Freud's 'Oceanic Feeling'

[YesNo]

It is in the local library I use which is why I don't have it with me. I will re-read it and see if it still makes sense to me. I don't recommend purchasing the book.

What has occurred to me in our discussion is that a baby is not a blank slate. Now I know I mentioned that earlier, but I am just now surprised by the concept which is why I want to re-read the book. How do they know this? I was originally convinced.

This all sort of relates to the "oceanic feeling" which is a metaphor for a specific human experience which is a subjective event. The metaphor doesn't mean much to me, but it does assume that an adult and not a young child who could not speak had the experience. So language must be presumed. With language comes the possibility of delusion as well as clarity. Prior to language, I don't see how a delusion could form.

One metaphor that Thomas Nagel created was to talk about "what it is like to be" someone subjectively. That metaphor makes more sense to me. It refers to our subjective experience as distinct from an objective description of what we might be experiencing which loses the subjectivity in the act of expressing it in language. The oceanic feeling would be part of what it is like to be those of us who have that experience.

[Whifflingpin]

"Kids aren't strong atheists, they just don't have an opinion about God one way or the other until someone suggests they form one."

By definition they don't have the words until they have learnt language, but it would be wrong to think of them as blank slates. Months before birth they have experiences, feelings and thoughts. All children who survive have quasi-religious experience in that they are provided with sustenance, warmth and comfort from a being that is unknowable and beyond reason. At the same time as they are learning that their immediate benefactor is a human parent, so they are learning that the parent and all other parents are provided with sustenance warmth and comfort from a source that is unknowable and beyond reason. As it is natural to apply what we know to what we don't know, so it is natural to feel that the unknowable source of well-being is a super-parent. The concept of the super-parent as an explanation of the universe seems more likely to precede the rejection of such a concept than otherwise.

[Ecurb]

Children definitely have experiences and learn from birth or before. However, I doubt such experiences (other than those which are overtly religious, like going to church) induce them automatically to posit a "God".

In the mid 20th century in the U.S., cultural anthropology was dominated by the "culture and personality" school of thought. Practitioners included the most famous American anthropologists, like Margaret Meade and Ruth Benedict. Benedict wrote, "Culture is personality writ large."

This school of thought was neo-Freudian. Adult personality (the thinking went) is determined in infancy, and will therefore reflect the child-rearing practices of the culture. Child-rearing techniques and traditions will, in turn, be influenced by adult personality. So culture is personality writ large -- an endless circle in which personality influences culture, which influences personality. Freud suggested, for example, that a remote, powerful father (like those in his own Vienna in the 1800s) would tend to lead to a remote, powerful, male God (like He in Christianity).

This all sounded great. These anthropologists were no dummies, and Meade wrote books like "Coming of Age in Samoa" promoting her theories. Unfortunately, it didn't work out.

In the 1960s anthropologists created the "Human Relations Area Files". This was a vast data base. In the days before computers it was housed in what looked like a card catalog. It cross referenced every culture studied by anthropologists, so you could look at child rearing traditions and techniques in every culture, and religion in every culture. Guess what? The correlation that Freud (and others) predicted did not exist. Same with most of the correlations which the "Culture and Personality" school expected.

So while it may be that children, "feel that the unknowable source of well-being is a super-parent.", research suggests this kind of thinking is a dead end. It doesn't stand up to scrutiny. Many religions don't have powerful Gods who act as "super parents". Although the monotheistic religions of the Middle East do, it seems risky to think they arose out of universal childhood experiences when many religions (practiced by adults who as babies were also provided for by their parents) do not. The specific guesses which anthropologists made concerning infancy and its relation to adult religion have been falsified. The more general guesses that whifflingpin suggests seem inconsistent with the ethnographic data (i.e. the wide variety of religious practices, many of which do NOT include gods who resemble "super-parents").

[YesNo]

If the a child's propensity to accept the existence of supernatural beings cannot be traced to child-rearing and child-bearing, perhaps that is evidence that these supernatural beings in some general sense are real and this knowledge from childhood goes beyond culture. That would be the worst case scenario for atheism.

There is a site called the "Born Atheist". I found this on that site: http://bornatheist.com/explanation.html

If everyone is born atheist, then religion is learned and can be unlearned.

