [he was influenced
by] the fear of being called to trial, and the adulation and an
ostentatious display of himself and his friends in power, who at that
time had great influence in the republic, and courts of judicature.
Pompey himself, incited by Caesar's enemies, because he was unwilling
that any person should bear an equal degree of dignity, had wholly
alienated himself from Caesar's friendship, and procured a
reconciliation with their common enemies; the greatest part of whom he
had himself brought upon Caesar during his affinity with him. At the
same time, chagrined at the disgrace which he had incurred by converting
the two legions from their expedition through Asia and Syria, to
[augment] his own power and authority, he was anxious to bring matters
to a war.

V.--For these reasons everything was done in a hasty and disorderly
manner, and neither was time given to Caesar's relations to inform him
[of the state of affairs] nor liberty to the tribunes of the people to
deprecate their own danger, nor even to retain the last privilege, which
Sylla had left them, the interposing their authority; but on the seventh
day they were obliged to think of their own safety, which the most
turbulent tribunes of the people were not accustomed to attend to, nor
to fear being called to an account for their actions, till the eighth
month. Recourse is had to that extreme and final decree of the senate
(which was never resorted to even by daring proposers except when the
city was in danger of being set on fire, or when the public safety was
despaired of). "That the consuls, praetors, tribunes of the people, and
proconsuls in the city should take care that the state received no
injury." These decrees are dated the eighth day before the ides of
January; therefore, in the first five days, on which the senate could
meet, from the day on which Lentulus entered into his consulate, the two
days of election excepted, the severest and most virulent decrees were
passed against Caesar's government, and against those most illustrious
characters, the tribunes of the people. The latter immediately made
their escape from the city, and withdrew to Caesar, who was then at
Ravenna, awaiting an answer to his moderate demands; [to see] if matters
could be brought to a peaceful termination by any equitable act on the
part of the enemies.

VI.--During the succeeding days the senate is convened outside the city.
Pompey repeated the same things which he had declared through Scipio. He
applauded the courage and firmness of the senate, acquainted them with
his force, and told them that he had ten legions ready; that he was
moreover informed and assured that Caesar's soldiers were disaffected,
and that he could not persuade them to defend or even follow him.
Motions were made in the senate concerning other matters; that levies
should be made through all Italy; that Faustus Sylla should be sent as
propraetor into Mauritania; that money should be granted to Pompey from
the public treasury. It was also put to the vote that king Juba should
be [honoured with the title of] friend and ally. But Marcellus said that
he would not allow this motion for the present. Philip, one of the
tribunes, stopped [the appointment of] Sylla; the resolutions respecting
the other matters passed. The provinces, two of which were consular, the
remainder praetorian, were decreed to private persons; Scipio got Syria,
Lucius Domitius Gaul: Philip and Marcellus were omitted, from a private
motive, and their lots were not even admitted. To the other provinces
praetors were sent, nor was time granted as in former years, to refer to
the people on their appointment, nor to make them take the usual oath,
and march out of the city in a public manner, robed in the military
habit, after offering their vows; a circumstance which had never before
happened. Both the consuls leave the city, and private men had lictors
in the city and capital, contrary to all precedents of former times.
Levies were made throughout Italy, arms demanded, and money exacted from
the municipal towns, and violently taken from the temples. All
distinctions between things human and divine are confounded.

VII.--These things being made known to Caesar, he harangued his
soldiers; he reminded them "of the wrongs done to him at all times by
his enemies, and complained that Pompey had been alienated from him and
led astray by them through envy and a malicious opposition to his glory,
though he had always favoured and promoted Pompey's honour and dignity.
He complained that an innovation had been introduced into the republic,
that the intercession of the tribunes, which had been restored a few
years before by Sylla, was branded as a crime, and suppressed by force
of arms; that Sylla, who had stripped the tribunes of every other power,
had, nevertheless, left the privilege of intercession unrestrained; that
Pompey, who pretended to restore what they had lost, had taken away the
privileges which they formerly had; that whenever the senate decreed,
"that the magistrates should take care that the republic sustained no
injury" (by which words and decree the Roman people were obliged to
repair to arms), it was only when pernicious laws were proposed; when
the tribunes attempted violent measures; when the people seceded, and
possessed themselves of the temples and eminences of the city; (and
these instances of former times, he showed them were expiated by the
fate of Saturninus and the Gracchi): that nothing of this kind was
attempted now, nor even thought of: that no law was promulgated, no
intrigue with the people going forward, no secession made; he exhorted
them to defend from the malice of his enemies, the reputation and honour
of that general, under whose command they had for nine years most
successfully supported the state; fought many successful battles, and
subdued all Gaul and Germany." The soldiers of the thirteenth legion,
which was present (for in the beginning of the disturbances he had
called it out, his other legions not having yet arrived), all cry out
that they are ready to defend their general, and the tribunes of the
commons, from all injuries.

VIII.--Having made himself acquainted with the disposition of his
soldiers, Caesar set off with that legion to Ariminum, and there met the
tribunes, who had fled to him for protection; he called his other
legions from winter quarters, and ordered them to follow him. Thither
came Lucius Caesar, a young man, whose father was a lieutenant general
under Caesar. He, after concluding the rest of his speech, and stating
for what purpose he had come, told Caesar that he had commands of a
private nature for him from Pompey; that Pompey wished to clear himself
to Caesar, lest he should impute those actions which he did for the
republic, to a design of affronting him; that he had ever preferred the
interest of the state to his own private connections; that Caesar, too,
for his own honour, ought to sacrifice his desires and resentment to the
public good, and not vent his anger so violently against his enemies,
lest in his hopes of injuring them, he should injure the republic. He
spoke a few words to the same purport from himself, in addition to
Pompey's apology. Roscius, the praetor, conferred with Caesar almost in
the same words, and on the same subject, and declared that Pompey had
empowered him to do so.

IX.--Though these things seemed to have no tendency towards redressing
his injuries, yet having got proper persons by whom he could communicate
his wishes to Pompey; he required of them both, that as they had
conveyed Pompey's demands to him, they should not refuse to convey his
demands to Pompey; if by so little trouble they could terminate a great
dispute, and liberate all Italy from her fears.

"That the honour of the republic had ever been his first object, and
dearer to him than life; that he was chagrined, that the favour of the
Roman people was wrested from him by the injurious reports of his
enemies; that he was deprived of a half-year's command, and dragged back
to the city, though the people had ordered that regard should be paid to
his suit for the consulate at the next election, though he was not
present; that, however, he had patiently submitted to this loss of
honour for the sake of the republic; that when he wrote letters to the
senate, requiring that all persons should resign the command of their
armies, he did not obtain even that request; that levies were made
throughout Italy; that the two legions which had been taken from him,
under the pretence of the Parthian war, were kept at home, and that the
state was in arms. To what did all these things tend, unless to his
ruin? But, nevertheless, he was ready to condescend to any terms, and to
endure everything for the sake of the republic. Let Pompey go to his own
province; let them both disband their armies; let all persons in Italy
lay down their arms; let all fears be removed from the city; let free
elections, and the whole republic be resigned to the direction of the
senate and Roman people. That these things might be the more easily
performed, and conditions secured and confirmed by oath, either let
Pompey come to Caesar, or allow Caesar to go to him; it might be that
all their disputes would be settled by an interview."

X.--Roscius and Lucius Caesar, having received this message, went to
Capua, where they met the consuls and Pompey, and declared to them
Caesar's terms. Having deliberated on the matter, they replied, and sent
written proposals to him by the same persons, the purport of which was,
that Caesar should return into Gaul, leave Ariminum, and disband his
army: if he complied with this, that Pompey would go to Spain. In the
meantime, until security was given that Caesar would perform his
promises, that the consuls and Pompey would not give over their levies.

XI.--It was not an equitable proposal, to require that Caesar should
quit Ariminum and return to his province; but that he [Pompey] should
himself retain his province and the legions that belonged to another,
and desire that Caesar's army should be disbanded, whilst he himself was
making new levies: and that he should merely promise to go to his
province, without naming the day on which he would set out; so that if
he should not set out till after Caesar's consulate expired, yet he
would not appear bound by any religious scruples about asserting a
falsehood. But his not granting time for a conference, nor promising to
set out to meet him, made the expectation of peace appear very hopeless.
Caesar, therefore, sent Marcus Antonius, with five cohorts from Ariminum
to Arretium; he himself stayed at Ariminum with two legions, with the
intention of raising levies there. He secured Pisaurus, Fanum, and
Ancona, with a cohort each.

XII.--In the meantime, being informed that Thermus the praetor was in
possession of Iguvium, with five cohorts, and was fortifying the town,
but that the affections of all the inhabitants were very well inclined
towards himself; he detached Curio with three cohorts, which he had at
Ariminum and Pisaurus. Upon notice of his approach, Thermus, distrusting
the affections of the townsmen, drew his cohorts out of it, and made his
escape; his soldiers deserted him on the road, and returned home. Curio
recovered Iguvium, with the cheerful concurrence of all the inhabitants.
Caesar, having received an account of this, and relying on the
affections of the municipal towns, drafted all the cohorts of the
thirteenth legion from the garrisons, and set out for Auximum, a town
into which Attius had brought his cohorts, and of which he had taken
possession, and from which he had sent senators round about the country
of Picenum, to raise new levies.

