My Philosophy

[Skydaemon]

You basically believe in determinism-lite, where humans do not have agency, or any free will, but get bumped in meaningless ways by randomness. The combination absolves them from responsibility for anything they do, and lacking free will, they cannot affect the future intentionally.

It is a depressing theory, but I think I'm back to this again.

I find the focus odd though. You basically begin with an assertion that people aren't independent actors, have no agency, and everything they do is scripted by the universe. After that you proceed to discuss peace of mind and living well. I can't see how either matter in this theory.

In your theory, you really don't exist as an independent entity, at least, no more so than as a label. Why does it matter if you live well or not? You'll live as you were determined to, a gear in the machine, the concept of living well has no meaning. You aren't capable of living badly or well, just as you were molded to live. In this theory, I'm not sure "you" even should be recognized independently of the universe around you. The universe will act as it must, and there is no you.

And although you try to shunt it as a reference only to fatalism, it works just as well in the context of determinism-lite instead of a fully determined universe. Whether the final destination is modified by randomness or not is irrelevant.

// As an aside, it was an interesting discussion so thanks for that, but my time for the evening is done.~ Cheers.

[Philosofer123]

You basically believe in determinism-lite, where humans do not have agency, or any free will, but get bumped in meaningless ways by randomness. The combination absolves them from responsibility for anything they do, and lacking free will, they cannot affect the future intentionally.

All bolded phrases are incorrect. Free will impossibilism does not imply any of them.

It is a depressing theory

Why?

I find the focus odd though. You basically begin with an assertion that people aren't independent actors, have no agency, and everything they do is scripted by the universe. After that you proceed to discuss peace of mind and living well. I can't see how either matter in this theory.

They matter because I care about living well. I would rather enjoy life than suffer.

In your theory, you really don't exist as an independent entity, at least, no more so than as a label. Why does it matter if you live well or not?

Because I care about living well. I would rather enjoy life than suffer.

You'll live as you were determined to, a gear in the machine, the concept of living well has no meaning. You aren't capable of living badly or well, just as you were molded to live.

Quoted phrases are false, and not implied by free will impossibilism.

And although you try to shunt it as a reference only to fatalism, it works just as well in the context of determinism-lite instead of a fully determined universe.

Not at all.

As an aside, it was an interesting discussion so thanks for that, but my time for the evening is done.~ Cheers.

My pleasure.

[YesNo]

The regress argument allows for quantum indeterminism that does not translate into macro-level indeterminism, and it allows for randomness in one's unintentional actions. Also, even if there are indeterministic/random factors involved in one's intentional actions, one cannot be responsible for such factors, so the conclusion of the argument (that ultimate responsibility is impossible) still holds.

When I mentioned determinism, I was thinking quantum uncertainty would contradict it. Since you are aware of quantum unceertainty then we don't have to worry about strict determinism. That would not agree with current science.

One thing I've noticed about discussions of quantum uncertainty is that it gets confused with "randomness". It seems when we drop "determinism", we figure the only thing left is "randomness". One skips the possibility that some kind of "choice" is being made that introduces something new into the system. However, choices require consciousness of some sort.

The quantum particles aren't acting randomly in the sense that any of their outcomes is equally likely. They generate non-random wave patterns on the detector in a double slit experiment where they have not been measured. If one thinks of them as if they were conscious having free will (in a limited way), they could be viewed as making individual choices taking into account what the other particles have done before them. Or, more traditionally and less anthropomorphically, one could think of them as not only particles, but "waves".

My view is only that free will in the way I have defined it (in terms of ultimate responsibility) is impossible. Free will of other types may still be possible.

What are those other forms of free will? Perhaps that would help me understand better.

If we consider the example of the paper you wrote. In what sense are you "responsible" for writing it? If you were not responsible, then who or what was responsible for writing it? Some theists might claim that God is ultimately responsible, but you don't acknowledge a God.

I assume you would acknowledge some responsibility, but it is only "ultimate" responsibility that you lack. However, who or what then is ultimately responsible?

A rational thought process is one that employs reason. No ultimate responsibility is required for one to apply reason.

But when we argue we make a choice to be rational. We could be irrational. So some choice was made. That choice is where the will comes in. I don't see how we are not responsible in some small way for that choice. In all of this I am not saying we have complete freedom to act any way we want. There are influences, but our choices add something new to the system.

You could not. But this is perfectly compatible with the usefulness of a philosophy of life.

