My Philosophy

[YesNo]

Maybe if you just keep saying this enough, on the 1,000,000th time it will actually be true! That seems to be YOUR philosophy, anyway; repeat nonsense enough so that you (and maybe one or two others) can actually believe it.

Is that how people who believe in many worlds convince themselves that they're right?

I've mentioned this before, but I'll say it again. I'm not trying to convince you. I want someone to challenge my positions. That's how I test them and how I get a better version of my positions. I don't care if anyone agrees with me or not.

These questions of the existence of strict determinism or its backup, chance, and its relationship to free will involve unquestioned cultural assumptions. To discuss them is challenging for people who don't want to step out of their metaphysical boxes.

These are the ones that I see at the moment rephrased as questions:

1) Does strict materialistic determinism actually exist? That is, is it possible to construct a state vector from which one can predict the entire future and claim to know the entire past. I don't think so. If it doesn't exist, the trending behavior that makes mathematical laws look deterministic needs to be rethought.

Quantum uncertainty, like it or not, has discredited this at the fundamental level. There is no reason not to assume it should be discredited everywhere.

2) Does the materialist's god-of-the-gaps, chance, exist at all? When determinism fails, this chance God is brought out to save the materialist's metaphysics, that is, fill in the gaps that determinism leaves unanswered.

Why is chance needed? If determinism fails then something must fill in the gap so that one does not have to acknowledge the existence of enough consciousness for choices to be made. Why are materialists afraid of consciousness? Why are they afraid of choices being made? Well, it would wipe out their metaphysical belief system.

Again, quantum uncertainty has discredited chance. If unconscious chance actually was behind quantum uncertainty, those many worlders would have no problem constructing the Schrodinger equation. They would simply assign all the coefficients the same value under the assumption there was a uniform (chance--unconscious) distribution.

3) Are human beings machines? We look more like organisms, but culturally some people think there is no difference between organisms and machines. It seems clear, again, like it or not, that we have sufficient will power to make choices for which we are responsible. That would mean we are not machines.

I'm hoping to name other unjustified assumptions to add to this list as our discussions progress.

[MorpheusSandman]

Is that how people who believe in many worlds convince themselves that they're right?

No MW advocate I know of goes around saying that MW is true and that CI has been falsified or that CI "isn't even an interpretation." You don't get it; it's the not the fact that you advocate CI that I'm so antagonistic towards you, it's the fact that, in doing so, you insist on repeating claims like "determinism is discredited by quantum uncertainty" or "MW isn't even an interpretation" that are PATENTLY FALSE. If you want to advocate CI, it's fine that you say "MW can't derive the Born rule," because that's true, and that's a problem; but it's NOT ok for you to utter nonsense like "determinism is discredited."

That you feel the need to repeat such things suggest either gross ignorance or dishonesty; at first I leaned towards the former, because there's no crime in being ignorant and I like to think the best of people, but in your repeated insistence on repeating falsites that you've been corrected on I now have to lean towards dishonesty, and it's all the more egregious when you put up this "I'm an innocent, honest truth-seeker who want people to challenge my opinion," which is bollocks. You started out your investigation believing in your magical, mystical "conscious choice" (never mind the lunacy of suggesting how particles could possible be "conscious" when we only know of consciousness to begin with because of a material brain made up of countless such particles) and wanting to disbelieve in determinism, and what you want to believe had colored everything you've read and said on the matter.

I have no problem "discussing" this subject with people that are honest or capable of understanding it; I don't think you are. My offer stands: I'll pay you to sign up for a physics forum and discuss this with others, if only so I can have a permanent record of many others confirming exactly what I've said. If you don't want to take up the challenge, then that speaks to your lack of honesty right there.

1) Does strict materialistic determinism actually exist? -- Quantum uncertainty, like it or not, has discredited this at the fundamental level.

It's "discredited" this ONLY if the collapse assumption of CI is true, and, I remind you, there's not a stitch of evidence--not in the math, not in the experiments--suggesting that it is. What's more, all of the paradoxes it creates suggests the exact opposite; that there is no collapse, everything is in a state of superposition, and, in which case, the wavefunction is deterministic and decohering into different worlds upon entanglement. The "uncertainty" is precisely what we'd expect to see since we can't see into both worlds simultaneously.

