the big bang theory~ how did we get here?

[MorpheusSandman]

This isn't true. The coin has two sides and will land on one. Base chance 50/50. In fact, "it's our inability to account and control those factors (our ignorance) that" prevents us from making the odds anything other than 50/50. Not the same thing... Another "if", and here's he's talking about predicting, rather than affecting, an admitted 50/50 outcome.

I'm not entirely sure with what you're having problem with here. You say "base chance 50/50," and this is just incorrect. The two sides of the coin are one factor in what side it will land on. All of the other elements I listed (force of flip, gravity, etc.) are just as much factors. Because we do not know them, we do not consider them. That doesn't mean they don't affect the probability of what side the coin will land on. Similarly, if the robot CAN take into consideration all of these factors and can guess what side the coin will land on with 90% accuracy, what makes you think the probability of it landing on either side is still 50/50? I don't know what you mean it's about "predicting not affecting," because all of those other factors (force of flip, etc.) are what EFFECTS (not AFFECTS) the outcome, and if you CAN take those into consideration like the robot, then the probability changes. What's changing, however, is one's level of knowledge about the deterministic processes. The coins' two sides are still a part of this, but now it no longer rules our (well, the robot's) probability assignment because it/we can factor in the other elements. Let me give three illustrative examples:

1. You are told a coin is loaded and that it will land on one side 80% of the time. You are not told what side it is. What is the probability of the coin landing on heads?
2. Same scenario, but now you are told it will land on heads 80% of the time. What's the probability it will land on heads?
3. Same scenario, but now you're a superhuman who can, as soon as the coin is flipped, instantly calculate all of the physics involved, and you know it will land on tails 100% of the time this flip. What is the probability it will land on heads?

The correct answer to 1. is 50%, the obvious answer to 2. is 80%, and the equally obvious answer to 3. is 0%. The only thing that changes in these three scenarios is our knowledge, not the coin or process itself. The coin is always going to land on tails that flip. Whether we assign the probability of it landing on heads as 50%, 80%, or 0% all depends on our knowledge about the coin and physics. That's what's meant by probability being in the mind.

[YesNo]

The two major choices are collapse VS decoherence; there are several variations on those two basic camps. All decoherence models that I know involve some version of MW (Many Histories, eg), because that's what it is.

Roland Omnes helped create decoherence theory, but he would be considered opposed to MW. The issue is not as simple as collapse vs decoherence. Feynman's many histories assumes the quantum stuff he wants to measure takes all possible routes and from there he calculates the probabilities. I see this as more of an alternate technique for calculation. This is not MW. CI, as I understand it, claims there are no values for the attributes being measured until they are measured.

I will admit the CI claim is hard to even understand, but it fits the quantum facts and basically throws them back in our faces. We expect there to be a reason why this electron, for example, the same as any other electron, is at some position and not another, but there isn't. If I understand CI correctly, it claims the electron has no position prior to measurement. That's the peculiarity of this interpretation. It is as if the electron makes a free choice, within the bounds of certain constraints, where it is. That choice is made at the moment of measurement. Prior to the measurement it was not at that position. It had no position attribute at all.

The first statement is just nonsense; by that token I can claim CI cannot be an interpretation because it conflicts with every other model of physics and simply assumes the existence of something (the collapse) for which there is no evidence for assuming.

CI is an interpretation for QM. It is not an interpretation for past physics. MW looks like an attempt to create an interpretation of QM so that it fits with past physics. Since MW cannot come up with the Born rule coefficients, it is not even an interpretation of QM.

I think the issue with collapse is more related to von Neumann's interpretation.

In a way, the two interpretations presents the two sides of Godel's Incompleteness Theorems about the inability of mathematical models to be both complete and consistent. CI is complete but inconsistent; MW is incomplete but consistent.

I don't think it has anything to do with Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. It is a more straightforward problem.

MW drops the assumption of collapse. Now it can brag that is its better than CI because it has one less axiom. However, because of dropping that axiom it can no longer generate the coefficients. It is more like dropping the 5th parallel postulate in Euclid's geometry. Now Euclidean geometry has one less axiom, but it can say nothing of value about parallel lines.

Similarly, MW proponents do not deny it has problems, but what we claim is that those problems are lesser than those of CI. Post after post you've blatantly ignored the seemingly insurmountable problems with CI and have spent most of your time picking problems with MW that aren't even problems. The Born Rule is a problem; not an insurmountable one, but a significant one. I find that problem less significant than those by CI. It's like one is staring at a dam; MW has a good-sized crack that needs to be attended to, while CI is completely crumbling. Sure, they're both problems, but not even remotely in the same ballpark.

I think the problem that you are having with CI is that it fits the quantum facts, but what it says about those facts is unacceptable. The problem with MW is that it does not fit the quantum facts, but it says what you want it to say.

It seems like it is more the quantum facts that are the problem.

Errr, that sounds like a garbled mess. Even if you take CI to be true then you have to believe that our world is deterministic on the macro level, because CI creates a split between the "indeterminstic" world of particles and the "deterministic" world of Einstein's GR. So even under CI it would be true that we are ignorant of certain deterministic processes and that this ignorance creates the appearance of probability; so why would "choice" not be the same thing? I'm not saying we COULD be ignorant of something, I'm saying we demonstrably ARE ignorant of certain deterministic processes, and drawing an inference between the probability that ignorance creates and the feeling of choice it would similarly create for us. You have to show why that inference is not valid.

I don't have to believe the world is deterministic because you believe that it is. That is why the claims you are making are not valid.