This looks like a search for meaning, but I think elsewhere in your paper you claimed that meaning was as impossible as free will.

As you can probably guess, my view is that life does have meaning, there are Gods, some of whom might even be interested in us, and we have adequate free will to assume responsibility for choices that we make since we, like other species, are conscious enough to make choices. I am finishing Alvin Plantinga's Where the Conflict Really Lies. This is a discussion of the conflict between science, religion and what he calls "naturalism".

[Philosofer123]

One skips the possibility that some kind of "choice" is being made that introduces something new into the system.

Either the choice has an explanation (in terms of the way the agent is, mentally speaking), or it does not. If it does, it is subject to the regress. And if it does not, then it is random and the agent cannot be responsible for it.

What are those other forms of free will? Perhaps that would help me understand better.

This would take too long to explain. Please refer to the SEP article on free will.

If we consider the example of the paper you wrote. In what sense are you "responsible" for writing it? If you were not responsible, then who or what was responsible for writing it? Some theists might claim that God is ultimately responsible, but you don't acknowledge a God.

I assume you would acknowledge some responsibility, but it is only "ultimate" responsibility that you lack. However, who or what then is ultimately responsible?

No one is ultimately responsible. The conclusion of the regress argument is that ultimate responsibility is impossible.

But when we argue we make a choice to be rational. We could be irrational. So some choice was made. That choice is where the will comes in. I don't see how we are not responsible in some small way for that choice. In all of this I am not saying we have complete freedom to act any way we want. There are influences, but our choices add something new to the system.

But one's intentional choices are a function of the way one is, mentally speaking. And the regress looms.

This looks like a search for meaning, but I think elsewhere in your paper you claimed that meaning was as impossible as free will.

My philosophy is not a search for meaning. As stated on the first page of the document, the purpose of the document is to advise myself on how to live well.

[YesNo]

Either the choice has an explanation (in terms of the way the agent is, mentally speaking), or it does not. If it does, it is subject to the regress. And if it does not, then it is random and the agent cannot be responsible for it.

What you are expressing is an inability to get past the deterministic/random duality. You seem to claim, by assumption or assertion, that there are only two cases. If our actions are not determined ("in terms of the way the agent is") then you claim they must be "random". There are other possibilities and quantum uncertainty illustrates it. There the patterned behavior of the particles is neither determined nor random.

With our own consciousness, we experience ourselves making choices and hence introducing an element that is neither deterministic nor random. Your claim goes counter to the evidence of our experience.

This would take too long to explain. Please refer to the SEP article on free will.

I know this is not easy to do, but you are making an extraordinary claim that our experience of being able to make a choice is unreliable. I am asking for more than mere assertions that the claim is true, but some argumentation. Basically, you have not convinced me not to accept my own experience over your philosophy.

The opposite of your position is not that we have absolute free will to act as individuals. It only claims we have adequate free will to be responsible while acting under various influences that blur our distinction as individuals.

No one is ultimately responsible. The conclusion of the regress argument is that ultimate responsibility is impossible.

How do you know that the regress argument is correct? It relies on the false duality of determinism and randomness. Even at the quantum level there is uncertainty that can be described as neither deterministic nor random. To deny that would put you in a position in opposition to current science. In terms of uncertainty, why should this not exist at the human level as well?

If there is uncertainty as well at the human level, the regress argument is faulty somewhere. I suggest it fails at the point where it claims as a mere assertion, without evidence, that "For any agent S and intentional action A, S does A because of the way S is in certain mental respects." The evidence of our experience falsifies that particular assertion. It needs to be modified to overcome the objections (evidence) of our experience and submitted for further possible falsification.

You are making an extraordinary claim that goes against the evidence of our experience. All I am asking for is some evidence, not even extraordinary evidence.

But one's intentional choices are a function of the way one is, mentally speaking. And the regress looms.

If you have something behaving as a "function" of something else, you have strict determinism.

My philosophy is not a search for meaning. As stated on the first page of the document, the purpose of the document is to advise myself on how to live well.

Again, when you ask yourself "how" to live well, you assume you have adequate free will to carry this out. If you have that free will, you are responsible, like it or not, for your choice on how to live. However, this contradicts your claims against free will.

[Philosofer123]

What you are expressing is an inability to get past the deterministic/random duality.