2) Does the materialist's god-of-the-gaps, chance, exist at all? When determinism fails, this chance God is brought out to save the materialist's metaphysics, that is, fill in the gaps that determinism leaves unanswered.

Why is chance needed? If determinism fails then something must fill in the gap so that one does not have to acknowledge the existence of enough consciousness for choices to be made. Why are materialists afraid of consciousness? Why are they afraid of choices being made? Well, it would wipe out their metaphysical belief system.

You are too funny sometimes. You dislike both determinism and chance, but don't seem to get that they are mutually exclusive and things have to be one or the other. The "indeterminism" of CI is really no different than "chance." Saying that some outcomes are more likely makes it "not chance" is as silly as saying gambling isn't "chance."

If unconscious chance actually was behind quantum uncertainty, those many worlders would have no problem constructing the Schrodinger equation. They would simply assign all the coefficients the same value under the assumption there was a uniform (chance--unconscious) distribution.

And then you come out with pseudo-scientific garble like this that's almost credible enough to find its way into a sci-fi anime. Born is not uniform; MW recognizes this, but doesn't know why. CI doesn't know why either, but invokes a mystical "collapse" that's about as explanatory as saying "Zeus!" to explain lightning.

[YesNo]

No MW advocate I know of goes around saying that MW is true and that CI has been falsified or that CI "isn't even an interpretation." You don't get it; it's the not the fact that you advocate CI that I'm so antagonistic towards you, it's the fact that, in doing so, you insist on repeating claims like "determinism is discredited by quantum uncertainty" or "MW isn't even an interpretation" that are PATENTLY FALSE. If you want to advocate CI, it's fine that you say "MW can't derive the Born rule," because that's true, and that's a problem; but it's NOT ok for you to utter nonsense like "determinism is discredited."

If you want me to think about this differently you will need to provide reasons or evidence. Otherwise, I will take the opportunity to summarize my latest understanding of the subject:

1) MW is not an interpretation of QM. Why? Because MW cannot formulate the Schrodinger equation from within the "interpretation". Without the Schrodinger equation, MW cannot claim to be in agreement with QM. What's "false" about that?

2) The Heisenburg uncertainty principle is derived mathematically from the Schrodinger equation. One of the points Bohm and Hiley made in The Undivided Universe, in the chapter criticizing many worlds, was to question whether the MW position actually removed uncertainty.

That you feel the need to repeat such things suggest either gross ignorance or dishonesty; at first I leaned towards the former, because there's no crime in being ignorant and I like to think the best of people, but in your repeated insistence on repeating falsites that you've been corrected on I now have to lean towards dishonesty, and it's all the more egregious when you put up this "I'm an innocent, honest truth-seeker who want people to challenge my opinion," which is bollocks. You started out your investigation believing in your magical, mystical "conscious choice" (never mind the lunacy of suggesting how particles could possible be "conscious" when we only know of consciousness to begin with because of a material brain made up of countless such particles) and wanting to disbelieve in determinism, and what you want to believe had colored everything you've read and said on the matter.

Regarding the claim that consciousness requires a material brain, this seems to me to be falsified by the behavior of slime mold that appears intelligent enough to make choices and yet doesn't have a material brain at all.

It's "discredited" this ONLY if the collapse assumption of CI is true, and, I remind you, there's not a stitch of evidence--not in the math, not in the experiments--suggesting that it is. What's more, all of the paradoxes it creates suggests the exact opposite; that there is no collapse, everything is in a state of superposition, and, in which case, the wavefunction is deterministic and decohering into different worlds upon entanglement. The "uncertainty" is precisely what we'd expect to see since we can't see into both worlds simultaneously.

If everything is in a state of superposition then determinism has been removed not only at the quantum level but at all levels. I think that might be the case, but I don't think it helps your argument against uncertainty.

You are too funny sometimes.

Thank you.

You dislike both determinism and chance, but don't seem to get that they are mutually exclusive and things have to be one or the other. The "indeterminism" of CI is really no different than "chance." Saying that some outcomes are more likely makes it "not chance" is as silly as saying gambling isn't "chance."