You are making an assumption that there is no possibility of any of us making a choice whatsoever. When confronted with my claim that we do make choices, and the evidence of my senses that they are choices, you counter with my supposed ignorance of deterministic processes. You claim "we demonstrably ARE ignorant", but you provide no evidence.

I agree that such a claim follows from your metaphysics, but your metaphysics is not my metaphysics and you have not provided me with either evidence or an adequate reason to switch metaphysics except that that is what you believe.

[Calidore]

I think the source of our disconnect is here:

if the robot CAN take into consideration all of these factors and can guess what side the coin will land on with 90% accuracy, what makes you think the probability of it landing on either side is still 50/50?

You seem to be equating the probability of correctly predicting which side the coin will land on with the actual physical odds of it landing on that side, while I'm saying they're two different things. For example, in your first loaded-coin scenario, you give the probability of the coin landing on heads as 50%, even though the coin is biased 80/20 in favor of an unknown side. I agree that, since the loaded side is unknown, the odds of choosing the correct side are still 50%, but the actual odds of it landing on heads are either 80% or 20%, depending on which side is loaded.

I'm also seeing a seeming contradiction between your answer here and something you said further up: In both cases, the side that's loaded and the the side that the robot is predicting are not specified, but you give an answer of 50% for the loaded coin and say "what makes you think the probability of it landing on either side is still 50/50?" for the robot example. Am I missing something?

Moving on to #2, we agree on this one. We know the coin will land on heads 80% of the time, thus the smart thing to do would be to guess heads, which will be right 80% of the time. Easy.

#3 is more interesting to me because it goes back to what I said above about you equating advance knowledge of a result with the odds of that result occurring.

With this established, I'm seeing the potential for an infinite conversation loop.

You say "base chance 50/50," and this is just incorrect.

And this is why I'm not sure we'll be able to connect. Two equally possible outcomes (assuming no loading, robots, or superpowers) with one possible result = 50/50. A "scientific" belief system that requires claiming otherwise is just bizarre to me.

[MorpheusSandman]

The issue is not as simple as collapse vs decoherence.

Those are the two basic approaches to the wavefunction issue. Of course there are many variations.

I will admit the CI claim is hard to even understand, but it fits the quantum facts and basically throws them back in our faces. We expect there to be a reason why this electron, for example, the same as any other electron, is at some position and not another, but there isn't. If I understand CI correctly, it claims the electron has no position prior to measurement. That's the peculiarity of this interpretation. It is as if the electron makes a free choice, within the bounds of certain constraints, where it is. That choice is made at the moment of measurement. Prior to the measurement it was not at that position. It had no position attribute at all.

Even the way you describe it makes CI out to be no better than magic: “why is an electron here instead of there! I dunno! Magic! Goddidit! Consciousdidit!” or “What are electrons before measurement? I dunno! Magic!” The problem with the latter is that if particles weren’t real entities before measurement then we shouldn’t be able to make certain predictions, yet we do. Cioran was explaining this in the last thread on the subject. How in the world can a particle “make a choice?” You stating that “prior to the measurement it had no possitional attribute” is just one of the many baseless assumptions of CI that makes no sense if you stop to think about it even for a second.

CI is an interpretation for QM. It is not an interpretation for past physics. MW looks like an attempt to create an interpretation of QM so that it fits with past physics. Since MW cannot come up with the Born rule coefficients, it is not even an interpretation of QM.

The whole “Ci is just an interp for QM, not past physics” is REALLY what hand-waving look likes. The issue is WHY is this model of QM not compatible with “past physics” that have not been disproved or replaced with a different/better model? What’s more, at what point does the world STOP working according to “past physics” and START working via QM, which would explain why they are mutually incompatible? You can’t point to that place; nobody can. Either it doesn’t exist, in which MW (or at least decoherence) is right, or it’s somewhere that nobody has found yet.

MW not being able to derive the Born rule makes it “not a theory,” not “not an interpretation.” CI can only derive the Born rule because it assumes the collapse, and the collapse is not part of any mathematical fact of QM; it's just an assumption.

I don't think it has anything to do with Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. It is a more straightforward problem.

MW drops the assumption of collapse. Now it can brag that is its better than CI because it has one less axiom. However, because of dropping that axiom it can no longer generate the coefficients.

You didn’t really argue why the analogy is invalid. MW not being able to generate the Born rule makes it consistent but incomplete; CI being able to generate the Born rule makes it complete but inconsistent. That’s Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem right there. MW being simpler in addition to it being consistent is just one more reason to prefer it.

I think the problem that you are having with CI is that it fits the quantum facts, but what it says about those facts is unacceptable. The problem with MW is that it does not fit the quantum facts, but it says what you want it to say.

The Flying Spaghetti Monster fits the facts of evolution. It’s easy to come up with something that fits the facts. That’s not an argument for how to choose between different interpretations/models. What’s unacceptable about CI is NOT that it fits the facts of QM, it’s that it doesn’t fit the facts of classic physics for no discernible reason. If someone could explain WHY there is a need for two different models for two different levels of physics that are mutually incompatible then that would be one thing, but nobody can explain it. MW DOES fit the quantum facts (and, what’s more, fits the facts of classic physics); that it can’t derive the Born rule doesn’t mean it “doesn’t fit the facts;” it “wouldn’t fit the facts” If MW contradicted the Born Rule—it doesn’t do this.

I don't have to believe the world is deterministic because you believe that it is.