Not at all. One can allow for a mixture of determinism and indeterminism. To the extent that there is an explanation for one's behavior, the regress looms. And the extent there is not, one cannot be responsible.

With our own consciousness, we experience ourselves making choices and hence introducing an element that is neither deterministic nor random. Your claim goes counter to the evidence of our experience.

The regress argument proves that our "experience" of free will is an illusion.

I know this is not easy to do, but you are making an extraordinary claim that our experience of being able to make a choice is unreliable. I am asking for more than mere assertions that the claim is true, but some argumentation. Basically, you have not convinced me not to accept my own experience over your philosophy.

The regress argument backs up my claim. Again, if you want to know more about the free will debate in general, then do your own research. A good place to start would be Galen Strawson's article on free will, which contains a defense of the regress argument:

http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014

How do you know that the regress argument is correct? It relies on the false duality of determinism and randomness.

False, as explained above.

Even at the quantum level there is uncertainty that can be described as neither deterministic nor random. To deny that would put you in a position in opposition to current science. In terms of uncertainty, why should this not exist at the human level as well?

From Wikipedia entry on quantum indeterminacy:

"Quantum indeterminacy can be quantitatively characterized by a probability distribution on the set of outcomes of measurements of an observable. The distribution is uniquely determined by the system state, and moreover quantum mechanics provides a recipe for calculating this probability distribution."

Thus quantum indeterminacy is a mixture of randomness and determinism. As explained above, such a mixture would not enable one to refute the regress argument.

I suggest it fails at the point where it claims as a mere assertion, without evidence, that "For any agent S and intentional action A, S does A because of the way S is in certain mental respects." The evidence of our experience falsifies that particular assertion.

How does the evidence of our experience falsify that particular assertion?

If you have something behaving as a "function" of something else, you have strict determinism.

With respect to one's intentional actions (actions performed for a reason), that is correct (at the macro level). To the extent that there is indeterminism in one's decisions, one's decisions are not intentional.

Again, when you ask yourself "how" to live well, you assume you have adequate free will to carry this out.

Not at all. Striving to live well is perfectly compatible with the impossibility of ultimate responsibility.

[YesNo]

Not at all. One can allow for a mixture of determinism and indeterminism. To the extent that there is an explanation for one's behavior, the regress looms. And the extent there is not, one cannot be responsible.

Your position seems caught inside a metaphysical box. You believe there are only two cases. Either something is determined by something else or it is random. You are not questioning three key things:

1) Is anything really determined?
2) Is anything really random?
3) Could there not be other cases besides the two you accept? In other words, I see no reason to say that a free choice could not be made.

The regress argument proves that our "experience" of free will is an illusion.

I usually assume that when one needs to discredit experience by calling it an illusion in order to keep a metaphysics running, there must be something wrong with the metaphysics.

The experience of free will falsifies the regress argument. The regress argument needs to be modified to avoid the falsification.

The regress argument backs up my claim. Again, if you want to know more about the free will debate in general, then do your own research. A good place to start would be Galen Strawson's article on free will, which contains a defense of the regress argument:

http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014

The article you cite illustrates the point I am trying to make about the metaphysical box one gets in when one assumes the determinism-random duality. Here is the quote about libertarian incompatibilists with my emphasis showing the duality problem:

They hold that we are indeed free and fully morally responsible agents, and that determinism must therefore be false. Their great difficulty is to explain why the falsity of determinism is any better than the truth of determinism when it comes to establishing our free agency and moral responsibility. For suppose that not every event is determined, and that some events occur randomly, or as a matter of chance. How can our claim to moral responsibility be improved by the supposition that it is partly a matter of chance or random outcome that we and our actions are as they are?

Notice the dualism between determinism and randomness. Notice the assumption that there are only two cases. The part that I put in bold is a logical assumption, a metaphysical box constraining one's thought, not a statement of fact. One could consider it a belief statement that forms part of an unquestioned metaphysical dogma. It certainly violates everyday experience which falsifies the belief statement.

From Wikipedia entry on quantum indeterminacy:

"Quantum indeterminacy can be quantitatively characterized by a probability distribution on the set of outcomes of measurements of an observable. The distribution is uniquely determined by the system state, and moreover quantum mechanics provides a recipe for calculating this probability distribution."

Thus quantum indeterminacy is a mixture of randomness and determinism. As explained above, such a mixture would not enable one to refute the regress argument.