This covers up what is more likely the case: atheism is what is learned and so can be unlearned. Why "more likely"? Because it seems that Barrett's evidence shows children are born believers. Why are they born believers is what is puzzling me at the moment. As Whifflingpin suggests, this could be related to child bearing and rearing, but perhaps this is not enough, as Ecurb suggests, to dispose children to their natural belief.

I also found Andrew Brown's "There is no such thing as an atheist baby." http://www.theguardian.com/commentis...babies-atheism He mentioned that some Muslims do the same thing that atheists try to get away with. They both claim that children are members of their groups by default.

There is a difference between someone "opting in" and "opting out" of a group. If one is required to opt in before they are a member of the group, then they have to make a conscious decision to enter the group. If one is a member by default, then the most one would be able to do is opt out. Children are a convenient class. They can neither opt in nor opt out. So ideologues, to the extent they can convince the gullible, can try to justify their positions by saying whatever nonsense they want about children. The children, unlike adults, cannot talk back to them.

There are two questions in my mind:

1) Are children better characterized as born believers or born atheists? According to Brown, "Everything we know from science shows that supernaturalism comes naturally to children." This would support the born believer view along with what Barrett reports. I am willing to accept that children are born believers based on on what I currently think is good scientific evidence.

2) Why are they born believers? If this cannot be traced to parental activity as Ecurb is suggesting it can't, then one has to ask if what the children are naturally believing has some truth backing it up.

[Ecurb]

2) Why are they born believers? If this cannot be traced to parental activity as Ecurb is suggesting it can't, then one has to ask if what the children are naturally believing has some truth backing it up.

This is not what I am suggesting at all. I am suggesting that REDUCTIONIST explanations for belief (in the case I mentioned the notion that belief in God can be explained by psychology related to child rearing) have generally been false.

Children believe in God for the simple reason that adults tell them to believe in God. This is also why children believe that 2+2=4, that the Pacific Ocean is bigger than the Atlantic Ocean, that objects fall at 32 feet per second squared, and that Mt Everest is the highest mountain in the world. This is so obvious that we need not even discuss it. How adults CAME to tell children about God is less obvious, and worth discussing.

To very young children, events that seem dull to us seem miraculous. The child who sees snow falling for the first time may very well think he is experiencing a miracle. I don't think this indicates children are "born believers", merely that things are new and exciting to them.

[Whifflingpin]

"So while it may be that children, "feel that the unknowable source of well-being is a super-parent.", research suggests this kind of thinking is a dead end."
It certainly does not go far to account for the multiplicity and detail of religions. It is enough to counter the idea that children are blank slates.
For brevity, I took for granted the power of other influences, including all the bad experiences. Had that not been the case, then I would have been arguing that we were all natural believers in Gaia rather than Jehovah. In fact I did not mean to imply that there would be a natural belief in monotheism of any kind but simply a pre-disposition to theism rather than atheism.

It is not sufficient to say that children believe in anything "for the simple reason that adults tell them to believe." That is simply a re-iteration of the tabula rasa view of children that has been discredited for at least as long as any Neo-Freudian view of religion. Anything adults tell must either fit in with or modify the child's world view before the child can be said to believe it. An infant will know that 2 biscuits is better than 1 biscuit long before hearing that 1+1=2, and you need to feed a child a lot of biscuits and other things before it will accept the convention that 2+2 always equals 4. This is so obvious that we need not discuss it.

Allowing that motivation is infinitely varied, how, in general, adults with a religious belief come to tell children about their belief is equally obvious. Just as mathematics or geography describe certain aspects of the world so does religion. Any parent with a religious belief will teach a child that religion along with teaching it to count or draw or whatever. That too is so obvious that we need not discuss it.

[YesNo]

This is not what I am suggesting at all. I am suggesting that REDUCTIONIST explanations for belief (in the case I mentioned the notion that belief in God can be explained by psychology related to child rearing) have generally been false.

I am taking your word for this failure of reductionist explanations. My point is that if you cannot come up with a reductionist explanation that can be backed up with empirical data then atheism is on shaky ground. You will then need a non-reductionist explanation of a child's subjective experience which could imply the reality of what some might call the "supernatural".