XIII.--Upon news of Caesar's approach, the senate of Auximum went in a
body to Attius Varus; and told him that it was not a subject for them to
determine upon: yet neither they, nor the rest of the freemen would
suffer Caius Caesar, a general, who had merited so well of the republic,
after performing such great achievements, to be excluded from their town
and walls; wherefore he ought to pay some regard to the opinion of
posterity, and his own danger. Alarmed at this declaration, Attius Varus
drew out of the town the garrison which he had introduced, and fled. A
few of Caesar's front rank having pursued him, obliged him to halt, and
when the battle began, Varus is deserted by his troops: some of them
disperse to their homes, the rest come over to Caesar; and along with
them, Lucius Pupius, the chief centurion, is taken prisoner and brought
to Caesar. He had held the same rank before in Cneius Pompey's army. But
Caesar applauded the soldiers of Attius, set Pupius at liberty, returned
thanks to the people of Auximum, and promised to be grateful for their

XIV.--Intelligence of this being brought to Rome, so great a panic
spread on a sudden that when Lentulus, the consul, came to open the
treasury, to deliver money to Pompey by the senate's decree, immediately
on opening the hallowed door he fled from the city. For it was falsely
rumoured that Caesar was approaching, and that his cavalry were already
at the gates. Marcellus, his colleague, followed him, and so did most of
the magistrates. Cneius Pompey had left the city the day before, and was
on his march to those legions which he had received from Caesar, and had
disposed in winter quarters in Apulia. The levies were stopped within
the city. No place on this side of Capua was thought secure. At Capua
they first began to take courage and to rally, and determined to raise
levies in the colonies, which had been sent thither by the Julian law:
and Lentulus brought into the public market-place the gladiators which
Caesar maintained there for the entertainment of the people, and
confirmed them in their liberty, and gave them horses and ordered them
to attend him; but afterwards, being warned by his friends that this
action was censured by the judgment of all, he distributed them among
the slaves of the districts of Campania, to keep guard there.

XV.--Caesar, having moved forward from Auximum, traversed the whole
country of Picenum. All the governors in these countries most cheerfully
received him, and aided his army with every necessary. Ambassadors came
to him even from Cingulum, a town which Labienus had laid out and built
at his own expense, and offered most earnestly to comply with his
orders. He demanded soldiers: they sent them. In the meantime, the
twelfth legion came to join Caesar; with these two he marched to
Asculum, the chief town of Picenum. Lentulus Spinther occupied that town
with ten cohorts; but, on being informed of Caesar's approach, he fled
from the town, and, in attempting to bring off his cohorts with him, was
deserted by a great part of his men. Being left on the road with a small
number, he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, who was sent by Pompey into
Picenum to confirm the people [in their allegiance]. Vibullius, being
informed by him of the transactions in Picenum, takes his soldiers from
him and dismisses him. He collects, likewise, from the neighbouring
countries, as many cohorts as he can from Pompey's new levies. Amongst
them he meets with Ulcilles Hirrus fleeing from Camerinum, with six
cohorts, which he had in the garrison there; by a junction with which he
made up thirteen cohorts. With them he marched by hasty journeys to
Corfinium, to Domitius Aenobarbus, and informed him that Caesar was
advancing with two legions. Domitius had collected about twenty cohorts
from Alba, and the Marsians, Pelignians, and neighbouring states.

XVI.--Caesar, having recovered Asculum and driven out Lentulus, ordered
the soldiers that had deserted from him to be sought out and a muster to
be made; and, having delayed for one day there to provide corn, he
marched to Corfinium. On his approach, five cohorts, sent by Domitius
from the town, were breaking down a bridge which was over the river, at
three miles' distance from it. An engagement taking place there with
Caesar's advanced-guard, Domitius's men were quickly beaten off from the
bridge and retreated precipitately into the town. Caesar, having marched
his legions over, halted before the town and encamped close by the

XVII.--Domitius, upon observing this, sent messengers well acquainted
with the country, encouraged by a promise of being amply rewarded, with
despatches to Pompey to Apulia, to beg and entreat him to come to his
assistance. That Caesar could be easily enclosed by the two armies,
through the narrowness of the country, and prevented from obtaining
supplies: unless he did so, that he and upwards of thirty cohorts, and a
great number of senators and Roman knights, would be in extreme danger.
In the meantime he encouraged his troops, disposed engines on the walls,
and assigned to each man a particular part of the city to defend. In a
speech to the soldiers he promised them lands out of his own estate; to
every private soldier four acres, and a corresponding share to the
centurions and veterans.

XVIII.--In the meantime, word was brought to Caesar that the people of
Sulmo, a town about seven miles distant from Corfinium, were ready to
obey his orders, but were prevented by Quintus Lucretius, a senator, and
Attius, a Pelignian, who were in possession of the town with a garrison
of seven cohorts. He sent Marcus Antonius thither, with five cohorts of
the eighth legion. The inhabitants, as soon as they saw our standards,
threw open their gates, and all the people, both citizens and soldiers,
went out to meet and welcome Antonius. Lucretius and Attius leaped off
the walls. Attius, being brought before Antonius, begged that he might
be sent to Caesar. Antonius returned the same day on which he had set
out with the cohorts and Attius. Caesar added these cohorts to his own
army, and sent Attius away in safety. The three first days Caesar
employed in fortifying his camp with strong works, in bringing in corn
from the neighbouring free towns, and waiting for the rest of his
forces. Within the three days the eighth legion came to him, and
twenty-two cohorts of the new levies in Gaul, and about three hundred
horse from the king of Noricum. On their arrival he made a second camp
on another part of the town, and gave the command of it to Curio. He
determined to surround the town with a rampart and turrets during the
remainder of the time. Nearly at the time when the greatest part of the
work was completed, all the messengers sent to Pompey returned.

XIX.--Having read Pompey's letter, Domitius, concealing the truth, gave
out in council that Pompey would speedily come to their assistance; and
encouraged them not to despond, but to provide everything necessary for
the defence of the town. He held private conferences with a few of his
most intimate friends, and determined on the design of fleeing. As
Domitius's countenance did not agree with his words, and he did
everything with more confusion and fear than he had shown on the
preceding days, and as he had several private meetings with his friends,
contrary to his usual practice, in order to take their advice, and as he
avoided all public councils and assemblies of the people, the truth
could be no longer hid nor dissembled; for Pompey had written back in
answer, "That he would not put matters to the last hazard; that Domitius
had retreated into the town of Corfinium, without either his advice or
consent. Therefore, if any opportunity should offer, he [Domitius]
should come to him with the whole force." But the blockade and works
round the town prevented his escape.

XX.--Domitius's design being noised abroad, the soldiers in Confinium
[**error in original: should be CORFINIUM] early in the evening began to
mutiny, and held a conference with each other by their tribunes and
centurions, and the most respectable amongst themselves: "that they were
besieged by Caesar; that his works and fortifications were almost
finished; that their general, Domitius, on whose hopes and expectations
they had confided, had thrown them off, and was meditating his own
escape; that they ought to provide for their own safety." At first the
Marsians differed in opinion, and possessed themselves of that part of
the town which they thought the strongest. And so violent a dispute
arose between them, that they attempted to fight and decide it by arms.
However, in a little time, by messengers sent from one side to the
other, they were informed of Domitius's meditated flight, of which they
were previously ignorant. Therefore they all with one consent brought
Domitius into public view, gathered round him, and guarded him; and sent
deputies out of their number to Caesar, to say that they were ready to
throw open their gates, to do whatever he should order, and to deliver
up Domitius alive into his hands.

XXI.--Upon intelligence of these matters, though Caesar thought it of
great consequence to become master of the town as soon as possible, and
to transfer the cohorts to his own camp, lest any change should be
wrought on their inclinations by bribes, encouragement, or fictitious
messages, because in war great events are often brought about by
trifling circumstances; yet, dreading lest the town should be plundered
by the soldiers entering into it, and taking advantage of the darkness
of the night, he commended the persons who came to him, and sent them
back to the town, and ordered the gates and walls to be secured. He
disposed his soldiers on the works, which he had begun, not at certain
intervals, as was his practice before, but in one continued range of
sentinels and stations, so that they touched each other, and formed a
circle round the whole fortification; he ordered the tribunes and
general officers to ride round; and exhorted them not only to be on
their guard against sallies from the town, but also to watch that no
single person should get out privately. Nor was any man so negligent or
drowsy as to sleep that night. To so great height was their expectation
raised, that they were carried away, heart and soul, each to different
objects, what would become of the Corfinians, what of Domitius, what of
Lentulus, what of the rest; what event would be the consequence of

XXII.--About the fourth watch, Lentulus Spinther said to our sentinels
and guards from the walls, that he desired to have an interview with
Caesar, if permission were given him. Having obtained it, he was
escorted out of town; nor did the soldiers of Domitius leave him till
they brought him into Caesar's presence. He pleaded with Caesar for his
life, and entreated him to spare him, and reminded him of their former
friendship; and acknowledged that Caesar's favours to him were very
great; in that through his interest he had been admitted into the
college of priests; in that after his praetorship he had been appointed
to the government of Spain; in that he had been assisted by him in his
suit for the consulate. Caesar interrupted him in his speech, and told
him, "that he had not left his province to do mischief [to any man], but
to protect himself from the injuries of his enemies; to restore to their
dignity the tribunes of the people who had been driven out of the city
on his account, and to assert his own liberty, and that of the Roman
people, who were oppressed by a few factious men." Encouraged by this
address, Lentulus begged leave to return to the town, that the security
which he had obtained for himself might be an encouragement to the rest
to hope for theirs; saying that some were so terrified that they were
induced to make desperate attempts on their own lives. Leave being
granted him, he departed.

XXIII.--When day appeared Caesar ordered all the senators and their
children, the tribunes of the soldiers, and the Roman knights, to be
brought before him. Among the persons of senatorial rank were Lucius
Domitius, Publius Lentulus Spinther, Lucius Vibullius Rufus, Sextus
Quintilius Varus, the quaestor, and Lucius Rubrius, besides the son of
Domitius, and several other young men, and a great number of Roman
knights and burgesses, whom Domitius had summoned from the municipal
towns. When they were brought before him he protected them from the
insolence and taunts of the soldiers; told them in few words that they
had not made him a grateful return, on their part, for his very
extraordinary kindness to them, and dismissed them all in safety. Sixty
sestertia, which Domitius had brought with him and lodged in the public
treasury, being brought to Caesar by the magistrates of Corfinium, he
gave them back to Domitius, that he might not appear more moderate with
respect to the life of men than in money matters, though he knew that it
was public money, and had been given by Pompey to pay his army. He
ordered Domitius's soldiers to take the oath to himself, and that day
decamped and performed the regular march. He stayed only seven days
before Corfinium, and marched into Apulia through the country of the
Marrucinians, Frentanians, and Larinates.