Unless the probabilities are all the same for each possible outcome the uncertain events are not random. Randomness requires a uniform distribution. So where does the randomness come in? That the Schrodinger formula determines a result is simply a property of mathematics formalism used to model reality. It is not a property of the real world.

To see this differently, consider the double slit experiment. Were the events random, there would be no wave pattern displayed on the detection screen.

How does the evidence of our experience falsify that particular assertion?

Evidence falsifies an assertion by its existence.

The assertion is a statement. The experience or evidence falsifies that statement because one can produce the evidence. Scientifically, we have a falsified statement. How does one get around this? One can either stop doing science and claim that the assertion is true regardless of the evidence or one can continue doing science and modify the assertion. Some metaphysicians prefer to stop doing science. They then must claim that the evidence is illusory.

Not at all. Striving to live well is perfectly compatible with the impossibility of ultimate responsibility.

My claim is that "striving to live well" is an act of will. If you are not responsible for that striving, who or what is? The belief that you can strive to live well and the belief in free will impossibilism are contradictory positions.

[Philosofer123]

Your position seems caught inside a metaphysical box. You believe there are only two cases. Either something is determined by something else or it is random.

Not at all. Read my quote again. You are ignoring its content.

The experience of free will falsifies the regress argument.

Not if it is an illusion, which is what the regress argument proves.

The article you cite illustrates the point I am trying to make about the metaphysical box one gets in when one assumes the determinism-random duality. Here is the quote about libertarian incompatibilists with my emphasis showing the duality problem:

You are quoting Strawson's statement of a different position. You have not touched his regress argument.

Unless the probabilities are all the same for each possible outcome the uncertain events are not random. Randomness requires a uniform distribution.

Again, you are ignoring what I actually said.

Evidence falsifies an assertion by its existence.

Unless your experience is an illusion, which the regress argument demonstrates.

My claim is that "striving to live well" is an act of will. If you are not responsible for that striving, who or what is? The belief that you can strive to live well and the belief in free will impossibilism are contradictory positions.

Not at all. The regress argument demonstrates that my willingness and ability to strive to live well are ultimately a function of factors that are completely outside of my control. Therefore, I cannot be ultimately responsible for my striving to live well.

[YesNo]

Not at all. Read my quote again. You are ignoring its content.

This is what you said that I responded to:

Not at all. One can allow for a mixture of determinism and indeterminism. To the extent that there is an explanation for one's behavior, the regress looms. And the extent there is not, one cannot be responsible.

It looks like there are two alternatives here. Either one has an explanation for someone's choice or it is caused by chance. The case you are missing is that one can make a choice and that is an adequate explanation. One does not need to bring in chance to explain it.

Not if it is an illusion, which is what the regress argument proves.

Again, I don't trust a metaphysics that claims that evidence from our experience is an illusion just because it counters the metaphysical position. This is not to say that we do not have illusions when our experience is faulty. We can have illusions. That is cleared up with other evidence. However, we can also have "delusions" which is when our metaphysical theory is faulty.

We need a way to avoid both illusions and delusions. One can expect a delusion to claim that evidence contradicting it is illusory.

You are quoting Strawson's statement of a different position. You have not touched his regress argument.

What I am pointing out in Strawson's comment is something that applies to the regress argument. It assumes determinism. Where determinism fails, it assumes that god-of-the-gaps, chance (randomness), must be responsible. Right up front the argument does not allow for anything or anyone to make any kind of choice, because that would involve some sort of consciousness. That's the metaphysical box it is in, the unquestioned blind spot it refuses to look at, because, if it did, the whole fantasy land it has constructed would fall apart.

And that is why the regress argument against free will fails.

Unless your experience is an illusion, which the regress argument demonstrates.

Basically, I have discredited the regress argument as valid by questioning its assumption that everything is either determined or the result of chance. My justification is to reference either (1) quantum uncertainty, or (2) our own experience of making choices.

One could find evidence elsewhere as well. For example, there is recent evidence that slim mold, without a brain, without "mental respects" (whatever they are), can function intelligently, that is, make choices it is responsible for: http://www.scientificamerican.com/ar...s-slime-molds/

Not at all. The regress argument demonstrates that my willingness and ability to strive to live well are ultimately a function of factors that are completely outside of my control. Therefore, I cannot be ultimately responsible for my striving to live well.

And I have shown that the regress argument is faulty. Consider Strawson's comment about libertarian incompatibilists:

"Their great difficulty is to explain why the falsity of determinism is any better than the truth of determinism when it comes to establishing our free agency and moral responsibility."

