Altruism, a possibility, a hope, or just stupid

[jab]

The three traits cooperation, delayed gratification, and altruism are distinct concepts, of course, and I offer both my apologies for muddling them earlier, and my salute the eyes out there who are keeping me accountable for the quality and understandability of my writing!

Cooperation is an association of persons or businesses for common benefit, which could be economic, intellectual, musical, whatever. Typically, cooperation is collaboration, in that the mutual assistance happens simultaneously; the "tit" and the "tat" of "tit for tat" is not necessarily, indeed usually is not, separated from each other by a large time frame. Or the "quo" in the "quid pro quo" is directly after the "quid." It is also relevant to point out that many times cooperation lends easily identifyable benefits. We're not talking about abstract "good" or "kindness". We're talking money, grades, lifing something heavy. Tangible and immediate "quo". And if that benefit doesn't appear in the partnership, we usually walk away. We sometimes go and sometimes don't go to study groups, the same with business partnerships, and other associations, for that reason. As a few of you so rightly pointed out, cooperation certainly is not perfectly correlated with either altruism or delayed gratification, as I suggested.

With respect to delayed gratification, however, the "quo" comes much later -- by definition. One pays out and has to wait to collect the deposit back, with interest of course. This is a higher order skill than cooperation, and not even all human master this trait, which I might argue is akin to patience and self-control over the, urges, or "witchcraft" as it is called in Plato's Republic. Psychologists have tested acquisition of delayed gratification by presenting a candy bar to a toddler, but promising 5 more if he doesn't eat it. Most fail. But those who don't get a tangible reward, one that they are aware of and looking forward to. So here, the "quo" you might say is delayed yet tangible, whereas with cooperation it is often immediate and tangible.

Altruism, on a society-wide level, is a trait that promotes survival. In colonies where it is practiced, people get helped out of hard times, live longer, more affluently, more healthfully, etc., because of the help they get when they're down for whatever reason, and this promotes general population health and reproduction and survival. But the payback, though profound on a society-level, is delayed and usually non-existent in terms of a physical payback to the agent who sacrifices himself for society or another. The "quid pro quo" structure doesn't really apply, as the definition of altruism constrains that one isn't doing "tit" for "tat", but just doing "tat"!

But the fact is that there is a benefit, though abstract, delayed, and often never personally rewarding for the agent. If a person does good hoping for a good reputation or some kind of reward, we agree that the agent was not being altruistic. If the agent is not acting with hope or expectation or cognizance of the potential of reward, and never receives a personal reward but only benefits his society, we can certainly call him "altruistic", I think. However, what if we take the middle road: the agent does end up being paid back, later, either abstractly or somewhat unrelatedly, yet the agent did the good he did unmindful of the possibility of payback. What then? I don't care what we call it. That's just a choice of semantics. Doing selfless good for others ("altruism") has an empirically verifiable survival benefit that will, by spreading into others' behavior, help you out, albeit usually in unrelated ways, in turn; and yet altruism cannot benefit, by definition, its practitioner. Is there a contradiction? Well, that's a personal choice of semantics if you ask me, and I don't care too much about that! I think not, though that depends upon how you want to define the word. That is a personal choice, and one I don't have much interest in. I care little about the terminology, so as long as the understanding of the relationship between agents is clear to me! One could simply point out that on any one given act of goodwill, an agent may not expect to receive remuneration; he may, in fact, receive it.

[jab]

Wow. I think the best lesson we can learn from that last paragraph is that copying and pasting sections of material and selecting "publish" before proofreading is less than desirable.

[Triskele]

The three traits cooperation, delayed gratification, and altruism are distinct concepts, of course, and I offer both my apologies for muddling them earlier, and my salute the eyes out there who are keeping me accountable for the quality and understandability of my writing!