XXIV.--Pompey, being informed of what had passed at Corfinium, marches
from Luceria to Canusium, and thence to Brundusium. He orders all the
forces raised everywhere by the new levies to repair to him. He gives
arms to the slaves that attended the flocks, and appoints horses for
them. Of these he made up about three hundred horse. Lucius, the
praetor, fled from Alba, with six cohorts: Rutilus Lupus, the praetor,
from Tarracina, with three. These having descried Caesar's cavalry at a
distance, which were commanded by Bivius Curius, and having deserted the
praetor, carried their colours to Curius and went over to him. In like
manner during the rest of his march, several cohorts fell in with the
main body of Caesar's army, others with his horse. Cneius Magius, from
Cremona, engineer-general to Pompey, was taken prisoner on the road and
brought to Caesar, but sent back by him to Pompey with this message: "As
hitherto he had not been allowed an interview, and was now on his march
to him at Brundusium, that it deeply concerned the commonwealth and
general safety that he should have an interview with Pompey; and that
the same advantage could not be gained at a great distance when the
proposals were conveyed to them by others, as if terms were argued by
them both in person."

XXV.--Having delivered this message he marched to Brundusium with six
legions, four of them veterans: the rest those which he had raised in
the late levy and completed on his march, for he had sent all Domitius's
cohorts immediately from Corfinium to Sicily. He discovered that the
consuls were gone to Dyrrachium with a considerable part of the army,
and that Pompey remained at Brundusium with twenty cohorts; but could
not find out, for a certainty, whether Pompey stayed behind to keep
possession of Brundusium, that he might the more easily command the
whole Adriatic sea, with the extremities of Italy and the coast of
Greece, and be able to conduct the war on either side of it, or whether
he remained there for want of shipping; and, being afraid that Pompey
would come to the conclusion that he ought not to relinquish Italy, he
determined to deprive him of the means of communication afforded by the
harbour of Brundusium. The plan of his work was as follows:--Where the
mouth of the port was narrowest he threw up a mole of earth on either
side, because in these places the sea was shallow. Having gone out so
far that the mole could not be continued in the deep water, he fixed
double floats, thirty feet on either side, before the mole. These he
fastened with four anchors at the four corners, that they might not be
carried away by the waves. Having completed and secured them, he then
joined to them other floats of equal size. These he covered over with
earth and mould, that he might not be prevented from access to them to
defend them, and in the front and on both sides he protected them with a
parapet of wicker work; and on every fourth one raised a turret, two
stories high, to secure them the better from being attacked by the
shipping and set on fire.

XXVI.--To counteract this, Pompey fitted out large merchant ships, which
he found in the harbour of Brundusium: on them he erected turrets three
stories high, and, having furnished them with several engines and all
sorts of weapons, drove them amongst Caesar's works, to break through
the floats and interrupt the works; thus there happened skirmishes every
day at a distance with slings, arrows, and other weapons. Caesar
conducted matters as if he thought that the hopes of peace were not yet
to be given up. And though he was very much surprised that Magius, whom
he had sent to Pompey with a message, was not sent back to him; and
though his attempting a reconciliation often retarded the vigorous
prosecution of his plans, yet he thought that he ought by all means to
persevere in the same line of conduct. He therefore sent Caninius
Rebilus to have an interview with Scribonius Libo, his intimate friend
and relation. He charges him to exhort Libo to effect a peace, but,
above all things, requires that he should be admitted to an interview
with Pompey. He declared that he had great hopes, if that were allowed
him, that the consequence would be that both parties would lay down
their arms on equal terms; that a great share of the glory and
reputation of that event would redound to Libo, if, through his advice
and agency, hostilities should be ended. Libo, having parted from the
conference with Caninius, went to Pompey, and, shortly after, returns
with answer that, as the consuls were absent, no treaty of compositions
could be engaged in without them. Caesar therefore thought it time at
length to give over the attempt which he had often made in vain, and act
with energy in the war.

XXVII.--When Caesar's works were nearly half finished, and after nine
days were spent in them, the ships which had conveyed the first division
of the army to Dyrrachium being sent back by the consuls, returned to
Brundusium. Pompey, either frightened at Caesar's works or determined
from the beginning to quit Italy, began to prepare for his departure on
the arrival of the ships; and the more effectually to retard Caesar's
attack, lest his soldiers should force their way into the town at the
moment of his departure, he stopped up the gates, built walls across the
streets and avenues, sunk trenches across the ways, and in them fixed
palisadoes and sharp stakes, which he made level with the ground by
means of hurdles and clay. But he barricaded with large beams fastened
in the ground and sharpened at the ends two passages and roads without
the walls, which led to the port. After making these arrangements, he
ordered his soldiers to go on board without noise, and disposed here and
there, on the wall and turrets, some light-armed veterans, archers and
slingers. These he designed to call off by a certain signal, when all
the soldiers were embarked, and left row-galleys for them in a secure

XXVIII.--The people of Brundusium, irritated by the insolence of
Pompey's soldiers, and the insults received from Pompey himself, were in
favour of Caesar's party. Therefore, as soon as they were aware of
Pompey's departure, whilst his men were running up and down, and busied
about their voyage, they made signs from the tops of the houses: Caesar,
being apprized of the design by them, ordered scaling ladders to be got
ready, and his men to take arms, that he might not lose any opportunity
of coming to an action. Pompey weighed anchor at nightfall. The soldiers
who had been posted on the wall to guard it, were called off by the
signal which had been agreed on, and knowing the roads, ran down to the
ships. Caesar's soldiers fixed their ladders and scaled the walls: but
being cautioned by the people to beware of the hidden stakes and covered
trenches, they halted, and being conducted by the inhabitants by a long
circuit, they reached the port, and captured with their long boats and
small craft two of Pompey's ships, full of soldiers, which had struck
against Caesar's moles.

XXIX.-Though Caesar highly approved of collecting a fleet, and crossing
the sea, and pursuing Pompey before he could strengthen himself with his
transmarine auxiliaries, with the hope of bringing the war to a
conclusion, yet he dreaded the delay and length of time necessary to
effect it: because Pompey, by collecting all his ships, had deprived him
of the means of pursuing him at present. The only resource left to
Caesar, was to wait for a fleet from the distant regions of Gaul,
Picenum, and the straits of Gibraltar. But this, on account of the
season of the year, appeared tedious and troublesome. He was unwilling
that, in the meantime, the veteran army, and the two Spains, one of
which was bound to Pompey by the strongest obligations, should be
confirmed in his interest; that auxiliaries and cavalry should be
provided and Gaul and Italy reduced in his absence.

XXX.--Therefore, for the present, he relinquished all intention of
pursuing Pompey, and resolved to march to Spain, and commanded the
magistrates of the free towns to procure him ships, and to have them
conveyed to Brundusium. He detached Valerius, his lieutenant, with one
legion to Sardinia; Curio, the proprietor, to Sicily with three legions;
and ordered him, when he had recovered Sicily, to immediately transport
his army to Africa. Marcus Cotta was at this time governor of Sardinia:
Marcus Cato, of Sicily: and Tubero, by the lots, should have had the
government of Africa. The Caralitani, as soon as they heard that
Valerius was sent against them, even before he left Italy, of their own
accord drove Cotta out of the town; who, terrified because he understood
that the whole province was combined [against him], fled from Sardinia
to Africa. Cato was in Sicily, repairing the old ships of war, and
demanding new ones from the states, and these things he performed with
great zeal. He was raising levies of Roman citizens, among the Lucani
and Brutii, by his lieutenants, and exacting a certain quota of horse
and foot from the states of Sicily. When these things were nearly
completed, being informed of Curio's approach, he made a complaint that
he was abandoned and betrayed by Pompey, who had undertaken an
unnecessary war, without making any preparation, and when questioned by
him and other members in the senate, had assured them that every thing
was ready and provided for the war. After having made these complaints
in a public assembly, he fled from his province.

XXXI.--Valerius found Sardinia, and Curio, Sicily, deserted by their
governors when they arrived there with their armies. When Tubero arrived
in Africa, he found Attius Varus in the government of the province, who,
having lost his cohorts, as already related, at Auximum, had straightway
fled to Africa, and finding it without a governor, had seized it of his
own accord, and making levies, had raised two legions. From his
acquaintance with the people and country, and his knowledge of that
province, he found the means of effecting this; because a few years
before, at the expiration of his praetorship, he had obtained that
province. He, when Tubero came to Utica with his fleet, prevented his
entering the port or town, and did not suffer his son, though labouring
under sickness, to set foot on shore; but obliged him to weigh anchor
and quit the place.