You don’t get it. The entire point of CI is that the collapse creates a split between the indeterministic world of QM and the deterministic world of GR. So you can’t escape determinism on some level even with CI. This is not some option/choice you can make, this is what CI actually is. Unless, of course, you don’t think GR is deterministic…

You are making an assumption that there is no possibility of any of us making a choice whatsoever. When confronted with my claim that we do make choices, and the evidence of my senses that they are choices, you counter with my supposed ignorance of deterministic processes. You claim "we demonstrably ARE ignorant", but you provide no evidence.

You’re still completely garbling the points being made.

1. Ontological (actual) Free Will would be experientially identical to our ignorance of determinism.
2. We are ignorant of some deterministic processes; see my posts to Callidore about how our ignorance of physics creates the 50/50 probability of a coin-flip.
3. You cannot use CI to escape determinism, because CI does not displace the determinism of classical physics, all it does is create a different model for QM that is incompatible with classical physics. For it to replace classical physics it would have to be consistent with our (extremely accurate) models of classical physics.
4. Given 3., you must admit either that determinism is applicable on the macro level, or claim that there’s something about QM we don’t know that would extend that indeterministic world to the classic level, and you have no scientific base for claiming the latter.
5. Given 3. and 4., you must show how our demonstrable ignorance of deterministic processes could not create the illusion of choices/free-will.
6. Absenting 5., you’d have to argue why it would be better to assume ontological free-will than it would be to assume ignorance of determinism given that we know the latter happens.

[MorpheusSandman]

Callidore, I think this should probably be my last attempt at explaining this. I tackle it from every angle I know to, and try to repeat a lot of the central points for emphasis. I understand how this can be counter-intuitive, but you have to understand that the human brain is wired to project itself onto reality, and that issues like this are where we have to learn to "disconnect" our fallacious intuitions and understand that that what we think/know/believe isn't necessarily identical to what's out there. A good primer would be The Map is Not the Territory, which tries to distinguish between reality and what we know/don't know/believe about reality.

I think the source of our disconnect is here:

What it seems to me like you're doing is you're abstracting one fact about the coin (its two sides) from the process of the actual flip (force, gravity, distance, etc.) and considering them as two different things. I don't know why you're doing this. The two sides of the coin in combination with the physics of the flip determine what side the coin will land on 100% of the time. If one could calculate all of these things, the odds would not be 50/50, but 100/0. That we can't (typically) account for those things makes it 50/50, because all we DO know is that there are two possibilities we can take into account. This is a statement about OUR KNOWLEDGE of the process, NOT a statement about the process itself.

You seem to be equating the probability of correctly predicting which side the coin will land on with the actual physical odds of it landing on that side, while I'm saying they're two different things.

You're right that they're two different things. The physical odds of the coin landing on the side it does is 100/0, if you factor in every physical fact including force, gravity, distance, and the two sides of the coin together. Let me repeat for emphasis: THE PHYSICAL ODDS OF THE COIN LANDING ON THE SIDE IT LANDS ON IS ALWAYS 100/0. The odds only BECOME 50/50 because we cannot take into account the physics, all we can account for is the coins' two sides. The probability is created by our knowledge and ignorance of the physical facts, not by the physical facts themselves.

I agree that, since the loaded side is unknown, the odds of choosing the correct side are still 50%, but the actual odds of it landing on heads are either 80% or 20%, depending on which side is loaded.

Correct on the first statement, but the second statement: "the actual odds of it landing on heads are either 80% or 20%" is what Yudkowsky described as the frequentist interpretation, and then argued why that interpretation is incorrect. Because, eg, if you are a superhuman and can calculate all of the other physical factors (force, gravity, etc.) and know that it will always land on tails that flip, then the probability is NOT 80/20, but rather 100/0. The fact that the probabilities change depending on our knowledge of the physical facts shows that probability is a statement about our knowledge/ignorance of reality, not reality itself.

I'm also seeing a seeming contradiction between your answer here and something you said further up: In both cases, the side that's loaded and the the side that the robot is predicting are not specified, but you give an answer of 50% for the loaded coin and say "what makes you think the probability of it landing on either side is still 50/50?" for the robot example. Am I missing something?

No contradiction, what I'm stating is that the probability we assign is completely dependent on our knowledge. If we know the coin is loaded but don't know what side is loaded we assign it 50/50. If we know what side is loaded we assign that side 80/20. If we know what side is loaded and can calculate all the physical processes, then we assign the side it will land on 100/0. In every case the probability is created by our knowledge regarding the flip, not the flip itself. When I asked "what makes you think the probability would still be 50/50?" was in response to the robot being able to take into account all of the physical processes and predict the results of the flip with 90% accuracy. Put another way, if the robot can predict the flip with 90% accuracy, would you take a bet where you laid $1 to $3 that the robot's prediction was right? If the probability was ACTUALLY 50/50 you'd lose (over time) making this bet, but if the robot's prediction is 90% accurate, you'd win (over time) making this bet. How can this be if the odds are ACTUALLY 50/50?

#3 is more interesting to me because it goes back to what I said above about you equating advance knowledge of a result with the odds of that result occurring.

If you have advanced knowledge of the result, what makes you think the odds of that event occurring are anything other than 100/0? However, what I'm describing isn't "advanced knowledge," but rather the ability to take in other factors that effect the result (force, gravity, distance, etc.). It seems to me that your mistake is abstracting one piece of knowledge about the coin (the two sides) from all the other processes that determine what side the coin lands on during the flip.