Cooperation is an association of persons or businesses for common benefit, which could be economic, intellectual, musical, whatever. Typically, cooperation is collaboration, in that the mutual assistance happens simultaneously; the "tit" and the "tat" of "tit for tat" is not necessarily, indeed usually is not, separated from each other by a large time frame. Or the "quo" in the "quid pro quo" is directly after the "quid." It is also relevant to point out that many times cooperation lends easily identifyable benefits. We're not talking about abstract "good" or "kindness". We're talking money, grades, lifing something heavy. Tangible and immediate "quo". And if that benefit doesn't appear in the partnership, we usually walk away. We sometimes go and sometimes don't go to study groups, the same with business partnerships, and other associations, for that reason. As a few of you so rightly pointed out, cooperation certainly is not perfectly correlated with either altruism or delayed gratification, as I suggested.

With respect to delayed gratification, however, the "quo" comes much later -- by definition. One pays out and has to wait to collect the deposit back, with interest of course. This is a higher order skill than cooperation, and not even all human master this trait, which I might argue is akin to patience and self-control over the, urges, or "witchcraft" as it is called in Plato's Republic. Psychologists have tested acquisition of delayed gratification by presenting a candy bar to a toddler, but promising 5 more if he doesn't eat it. Most fail. But those who don't get a tangible reward, one that they are aware of and looking forward to. So here, the "quo" you might say is delayed yet tangible, whereas with cooperation it is often immediate and tangible.

Altruism, on a society-wide level, is a trait that promotes survival. In colonies where it is practiced, people get helped out of hard times, live longer, more affluently, more healthfully, etc., because of the help they get when they're down for whatever reason, and this promotes general population health and reproduction and survival. But the payback, though profound on a society-level, is delayed and usually non-existent in terms of a physical payback to the agent who sacrifices himself for society or another. The "quid pro quo" structure doesn't really apply, as the definition of altruism constrains that one isn't doing "tit" for "tat", but just doing "tat"!

But the fact is that there is a benefit, though abstract, delayed, and often never personally rewarding for the agent. If a person does good hoping for a good reputation or some kind of reward, we agree that the agent was not being altruistic. If the agent is not acting with hope or expectation or cognizance of the potential of reward, and never receives a personal reward but only benefits his society, we can certainly call him "altruistic", I think. However, what if we take the middle road: the agent does end up being paid back, later, either abstractly or somewhat unrelatedly, yet the agent did the good he did unmindful of the possibility of payback. What then? I don't care what we call it. That's just a choice of semantics. Doing selfless good for others ("altruism") has an empirically verifiable survival benefit that will, by spreading into others' behavior, help you out, albeit usually in unrelated ways, in turn; and yet altruism cannot benefit, by definition, its practitioner. Is there a contradiction? Well, that's a personal choice of semantics if you ask me, and I don't care too much about that! I think not, though that depends upon how you want to define the word. That is a personal choice, and one I don't have much interest in. I care little about the terminology, so as long as the understanding of the relationship between agents is clear to me! One could simply point out that on any one given act of goodwill, an agent may not expect to receive remuneration; he may, in fact, receive it.

i am definitely with you on your pointing out of cooperation, delayed gratification, and altruism, but again, i think that there is a fourth catagory that explains your statement that altuism is in existance in our society, and that is enlightened self interest. while they do claim to say that it is purely for the good of other people, that is not true. the first way that they benefit is through the reciprocated kindness of other people parroting good behavioral patterns, also along with this, is the fact that often times the community they are in will become better as a whole, and so they will have a better life on a communal/social level. the second way is in a form of addiction/obsessive compulsive behavior patterns. the "altruistic" person feels good, and often superior to the person that they are helping, and so to regain this sensation of moral superiority, and guilt assuagement, they continue their charitable actions. the benefit from this situation is certainly less concrete, but present none the less.

[jab]

the first way that they benefit is through the reciprocated kindness of other people parroting good behavioral patterns, also along with this, is the fact that often times the community they are in will become better as a whole, and so they will have a better life on a communal/social level. the second way is in a form of addiction/obsessive compulsive behavior patterns. the "altruistic" person feels good, and often superior to the person that they are helping, and so to regain this sensation of moral superiority, and guilt assuagement, they continue their charitable actions. the benefit from this situation is certainly less concrete, but present none the less.