XXXIL.--When these affairs were despatched, Caesar, that there might be
an intermission from labour for the rest of the season, drew off his
soldiers to the nearest municipal towns, and set off in person for Rome.
Having assembled the senate, he reminded them of the injustice of his
enemies; and told them, "That he aimed at no extraordinary honour, but
had waited for the time appointed by law, for standing candidate for the
consulate, being contented with what was allowed to every citizen. That
a bill had been carried by the ten tribunes of the people
(notwithstanding the resistance of his enemies, and a very violent
opposition from Cato, who in his usual manner, consumed the day by a
tedious harangue) that he should be allowed to stand candidate, though
absent, even in the consulship of Pompey; and if the latter disapproved
of the bill, why did he allow it to pass? if he approved of it, why
should he debar him [Caesar] from the people's favour? He made mention
of his own patience, in that he had freely proposed that all armies
should be disbanded, by which he himself would suffer the loss both of
dignity and honour. He urged the virulence of his enemies, who refused
to comply with what they required from others, and had rather that all
things should be thrown into confusion, than that they should lose their
power and their armies. He expatiated on their injustice, in taking away
his legions: their cruelty and insolence in abridging the privileges of
the tribunes; the proposals he had made, and his entreaties of an
interview, which had been refused him: For which reasons, he begged and
desired that they would undertake the management of the republic, and
unite with him in the administration of it. But if through fear they
declined it, he would not be a burden to them, but take the management
of it on himself. That deputies ought to be sent to Pompey, to propose a
reconciliation; as he did not regard what Pompey had lately asserted in
the senate, that authority was acknowledged to be vested in those
persons to whom ambassadors were sent, and fear implied in those that
sent them. That these were the sentiments of low, weak minds: that for
his part, as he had made it his study to surpass others in glory, so he
was desirous of excelling them in justice and equity."

XXXIII.--The senate approved of sending deputies, but none could be
found fit to execute the commission: for every person, from his own
private fears, declined the office. For Pompey, on leaving the city, had
declared in the open senate, that he would hold in the same degree of
estimation, those who stayed in Rome and those in Caesar's camp. Thus
three days were wasted in disputes and excuses. Besides, Lucius
Metellus, one of the tribunes, was suborned by Caesar's enemies, to
prevent this, and to embarrass everything else which Caesar should
propose. Caesar having discovered his intention, after spending several
days to no purpose, left the city, in order that he might not lose any
more time, and went to Transalpine Gaul, without effecting what he had

XXXIV.--On his arrival there, he was informed that, Vibullius Rufus,
whom he had taken a few days before at Corfinium, and set at liberty,
was sent by Pompey into Spain; and that Domitius also was gone to seize
Massilia with seven row-galleys, which were fitted up by some private
persons at Igilium and Cosa, and which he had manned with his own
slaves, freedmen, and colonists: and that some young noblemen of
Massilia had been sent before him; whom Pompey, when leaving Rome had
exhorted, that the late services of Caesar should not erase from their
minds the memory of his former favours. On receiving this message, the
Massilians had shut their gates against Caesar, and invited over to them
the Albici, who had formerly been in alliance with them, and who
inhabited the mountains that overhung Massilia: they had likewise
conveyed the corn from the surrounding country, and from all the forts
into the city; had opened armouries in the city: and were repairing the
walls, the fleet, and the gates.

XXXV.--Caesar sent for fifteen of the principal persons of Massilia to
attend him. To prevent the war commencing among them, he remonstrates
[in the following language]; "that they ought to follow the precedent
set by all Italy, rather than submit to the will of any one man." He
made use of such arguments as he thought would tend to bring them to
reason. The deputies reported his speech to their countrymen, and by the
authority of the state bring him back this answer: "That they understood
that the Roman people was divided into two factions: that they had
neither judgment nor abilities to decide which had the juster cause; but
that the heads of these factions were Cneius Pompey and Caius Caesar,
the two patrons of the state: the former of whom had granted to their
state the lands of the Volcae Arecomici, and Helvii; the latter had
assigned them a part of his conquests in Gaul, and had augmented their
revenue. Wherefore, having received equal favours from both, they ought
to show equal affection to both, and assist neither against the other,
nor admit either into their city or harbours."

XXXVI.--Whilst this treaty was going forward, Domitius arrived at
Massilia with his fleet, and was received into the city, and made
governor of it. The chief management of the war was entrusted to him. At
his command they send the fleet to all parts; they seize all the
merchantmen they could meet with, and carry them into the harbour; they
apply the nails, timber, and rigging, with which they were furnished to
rig and refit their other vessels. They lay up in the public stores, all
the corn that was found in the ships, and reserve the rest of their
lading and convoy for the siege of the town, should such an event take
place. Provoked at such ill treatment, Caesar led three legions against
Massilia, and resolved to provide turrets, and vinae to assault the
town, and to build twelve ships at Arelas, which being completed and
rigged in thirty days (from the time the timber was cut down), and being
brought to Massilia, he put under the command of Decimus Brutus; and
left Caius Trebonius his lieutenant, to invest the city.

XXXVII.--Whilst he was preparing and getting these things in readiness,
he sent Caius Fabius one of his lieutenants into Spain with three
legions, which he had disposed in winter quarters in Narbo, and the
neighbouring country; and ordered him immediately to seize the passes of
the Pyrenees, which were at that time occupied by detachments from
Lucius Afranius, one of Pompey's lieutenants. He desired the other
legions, which were passing the winter at a great distance, to follow
close after him. Fabius, according to his orders, by using expedition,
dislodged the party from the hills, and by hasty marches came up with
the army of Afranius.

XXXVIII.--On the arrival of Vibullius Rufus, whom, we have already
mentioned, Pompey had sent into Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro,
his lieutenants (one of whom had the command of Hither Spain, with three
legions; the second of the country from the forest of Castulo to the
river Guadiana with two legions; the third from the river Guadiana to
the country of the Vettones and Lusitania, with the like number of
legions), divided amongst themselves their respective departments.
Petreius was to march from Lusitania through the Vettones, and join
Afranius with all his forces; Varro was to guard all Further Spain with
what legions he had. These matters being settled, reinforcements of
horse and foot were demanded from Lusitania, by Petreius; from the
Celtiberi, Cantabri, and all the barbarous nations which border on the
ocean, by Afranius. When they were raised, Petreius immediately marched
through the Vettones to Afranius. They resolved by joint consent to
carry on the war in the vicinity of Ilerda, on account of the advantages
of its situation.

XXXIX.--Afranius, as above mentioned, had three legions, Petreius two.
There were besides about eighty cohorts raised in Hither and Further
Spain (of which, the troops belonging to the former province had
shields, those of the latter targets), and about five thousand horse
raised in both provinces. Caesar had sent his legions into Spain, with
about six thousand auxiliary foot, and three thousand horse, which had
served under him in all his former wars, and the same number from Gaul,
which he himself had provided, having expressly called out all the most
noble and valiant men of each state. The bravest of these were from the
Aquitani and the mountaineers, who border on the Province in Gaul. He
had been informed that Pompey was marching through Mauritania with his
legions to Spain, and would shortly arrive. He at the same time borrowed
money from the tribunes and centurions, which he distributed amongst his
soldiers. By this proceeding he gained two points; he secured the
interest of the centurions by this pledge in his hands, and by his
liberality he purchased the affections of his army.

XL.--Fabius sounded the inclinations of the neighbouring states by
letters and messengers. He had made two bridges over the river Segre, at
the distance of four miles from each other. He sent foraging parties
over these bridges, because he had already consumed all the forage that
was on his side of the river. The generals of Pompey's army did almost
the same thing, and for the same reason: and the horse had frequent
skirmishes with each other. When two of Fabius's legions had, as was
their constant practice, gone forth as the usual protection to the
foragers, and had crossed the river, and the baggage, and all the horse
were following them, on a sudden, from the weight of the cattle, and the
mass of water, the bridge fell, and all the horse were cut off from the
main army, which being known to Petreius and Afranius, from the timber
and hurdles that were carried down the river, Afranius immediately
crossed his own bridge, which communicated between his camp and the
town, with four legions and all the cavalry, and marched against
Fabius's two legions. When his approach was announced, Lucius Plancus,
who had the command of those legions, compelled by the emergency, took
post on a rising ground; and drew up his army with two fronts, that it
might not be surrounded by the cavalry. Thus, though engaged with
superior numbers, he sustained the furious charge of the legions and the
horse. When the battle was begun by the horse, there were observed at a
distance by both sides the colours of two legions, which Caius Fabius
had sent round by the further bridge to reinforce our men, suspecting,
as the event verified, that the enemy's generals would take advantage of
the opportunity which fortune had put in their way, to attack our men.
Their approach put an end to the battle, and each general led back his
legions to their respective camps.

XLI.--In two days after Caesar came to the camp with nine hundred horse,
which he had retained for a bodyguard. The bridge which had been broken
down by the storm was almost repaired, and he ordered it to be finished
in the night. Being acquainted with the nature of the country, he left
behind him six cohorts to guard the bridge, the camp, and all his
baggage, and the next day set off in person for Ilerda, with all his
forces drawn up in three lines, and halted just before the camp of
Afranius, and having remained there a short time under arms, he offered
him battle on equal terms. When this offer was made, Afranius drew out
his forces, and posted them on the middle of a hill, near his camp. When
Caesar perceived that Afranius declined coming to an engagement, he
resolved to encamp at somewhat less than half a mile's distance from the
very foot of the mountain; and that his soldiers whilst engaged in their
works, might not be terrified by any sudden attack of the enemy, or
disturbed in their work, he ordered them not to fortify it with a wall,
which must rise high, and be seen at a distance, but draw, on the front
opposite the enemy, a trench fifteen feet broad. The first and second
lines continued under arms as was from the first appointed. Behind them
the third line was carrying on the work without being seen; so that the
whole was completed before Afranius discovered that the camp was being

XLII.--In the evening Caesar drew his legions within this trench, and
rested them under arms the next night. The day following he kept his
whole army within it, and as it was necessary to bring materials from a
considerable distance, he for the present pursued the same plan in his
work; and to each legion, one after the other, he assigned one side of
the camp to fortify, and ordered trenches of the same magnitude to be
cut: he kept the rest of the legions under arms without baggage to
oppose the enemy. Afranius and Petreius, to frighten us and obstruct the
work, drew out their forces at the very foot of the mountain, and
challenged us to battle. Caesar, however, did not interrupt his work,
relying on the protection of the three legions, and the strength of the
fosse. After staying for a short time, and advancing no great distance
from the bottom of the hill, they led back their forces to their camp.
The third day Caesar fortified his camp with a rampart, and ordered the
other cohorts which he had left in the upper camp, and his baggage to be
removed to it.