Two equally possible outcomes (assuming no loading, robots, or superpowers) with one possible result = 50/50.

The two outcomes are only equally likely if one is ignorant of all the physical facts. If one is not ignorant of the physical facts the outcomes are not equally likely.

A "scientific" belief system that requires claiming otherwise is just bizarre to me.

It's not a "belief system." It seems bizarre to you because people often have great difficult with understanding that their ignorance is a statement about themselves, not about reality. If you are ignorant of the deterministic processes of a coin-flip, this does not mean that the process is actually indeterministic, that the odds are actually 50/50 what side it lands on. The odds it lands on the side it does is 100/0 taking into account the physical processes. It's only 50/50 when we can't take into account the physical processes. The 50/50 reflects our state of knowledge and ignorance, not the state of the flip itself.

Yudkowsky compares this to the classic Map-Territory relation, where the map is our knowledge/beliefs about reality and the territory is reality itself. If there's a blank spot on a map--our ignorance--then that doesn't mean that there's nothing at that spot in the actual territory; ie, if we don't know something about reality (the physics involved in a coin-flip), then that doesn't mean that the process is 50/50 and indeterministic. Your entire problem is that you're mistaking a statement about our knowledge (probability, the 50/50 flip) with a statement about reality.

[YesNo]

Even the way you describe it makes CI out to be no better than magic: “why is an electron here instead of there! I dunno! Magic! Goddidit! Consciousdidit!” or “What are electrons before measurement? I dunno! Magic!” The problem with the latter is that if particles weren’t real entities before measurement then we shouldn’t be able to make certain predictions, yet we do. Cioran was explaining this in the last thread on the subject. How in the world can a particle “make a choice?” You stating that “prior to the measurement it had no possitional attribute” is just one of the many baseless assumptions of CI that makes no sense if you stop to think about it even for a second.

I deliberately called what the electron does as making a choice to emphasize the problem. If an electron can make a choice, it would have to be conscious in some way.

The interpretations try to avoid going down that path of the electron making a choice by either not saying anything more about it (CI) or coming up with some sort of collapse (von Neumann) or saying the measuring instruments are causing the disturbance. Or in the MW case, claiming that every possibility is magically realized.

The whole “Ci is just an interp for QM, not past physics” is REALLY what hand-waving look likes. The issue is WHY is this model of QM not compatible with “past physics” that have not been disproved or replaced with a different/better model? What’s more, at what point does the world STOP working according to “past physics” and START working via QM, which would explain why they are mutually incompatible? You can’t point to that place; nobody can. Either it doesn’t exist, in which MW (or at least decoherence) is right, or it’s somewhere that nobody has found yet.

The reason QM is not compatible with past physics is because of the quantum facts, the evidence, that invalidate the past physics and leave it as an approximation only. My view is that the whole world works according to QM.

You didn’t really argue why the analogy is invalid. MW not being able to generate the Born rule makes it consistent but incomplete; CI being able to generate the Born rule makes it complete but inconsistent. That’s Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem right there. MW being simpler in addition to it being consistent is just one more reason to prefer it.

Godel's incompleteness theorem showed that if you assume you have a supposedly complete theory of arithmetic, you can generate from that theory a legitimate theorem that cannot be proved in that theory leading to a contradiction. So the theory is not complete as assumed.

In the case of MW we are talking about five axioms, not a whole theory. From these five axioms MW cannot show how to generate the probabilities because in its view everything happens. And yet, we need those probabilities to use QM. So we are at a level of axioms not able to explain the facts, and yet with adherents claiming we should accept those axioms anyway.

That is why the analogy with Euclid fits the situation better.

The Flying Spaghetti Monster fits the facts of evolution. It’s easy to come up with something that fits the facts. That’s not an argument for how to choose between different interpretations/models. What’s unacceptable about CI is NOT that it fits the facts of QM, it’s that it doesn’t fit the facts of classic physics for no discernible reason. If someone could explain WHY there is a need for two different models for two different levels of physics that are mutually incompatible then that would be one thing, but nobody can explain it. MW DOES fit the quantum facts (and, what’s more, fits the facts of classic physics); that it can’t derive the Born rule doesn’t mean it “doesn’t fit the facts;” it “wouldn’t fit the facts” If MW contradicted the Born Rule—it doesn’t do this.

It is all QM. Classical physics is just an approximation. The reason is because of the quantum facts that experimenters have observed and QM has explained.

You don’t get it. The entire point of CI is that the collapse creates a split between the indeterministic world of QM and the deterministic world of GR. So you can’t escape determinism on some level even with CI. This is not some option/choice you can make, this is what CI actually is. Unless, of course, you don’t think GR is deterministic…

I don't think it is so much about the collapse or decoherence, which focuses attention on the measurement, as the quantum fact that the electron can be modeled as making a choice. One goes to the measurement to try to find some way to explain why the electron is not making a choice.

With Bell's theorem and empirical evidence supporting it, the electron is also non-local, which messes with relativity.

As far as "escaping determinism", given QM, the problem is how much pseudo-determinism actually remains.

1. Ontological (actual) Free Will would be experientially identical to our ignorance of determinism.

I'll accept that. Also, our ignorance of ontological indeterminism could look like determinism.

2. We are ignorant of some deterministic processes; see my posts to Callidore about how our ignorance of physics creates the 50/50 probability of a coin-flip.

I'll accept that, although I think in your exchange with Calidore you are assuming that the world is deterministic. It is not.