If one gets out of the metaphysical box built by determinism and chance, there is no "great difficulty" involved.

By the way, there is another metaphysical assumption involved in these free will arguments. It basically is that we are just machines, not organisms making choices.

[Philosofer123]

The case you are missing is that one can make a choice and that is an adequate explanation.

"Making a choice" is not an "adequate explanation". One needs an explanation as to why one made that particular choice; otherwise, the choice has no explanation, which means that one cannot be responsible for that choice.

Again, I don't trust a metaphysics that claims that evidence from our experience is an illusion just because it counters the metaphysical position. This is not to say that we do not have illusions when our experience is faulty. We can have illusions. That is cleared up with other evidence. However, we can also have "delusions" which is when our metaphysical theory is faulty.

We need a way to avoid both illusions and delusions. One can expect a delusion to claim that evidence contradicting it is illusory.

Whether you "trust" the regress argument is irrelevant. You have failed to refute it.

What I am pointing out in Strawson's comment is something that applies to the regress argument.

Again, you have failed to refute the regress argument. To do so, you must either show that one or more of its premises is not necessarily true, or that its premises do not logically entail its conclusion, or both. You have done neither.

This renders the rest of your post irrelevant.

[MorpheusSandman]

This has been an exceedingly humorous debate between two people that know neither science or philosophy. I'm inclined to point out that, as usual in philosophy, the debaters are getting hung up on words more than actual facts: I taboo the words "determinism," "random," "regress," "choice," "responsibility," and "free will;" now, argue what you mean without using those words (and don't just substitute synonyms, like "chance" for "random"), at least until you clearly define them.

Example: A bowl of food is placed in front of me. In my mind there is an instinct to eat in order to survive. Yet, in spite of this instinct, I can either eat or not eat. Most people if they're hungry will simply eat, unless there's some competing impulse not to, such as it being a religious fasting holiday, or maybe that food is forbidden in their culture, or maybe the person is watching their weight. When people refer to "choice" they typically refer to these competing impulses between doing and not doing. From that, several questions arise:

1. Is there a physical mechanism (biology, physics, etc.) that controls that choice?
2. If so, is anyone "responsible" for that choice (more on responsibility in a moment).
3. If not, what is it that facilitates the choice?
4. If not, is anyone responsible for that choice
5. Regardless of the above issue of determinism/indeterminism, since we can't will the instinctual impulses to begin with, are we responsible regardless?

YesNo answers "no" to one, "free will" to three, and "yes" (I presume) to 4.; Philosofer says "it doesn't matter" to one and three "no" to two and four. I think both of these are wrong. I don't think either of you have really addressed 5., though perhaps it's Philosofer's implicit "yes" to five that informs his other answers. YesNo and I have been over one ad nauseam as it relates to quantum physics (I think he's demonstrably ignorant on the subject), so I won't rehash those arguments; so, for the purpose of this thread, I'll keep it to the notion of "responsibility."

For me, it's quite simple; responsibility, like, morality, is a social phenomenon. We hold people "responsible" as a means of lessening the likelihood that they'll (or others) will do things that can damage the society. Whether people "choose" to murder of their own free will, out of deterministic instinct, or out of pure chance is irrelevant; what's relevant is whether us holding murderers "responsible" via imprisonment, execution, etc. makes it less likely for people to committ murder. I'm fairly confident in saying that it does. Thought of this way, such "responsibility" is really just a means by which we have a considerable influence on the competing impulses that people have. The question "is X responsible for Y" is much less important than "if X thinks he will be responsible for Y, is X less likely to do Y?" and the obvious answer to that is "yes."

So I'm with Philosofer in that the issue of responsibility isn't tied to the determinism/indeterminism/free-will issue, but disagree with him in thinking that it's an ontological question as opposed to a social one. Really, responsibility is little more than the social equivalent of, say, pain; pain is a physical feedback system that teaches us that certain actions have consequences on our being. As a child, whether or not I'm "free" to put my hand on a hot stove is rather irrelevant to the question of whether doing so will be painful and influence me to not do it again. In that sense, I'm "responsible" in that I acted (for whatever reason) and the action had negative consequences for me. If you think of responsibility like that (and I think it's the most sensible way to think of it) then most of these issues go away.