XLIIL-Between the town of Ilerda and the next hill, on which Afranius
and Petreius were encamped, there was a plain about three hundred paces
broad, and near the middle of it an eminence somewhat raised above the
level: Caesar hoped that if he could get possession of this and fortify
it, he should be able to cut off the enemy from the town, the bridge,
and all the stores which they had laid up in the town. In expectation of
this he led three legions out of the camp, and, drawing up his army in
an advantageous position, he ordered the advanced men of one legion to
hasten forward and seize the eminence. Upon intelligence of this the
cohorts which were on guard before Afranius's camp were instantly sent a
nearer way to occupy the same post. The two parties engage, and as
Afranius's men had reached the eminence first, our men were repulsed,
and, on a reinforcement being sent, they were obliged to turn their
backs and retreat to the standards of legions.

XLIV.--The manner of fighting of those soldiers was to run forward with
great impetuosity and boldly take a post, and not to keep their ranks
strictly, but to fight in small scattered parties: if hard pressed they
thought it no disgrace to retire and give up the post, being accustomed
to this manner of fighting among the Lusitanians and other barbarous
nations; for it commonly happens that soldiers are strongly influenced
by the customs of those countries in which they have spent much time.
This method, however, alarmed our men, who were not used to such a
description of warfare. For they imagined that they were about to be
surrounded on their exposed flank by the single men who ran forward from
their ranks; and they thought it their duty to keep their ranks, and not
to quit their colours, nor, without good reason, to give up the post
which they had taken. Accordingly, when the advanced guard gave way, the
legion which was stationed on that wing did not keep its ground, but
retreated to the next hill.

XLV.--Almost the whole army being daunted at this, because it had
occurred contrary to their expectations and custom, Caesar encouraged
his men and led the ninth legion to their relief, and checked the
insolent and eager pursuit of the enemy, and obliged them, in their
turn, to show their backs and retreat to Ilerda, and take post under the
walls. But the soldiers of the ninth legion, being over zealous to
repair the dishonour which had been sustained, having rashly pursued the
fleeing enemy, advanced into disadvantageous ground and went up to the
foot of the mountain on which the town Ilerda was built. And when they
wished to retire they were again attacked by the enemy from the rising
ground. The place was craggy in the front and steep on either side, and
was so narrow that even three cohorts, drawn up in order of battle,
would fill it; but no relief could be sent on the flanks, and the horse
could be of no service to them when hard pressed. From the town, indeed,
the precipice inclined with a gentle slope for near four hundred paces.
Our men had to retreat this way, as they had, through their eagerness,
advanced too inconsiderately. The greatest contest was in this place,
which was much to the disadvantage of our troops, both on account of its
narrowness, and because they were posted at the foot of the mountain, so
that no weapon was thrown at them without effect: yet they exerted their
valour and patience, and bore every wound. The enemy's forces were
increasing, and cohorts were frequently sent to their aid from the camp
through the town, that fresh men might relieve the weary. Caesar was
obliged to do the same, and relieve the fatigued by sending cohorts to
that post.

XLVI.--After the battle had in this manner continued incessantly for
five hours, and our men had suffered much from superior numbers, having
spent all their javelins, they drew their swords and charged the enemy
up the hill, and, having killed a few, obliged the rest to fly. The
cohorts being beaten back to the wall, and some being driven by their
fears into the town, an easy retreat was afforded to our men. Our
cavalry also, on either flank, though stationed on sloping or low
ground, yet bravely struggled up to the top of the hill, and, riding
between the two armies, made our retreat more easy and secure. Such were
the various turns of fortune in the battle. In the first encounter about
seventy of our men fell: amongst them Quintus Fulgenius, first centurion
of the second line of the fourteenth legion, who, for his extraordinary
valour, had been promoted from the lower ranks to that post. About six
hundred were wounded. Of Afranius's party there were killed Titus
Caecilius, principal centurion, and four other centurions, and above two
hundred men.

XLVII.--But this opinion is spread abroad concerning this day, that each
party thought that they came off conquerors. Afranius's soldiers,
because, though they were esteemed inferior in the opinion of all, yet
they had stood our attack and sustained our charge, and, at first, had
kept the post and the hill which had been the occasion of the dispute;
and, in the first encounter, had obliged our men to fly: but ours,
because, notwithstanding the disadvantage of the ground and the
disparity of numbers, they had maintained the battle for five hours, had
advanced up the hill sword in hand, and had forced the enemy to fly from
the higher ground and driven them into the town. The enemy fortified the
hill, about which the contest had been, with strong works, and posted a
garrison on it.

XLVIII.--In two days after this transaction, there happened an
unexpected misfortune. For so great a storm arose, that it was agreed
that there were never seen higher floods in those countries; it swept
down the snow from all the mountains, and broke over the banks of the
river, and in one day carried away both the bridges which Fabius had
built,--a circumstance which caused great difficulties to Caesar's army.
For as our camp, as already mentioned, was pitched between two rivers,
the Segre and Cinca, and as neither of these could be forded for the
space of thirty miles, they were all of necessity confined within these
narrow limits. Neither could the states, which had espoused Caesar's
cause, furnish him with corn, nor the troops, which had gone far to
forage, return, as they were stopped by the waters: nor could the
convoys, coming from Italy and Gaul, make their way to the camp.
Besides, it was the most distressing season of the year, when there was
no corn in the blade, and it was nearly ripe: and the states were
exhausted, because Afranius had conveyed almost all the corn, before
Caesar's arrival, into Ilerda, and whatever he had left, had been
already consumed by Caesar. The cattle, which might have served as a
secondary resource against want, had been removed by the states to a
great distance on account of the war. They who had gone out to get
forage or corn, were chased by the light troops of the Lusitanians, and
the targeteers of Hither Spain, who were well acquainted with the
country, and could readily swim across the river, because it is the
custom of all those people not to join their armies without bladders.

XLIX.--But Afranius's army had abundance of everything; a great stock of
corn had been provided and laid in long before, a large quantity was
coming in from the whole province: they had a good store of forage. The
bridge of Ilerda afforded an opportunity of getting all these without
any danger, and the places beyond the bridge, to which Caesar had no
access, were as yet untouched.

L.--Those floods continued several days. Caesar endeavoured to repair
the bridges, but the height of the water did not allow him: and the
cohorts disposed along the banks did not suffer them to be completed;
and it was easy for them to prevent it, both from the nature of the
river and the height of the water, but especially because their darts
were thrown from the whole course of the bank on one confined spot; and
it was no easy matter at one and the same time to execute a work in a
very rapid flood, and to avoid the darts.

LI.--Intelligence was brought to Afranius that the great convoys, which
were on their march to Caesar, had halted at the river. Archers from the
Rutheni, and horse from the Gauls, with a long train of baggage,
according to the Gallic custom of travelling, had arrived there; there
were besides about six thousand people of all descriptions, with slaves
and freed men. But there was no order, or regular discipline, as every
one followed his own humour, and all travelled without apprehension,
taking the same liberty as on former marches. There were several young
noblemen, sons of senators, and of equestrian rank; there were
ambassadors from several states; there were lieutenants of Caesar's. The
river stopped them all. To attack them by surprise, Afranius set out in
the beginning of the night, with all his cavalry and three legions, and
sent the horse on before, to fall on them unawares; but the Gallic horse
soon got themselves in readiness, and attacked them. Though but few,
they withstood the vast number of the enemy, as long as they fought on
equal terms: but when the legions began to approach, having lost a few
men, they retreated to the next mountains. The delay occasioned by this
battle was of great importance to the security of our men; for having
gained time, they retired to the higher grounds. There were missing that
day about two hundred bow-men, a few horse, and an inconsiderable number
of servants and baggage.

LII.--However, by all these things, the price of provisions was raised,
which is commonly a disaster attendant, not only on a time of present
scarcity, but on the apprehension of future want. Provisions had now
reached fifty denarii each bushel; and the want of corn had diminished
the strength of the soldiers; and the inconveniences were increasing
every day: and so great an alteration was wrought in a few days, and
fortune had so changed sides, that our men had to struggle with the want
of every necessary; while the enemy had an abundant supply of all
things, and were considered to have the advantage. Caesar demanded from
those states which had acceded to his alliance, a supply of cattle, as
they had but little corn. He sent away the camp followers to the more
distant states, and endeavoured to remedy the present scarcity by every
resource in his power.

LIII.--Afranius and Petreius, and their friends, sent fuller and more
circumstantial accounts of these things to Rome, to their acquaintances.
Report exaggerated them so that the war appeared to be almost at an end.
When these letters and despatches were received at Rome, a great
concourse of people resorted to the house of Afranius, and
congratulations ran high: several went out of Italy to Cneius Pompey;
some of them, to be the first to bring him the intelligence; others,
that they might not be thought to have waited the issue of the war, and
to have come last of all.

LIV.--When Caesar's affairs were in this unfavourable position, and all
the passes were guarded by the soldiers and horse of Afranius, and the
bridges could not be prepared, Caesar ordered his soldiers to make ships
of the kind that his knowledge of Britain a few years before had taught
him. First, the keels and ribs were made of light timber, then, the rest
of the hulk of the ships was wrought with wicker-work, and covered over
with hides. When these were finished, he drew them down to the river in
waggons in one night, a distance of twenty-two miles from his camp, and
transported in them some soldiers across the river, and on a sudden took
possession of a hill adjoining the bank. This he immediately fortified,
before he was perceived by the enemy. To this he afterwards transported
a legion: and having begun a bridge on both sides, he finished it in two
days. By this means, he brought safe to his camp the convoys, and those
who had gone out to forage; and began to prepare a conveyance for the

LV.--The same day he made a great part of his horse pass the river, who,
falling on the foragers by surprise as they were dispersed without any
suspicions, intercepted an incredible number of cattle and people; and
when some Spanish light-armed cohorts were sent to reinforce the enemy,
our men judiciously divided themselves into two parts, the one to
protect the spoil, the other to resist the advancing foe, and to beat
them back, and they cut off from the rest and surrounded one cohort,
which had rashly ventured out of the line before the others, and after
putting it to the sword, returned safe with considerable booty to the
camp over the same bridge.