There are two perspectives to consider:

1) Using classical physics, the robot will not be able to calculate all the forces accurately enough to give a deterministic result all the time. However, that can be attributed to the ignorance of the forces that you mentioned. That supposed ignorance allows you to keep your "map" or metaphysics intact. It is possible that the world actually is indeterministic.

2) Using QM, even a supernatural agent, with complete knowledge of all that can be known, cannot know what will happen because those facts do not exist. This overrides any determinism. It shows that what we are ignorant of, from the classical position, is the indeterminism. With QM, it is not an ignorance of the deterministic forces anymore. The accurate knowledge required for determinism, does not exist.

3. You cannot use CI to escape determinism, because CI does not displace the determinism of classical physics, all it does is create a different model for QM that is incompatible with classical physics. For it to replace classical physics it would have to be consistent with our (extremely accurate) models of classical physics.

Classical physics is over except as an approximation. So, any determinism that was part of classical physics, its "map" or metaphysics, is no longer relevant. Classical physics is only as accurate as we can make measurements. Even its "constants" may not be constant at a certain level of accuracy.

So, I don't accept this.

4. Given 3., you must admit either that determinism is applicable on the macro level, or claim that there’s something about QM we don’t know that would extend that indeterministic world to the classic level, and you have no scientific base for claiming the latter.

I don't have to admit that, nor do I have to claim that QM is missing some hidden variable. Determinism is an old "map" for a reality, "territory", that has been shown by quantum facts to be far different from what that deterministic map said they were. You need to get a new map that fits the territory better.

The indeterminism can be viewed in our choices, and since we know we are conscious, we can legitimately talk about these as choices. The indeterminism can also be seen in the measurements of quantum stuff.

5. Given 3. and 4., you must show how our demonstrable ignorance of deterministic processes could not create the illusion of choices/free-will.

Are you claiming that because illusions exist then everything is an illusion? If so, that's a fallacy.

This is your extraordinary claim, not mine. You need to provide evidence that there is no possibility of free choice, none whatsoever, in spite of the evidence of QM, in spite of the evidence of our own experience. It is not enough to repeat metaphysical dogmas. Evidence is required.

6. Absenting 5., you’d have to argue why it would be better to assume ontological free-will than it would be to assume ignorance of determinism given that we know the latter happens.

Actually, i don't have to do anything. You are the one claiming that my experience is an illusion. You need to provide evidence that you are right. So far, you have not provided any.

[cafolini]

The only relativity that has worked in 99.999...% of cases and is responsible for 99.999...% of evolution in technology, including the abuse of the use of the technology that stupidly aspires to deny it, is Galilean relativity, pioneered by Newton and proven to work beyond the shadow of a doubt in what can be done. QM is an interpretation that has neither proof of indeterminism nor determinism, except in the idiocy of philo-sophist babbling. You people should study Faraday, Bernoulli, Ohm, Plank, Tesla. But you people cannot ever even grasp the Books of Euclid and Archimedes.

[mal4mac]

Newtonian cosmology is actually a highly respected model, adequate for many purposes, especially if the flat model of cosmology is correct (as latest observations indicate). One thing it makes easy is intuition & visualisation, you can think of the universe as starting with a big bang exploding into 3D space, and not go far wrong. It's at least as good as the old balloon model of the big bang... and the maths is quite simple:

http://www.ast.cam.ac.uk/~pettini/Ph.../lecture02.pdf

Unfortunately (?), though, SR and GR are necessary to explain some things... those 0.001% of cases are important!

[cafolini]

Newtonian cosmology is actually a highly respected model, adequate for many purposes, especially if the flat model of cosmology is correct (as latest observations indicate). One thing it makes easy is intuition & visualisation, you can think of the universe as starting with a big bang exploding into 3D space, and not go far wrong. It's at least as good as the old balloon model of the big bang... and the maths is quite simple:

http://www.ast.cam.ac.uk/~pettini/Ph.../lecture02.pdf

Unfortunately (?), though, SR and GR are necessary to explain some things... those 0.001% of cases are important!

There is no such thing as Newtonian cosmology. But there are Cosmicomics, and Numbers in the Dark.

[MorpheusSandman]

The interpretations try to avoid going down that path of the electron making a choice by either not saying anything more about it (CI) or coming up with some sort of collapse (von Neumann) or saying the measuring instruments are causing the disturbance. Or in the MW case, claiming that every possibility is magically realized.

The interpretations “avoid going down that path” because how in the world would you move toward proving it or even arguing for it? We don’t even fully understand how a brain/consciousness makes decisions, and we only know about it all because countless particles are making up the matter of a brain. How can a non-brain make a decision? How could you show that it did? There’s nothing “magical” about MW; no collapse equals decoherence equals MW, and this is consistent with what we’ve tested by placing larger objects in superposition. It’s CI that’s invoking “magic” (God, consciousness, etc.) to explain how particles behave how they do.

The reason QM is not compatible with past physics is because of the quantum facts, the evidence, that invalidate the past physics and leave it as an approximation only. My view is that the whole world works according to QM.

Doesn’t work like that because once the wavefunction “collapses” to a particle, and once you get the bending/stretching of spacetime by gravity, GR is perfectly accurate. Conversely, QM runs into problem when relativistic effects exist, and you end up with contradictions. If the whole world works according to QM then that would be MW, not CI, because classical physics has no “wavefunction collapse” and the only way to apply QM to larger objects is to assume everything is in a state of superposition, which would give you MW since there’s no collapse.