Well put! That's what I wish I had said.

In one species of spider, the mother allows her young to eat her. There is no payback for this behavior to the mother, I would say. Her genes have this instinct encoded because it serves to ensure their passing on. The genetic pattern is acting with enlightened self interest, I suppose, if you want to grant cognition to DNA. Many ancient cultures viewed offspring as a form of immortality for the deceased. How do you want to view it? If the mother spider is dead after her death, she seems to reap nothing from her death; only her offspring do. Is this instinctual behavior altruism?

[Matrim Cuathon]

altruism is a false concept. people feel good helping others. its gives them a boost. even if they have no material motive.

[Triskele]

Well put! That's what I wish I had said.

In one species of spider, the mother allows her young to eat her. There is no payback for this behavior to the mother, I would say. Her genes have this instinct encoded because it serves to ensure their passing on. The genetic pattern is acting with enlightened self interest, I suppose, if you want to grant cognition to DNA. Many ancient cultures viewed offspring as a form of immortality for the deceased. How do you want to view it? If the mother spider is dead after her death, she seems to reap nothing from her death; only her offspring do. Is this instinctual behavior altruism?

i disagree, this is not enlightened self interest because it is not a choice, the spider being a basic species, thus it is not a choice and so cannot be altruism. this is actually the question adressed in "clockwork orange" (or at least on of them), in that if people are doing good involuntarily, is it actually doing good? however you are right if a human were to do this, thus being a concious choice because we can deny instince, the continuation of a species being the benefit that the mother recieved.

[iloveamano]

I think this whole philosophy bases itself on the nature of man being fundamentally good. And I would agree, that is to say, if the nature of man is good then it should logically follow that altruism is possible. But I would also agree if Man's nature is corrupt that it is not possible, or that if it's neutral or non-existent it is again not possible.

[jab]

Just to point out, there's not anything do agree or disagree with in my last post, as I was asking a question without implying an answer that I favor. As I said ever so (embarrassingly) redundantly before, at this point one is simply choosing the precise definition of altruism one wishes. Therefore, the differences between which nuances of the definition we want to keep or reject (for whatever reason, either because we think it is a "better" definition, or because it is more consistent with the majority of scholarly usage, or because it is more aligned with historical usage, or because it makes more sense in light of one's other philosophical convictions, etc.) are constraining our choice as to whether "altruism" is possible or not. Saying "altruism = x" and that "x isn't (or is) possible in this (or any) circumstance," "and so altruism isn't (or is) possible" simply proves your definition of altruism (if your logic is cogent). This discussion, then, is all about defining altruism. It isn't immediately obvious that the argument is in the definition because 1) very subtle nuances are sometimes at work making the huge differences in our results, and 2) to make things more complicated, science, psychology, and lay-parlance all have different takes on the word that are influencing us according to our field of exposure and interest.

To my delight, the kind of close scrutiny we are engaging in has been most helpful in seeing these differences and helping me see the consequences of each definition. I feel greatly benefited by the different angles to the concept you (pl.) have pointed out. Let us all explore carefully the implications of each other's lexicographal decisions.

Various types of selfless behavior which we have encountered on our way I now present in review. It would be nice to come up with a more precise set of terminology for these conditions. Perhaps they will take shape. For now, here are the five definitions I've noticed (add more if I've forgotten any):

#1 Acting volitionally for the good of the community without any anticipated or actual personal benefit.
#2 Acting volitionally for the good of the community without any anticipated personal benefit. [The omission of "or actual" is important.]
#3 Acting volitionally for the greater good when one's own benefit is relatively paltry. [This is surprising candidate! But it intrigues me! Heretofore we have demanded that there be no remuneration, which seems like an easy assumption. That should be our danger sign. However, if one were picking definitions based upon what best delineates the important distinctions of the psychology of action (a debatable presupposition itself), it would perhaps follow that if a reward is, to a certain to-be-determined degree, "paltry" in comparison with the loss of the sacrifice, then it is natural to assume that the agent had not acted in order to receive the reward in any way, or at least that all of the act did not happen because of self-interest, but rather that some other "pure" impulse may have cause the action; the "rewards" are inconsequential or insufficient in explaining the motives for acting.]
#4 Acting purely instinctually for the good of the community without any actual personal benefit.
#5 Acting purely instinctually for the good of the community when one's own benefit is relatively paltry.