LVI.--Whilst these affairs are going forward at Ilerda, the Massilians,
adopting the advice of Domitius, prepared seventeen ships of war, of
which eleven were decked. To these they add several smaller vessels,
that our fleet might be terrified by numbers: they man them with a great
number of archers and of the Albici, of whom mention has been already
made, and these they incited by rewards and promises. Domitius required
certain ships for his own use, which he manned with colonists and
shepherds, whom he had brought along with him. A fleet being thus
furnished with every necessary, he advanced with great confidence
against our ships, commanded by Decimus Brutus. It was stationed at an
island opposite to Massilia.

LVII.--Brutus was much inferior in number of ships; but Caesar had
appointed to that fleet the bravest men selected from all his legions,
antesignani and centurions, who had requested to be employed in that
service. They had provided iron hooks and harpoons, and had furnished
themselves with a vast number of javelins, darts, and missiles. Thus
prepared, and being apprised of the enemy's approach, they put out from
the harbour, and engaged the Massilians. Both sides fought with great
courage and resolution; nor did the Albici, a hardy people, bred on the
highlands and inured to arms, fall much short of our men in valour: and
being lately come from the Massilians, they retained in their minds
their recent promises: and the wild shepherds, encouraged by the hope of
liberty, were eager to prove their zeal in the presence of their

LVIII.--The Massilians themselves, confiding in the quickness of their
ships, and the skill of their pilots, eluded ours, and evaded the shock,
and as long as they were permitted by clear space, lengthening their
line they endeavoured to surround us, or to attack single ships with
several of theirs, or to run across our ships, and carry away our oars,
if possible; but when necessity obliged them to come nearer, they had
recourse, from the skill and art of the pilots, to the valour of the
mountaineers. But our men, not having such expert seamen, or skilful
pilots, for they had been hastily drafted from the merchant ships, and
were not yet acquainted even with the names of the rigging, were
moreover impeded by the heaviness and slowness of our vessels, which
having been built in a hurry and of green timber, were not so easily
manoeuvred. Therefore, when Caesar's men had an opportunity of a close
engagement, they cheerfully opposed two of the enemy's ships with one of
theirs. And throwing in the grappling irons, and holding both ships
fast, they fought on both sides of the deck, and boarded the enemy's;
and having killed numbers of the Albici and shepherds, they sank some of
their ships, took others with the men on board, and drove the rest into
the harbour. That day the Massilians lost nine ships, including those
that were taken.

LIX.--When news of this battle was brought to Caesar at Ilerda, the
bridge being completed at the same time, fortune soon took a turn. The
enemy, daunted by the courage of our horse, did not scour the country as
freely or as boldly as before: but sometimes advancing a small distance
from the camp, that they might have a ready retreat, they foraged within
narrower bounds: at other times, they took a longer circuit to avoid our
outposts and parties of horse; or having sustained some loss, or
descried our horse at a distance, they fled in the midst of their
expedition, leaving their baggage behind them; at length they resolved
to leave off foraging for several days, and, contrary to the practice of
all nations, to go out at night.

LX.--In the meantime the Oscenses and the Calagurritani, who were under
the government of the Oscenses, send ambassadors to Caesar, and offer to
submit to his orders. They are followed by the Tarraconenses, Jacetani,
and Ausetani, and in a few days more by the Illurgavonenses, who dwell
near the river Ebro. He requires of them all to assist him with corn, to
which they agreed, and having collected all the cattle in the country,
they convey them into his camp. One entire cohort of the
Illurgavonenses, knowing the design of their state, came over to Caesar,
from the place where they were stationed, and carried their colours with
them. A great change is shortly made in the face of affairs. The bridge
being finished, five powerful states being joined to Caesar, a way
opened for the receiving of corn, and the rumours of the assistance of
legions which were said to be on their march, with Pompey at their head,
through Mauritania, having died away, several of the more distant states
revolt from Afranius, and enter into league with Caesar.

LXI.--Whilst the spirits of the enemy were dismayed at these things,
Caesar, that he might not be always obliged to send his horse a long
circuit round by the bridge, having found a convenient place, began to
sink several drains, thirty feet deep, by which he might draw off a part
of the river Segre, and make a ford over it. When these were almost
finished, Afranius and Petreius began to be greatly alarmed, lest they
should be altogether cut off from corn and forage, because Caesar was
very strong in cavalry. They therefore resolved to quit their posts, and
to transfer the war to Celtiberia. There was, moreover, a circumstance
that confirmed them in this resolution: for of the two adverse parties,
that which had stood by Sertorius in the late war, being conquered by
Pompey, still trembled at his name and sway, though absent: the other
which had remained firm in Pompey's interest, loved him for the favours
which they had received: but Caesar's name was not known to the
barbarians. From these they expected considerable aid, both of horse and
foot, and hoped to protract the war till winter, in a friendly country.
Having come to this resolution, they gave orders to collect all the
ships in the river Ebro, and to bring them to Octogesa, a town situated
on the river Ebro, about twenty miles distant from their camp. At this
part of the river, they ordered a bridge to be made of boats fastened
together, and transported two legions over the river Segre, and
fortified their camp with a rampart, twelve feet high.

LXII.--Notice of this being given by the scouts, Caesar continued his
work day and night, with very great fatigue to the soldiers, to drain
the river, and so far effected his purpose, that the horse were both
able and bold enough, though with some difficulty and danger, to pass
the river; but the foot had only their shoulders and upper part of their
breast above the water, so that their fording it was retarded, not only
by the depth of the water, but also by the rapidity of the current.
However, almost at the same instant, news was received of the bridge
being nearly completed over the Ebro, and a ford was found in the Segre.

LXIII.--Now indeed the enemy began to think that they ought to hasten
their march. Accordingly, leaving two auxiliary cohorts in the garrison
at Ilerda, they crossed the Segre with their whole force, and formed one
camp with the two legions which they had led across a few days before.
Caesar had no resource, but to annoy and cut down their rear; since with
his cavalry to go by the bridge, required him to take a long circuit; so
that they would arrive at the Ebro by a much shorter route. The horse,
which he had detached, crossed the ford, and when Afranius and Petreius
had broken up their camp about the third watch, they suddenly appeared
on their rear, and spreading round them in great numbers, began to
retard and impede their march.

LXIV.--At break of day, it was perceived from the rising grounds which
joined Caesar's camp, that their rear was vigorously pressed by our
horse; that the last line sometimes halted and was broken; at other
times, that they joined battle and that our men were beaten back by a
general charge of their cohorts, and, in their turn, pursued them when
they wheeled about: but through the whole camp the soldiers gathered in
parties, and declared their chagrin that the enemy had been suffered to
escape from their hands and that the war had been unnecessarily
protracted. They applied to their tribunes and centurions, and entreated
them to inform Caesar that he need not spare their labour or consider
their danger; that they were ready and able, and would venture to ford
the river where the horse had crossed. Caesar, encouraged by their zeal
and importunity, though he felt reluctant to expose his army to a river
so exceedingly large, yet judged it prudent to attempt it and make a
trial. Accordingly, he ordered all the weaker soldiers, whose spirit or
strength seemed unequal to the fatigue, to be selected from each
century, and left them, with one legion besides, to guard the camp: the
rest of the legions he drew out without any baggage, and, having
disposed a great number of horses in the river, above and below the
ford, he led his army over. A few of his soldiers being carried away by
the force of the current, were stopped by the horse and taken up, and
not a man perished. His army being safe on the opposite bank, he drew
out his forces and resolved to lead them forward in three battalions:
and so great was the ardour of the soldiers that, notwithstanding the
addition of a circuit of six miles and a considerable delay in fording
the river, before the ninth hour of the day they came up with those who
had set out at the third watch.

LXV.--When Afranius, who was in company with Petreius, saw them at a
distance, being affrighted at so unexpected a sight, he halted on a
rising ground and drew up his army. Caesar refreshed his army on the
plain that he might not expose them to battle whilst fatigued; and when
the enemy attempted to renew their march, he pursued and stopped them.
They were obliged to pitch their camp sooner than they had intended, for
there were mountains at a small distance; and difficult and narrow roads
awaited them about five miles off. They retired behind these mountains
that they might avoid Caesar's cavalry, and, placing parties in the
narrow roads, stop the progress of his army and lead their own forces
across the Ebro without danger or apprehension. This it was their
interest to attempt and to effect by any means possible; but, fatigued
by the skirmishes all day, and by the labour of their march, they
deferred it till the following day: Caesar likewise encamped on the next

LXVI.--About midnight a few of their men who had gone some distance from
the camp to fetch water, being taken by our horse, Caesar is informed by
them that the generals of the enemy were drawing their troops out of the
camp without noise. Upon this information Caesar ordered the signal to
be given and the military shout to be raised for packing up the baggage.
When they heard the shout, being afraid lest they should be stopped in
the night and obliged to engage under their baggage, or lest they should
be confined in the narrow roads by Caesar's horse, they put a stop to
their march and kept their forces in their camp. The next day Petreius
went out privately with a few horse to reconnoitre the country. A
similar movement was made from Caesar's camp. Lucius Decidius Saxa was
detached with a small party to explore the nature of the country. Each
returned with the same account to his camp, that there was a level road
for the next five miles, that there then succeeded a rough and
mountainous country. Whichever should first obtain possession of the
defiles would have no trouble in preventing the other's progress.