The point I am trying to make is that the view that determinism and chance are mutually exclusion is a metaphysical assumption that clouds one's thinking. This is why Pilosofer123 can't see past "free will impossibilism" leading to the view that our ability to make a choice as an illusion.

This is my view:

(1) Strict determinism is a metaphysical delusion. Things "trend" and from here we get approximate mathematical laws. I am using my understanding of Rupert Sheldrake's position regarding this, although I don't know if I understand Sheldrake completely.

(2) Uniformly distributed chance is rare in nature. If the chance event is not uniformly distributed, there is no guarantee that something else isn't going on. If the metaphysics one promotes must avoid conscious input of one sort or another, the materialist's god-of-the-gaps Chance must be a uniform distribution to even get off the ground as a viable position that does away with consciousness.

(3) Consciousness is fundamental. I think panpsychism, as a current philosophy of mind, is more likely true than not: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism It fits reality better.

[MorpheusSandman]

If you want me to think about this differently you will need to provide reasons or evidence.

I have. Repeatedly. You've ignored it. I have no reason of thinking you'll change now.

1) MW is not an interpretation of QM. Why? Because MW cannot formulate the Schrodinger equation from within the "interpretation". Without the Schrodinger equation, MW cannot claim to be in agreement with QM. What's "false" about that?

2) The Heisenburg uncertainty principle is derived mathematically from the Schrodinger equation. One of the points Bohm and Hiley made in The Undivided Universe, in the chapter criticizing many worlds, was to question whether the MW position actually removed uncertainty.

1) You don't seem to get that Shrodinger is DESCRIPTIVE, while Born, which derives Shrodinger, is EXPLANATORY. How to explain the difference... imagine you're an alien that's just discovered human automobiles. After much testing, you can describe what they do, but you don't understand how/why they do it (via combustion). Even if you don't understand how/why it works, you can still describe what it does. Shrodinger is describing what the car does; Born is explaining why it does it.

You have this wonky notion that MW needs to "explain" Shrodinger (via Born) in order for it to be an interpretation. This is classic YesNo nonsense, especially when you consider that CI's "collapse" only "explains" Born by assuming something it has no reason to assume, and a great many reasons NOT to assume it. It would be like saying that the alien that shouts "gremlins!" to explain how a car runs is a legitimate interpretation, while an alien that says "it probably has something to do with that oily, transparent liquid, but I don't know what" isn't a legitimate interpretation.

I'll repeat this simple important fact: MW can't derive Born, but CI only derives Born at the expense of creating paradoxes and assuming something (a collapse) not validated by math or testing. An advocate of EITHER interp has to argue why their approach is better, and why the problems inherent in their approach aren't that serious. The way I see it, MW has one problem that's potentially solvable; CI has multiple problems that probably aren't. You always seem to gloss over the manifold problems in CI as if they don't exist. To me, MW not being able to derive Born is relatively MINOR compared to all the craziness of CI. Even invoking your magical, mystical "conscious choice" doesn't explain how particles can affect each other thousands of miles away at thousands of times faster than the speed of light.

2) MW would not remove uncertainty from a subjective standpoint. HUP merely expresses the limits of our knowledge before observation: "you can know this much, be this precise about the future, but no more until you actually get entangled with the particles." I have no idea why Bohm or Hiley would think MW removes uncertainty, unless they (maybe like you) don't get this crucial difference between the objective determinacy of Shrodinger VS the subjective indeterminacy of HUP.

Regarding the claim that consciousness requires a material brain, this seems to me to be falsified by the behavior of slime mold that appears intelligent enough to make choices and yet doesn't have a material brain at all.

You misquoted me; what I said was: "WE only know of consciousness to begin with because of a material brain made up of countless such particles," meaning that our experience of consciousness is tied to our brains. We have no clue what "experience" a slime mold has, whether it counts as consciousness or makes choice or if it's just a blob of DNA acting and reacting. Even the slime mold is made up of countless particles that make up the nuclei, proteins, DNA, etc. These are far from singular particles; they're still highly complex, organic, organized, life (comparatively, at least).