As I see it atheism cannot survive without reductionism. The conscious subjective experiences we are discussing, whether the oceanic feeling or a child's disposition to belief, has to be reduced to something unconscious or at least panpsychic. If it turns out that some form of consciousness from the top-down is in any way active, then atheism is false.

Children believe in God for the simple reason that adults tell them to believe in God. This is also why children believe that 2+2=4, that the Pacific Ocean is bigger than the Atlantic Ocean, that objects fall at 32 feet per second squared, and that Mt Everest is the highest mountain in the world. This is so obvious that we need not even discuss it. How adults CAME to tell children about God is less obvious, and worth discussing.

You need to provide empirical evidence for your claim that a child's disposition to believe is caused by parents talking to the child or other forms of socialization. Given Barrett's survey, this cannot be taken for granted.

However, I agree that your position needs to reduce the child's experience to an adult experience that can be delusional in order to maintain atheism.

To very young children, events that seem dull to us seem miraculous. The child who sees snow falling for the first time may very well think he is experiencing a miracle. I don't think this indicates children are "born believers", merely that things are new and exciting to them.

I will keep in mind the possibility of novelty as why Barrett considers children to be born believers. I don't remember if he addresses it or not.

Where does a child's imaginary friends come from? Do parents tell their children there are monsters in the closet? It seems to me that the role of parents with respect to the child's disposition to believe is to tame it rather than create it.

What interests me now about what I remember from Barrett is whether the evidence he reports implies that the child's knowledge can be viewed as coming from an experience of reality that we have lost. I wasn't thinking about this when I read the book the first time. If that is the case then the evidence supporting the concept of "born believer" also supports theism.

[Ecurb]

It is not sufficient to say that children believe in anything "for the simple reason that adults tell them to believe." That is simply a re-iteration of the tabula rasa view of children that has been discredited for at least as long as any Neo-Freudian view of religion. Anything adults tell must either fit in with or modify the child's world view before the child can be said to believe it. An infant will know that 2 biscuits is better than 1 biscuit long before hearing that 1+1=2, and you need to feed a child a lot of biscuits and other things before it will accept the convention that 2+2 always equals 4. This is so obvious that we need not discuss it.

Allowing that motivation is infinitely varied, how, in general, adults with a religious belief come to tell children about their belief is equally obvious. Just as mathematics or geography describe certain aspects of the world so does religion. Any parent with a religious belief will teach a child that religion along with teaching it to count or draw or whatever. That too is so obvious that we need not discuss it.

I agree about why adults tell children about religion. Also, my examples of arithmetic and science might not be the best ones. Myth is more equivalent to history that to science. Children surely believe that Julius Caesar was assassinated in the Senate and said, "Et tu, Brute" for the same reason they believe that Jesus died on the cross and arose from the dead -- because adults they trust tell them that's what happened. Scientific "facts" must (perhaps) fit with children's perceptions of reality (although children may not be the best of naturalists, and if you tell them that lemmings commit mass suicide they, like adults, might believe it until someone else tells them otherwise, especially since most kids never see a lemming). Nonetheless, children probably don't (and can't) confirm or falsify most scientific "facts" that they learn, and almost all historical "facts" that they learn.

Unlike science, history is not reproducible. There's no way to confirm through experience or experiment most historical "facts" children are taught. That's also true of many (but not all, as W. points out) scientific facts. Experiments comparing human infants to chimpanzee infants show that the chimps are often equal to or more advanced than the humans in mental development, problem solving, etc., until the humans learn language, at which point the humans rapidly outstrip the apes. This would seem to support my position. We learn through language.

Do any non-human animals have religions? I doubt it (but I don't know). Animals certainly seem to practice rituals, which are, in human society, often religious. Indeed (to continue an anthropology lecture) one anthropological "school" of thought was the "Myth and ritual" school, which posited that rituals preceded myths. Myths developed (acc. this school of thought) as "explanations" for the rituals. If we accept that non-human animals practice rituals, it makes sense to think rituals preceded myths (which are necessarily linguistic), although the rest of the theory is more problematic.

[Ecurb]

You need to provide empirical evidence for your claim that a child's disposition to believe is caused by parents talking to the child or other forms of socialization. Given Barrett's survey, this cannot be taken for granted.

