Absence of Evidence is Evidence of Absence

[MorpheusSandman]

What do you say P(S), the probability of Sasquatch is? What is P(MW), the probability of Many Worlds. Those numbers are comparable.

I'd say P(S) is less than 1% (I don't give anything a 0%), while P(MW) is true is 90% or so.

Unlike Sasquatch there really is no evidence for MW.

The math is the evidence. The fact that every test has yet to find any split between the quantum and macro world is the evidence. Occam's Razor is the evidence. Every empirical test we have points towards MW and not anything else.

my position is when "you take the math that models QM as real and add nothing else" you no longer get an interpretation of QM.

You can vehemently disagree with MW all you want, but to call it "not an interpretation" is just egregiously ignorant and does nothing but show your bias. I think Copenhagen is equally stupid and wrong, but I don't call it "not an interpretation" because it is. You don't get to redefine scientific terms to fit your tastes.

Also, you have no rational reason for rejecting the math of QM or for stating that it's unreal except your deification of our sense-experience, which has proven so fallible and limited over the course of centuries I have no idea why you'd feel it's more reliable than a mathematical model that has withstood every test science has thrown at it for almost 100 years now. MW explains both the objective determinism of Shrodinger and the subjective indeterminism of Heisenberg; you have presented absolutely no substantial logical (much less mathematical or scientific) arguments against either of these.

[YesNo]

I'd say P(S) is less than 1% (I don't give anything a 0%), while P(MW) is true is 90% or so.

How are we going to argue using probabilities if our assessment of the probability of something existing is so different? You say P(MW) = 90 and I say P(MW) = 0.

Don't worry. I don't want to change your mind.

My problem with Sasquatch, on the other hand, is cultural. When I think of him (or her--I suppose there should be a female version), I think of a humanoid with three characteristics: (1) big, (2) hairy, and (3) nonexistent.

So, if I should happen to see Hagrid coming out of his cottage behind Hogwarts, I wouldn't call him Sasquatch because he exists. In the same way, when I see Uncle Fred on his monthly trip back to town for supplies, I wouldn't (dare) call him Sasquatch because he exists. Culturally built into the very definition of Sasquatch for many people (and I'm trying not to be one of them) is his nonexistence. No wonder they don't go looking for him.

That's why I put P(S) > 0.

[The Atheist]

My problem with Sasquatch, on the other hand, is cultural. When I think of him (or her--I suppose there should be a female version),...

There is definitely at least one female; pretty sure she's named Penny.

[MorpheusSandman]

How are we going to argue using probabilities if our assessment of the probability of something existing is so different?

There's a famous Bayesian saying that true Bayesians cannot agree to disagree because any difference in their priors indicate a difference in knowledge that, if they both possessed the same knowledge, would not be different (their priors I mean). In our case, the difference is clearly in your desire to believe in indeterminism and choice, and how this bias has lead you repeatedly to misunderstand QM or what MW actually is; I have no such bias. My only desire is to believe the truth. If a scientific experiment came out tomorrow that proved Copenhagen right I would believe it instantly and drop MW. I only think MW is true based on the available evidence.

My problem with Sasquatch, on the other hand, is cultural. When I think of him (or her--I suppose there should be a female version), I think of a humanoid with three characteristics: (1) big, (2) hairy, and (3) nonexistent.

Well, it's a bit silly to think of nonexistence as being a quality of thing. I mean, we DO discover new species rather frequently, and there are still parts of the Earth that are quite hard for us to access and study, so there's always the possibility that there's something out there that is LIKE a bigfoot we still haven't found. It's unlikely, given its size and how much myth has been built up around it (most of the strange creatures near the bottom of the ocean are stranger than any man-made fiction; see the Basking Shark or Goblin Shark).

[MorpheusSandman]

There is definitely at least one female; pretty sure she's named Penny.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EJDeZIMoEUw

[YesNo]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EJDeZIMoEUw

If that is the Penny one is likely to find when looking for Sasquatch, I don't see why more people aren't looking for her.

I plan on calling mine Betsy Bigfoot assuming I can find her and she doesn't feed me to the little Sasquatches.