If everything is in a state of superposition then determinism has been removed not only at the quantum level but at all levels. I think that might be the case...

Absolutely false. Remember that the wavefunction IS deterministic, so if everything is in superposition then it's evolving according to that deterministic formula. CI NEEDS the collapse in order to make the wavefunction indeterministic. No collapse, no indeterminism; all you have left is observer uncertainty, which is not the same. This is another fundamental point you've never understood: MW as its simplest is saying "everything is in superposition." If that's true, then MW is true. So you can't think that "everything is in superposition" is a true statement without also thinking MW is true; they're the same thing.

This is my view:

Yeah, it's a complete mess right from the get-go. There are no "approximate mathematical laws." Those used in QM are ridiculously precise. Rupert Sheldrake is a first-rate charlatan promoting pseudoscience (and this is not my opinion, but that of the scientific community at large). "Uniform chance" is a nonsense term, and saying "consciousness is fundamental" is what Wittgenstein would call a meaningless statement.

[Philosofer123]

Actually, it is. The choice is the explanation. It needs no other explanation than its existence.

If the choice has no explanation, then it is non-rational (not based on reason). And it makes no sense to hold someone responsible for a non-rational choice.

The regress argument claims there is a deterministic explanation for each mental state. The person having that mental state has no responsibility for that state since some previous mental state determined it and so on. If one argues that reality is indeterministic, then those promoting the regress argument bring in their god-of-the-gaps, chance, or "randomness", to keep their metaphysics afloat.

The regress argument depends on either (1) strict determinism or (2) a dualism between determinism and chance. These are mere assumptions. Neither of these have support from either our own experiences nor from quantum uncertainty. They are purely metaphysical assumptions without basis in reality.

From a scientific perspective, that falsifies the regress argument.

Indeed, I have shown that.

The determinism premise has been discredited by quantum uncertainty if not by our own experiences. The god-of-the-gaps back-up premise that if strict determinism is not true then a determinism=chance operation is in play has also been discredited by quantum uncertainty since the probabilities that quantum physics comes up are not uniform. They are not random, that is, not caused by the god-of-the-gaps Chance.

So, something else is involved besides determinism or chance. Because of that, the regress argument freeing you from responsibility for your actions does not hold.

The regress argument has no "determinism premise". As I explained in post #12, the regress argument does not assume determinism.

So again, in order to refute the regress argument, you must either show that one or more of its premises is not necessarily true, or you must show that its premises do not logically entail its conclusion. You have done neither, so the argument stands.

[YesNo]

If the choice has no explanation, then it is non-rational (not based on reason). And it makes no sense to hold someone responsible for a non-rational choice.

At least you seem to agree that choices can be made. If one wants an "explanation" for the choice, one might be able to bring back Aristotle's four causes (explanations) and use them.

The regress argument has no "determinism premise". As I explained in post #12, the regress argument does not assume determinism.

So again, in order to refute the regress argument, you must either show that one or more of its premises is not necessarily true, or you must show that its premises do not logically entail its conclusion. You have done neither, so the argument stands.

What your position depends on is a dichotomy between determinism and chance. If something is not deterministic, then the god-of-the-gaps chance is invoked to explain it. There are two problems with that: (1) there may be more going on than determinism and chance and (2) both determinism and chance may be soft, that is, not having any reality except as approximations.

Actually, I have refuted the regress argument. The regress argument is based upon a metaphysical assumption that you need to justify now that I have pointed it out.

[YesNo]

You have this wonky notion that MW needs to "explain" Shrodinger (via Born) in order for it to be an interpretation. This is classic YesNo nonsense, especially when you consider that CI's "collapse" only "explains" Born by assuming something it has no reason to assume, and a great many reasons NOT to assume it.

What MW needs to do is find the coefficients of the Schrodinger equation without copying those from Copenhagen. It does not need to explain the equation.

I don't think MW will ever be able to do this. The reason is that, assuming there are many worlds, one would have to find a position outside the universe of worlds from which to measure the probability of specific events after a test was run. That requires taking a supernatural position or having a supernatural agent of some sort willing to make those measurements and willing to communicate them to us. One cannot trust the results of an experiment performed in one of those worlds, like the real world we are living in.