However, I agree that your position needs to reduce the child's experience to an adult experience that can be delusional in order to maintain atheism.


.

Persuasive evidence about what children "believe" cannot exist, because we cannot determine what children believe. We can only determine what they say they believe. However, it is clear that children are rewarded for saying they believe in some things, and punished for saying they do not believe. If, for example, a first grade history test asks, "Who was th first President of the U.S.?", children who answer "George Washington" will be rewarded, and those who answer, "Mao Tse Tsung" will be punished. It's not much of a leap to suggest that a child's answers are influenced by this.

Of course it is possible that children see more clearly than adults because they lack adult prejudices (from your explanation, this seems to be Barrett's position). After all, the grownups claimed to admire the emperor's clothes, and only the child said he was naked. Nonetheless, the notion that this is a default position for religious belief seems ludicrous. That the explanation is more akin to why children believe George Washington was the first president seems far more likely.

[Whifflingpin]

"Children surely believe that Julius Caesar was assassinated in the Senate and said, "Et tu, Brute" for the same reason they believe that Jesus died on the cross and arose from the dead -- because adults they trust tell them that's what happened."
That's probably true at some stage. Maybe the interesting bit is where the growing child says "No, people don't rise from the dead" and then proceeds to "Yes, He did and we do." [Note that that is a totally different phenomenon from the child's rejection of Tooth Fairy or Father Christmas stories. Detractors from religion try to equate the various types of "non-scientific" tales that parents tell. No-one, however goes back from unbelieving in Santa Claus to believing in him, whereas periods of unbelief/re-belief/re-interpretation are a common if not essential part of learning a religion.]
But my initial argument certainly did not extend to the acquisition of specific items of doctrine. I remember, from several decades ago when I was a Sunday-school teacher, that I referred to Mary as "mother-of-God." I was corrected by an eight year old, or thereabouts, who was at a stage of being able to believe general propositions about God being the creator or loving father of all, but not doctrinal niceties like the Trinity or the status of Jesus' mother. I certainly did not consider trying to explain why I had used the phrase, but accepted the correction with thanks.

"Experiments comparing human infants to chimpanzee infants .... This would seem to support my position. We learn through language."
Possibly, but not conclusively, since "correlation does not imply causality;" human children acquire many capabilities later than other species and the fact that two sets of ability develop at about the same time does not mean they are interdependent. Anecdotally, I was watching my grandson yesterday amusing himself by dropping a balloon over a gate almost as high as himself, and retrieving it by putting his hand through the bars, pinching the balloon with one so that he could lift it far enough to reach it over the gate with his other hand. His linguistic level is to use the same word for ball as for balloon, and he has no words for soft/hard or light/heavy, but he is capable of differentiating between a ball and a balloon and amusing himself with a game with a balloon that he knows could not be played with a ball. Not much, maybe, in the way of evidence, but it suggests his problem solving skills to be ahead of his language. Obviously, anecdote notwithstanding, it would be fatuous to suggest that language is not a major tool in learning.

"Persuasive evidence about what children "believe" cannot exist, because we cannot determine what children believe."
True, but, up to a point we can remember. Again anecdotally, I remember an occasion when I was in the 9/10 age year at school on which a teacher asked the class how they pictured God (in those days we were all deemed Church of England till proven otherwise.) After a bewildered and embarrassed silence, and an attempt from one brave lad to describe God as a kind of great light in the sky, the teacher said that he thought of God as a kindly bearded human. Between his posing the question and giving the "approved" answer, I became aware that I knew that God was not only beyond the scope of my language but must also be beyond the scope of language itself and that (although I could not have used the expression) anything we said about God was in the nature of parable. It was probably two or three years later that I found that my unspoken answer was a "right" answer, and that the Incarnation, doctrinally speaking, amongst other things, is the Creator's means of making Itself known to Its creation.

[Ecurb]

Just to add to the discussion, Wiffling, I am not assuming that atheism is the default position because it is correct. I just think the concept of God is culturally constituted and learned (whether or not it is "true", the notion that time is relative is also culturally constituted and seems unnatural and counter intuitive). Would an ancient Greek, whose Zeuses and Apollos were so different from our God, have been likely to know that God "was not only beyond the scope of my language but must also be beyond the scope of language itself and that (although I could not have used the expression) anything we said about God was in the nature of parable."? I don't know, of course, but I doubt it. Man makes himself (as V. Gordon Childe entitled his book). We create culture, and we are created by culture. It is difficult to say which aspects of our "selves" are "natural" as opposed to "man made".