[YesNo]

There's a famous Bayesian saying that true Bayesians cannot agree to disagree because any difference in their priors indicate a difference in knowledge that, if they both possessed the same knowledge, would not be different (their priors I mean). In our case, the difference is clearly in your desire to believe in indeterminism and choice, and how this bias has lead you repeatedly to misunderstand QM or what MW actually is; I have no such bias. My only desire is to believe the truth. If a scientific experiment came out tomorrow that proved Copenhagen right I would believe it instantly and drop MW. I only think MW is true based on the available evidence.

The scientific experiments that validate Copenhagen as an interpretation for QM are the various double slit experiments.

One problem with MW is that it removes the Born assumption and so it can't calculate the coefficients of the Schrodinger wave equation. That is not an asset for an interpretation but a liability. Because of that MW doesn't even reach the level of an interpretation for QM. In effect, it is false. That is why I have assessed P(MW) to be zero.

The Heisenberg principle requires "uncertainty" and this is a mathematical consequence of the Schrodinger wave function. This is in conflict with both "randomness" and "determinism". This is not to say that the Schrodinger equation itself is not deterministic. It is. But what does it determine? It determines a set of probabilities that an individual particle might have based on the group of particles. In this case the group of particles is primary, not the individual particle. Because MW can't see that and insists on preserving an obsolete billiard ball model of reality, its grasp on reality is weak. This is another reason for P(MW) = 0.

Bohm and Hiley brought up other unacknowledged assumptions related to Hilbert space that the various MW proponents make. From their perspective, MW loses the Occam Razor's argument on MW's own terms.

The only way one might bring determinism back into QM is to add assumptions, such as Bohm has done, not remove them. However, the cost of these added assumptions based on Bell's inequality is accepting non-locality.

EDIT:

To bring this back to the OP. I don't understand how anyone who believes in MW can also believe in the strict validity of the saying that "absence of evidence is evidence of absence". MW has no empirical evidence supporting it, nor even a rational foundation. Using that maxim as a guide is another way to see that P(MW) = 0.

[MorpheusSandman]

The scientific experiments that validate Copenhagen as an interpretation for QM are the various double slit experiments.

Absolutely false. There is nothing in a double slit that confirms a collapse postulate. MW explains the double slit results better than CI.

One problem with MW is that it removes the Born assumption and so it can't calculate the coefficients of the Schrodinger wave equation. That is not an asset for an interpretation but a liability. Because of that MW doesn't even reach the level of an interpretation for QM.

Yeah, I'm the one that pointed you toward this problem and admitted it as such. But as a problem it's no more severe (I'd say much less so) than those facing Copenhagen. However, it's ridiculously wrong to state that without Born MW doesn't count as an interpretation. I explained this in another thread that even theories being incomplete (like gravity or evolution) don't invalidate them. Being inconsistent, like CI, is worse than being incomplete, like MW).

The Heisenberg principle requires "uncertainty" and this is a mathematical consequence of the Schrodinger wave function.

The HUP requires subjective/observer uncertainty, not objective uncertainty since, as you said, Shrodinger (SWE) itself is deterministic. Trying to say that SWE is deterministic of indeterminism is an oxymoron and is only reoncilible via MW. I have no idea what you mean by "set of probabilities... based on the group of particles." WHAT "group of particles?" The double slit experiments were done both with groups and individual particles with the same results.

Bohm and Hiley brought up other unacknowledged assumptions related to Hilbert space that the various MW proponents make. From their perspective, MW loses the Occam Razor's argument on MW's own terms.

Well, you'd have to clarify what these assumptions are rather than just assert they exist.

MW has no empirical evidence supporting it, nor even a rational foundation.

Yes it does. Every QM experiment done so far is evidence for MW since every one confirms that the math, which MW takes as real and sufficient in itself, is accurate, while none have supported any of the assumptions present in CI or anything else.

If you could ever get past all these falsities you insist on repeating, maybe you could see this issue with some clarity.

[MorpheusSandman]

If that is the Penny one is likely to find when looking for Sasquatch, I don't see why more people aren't looking for her.