So why trust Copenhagen over MW? Well, they can find those coefficients. What is more, they run a test and they can use the results of that test to predict the probability of something happening the next time and the next time. All in one world. All without the need of a supernatural agent. If MW trusts the results of its experiments, it is making a major assumption that the world we are living in will give us useful results. I suppose you could say, because QM works at all, MW must be false.

[MorpheusSandman]

What MW needs to do is find the coefficients of the Schrodinger equation without copying those from Copenhagen. It does not need to explain the equation.

These two things are essentially identical, since Born explains Schrodinger; for MW to derive Born would be to explain Schrodinger, they go hand in hand.

I don't think MW will ever be able to do this.

Most thought we'd never fly to the moon or figure out what caused lightning; you underestimate the cleverness and resourcefulness of science. Quantum computing may very well be able to derive Born via MW. There are already plenty of plausible ideas out there how to get Born from MW: http://hanson.gmu.edu/mangledworlds.html

FWIW, it's not necessarily necessary (heh) to be outside the "worlds" in order to derive Born. I mean, if MW is right then the wavefunction is already, in a sense, us glimpsing multiple worlds contained in a point. The problem is the barrier we run up against when we become entangled with the wavefunction. If you have something that can crunch enough numbers then it's entirely possible it could measure without the same effects of entanglement and we'd have a new way of testing. Anyway, I'm not betting against anything they'll be able to find out through it in, say, 25-50 years time. Who knows, we may all be completely wrong.

So why trust Copenhagen over MW? Well, they can find those coefficients.

Yes, I've already stated this; but you ignore that they "find those coefficients" by assuming a collapse that they have no justification for assuming either via math or via testing, and this assumption also creates contradictions and paradoxes that 100 years of physics have yet to solve. So, you need to address these problems rather than just touting its one "success"

I suppose you could say, because QM works at all, MW must be false.

MW makes the same predictions CI does! Neither are experimentally distinguishable from each other! Again, that MW can't explain Schrodinger via Born doesn't prevent it from using Born any more than my hypothetical aliens not being able to explain how the car runs prevent them from driving the car. QM "working" is not an argument for either interpretation.

[MorpheusSandman]

If one wants an "explanation" for the choice, one might be able to bring back Aristotle's four causes (explanations) and use them.

Yes, I'm sure a guy that lived thousands of years ago before the advent of modern science had "choice" all figured out. Hint: most all dead philosophers were wrong on most every major topic concerning reality as-it-is (ie, not necessarily about ethics and similar subjects, which don't correspond to how reality is, but how we want it to be).

There are two problems with that: (1) there may be more going on than determinism and chance and (2) both determinism and chance may be soft, that is, not having any reality except as approximations.

(1) What else is going on? (2) The terms "determinism" and "chance" themselves are just approximations of language, they're already about as "soft" as it gets; but I've yet to see you present any plausible way in which they can co-exist. The closest you get is CI which says that QM is all about "chance" but classical mechanics is all "deterministic" and there's some magical "collapse" where the former becomes the latter.

[Philosofer123]

At least you seem to agree that choices can be made. If one wants an "explanation" for the choice, one might be able to bring back Aristotle's four causes (explanations) and use them.

The explanation that is required for rational choice is an explanation in terms of one's reasoning process. To the extent such an explanation is not available, the choice is non-rational, and one cannot be responsible for non-rational choices. And to the extent such an explanation is available, the regress looms. Aristotle can't help you here.

What your position depends on is a dichotomy between determinism and chance. If something is not deterministic, then the god-of-the-gaps chance is invoked to explain it. There are two problems with that: (1) there may be more going on than determinism and chance and (2) both determinism and chance may be soft, that is, not having any reality except as approximations.

Actually, I have refuted the regress argument. The regress argument is based upon a metaphysical assumption that you need to justify now that I have pointed it out.

The dichotomy is not between determinism and chance, but between one's choices being explainable in terms of one's reasoning process or not. To the extent such an explanation is not available, the choice is non-rational, and one cannot be responsible for non-rational choices. And to the extent such an explanation is available, the regress looms.