Each of these definitions of altruism carry pre-suppositions. I carry the pre-supposition that evolutionary forces explain our altruistic behavior and that, therefore, altruistic behavior must have a "benefit". However, I don't (yet!) accept the conclusion that we shouldn't choose to use the word "altruistic" for describing certain behavior.

First, as I said in an earlier post, sometimes the "altruistic" gene may benefit itself and not the agent, which leads one to the question of whether instinctual behavior deserves the title "altruistic". Triskele has implied that he is prepared to argue against it. I'd concur, for my own reasons, if we assume free will exists, since then it would be a useful distinction. But if free will doesn't exist, I'd like to keep the word "altruism" and we'd therefore have to take a biological approach to the definition to keep it in, which I "just want to do". How's that for laying bare a ridiculous, emotional presupposition.

Second (what is this a list of, again?....), each individual act may or may not be linked to a reward, even if evolutionary forces have created a propensity towards doing good: (a) a reward may not come in some circumstances; (b) expectation of reward, perhaps more germane than actual reward, may certainly be absent; (c) the amount of reward may be so small that it doesn't constitute enough of the decision.

In other words, evolutionary forces may have programmed us to actually be good. See this article from Stanford for an elaboration (near the end) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/altruism-biological/.

To leave my own points, I'll bring up Matrim's pithy entry, which assumes (perhaps rightly) that all behavior can be explained entirely in terms of enlightened self interest. (A counter-argument is implied in definition #3 and in my above in my own argument's part [c]). Even if Matrim successfully argues his thesis that the "boost" is always the full component of the motivational force in all situations for doing good to others (eliminating #1 and #4 since there is always "actual", and of course eliminating #3 and #5), one could still argue that #2 is an acceptable definition of altruism. This definition, moreover, could be a definition that is a "real" and not "false" concept.

Thoughts? Anyone still reading this?.... Would that indulgence be a clear case of altruism? (Haha.)

[Triskele]

Just to point out, there's not anything do agree or disagree with in my last post, as I was asking a question without implying an answer that I favor. As I said ever so (embarrassingly) redundantly before, at this point one is simply choosing the precise definition of altruism one wishes. Therefore, the differences between which nuances of the definition we want to keep or reject (for whatever reason, either because we think it is a "better" definition, or because it is more consistent with the majority of scholarly usage, or because it is more aligned with historical usage, or because it makes more sense in light of one's other philosophical convictions, etc.) are constraining our choice as to whether "altruism" is possible or not. Saying "altruism = x" and that "x isn't (or is) possible in this (or any) circumstance," "and so altruism isn't (or is) possible" simply proves your definition of altruism (if your logic is cogent). This discussion, then, is all about defining altruism. It isn't immediately obvious that the argument is in the definition because 1) very subtle nuances are sometimes at work making the huge differences in our results, and 2) to make things more complicated, science, psychology, and lay-parlance all have different takes on the word that are influencing us according to our field of exposure and interest.

I realized that your last post was on connected to the previous argument, but I responded to it with my own fallible opionion because it does bring up an interesting addition to our semantic discussion of altruism… “Free Will”. This interesting point should be taken into consideration because there is no actual proof that god exists and so along with this the conception of free will is taken into doubt. With free will in doubt I find that the question of altruism becomes ever more convoluted (and thus to me far more interesting.) its true that this forum has been relegated to a question of language, but to me that is hardly trivial because language shapes the reality we live in, and influences the concepts that we can master.

To my delight, the kind of close scrutiny we are engaging in has been most helpful in seeing these differences and helping me see the consequences of each definition. I feel greatly benefited by the different angles to the concept you (pl.) have pointed out. Let us all explore carefully the implications of each other's lexicographal decisions.