LXVII.--There was a debate in the council between Afranius and Petreius,
and the time of marching was the subject. The majority were of opinion
that they should begin their march at night, "for they might reach the
defiles before they should be discovered." Others, because a shout had
been raised the night before in Caesar's camp, used this as an argument
that they could not leave the camp unnoticed: "that Caesar's cavalry
were patrolling the whole night, and that all the ways and roads were
beset; that battles at night ought to be avoided, because in civil
dissension, a soldier once daunted is more apt to consult his fears than
his oath; that the daylight raised a strong sense of shame in the eyes
of all, and that the presence of the tribunes and centurions had the
same effect: by these things the soldiers would be re strained and awed
to their duty. Wherefore they should, by all means, attempt to force
their way by day; for, though a trifling loss might be sustained, yet
the post which they desired might be secured with safety to the main
body of the army." This opinion prevailed in the council, and the next
day, at the dawn, they resolved to set forward.

LXVIII.--Caesar, having taken a view of the country, the moment the sky
began to grow white, led his forces from the camp and marched at the
head of his army by a long circuit, keeping to no regular road; for the
road which led to the Ebro and Octogesa was occupied by the enemy's
camp, which lay in Caesar's way. His soldiers were obliged to cross
extensive and difficult valleys. Craggy cliffs, in several places,
interrupted their march, insomuch that their arms had to be handed to
one another, and the soldiers were forced to perform a great part of
their march unarmed, and were lifted up the rocks by each other. But not
a man murmured at the fatigue, because they imagined that there would be
a period to all their toils if they could cut off the enemy from the
Ebro and intercept their convoys.

LXIX.--At first, Afranius's soldiers ran in high spirits from their camp
to look at us, and in contumelious language upbraided us, "that we were
forced, for want of necessary subsistence, to run away, and return to
Ilerda." For our route was different from what we proposed, and we
appeared to be going a contrary way. But their generals applauded their
own prudence in keeping within their camp, and it was a strong
confirmation of their opinion, that they saw we marched without waggons
or baggage, which made them confident that we could not long endure
want. But when they saw our army gradually wheel to the right, and
observed our van was already passing the line of their camp, there was
nobody so stupid, or averse to fatigue, as not to think it necessary to
march from the camp immediately, and oppose us. The cry to arms was
raised, and all the army, except a few which were left to guard the
camp, set out and marched the direct road to the Ebro.

LXX.--The contest depended entirely on despatch, which should first get
possession of the defile and the mountain. The difficulty of the roads
delayed Caesar's army, but his cavalry pursuing Afranius's forces,
retarded their march. However, the affair was necessarily reduced to
this point, with respect to Afranius's men, that if they first gained
the mountains, which they desired, they would themselves avoid all
danger, but could not save the baggage of their whole army, nor the
cohorts which they had left behind in the camps, to which, being
intercepted by Caesar's army, by no means could assistance be given.
Caesar first accomplished the march, and having found a plain behind
large rocks, drew up his army there in order of battle and facing the
enemy. Afranius, perceiving that his rear was galled by our cavalry, and
seeing the enemy before him, having come to a hill, made a halt on it.
Thence he detached four cohorts of Spanish light infantry to the highest
mountain which was in view: to this he ordered them to hasten with all
expedition, and to take possession of it, with the intention of going to
the same place with all his forces, then altering his route, and
crossing the hills to Octogesa. As the Spaniards were making towards it
in an oblique direction, Caesar's horse espied them and attacked them,
nor were they able to withstand the charge of the cavalry even for a
moment, but were all surrounded and cut to pieces in the sight of the
two armies.

LXXI.--There was now an opportunity for managing affairs successfully,
nor did it escape Caesar, that an army daunted at suffering such a loss
before their eyes, could not stand, especially as they were surrounded
by our horse, and the engagement would take place on even and open
ground. To this he was importuned on all sides. The lieutenants,
centurions, and tribunes, gathered round him, and begged "that he would
not hesitate to begin the battle: that the hearts of all the soldiers
were very anxious for it: that Afranius's men had by several
circumstances betrayed signs of fear; in that they had not assisted
their party; in that they had not quitted the hill; in that they did not
sustain the charge of our cavalry, but crowding their standards into one
place, did not observe either rank or order. But if he had any
apprehensions from the disadvantage of the ground, that an opportunity
would be given him of coming to battle in some other place: for that
Afranius must certainly come down, and would not be able to remain there
for want of water."

LXXII.--Caesar had conceived hopes of ending the affair without an
engagement, or without striking a blow, because he had cut off the
enemy's supplies. Why should he hazard the loss of any of his men, even
in a successful battle? Why should he expose soldiers to be wounded; who
had deserved so well of him? Why, in short, should he tempt fortune?
especially when it was as much a general's duty to conquer by tactics,
as by the sword. Besides, he was moved with compassion for those
citizens, who, he foresaw, must fall: and he had rather gain his object
without any loss or injury to them. This resolution of Caesar was not
generally approved of; but the soldiers openly declared to each other,
that since such an opportunity of victory was let pass, they would not
come to an engagement, even when Caesar should wish it. He persevered
however in his resolution, and retired a little from that place to abate
the enemy's fears. Petreius and Afranius, having got this opportunity,
retired to their camp. Caesar, having disposed parties on the mountains,
and cut off all access to the Ebro, fortified his camp as close to the
enemy as he could.

LXXIII.--The day following, the generals of his opponents, being alarmed
that they had lost all prospect of supplies, and of access to the Ebro,
consulted as to what other course they should take. There were two
roads, one to Ilerda, if they chose to return, the other to Tarraco, if
they should march to it. Whilst they were deliberating on these matters,
intelligence was brought them that their watering parties were attacked
by our horse: upon which information, they dispose several parties of
horse and auxiliary foot along the road, and intermix some legionary
cohorts, and begin to throw up a rampart from the camp to the water,
that they might be able to procure water within their lines, both
without fear, and without a guard. Petreius and Afranius divided this
task between themselves, and went in person to some distance from their
camp for the purpose of seeing it accomplished.

LXXIV.--The soldiers having obtained by their absence a free opportunity
of conversing with each other, came out in great numbers, and inquired
each for whatever acquaintance or fellow citizen he had in our camp, and
invited him to him. First they returned them general thanks for sparing
them the day before, when they were greatly terrified, and acknowledged
that they were alive through their kindness; then they inquired about
the honour of our general, and whether they could with safety entrust
themselves to him; and declared their sorrow that they had not done so
in the beginning, and that they had taken up arms against their
relations and kinsmen. Encouraged by these conferences, they desired the
general's parole for the lives of Petreius and Afranius, that they might
not appear guilty of a crime, in having betrayed their generals. When
they were assured of obtaining their demands, they promised that they
would immediately remove their standards, and sent centurions of the
first rank as deputies to treat with Caesar about a peace. In the
meantime some of them invite their acquaintances, and bring them to
their camp, others are brought away by their friends, so that the two
camps seemed to be united into one, and several of the tribunes and
centurions came to Caesar, and paid their respects to him. The same was
done by some of the nobility of Spain, whom they summoned to their
assistance, and kept in their camp as hostages. They inquired after
their acquaintance and friends, by whom each might have the means of
being recommended to Caesar. Even Afranius's son, a young man,
endeavoured by means of Sulpitius the lieutenant, to make terms for his
own and his father's life. Every place was filled with mirth and
congratulations; in the one army, because they thought they had escaped
so impending danger; in the other, because they thought they had
completed so important a matter without blows; and Caesar, in every
man's judgment, reaped the advantage of his former lenity, and his
conduct was applauded by all.

LXXV.--When these circumstances were announced to Afranius, he left the
work which he had begun, and returned to his camp determined, as it
appeared, whatever should be the event to bear it with an even and
steady mind. Petreius did not neglect himself; he armed his domestics;
with them and the praetorian cohort of Spaniards, and a few foreign
horse, his dependants, whom he commonly kept near him to guard his
person, he suddenly flew to the rampart, interrupted the conferences of
the soldiers, drove our men from the camp, and put to death as many as
he caught. The rest formed into a body, and, being alarmed by the
unexpected danger, wrapped their left arms in their cloaks, and drew
their swords, and in this manner, depending on the nearness of their
camp, defended themselves against the Spaniards, and the horse, and made
good their retreat to the camp, where they were protected by the
cohorts, which were on guard.

LXXVI.--Petreius, after accomplishing this, went round every maniple,
calling the soldiers by their names and entreating with tears, that they
would not give up him and their absent general Pompey, as a sacrifice to
the vengeance of their enemies. Immediately they ran in crowds to the
general's pavilion, when he required them all to take an oath that they
would not desert nor betray the army nor the generals, nor form any
design distinct from the general interest. He himself swore first to the
tenor of those words, and obliged Afranius to take the same oath. The
tribunes and centurions followed their example; the soldiers were
brought out by centuries, and took the same oath. They gave orders, that
whoever had any of Caesar's soldiers should produce them; as soon as
they were produced, they put them to death publicly in the praetorium,
but most of them concealed those that they had entertained, and let them
out at night over the rampart. Thus the terror raised by the generals,
the cruelty of the punishments, the new obligation of an oath, removed
all hopes of surrender for the present, changed the soldiers' minds, and
reduced matters to the former state of war.

LXXVII.--Caesar ordered the enemy's soldiers, who had come into his camp
to hold a conference, to be searched for with the strictest diligence,
and sent back. But of the tribunes and centurions, several voluntarily
remained with him, and he afterwards treated them with great respect.
The centurions he promoted to higher ranks, and conferred on the Roman
knights the honour of tribunes.

LXXVIII.--Afranius's men were distressed in foraging, and procured water
with difficulty. The legionary soldiers had a tolerable supply of corn,
because they had been ordered to bring from Ilerda sufficient to last
twenty-two days; the Spanish and auxiliary forces had none, for they had
but few opportunities of procuring any, and their bodies were not
accustomed to bear burdens; and therefore a great number of them came
over to Caesar every day. Their affairs were under these difficulties;
but of the two schemes proposed, the most expedient seemed to be to
return to Ilerda, because they had left some corn there; and there they
hoped to decide on a plan for their future conduct. Tarraco lay at a
greater distance; and in such a space they knew affairs might admit of
many changes. Their design having met with approbation, they set out
from their camp. Caesar having sent forward his cavalry, to annoy and
retard their rear, followed close after with his legions. Not a moment
passed in which their rear was not engaged with our horse.