Of course, you may say that classical physics is an “approximation” because QM is “more accurate,” though this is debatable; GR has withstood every test we’ve thrown at it and so has QM, so it’s a bit strange to talk about one being “more accurate” when both work with 100% consistency within their contexts. Perhaps QM gives you “more accurate” results at farther decimal places, but GR gives accurate results for as far as its testing decimal places can stretch. That implies the limitations of our testing, not the models.

However, never has an approximation been contradicted by the more accurate model. IE, when Newtonian physics was replaced by GR, the two were still compatible; GR merely took into account more factors than NP and subsumed NP under its paradigm. IE, it explained more, it didn’t contradict. You could say the same thing about Darwinian evolution VS modern evolution: a refinement and subsumation, not a contradiction.

CI would be the very first time in the history of science that a new theory contradicted an approximation. MW, on the other hand, is a subsumation/refinement in the exact same way GR is a subsumation/refinement of NP. MW fits what we knows about how “more accurate” models subsume/refine older models, CI does not (yet another reason to prefer MW).

Godel's incompleteness theorem showed that if you assume you have a supposedly complete theory of arithmetic, you can generate from that theory a legitimate theorem that cannot be proved in that theory leading to a contradiction. So the theory is not complete as assumed.

In the case of MW we are talking about five axioms, not a whole theory. From these five axioms MW cannot show how to generate the probabilities because in its view everything happens. And yet, we need those probabilities to use QM. So we are at a level of axioms not able to explain the facts, and yet with adherents claiming we should accept those axioms anyway.

Obviously the analogy doesn’t work perfectly because in the case of CI/MW we’re dealing with interpretations rather than mathematical theorems, but I still don’t think anything you’ve said has invalidated the metaphor (except if you read it literally, in which case you could do that with all metaphors). You can view CI as being “complete,” yet it’s completeness contradicts everything else we know about physics. Sorry, you cannot explain this away by saying “past physics was an approximation” because approximations aren’t contradicted by theories that are more comprehensive, they get refined ala GR/NP, or modern evolution/Darwinian evolution. In that sense, MW is consistent with what we know, yet incomplete because it has to assume the Born probabilities without (yet) being able to prove them. Yes, this analogous, not literal.

With Bell's theorem and empirical evidence supporting it, the electron is also non-local, which messes with relativity.

Right, and how do you explain this? How do particles affect each other at great distances many times faster than the speed of light? Magic?

As far as "escaping determinism", given QM, the problem is how much pseudo-determinism actually remains.

No, the problem is whether or not what appears indeterministic is a product of our limited perspective or the ontology of physics.

There are two perspectives to consider:

Wrong. The coin is large is enough and is moving through large enough space to be accurately predicted via GR (in fact, it’s probably large enough to be accurately predicted via Newtonian physics). If GR can accurately predict the accuracy of aluminum ion clocks, then it can easily accurately predict the results of a coin toss. The problem is not with the physical models but with engineering applications. Saying that GR/NP could predict a coin flip accurately is different than building a computer/robot capable of doing so, or even building a robot flipper capable of controlling all of the conditions to the exactitude of GR/NP. Also there would be the classic problem of induction, but that’s another matter entirely.

Classical physics is over except as an approximation.

Classic physics is only an “approximation” down to a certain size, and then it doesn’t give inaccurate results, it gives nonsensical (contradictory) results; that’s a completely different thing.

You need to get a new map that fits the territory better.

MW is a map that fits just fine.

Are you claiming that because illusions exist then everything is an illusion? If so, that's a fallacy.

No, of course not. I’m specifically saying that our ignorance of deterministic processes would create the illusion of free will. We can argue over whether or not there are deterministic processes, but that doesn’t defeat the statement.

This is your extraordinary claim, not mine. You need to provide evidence that there is no possibility of free choice, none whatsoever, in spite of the evidence of QM, in spite of the evidence of our own experience. It is not enough to repeat metaphysical dogmas. Evidence is required.

You obviously aren’t keeping up with my claims. I have never claimed there is no possibility of free choice. I’m saying there are two possibilities, one is that there is ontological free will and this is what we experience, and two that our ignorance of determinism creates the illusion of free-will. Further, I’m arguing why the second option is more likely than the former option. I enumerated all of the reasons why. It seems the only one we’re really in disagreement about is whether there are deterministic processes or not. You say the “evidence” of QM contradicts this, but that’s only if you assume the truth of CI, and I’ve already pointed out the multitudinous problems of CI that you’ve yet to satisfactorily answer. In contrast, MW has one problem regarding it not (yet) being able to derive the Born probabilities. I claim this problem is much lesser than the problems facing CI. You seem to disagree, but have yet to argue why CI’s problems are lesser.

You are the one claiming that my experience is an illusion. You need to provide evidence that you are right. So far, you have not provided any.

I’m not claiming that. I’m claiming it’s more likely that’s the case, and I have provided evidence as to why. You just don’t like the evidence. Further, you've given no evidence to prefer your explanation (ontological free-will) except "your experience," and I have given numerous examples of how our experiences are illusory, especially when it comes to physics. If anything, our senses have proved historically unreliable for accurately inferring statements about how physics works. In fact, why don't you provide an example of how our senses and metaphysical intuitions have ever been accurate with regards to how physics works. It was wrong about the flat Earth, it was wrong about geocentrism, it was wrong (or at best incomplete) with Newtonian physics, etc. All I see is a long history of wrong that was only corrected via the scientific method, not by a sensory experience translating to an accurate intuition about reality.