I also, not only that, but you have used the word “lexicographal” which is actually lexicographic, but even so, is not something I see every day.

#1 Acting volitionally for the good of the community without any anticipated or actual personal benefit.
#2 Acting volitionally for the good of the community without any anticipated personal benefit. [The omission of "or actual" is important.]
#3 Acting volitionally for the greater good when one's own benefit is relatively paltry. [This is surprising candidate! But it intrigues me! Heretofore we have demanded that there be no remuneration, which seems like an easy assumption. That should be our danger sign. However, if one were picking definitions based upon what best delineates the important distinctions of the psychology of action (a debatable presupposition itself), it would perhaps follow that if a reward is, to a certain to-be-determined degree, "paltry" in comparison with the loss of the sacrifice, then it is natural to assume that the agent had not acted in order to receive the reward in any way, or at least that all of the act did not happen because of self-interest, but rather that some other "pure" impulse may have cause the action; the "rewards" are inconsequential or insufficient in explaining the motives for acting.]
#4 Acting purely instinctually for the good of the community without any actual personal benefit.
#5 Acting purely instinctually for the good of the community when one's own benefit is relatively paltry.

Yes, yes, I think that these five definitions do carry the thread of our conversation thus far fairly effectively. And I agree with you in the third one, because while the individual does necessarily benefit from this exchange, they do so with the conscious knowledge that the cost far outweighs the gain, which is perhaps the closest thing that humans can get to true altruism. There is one thing though, I question whether the evolution of altruistic instincts is actually biological. I would argue that it is in fact anthropological in that I think that enlightened self interest came about on a large scale with the advent of organized religions and their inherent social messages. If you take a look you can see common threads of social justice throughout most of the major religions of the world. Then it is merely a question of the chicken and the egg, whether religion spawned conscious social actions, or the instinct was there and had revealed itself in human society through the organized religions of various cultures.

First, as I said in an earlier post, sometimes the "altruistic" gene may benefit itself and not the agent, which leads one to the question of whether instinctual behavior deserves the title "altruistic". Triskele has implied that he is prepared to argue against it. I'd concur, for my own reasons, if we assume free will exists, since then it would be a useful distinction. But if free will doesn't exist, I'd like to keep the word "altruism" and we'd therefore have to take a biological approach to the definition to keep it in, which I "just want to do". How's that for laying bare a ridiculous, emotional presupposition.

Here it is again, the question of free will. This is not so much as black and white as it may appear, this is because we have to deal with the concepts of fatism, predestination, free will, and determinism, do we have free will, but the outcome is predetermined/ is everything just a pattern and we have no actual choices, simply social programming? Do we have total free will? Or can we only choose major things, but the rest is just how we are raised? Perhaps not so emotional as unbased thought, which is also an interesting topic.

Yes, yes I am still reading it, but I have the sneaking sensation that I am the only one.

[Triskele]

am i the only one that finds it ironic that to post these things we have to go to "quick" reply.

[Triskele]

excellent article, it really plays into what we are talking about, i will formulate a reply, but i need to digest it first.

[atiguhya padma]

Regarding altruism and freewill:

Firstly, it would seem that altruism can be a biological instinct. We are statistically more likely to sacrifice ourselves for a cousin than for a complete stranger, simply because we have more common genetic material. See Matt Ridley's The Origins of Virtue.

Secondly, with respect to freewill, I always have a problem with reconciling the idea of the law of causation with the premise of freewill. The Online Oxford English Dictionary has this definition for free will:

<• noun the power to act without the constraints of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one’s own discretion.>

This definition seems to suggest that freewill is independent of causation, if you equate "constraints of necessity" or "fate" with the law of causation. As nothing can both 1) exist in a Universe where causation dictates every event that takes place or could possibly take place and 2) be independent of causation, it would appear that freewill like religion is a myth.

[Triskele]

Regarding altruism and freewill:

Firstly, it would seem that altruism can be a biological instinct. We are statistically more likely to sacrifice ourselves for a cousin than for a complete stranger, simply because we have more common genetic material. See Matt Ridley's The Origins of Virtue.