LXXIX.--Their manner of fighting was this: the light cohorts closed
their rear, and frequently made a stand on the level grounds. If they
had a mountain to ascend, the very nature of the place readily secured
them from any danger; for the advanced guards, from the rising grounds,
protected the rest in their ascent. When they approached a valley or
declivity, and the advanced men could not impart assistance to the
tardy, our horse threw their darts at them from the rising grounds with
advantage; then their affairs were in a perilous situation; the only
plan left was, that whenever they came near such places, they should
give orders to the legions to halt, and by a violent effort repulse our
horse; and these being forced to give way, they should suddenly, with
the utmost speed, run all together down to the valley, and having passed
it, should face about again on the next hill. For so far were they from
deriving any assistance from their horse (of which they had a large
number), that they were obliged to receive them into the centre of their
army, and themselves protect them, as they were daunted by former
battles. And on their march no one could quit the line without being
taken by Caesar's horse.

LXXX.--Whilst skirmishes were fought in this manner, they advanced but
slowly and gradually, and frequently halted to help their rear, as then
happened. For having advanced four miles, and being very much harassed
by our horse, they took post on a high mountain, and there entrenched
themselves on the front only, facing the enemy; and did not take their
baggage off their cattle. When they perceived that Caesar's camp was
pitched, and the tents fixed up, and his horse sent out to forage, they
suddenly rushed out about twelve o'clock the same day, and, having hopes
that we should be delayed by the absence of our horse, they began to
march, which Caesar perceiving, followed them with the legions that
remained. He left a few cohorts to guard his baggage, and ordered the
foragers to be called home at the tenth hour, and the horse to follow
him. The horse shortly returned to their daily duty on march, and
charged the rear so vigorously, that they almost forced them to fly; and
several privates and some centurions were killed. The main body of
Caesar's army was at hand, and universal ruin threatened them.

LXXXI.--Then indeed, not having opportunity either to choose a
convenient position for their camp, or to march forward, they were
obliged to halt, and to encamp at a distance from water, and on ground
naturally unfavourable. But for the reasons already given, Caesar did
not attack them, nor suffer a tent to be pitched that day, that his men
might be the readier to pursue them whether they attempted to run off by
night or by day. Observing the defect in their position, they spent the
whole night in extending their works, and turn their camp to ours. The
next day, at dawn, they do the same, and spend the whole day in that
manner, but in proportion as they advanced their works, and extended
their camp, they were farther distant from the water; and one evil was
remedied by another. The first night, no one went out for water. The
next day, they left a guard in the camp, and led out all their forces to
water: but not a person was sent to look for forage. Caesar was more
desirous that they should be humbled by these means, and forced to come
to terms, than decide the contest by battle. Yet he endeavoured to
surround them with a wall and trench, that he might be able to check
their most sudden sally, to which he imagined that they must have
recourse. Hereupon, urged by want of fodder, that they might be the
readier for a march, they killed all their baggage cattle.

LXXXII.--In this work, and the deliberations on it, two days were spent.
By the third day a considerable part of Caesar's works was finished. To
interrupt his progress, they drew out their legions about the eighth
hour, by a certain signal, and placed them in order of battle before
their camp. Caesar calling his legions off from their work, and ordering
the horse to hold themselves in readiness, marshalled his army: for to
appear to decline an engagement contrary to the opinion of the soldiers
and the general voice, would have been attended with great disadvantage.
But for the reasons already known, he was dissuaded from wishing to
engage, and the more especially, because the short space between the
camps, even if the enemy were put to flight, would not contribute much
to a decisive victory; for the two camps were not distant from each
other above two thousand feet. Two parts of this were occupied by the
armies, and one third left for the soldiers to charge and make their
attack. If a battle should be begun, the nearness of the camps would
afford a ready retreat to the conquered party in the flight. For this
reason Caesar had resolved to make resistance, if they attacked him, but
not to be the first to provoke the battle.

LXXXIII.--Afranius's five legions were drawn up in two lines, the
auxiliary cohorts formed the third line, and acted as reserves. Caesar
had three lines, four cohorts out of each of the five legions formed the
first line. Three more from each legion followed them, as reserves: and
three others were behind these. The slingers and archers were stationed
in the centre of the line; the cavalry closed the flanks. The hostile
armies being arranged in this manner, each seemed determined to adhere
to his first intention: Caesar not to hazard a battle, unless forced to
it; Afranius to interrupt Caesar's works. However, the matter was
deferred, and both armies kept under arms till sunset; when they both
returned to their camp. The next day Caesar prepared to finish the works
which he had begun. The enemy attempted to pass the river Segre by a
ford. Caesar, having perceived this, sent some light-armed Germans and a
party of horse across the river, and disposed several parties along the
banks to guard them.

LXXXIV.--At length, beset on all sides, their cattle having been four
days without fodder, and having no water, wood, or corn, they beg a
conference; and that, if possible, in a place remote from the soldiers.
When this was refused by Caesar, but a public interview offered if they
chose it, Afranius's son was given as a hostage to Caesar. They met in
the place appointed by Caesar. In the hearing of both armies, Afranius
spoke thus: "That Caesar ought not to be displeased either with him or
his soldiers, for wishing to preserve their attachment to their general,
Cneius Pompey. That they had now sufficiently discharged their duty to
him, and had suffered punishment enough, in having endured the want of
every necessary: but now, pent up almost like wild beasts, they were
prevented from procuring water, and prevented from walking abroad; and
were not able to bear the bodily pain or the mental disgrace: but
confessed themselves vanquished: and begged and entreated, if there was
any room left for mercy, that they should not be necessitated to suffer
the most severe penalties." These sentiments were delivered in the most
submissive and humble language.

LXXXV.--Caesar replied, "That either to complain or sue for mercy became
no man less than him: for that every other person had done their duty:
himself, in having declined to engage on favourable terms, in an
advantageous situation and time, that all things tending to a peace
might be totally unembarrassed: his army, in having preserved and
protected the men whom they had in their power, notwithstanding the
injuries which they had received, and the murder of their comrades; and
even Afranius's soldiers, who of themselves treated about concluding a
peace, by which they thought that they would secure the lives of all.
Thus, that the parties on both sides inclined to mercy: that the
generals only were averse to peace: that they paid no regard to the laws
either of conference or truce; and had most inhumanly put to death
ignorant persons, who were deceived by a conference: that therefore,
they had met that fate which usually befalls men from excessive
obstinacy and arrogance; and were obliged to have recourse, and most
earnestly desire that which they had shortly before disdained. That for
his part, he would not avail himself of their present humiliation, or
his present advantage, to require terms by which his power might be
increased, but only that those armies, which they had maintained for so
many years to oppose him, should be disbanded: for six legions had been
sent into Spain, and a seventh raised there, and many and powerful
fleets provided, and generals of great military experience sent to
command them, for no other purpose than to oppose him; that none of
these measures were adopted to keep the Spains in peace, or for the use
of the province, which, from the length of the peace, stood in need of
no such aid; that all these things were long since designed against him:
that against him a new sort of government was established, that the same
person should be at the gates of Rome, to direct the affairs of the
city; and though absent, have the government of two most warlike
provinces for so many years: that against him the laws of the
magistrates had been altered; that the late praetors and consuls should
not be sent to govern the provinces as had been the constant custom, but
persons approved of and chosen by a faction. That against him the excuse
of age was not admitted: but persons of tried experience in former wars
were called up to take the command of the armies, that with respect to
him only, the routine was not observed which had been allowed to all
generals, that, after a successful war, they should return home and
disband their armies, if not with some mark of honour, at least without
disgrace: that he had submitted to all these things patiently, and would
still submit to them: nor did he now desire to take their army from them
and keep it to himself (which, however, would not be a difficult
matter), but only that they should not have it to employ against him:
and therefore, as he said before, let them quit the provinces, and
disband their army. If this was complied with, he would injure no
person; that these were the last and only conditions of peace."

LXXXVI.--It was very acceptable and agreeable to Afranius's soldiers, as
might be easily known from their signs of joy, that they who expected
some injury after this defeat, should obtain without solicitation the
reward of a dismissal. For when a debate was introduced about the place
and time of their dismissal, they all began to express, both by words
and signs, from the rampart where they stood, that they should be
discharged immediately: for although every security might be given that
they would be disbanded, still the matter would be uncertain, if it was
deferred to a future day. After a short debate on either side, it was
brought to this issue: that those who had any settlement or possession
in Spain, should be immediately discharged: the rest at the river Var.
Caesar gave security that they should receive no damage, and that no
person should be obliged against his inclination to take the military
oath under him.

LXXXVII.--Caesar promised to supply them with corn from the present
time, till they arrived at the river Var. He further adds, that whatever
any of them lost in the war, which was in the possession of his
soldiers, should be restored to those that lost them. To his soldiers he
made a recompense in money for those things, a just valuation being
made. Whatever disputes Afranius's soldiers had afterwards amongst
themselves, they voluntarily submitted to Caesar's decision. Afranius
and Petreius, when pay was demanded by the legions, a sedition almost
breaking out, asserted that the time had not yet come, and required that
Caesar should take cognizance of it: and both parties were content with
his decision. About a third part of their army being dismissed in two
days, Caesar ordered two of his legions to go before, the rest to follow
the vanquished enemy: that they should encamp at a small distance from
each other. The execution of this business he gave in charge to Quintus
Fufius Kalenus, one of his lieutenants. According to his directions,
they marched from Spain to the river Var, and there the rest of the army
was disbanded.

Julius Caesar

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