[YesNo]

The interpretations “avoid going down that path” because how in the world would you move toward proving it or even arguing for it? We don’t even fully understand how a brain/consciousness makes decisions, and we only know about it all because countless particles are making up the matter of a brain. How can a non-brain make a decision? How could you show that it did?

I think this issue of choice for the quantum stuff, say an electron declaring its position or momentum in an experiment, is the heart of the problem. There is nothing to distinguish this electron from another. There are no hidden variables, but still the electron gives different answers and they are not random answers.

I don't think any of the interpretations want to claim that the electron is making a choice. I think that is what they want to avoid having to say.

Regarding consciousness, one could define a basic consciousness as the ability to make a "choice". With that the electron becomes conscious, by definition, if it made a choice. Unless one can come up with a cause for the electron's "choice", it can be modeled as a "choice" implying it is conscious in some basic way.

From here you get the varied interpretations which try to go to the measurement process itself to show that the electron did not actually make a choice. It doesn't matter whether the wave function collapsed or not. That is just different interpretations bickering among themselves. What matters is whether the electron made a choice.

Of course, you may say that classical physics is an “approximation” because QM is “more accurate,” though this is debatable; GR has withstood every test we’ve thrown at it and so has QM,

Relativity has failed the non-locality test that Bell formulated and experimenters later verified. The reality of the universe is non-local, although communication is limited by the speed of light.

These results about non-locality are not at the level of quantum theory nor any interpretation, but at the same level as the double-slit experiments. They are facts that can be used to falsify parts of a theory.

Right, and how do you explain this? How do particles affect each other at great distances many times faster than the speed of light? Magic?

Non-locality is a quantum fact.

I was recently reading Nick Herbert's Quantum Reality (1985). Although it is old, the exposition is good. He provided a summary of the non-locality issue. As I recall, he said that every interpretation has to include non-locality or it fails. He mentioned that MW fulfills this by the non-locality of creating many worlds instantaneously.

No, the problem is whether or not what appears indeterministic is a product of our limited perspective or the ontology of physics.

What I am trying to say, is the world could just as well appear deterministic because of our limited perspective, but not actually be so. What we see are trends not deterministic causes. This is where the idea of pseudo-determinism comes in.

Classic physics is only an “approximation” down to a certain size, and then it doesn’t give inaccurate results, it gives nonsensical (contradictory) results; that’s a completely different thing.

If something can be measured, it is not nonsensical. It might contradict our "map" or metaphysics.

You obviously aren’t keeping up with my claims. I have never claimed there is no possibility of free choice.

If that is what you are saying, then we are in agreement. There is a possibility of choice.

Based on QM and my own experiences that possibility is close to 100%. I don't think we could function as we do without the ability to make some choices, however else we are constrained.

I’m saying there are two possibilities, one is that there is ontological free will and this is what we experience, and two that our ignorance of determinism creates the illusion of free-will. Further, I’m arguing why the second option is more likely than the former option. I enumerated all of the reasons why. It seems the only one we’re really in disagreement about is whether there are deterministic processes or not. You say the “evidence” of QM contradicts this, but that’s only if you assume the truth of CI, and I’ve already pointed out the multitudinous problems of CI that you’ve yet to satisfactorily answer. In contrast, MW has one problem regarding it not (yet) being able to derive the Born probabilities. I claim this problem is much lesser than the problems facing CI. You seem to disagree, but have yet to argue why CI’s problems are lesser.

Actually, I don't even understand CI well enough to say I agree with it or not. It seems to be the safest approach to take because it just deals with the facts.

Our ignorance of determinism or our ignorance of indeterminism makes no difference as to whether we are completely determined or not. It does not help us make a decision as to the facts of the matter and may very well get in the way of seeing the facts.

I’m not claiming that. I’m claiming it’s more likely that’s the case, and I have provided evidence as to why. You just don’t like the evidence. Further, you've given no evidence to prefer your explanation (ontological free-will) except "your experience," and I have given numerous examples of how our experiences are illusory, especially when it comes to physics. If anything, our senses have proved historically unreliable for accurately inferring statements about how physics works. In fact, why don't you provide an example of how our senses and metaphysical intuitions have ever been accurate with regards to how physics works. It was wrong about the flat Earth, it was wrong about geocentrism, it was wrong (or at best incomplete) with Newtonian physics, etc. All I see is a long history of wrong that was only corrected via the scientific method, not by a sensory experience translating to an accurate intuition about reality.

I don't see the evidence. This is how I see the argument we are having about the possibility of humans making a choice.

Assume I am looking at a tree. That is my experience. The tree is there. You tell me, "No, the tree is not there. That is an illusion. You have had many illusions in the past, so this could be an illusion as well."

I say, "Fine, I have had illusions in the past, but I change my mind given evidence. Give me evidence that this particular time it is also an illusion."

At this point you repeat the argument about my having had illusions in the past as evidence that the tree is not there. You might even add, "There is a possibility that this tree is an illusion like those in the past."

I respond, "Yes, I know. There is a possibility I could be wrong, but show me that this tree is an illusion."

You say, "It is even more likely that you are having an illusion than not."

I say, "Who cares? As far as illusion go, you are a human being as well and have had just as many illusions as I do. How can I trust that your claim is not also an illusion? That is why I need evidence."

That is where I see us at the moment. We are caught arguing over the possibility of anyone making a choice, but I am not interested in possibilities. I want to know whether we can make any choice or not.

My conclusion is until I get evidence to the contrary that I am willing to accept, the tree is there. In the case of free will, we can make choices.