[YesNo]

Persuasive evidence about what children "believe" cannot exist, because we cannot determine what children believe.

Since Barrett provided evidence, evidence exists.

Until there is empirical evidence to the contrary, not just rhetoric, I am going by the following opt-in definition of an atheist:

An atheist is someone who explicitly opts-in to being an atheist. No one else is an atheist.

This excludes children since they do not have the required language skills to opt-in. It also excludes people who do not claim membership in any church, such as myself, but who have not explicitly opted-in to atheism.

By definition the concept of "born atheist" is false because the opt-in requirement is missing.

[Whifflingpin]

"An atheist is someone who explicitly opts-in to being an atheist. No one else is an atheist."

If that is your definition, then it would be only fair to allow Ecurb the complementary definition:

"A theist is someone who explicitly opts-in to being a theist. No one else is a theist."

These both exclude infants who do not have the required language skills to opt-in. Further, as Ecurb has pointed out, one cannot know what another person believes until that person is able to express that belief without expectation of punishment or reward, which, for most people, probably means never.

*** *** ***

"Would an ancient Greek... have been likely to know that ... anything we said about [divine things] was in the nature of parable."?
The "ancient Greeks" include a vast number of people over several centuries, and between them they seem to have expressed pretty much everything that can usefully be said on anything in philosophy or theology. I have a vague memory that Plato had made comments similar to mine, but a brief attempt to locate those comments only showed me that there are probably as many different views on what Plato said as there are on the nature of the gods. I am going to stop now, as even the emoticons by the side of the dialog box are making fun of me

[YesNo]

Yes. The definition should be expanded so it doesn't only apply to atheists. I am also annoyed with those Muslims who think I was born Muslim. Along with atheists I would include any form of theism that a group has aligned around. One has to explicitly opt-in to be counted and one can always opt-out. The point is to keep these groups from inflating their numbers at the cost of those who have not made a choice to join or stay in the group.

When it comes to "born believers" we are talking about a childhood experience of reality, perhaps related to the oceanic feeling in the OP. I don't think it is what most theistic positions would consider to be orthodox. The implied supernatural reality means that it cannot be atheism.

[Ecurb]

I'm no expert on Plato, or on the Ancient Greeks, and maybe they were a bad example (although there might be quite a gulf between Homer and Plato). Nonetheless, there are a wide variety of Gods in the history of the world, and a wide variety of atheistic religions (like Buddhism), and I'm confident that these cultures influence how young children think about the supernatural.

As far as Barrett's evidence, what is it? I admit I haven't found the book yet, but you haven't offered any evidence, yesno, you merely say Barrett does.

Here's my experience (and also a reaction to the anti-Christmas thread in "general discussions", in which yesno is a participant): rituals like Christmas create an almost supernatural thrill in young children. I'm not religious, but I still thrill to the notion that God gave his only begotten Son to save us from our sins, and my spiritual thrill may be related to the excitement I felt at Christmas as a very young children. Now this excitement is partly spiritual (even for young kids) and partly based on family fun and greed. The thrill of receiving hidden gifts as a child suggests the thrill of receiving the gift of Jesus' birth. Here are two of my favorite Christmas literary treasures:

http://www.journeywithjesus.net/Poem...hristmas.shtml

http://shortstories.co.in/the-heavenly-christmas-tree/

I like it when authors step out of their role as narrator and speak directly to their readers, as Dostoevsky does in "The Heavenly Christmas Tree". The end of the story expresses my own feelings:

Why have I made up such a story, so out of keeping with an ordinary diary,
and a writer’s above all? And I promised two stories dealing with real
events! But that is just it, I keep fancying that all this may have
happened really–that is, what took place in the cellar and on the
woodstack; but as for Christ’s Christmas tree, I cannot tell you whether
that could have happened or not.

p.s. Dostoevsky's story is quite short, and anyone who likes Christmas stories should read it.