[YesNo]

The dichotomy is not between determinism and chance, but between one's choices being explainable in terms of one's reasoning process or not. To the extent such an explanation is not available, the choice is non-rational, and one cannot be responsible for non-rational choices. And to the extent such an explanation is available, the regress looms.

Of course one can. If you make a choice, you are responsible. That's the way reality is. It doesn't matter whether the choice was rationally made or not.

If you open the metaphysical box, stand up, stretch, step outside and take a deep breath, you will see that the regress argument is nonsense built out of a misunderstanding of determinism and chance.

[Philosofer123]

Of course one can. If you make a choice, you are responsible. That's the way reality is. It doesn't matter whether the choice was rationally made or not.

Then why is insanity a legitimate legal defense for one who has committed a crime?

[YesNo]

Then why is insanity a legitimate legal defense for one who has committed a crime?

If you sincerely explain to the judge the regress argument, I agree that this should help the insanity plea.

[YesNo]

Most thought we'd never fly to the moon or figure out what caused lightning; you underestimate the cleverness and resourcefulness of science. Quantum computing may very well be able to derive Born via MW. There are already plenty of plausible ideas out there how to get Born from MW: http://hanson.gmu.edu/mangledworlds.html

FWIW, it's not necessarily necessary (heh) to be outside the "worlds" in order to derive Born. I mean, if MW is right then the wavefunction is already, in a sense, us glimpsing multiple worlds contained in a point. The problem is the barrier we run up against when we become entangled with the wavefunction. If you have something that can crunch enough numbers then it's entirely possible it could measure without the same effects of entanglement and we'd have a new way of testing. Anyway, I'm not betting against anything they'll be able to find out through it in, say, 25-50 years time. Who knows, we may all be completely wrong.

Yes, I've already stated this; but you ignore that they "find those coefficients" by assuming a collapse that they have no justification for assuming either via math or via testing, and this assumption also creates contradictions and paradoxes that 100 years of physics have yet to solve. So, you need to address these problems rather than just touting its one "success"

In the article you cite, Robin Hanson writes this:

We have done enough tests by now that if the many worlds view were right, the worlds where the tests were passed would constitute an infinitesimally tiny fraction of the set of all those worlds where the test was tried. So the key question is: how is it that we happen to be in one of those very rare worlds? Any classical statistical significance test would strongly reject the hypothesis that we are in a typical world.

I agree with this. We should not be experiencing ourselves in this exceptional world where QM works the way it does, if many worlds were true. I don't think he's right in claiming that the probability should be uniform across this universe of worlds, but if he wants to avoid introducing something else, he has to have a uniform distribution. However, that just makes the rarity of our experienced world more evident. It is evidence that something is wrong with many worlds concept.

It seems as if the "mangled" worlds are a way to get rid of those other worlds to explain why we don't ever experience ourselves there.

MW makes the same predictions CI does! Neither are experimentally distinguishable from each other! Again, that MW can't explain Schrodinger via Born doesn't prevent it from using Born any more than my hypothetical aliens not being able to explain how the car runs prevent them from driving the car. QM "working" is not an argument for either interpretation.

To the extent that many worlds predicts that all results happen in some world, it predicts what CI predicts for one world. It doesn't need the Schrodinger equation to do that. But that makes it a weaker theory because it is harder to falsify than the CI interpretation.

[MorpheusSandman]

..if he wants to avoid introducing something else, he has to have a uniform distribution. However, that just makes the rarity of our experienced world more evident... It seems as if the "mangled" worlds are a way to get rid of those other worlds to explain why we don't ever experience ourselves there.

All of this is wrong, which just confirms my suspicion that you don't understand most of what you read on this subject.

To the extent that many worlds predicts that all results happen in some world, it predicts what CI predicts for one world.

Exactly, so they are experimentally indistinguishable.

But that makes it a weaker theory because it is harder to falsify than the CI interpretation.

Actually, it's the reverse; MW is quite easy to falsify and CI is near impossible to falsify. MW's key assumption that QM works all the way down is falsifiable if we find any split between he micro and macro world predicted by CI's collapse. However, there's nothing you can "find" to falsify CI, although finding said split would prove it.