Secondly, with respect to freewill, I always have a problem with reconciling the idea of the law of causation with the premise of freewill. The Online Oxford English Dictionary has this definition for free will:

<• noun the power to act without the constraints of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one’s own discretion.>

This definition seems to suggest that freewill is independent of causation, if you equate "constraints of necessity" or "fate" with the law of causation. As nothing can both 1) exist in a Universe where causation dictates every event that takes place or could possibly take place and 2) be independent of causation, it would appear that freewill like religion is a myth.

well said friend, but if free will is a myth, than the individualist policies that America is founded on would also be rendered fiction, as would every govornment policy based on the assumption that humans have choice. but here is the thing, humans can act out of necessity, but they can also act completely irrational. take for example the monks that set themselves on fire, or the priests that stay in meditation for so long that they starve to death, or explorers, of thrill seekers. none of these occupations are instinctual, and all either result in the death of the individual, or at least hold the potential for such a result.

[jab]

Thanks for the heads up on the word lexicographic. I couldn't find the correct adjectival form of the word "lexicography" in my dictionary, so I took the liberty of making one up. I was confident the meaning would be clear!

Until the last month I've assumed that the parents of religion are possibily some combination of truth, self-serving twists of the truth, or evolution, which would create a false religion that has some sort of survivalist benefit, which as we've discussed would be the social justice, cooperation, delayed gratification, and/or altruism religions all not coincidentally promote to generally the same degree as their success.

I would have argued last week that even if religion created these characteristics (instead of evolution), as the novel (to me) chicken/egg aspect of this issue opens as a possibility, that even then, in the end natural selection is still the main cause of the traits, not religion, for it is the survival benefit of the traits would have allowed the traits to survive. Cooperation, et al have would have died out out shortly after coming into existence if only religion and not natural selection favored it.

However, I just read an article at the NYTimes website about a few thinkers who suggest that religion has no survival benefit at all; rather it is a "misfiring"--or, less negatively, a side-effect--of other traits that we evolved for their survival benefit.

"Some cognitive scientists think of brain functioning in terms of modules, a series of interconnected machines, each one responsible for a particular mental trick. They do not tend to talk about a God module per se; they usually consider belief in God a consequence of other mental modules."

<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/magazine/04evolution.t.html?ex=1330837200&en=be2b80235e0bbc 91&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink">Evo lution and Religion: Darwin's God</a> NYTimes March 4, 2007

[Triskele]

Thanks for the heads up on the word lexicographic. I couldn't find the correct adjectival form of the word "lexicography" in my dictionary, so I took the liberty of making one up. I was confident the meaning would be clear!

Until the last month I've assumed that the parents of religion are possibily some combination of truth, self-serving twists of the truth, or evolution, which would create a false religion that has some sort of survivalist benefit, which as we've discussed would be the social justice, cooperation, delayed gratification, and/or altruism religions all not coincidentally promote to generally the same degree as their success.

I would have argued last week that even if religion created these characteristics (instead of evolution), as the novel (to me) chicken/egg aspect of this issue opens as a possibility, that even then, in the end natural selection is still the main cause of the traits, not religion, for it is the survival benefit of the traits would have allowed the traits to survive. Cooperation, et al have would have died out out shortly after coming into existence if only religion and not natural selection favored it.

However, I just read an article at the NYTimes website about a few thinkers who suggest that religion has no survival benefit at all; rather it is a "misfiring"--or, less negatively, a side-effect--of other traits that we evolved for their survival benefit.

<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/magazine/04evolution.t.html?ex=1330837200&en=be2b80235e0bbc 91&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink">Evo lution and Religion: Darwin's God</a> NYTimes March 4, 2007

but if religion is only the brain neurons misfiring then why do all cultures have some form religion or spiritual philosophy. and if all of these are mistakes, then why have religions always led culture and mass amounts of people. if religion is a evolutionary mistake than it is a mistake that grew into the key of human society. i think this may be one of the evolutionary quirks that draw out the strengths of a species.