[Philosofer123]

5. Regardless of the above issue of determinism/indeterminism, since we can't will the instinctual impulses to begin with, are we responsible regardless?

though perhaps it's Philosofer's implicit "yes" to five that informs his other answers.

Actually, I answer "no" to five.

For me, it's quite simple; responsibility, like, morality, is a social phenomenon. We hold people "responsible" as a means of lessening the likelihood that they'll (or others) will do things that can damage the society. Whether people "choose" to murder of their own free will, out of deterministic instinct, or out of pure chance is irrelevant; what's relevant is whether us holding murderers "responsible" via imprisonment, execution, etc. makes it less likely for people to committ murder. I'm fairly confident in saying that it does. Thought of this way, such "responsibility" is really just a means by which we have a considerable influence on the competing impulses that people have.

I agree that punishment for pragmatic reasons (such as deterrence, quarantine and perhaps rehabilitation) makes sense, regardless of whether ultimate responsibility exists. But if free will impossibilism is correct, then punishment for retributive reasons makes no sense. And it is clear that penal systems around the world do punish criminals at least in part for retribution. This is one practical implication of free will impossibilism that your analysis is missing. But the more significant practical implication of free will impossibilism is that it renders irrational a whole range of negative emotions, including resentment and regret (see page 6 of my document). This strongly conduces to peace of mind.

[MorpheusSandman]

I worded that hypothetical response to 5. poorly; what I meant is that maybe because you'd answer yes to the fact that we can't will our impulses would be why you'd argue we don't have responsibility.

To me, you don't need things like "free will impossibilism" to discuss irrationality in humans, as there are entire areas of science, such as the study of biases in cognitive/neuroscience, that focus on this. Most of our emotions stem from either irrational or arational (I call "arational" those initial premises that can not find a basis in statements about how reality is: "It is important that I live" would be an arational statement) impulses. In that regard, I don't think resentment, regret, or the desire for retribution is any different than most emotions. I do agree with you that they certainly don't help one's state of mind and even if we get was we desire from them it doesn't necessarily lessen the initial pain that caused the desire. Humans, though, when they suffer irreparable wrongs will INVENT ways to create closure if not actual ones exist. It provides the illusion of reparation if not any actuality; but all humans make do with manifold illusions about reality. That people find things like determinism "depressing" is why they latch on to the possibility of free will, despite the fact that there's not a stitch of evidence that it exists. Someone like YesNo loves to come back to our experiences, despite the fact that the last few hundred years have been a steady stream of scientific discoveries that showed us how illusive our experiences are, especially in what inferences we draw from them.

[YesNo]

"Making a choice" is not an "adequate explanation". One needs an explanation as to why one made that particular choice; otherwise, the choice has no explanation, which means that one cannot be responsible for that choice.

Actually, it is. The choice is the explanation. It needs no other explanation than its existence.

Whether you "trust" the regress argument is irrelevant. You have failed to refute it.

The regress argument claims there is a deterministic explanation for each mental state. The person having that mental state has no responsibility for that state since some previous mental state determined it and so on. If one argues that reality is indeterministic, then those promoting the regress argument bring in their god-of-the-gaps, chance, or "randomness", to keep their metaphysics afloat.

The regress argument depends on either (1) strict determinism or (2) a dualism between determinism and chance. These are mere assumptions. Neither of these have support from either our own experiences nor from quantum uncertainty. They are purely metaphysical assumptions without basis in reality.

From a scientific perspective, that falsifies the regress argument.

Again, you have failed to refute the regress argument. To do so, you must either show that one or more of its premises is not necessarily true, or that its premises do not logically entail its conclusion, or both. You have done neither.

This renders the rest of your post irrelevant.

Indeed, I have shown that.

The determinism premise has been discredited by quantum uncertainty if not by our own experiences. The god-of-the-gaps back-up premise that if strict determinism is not true then a determinism=chance operation is in play has also been discredited by quantum uncertainty since the probabilities that quantum physics comes up are not uniform. They are not random, that is, not caused by the god-of-the-gaps Chance.

So, something else is involved besides determinism or chance. Because of that, the regress argument freeing you from responsibility for your actions does not hold.

[MorpheusSandman]

The determinism premise has been discredited by quantum uncertainty

Maybe if you just keep saying this enough, on the 1,000,000th time it will actually be true! That seems to be YOUR philosophy, anyway; repeat nonsense enough so that you (and maybe one or two others) can actually believe it.