[MorpheusSandman]

I think this issue of choice for the quantum stuff, say an electron declaring its position or momentum in an experiment, is the heart of the problem.

You did absolutely nothing to answer my questions. For this discussion, I taboo the word “choice.” You cannot say “choice.” What you have to do is break down the physical processes involved in choices (without ever using the word), show how we know what they are and how they work, and then show how a single particle can replicate those processes. GO.

Relativity has failed the non-locality test that Bell formulated and experimenters later verified.

No, not even close. Non-locality is only a quantum fact if you accept collapse/CI. Again, you cite a reference on MW that’s almost two decades old. Please read something more recent. MW is local.

What I am trying to say, is the world could just as well appear deterministic because of our limited perspective, but not actually be so. What we see are trends not deterministic causes. This is where the idea of pseudo-determinism comes in.

Basically what you’re talking about with “trends not deterministic causes” is Hume’s Problem of Induction which states we can never move from the consistency of past observances to absolute, eternal truth. It’s a fair enough point, but then the whole argument becomes moot because you’ve disallowed for the possibility of anyone ever claiming anything is deterministic. “Oh, sure, you’ve predicted the sun will rise in the East correctly every day for your entire life, but it may turn into a snow bunny tomorrow! It’s entirely indeterministic!”

If something can be measured, it is not nonsensical. It might contradict our "map" or metaphysics.

I don’t really know what you’re saying here… if you apply GR to quantum phenomena, you get “nonsense” like infinities. See here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2mjoI7bgXM At roughly 6:50 they describe the attempts at unifying the two and how it breeds more of the same nonsensical results. This is what I’ve been saying about having two theories that perfectly describe phenomena on two different levels and the inability for one to subsume the other. CI is “complete,” and that completeness seems to contradict another theory that works perfectly well on another scale; there is no reason why this should be, and certainly not one we’ve found in the past century of dealing with it.

Your claims that “QM is a more accurate model than GR” is only correct if we’re talking about events at quantum levels, but this does not explain why GR is perfectly accurate at macro levels. If GR was “just an approximation” and QM was “more accurate” then the math for GR should fit into the math for QM and not produce infinities. They should work together, because this is how approximations VS more accurate models work; it’s how GR VS Newton works, it’s how Darwin VS modern evolution works. You don’t end up with two contradictory theories, you end up with one approximate theory that fits inside a more comprehensive theory. If GR was indeed wrong, then it should not work as well as it does.

Really, the fact that MW is “incomplete,” that it can’t derive the Born theories, really makes it much more open to being reconciled with GR completely, especially since it works on the same principles GR works on (locality, deterministic, real, etc.).

I don't think we could function as we do without the ability to make some choices, however else we are constrained.

You still haven’t argued what would make this any different from our ignorance of determinism leading to the feeling of having a choice. Why don’t you think we could function as we do without ontological choices?

It seems to be the safest approach to take because it just deals with the facts.

All QM interpretations “deal with the facts,” the difference is in how they treat them. CI introduces a collapse that is not present in the math, it assumes one world, it assumes humans don’t behave like particles, and you get all of the insolvable problems/paradoxes because of those assumptions. IMO, MW “deals with the facts” more concretely by simply assuming the wavefunction is real and extends to all levels and all things. Yes, by assuming this we can’t derive Born, but we also eliminate the paradoxes, several additional assumptions, and leave open the possibility of reconciliation with a theory that works perfectly on non-quantum levels.

Our ignorance of determinism or our ignorance of indeterminism makes no difference as to whether we are completely determined or not.

No, you’re right that they’re two separate issues, but the reason for bringing up “ignorance of determinism producing illusion of choice” is because you initially argued that our experiential feeling of choice was indeed evidence of actual choice. I argued that our ignorance of determinism would equally explain the feeling of choice and is quite consistent with what we know about the limitations of human cognition/knowledge. We are even ignorant of how our own brains work, yet people make all kinds of metaphysical assumptions about what their thoughts mean without investigating the thing that seems to produce those thoughts.

This is how I see the argument we are having about the possibility of humans making a choice.

I figured sooner or later you’d make this argument, but it’s a fallacious one for an obvious reason: A sense experience leading to the question of objective existence is entirely different to a subjective experience leading to the question of an objective cause of that experience. Let me try to distinguish the difference:

If you see a tree you are assuming that there is an external object producing that experience. You can help confirm it with other senses (touch, taste, smell), you can ask others to confirm it the same way, and, what’s more, you can build up a whole network of causal entanglements by which to see if the tree is/isn’t there under certain conditions (ie, blindness, lack of light, cutting it down, etc.) to see how the sense changes. So not only do you have the consistency of sight, you have the consistency of other senses, the confirmation of others, and more in-depth network including understanding how light interacts with eyes and brains. In every way we have available to us we can confirm the existence of the tree.

Choice is not even remotely the same thing as the above. Firstly, there is no sense of anything external relating to choice. You don’t see it, smell it, taste it, hear it, etc. you are merely feeling (ie, not sensing with your 5 senses) what is more than likely the physical processes of your brain. We know a great deal about how brain processes produces feelings, and we have no examples to contradict this (ie, that such feelings can be produced without a brain).

However, you’d claim that this “feeling” corresponds to an actual, ontological free will. IE, something else “out there” is producing this feeling and this feeling allows you to make an actual choice that is not determined by the physical make-up of your brain. These are all some bold assumptions, and I see absolutely no basis for assuming any of these things. In fact, there are many reasons to NOT assume these things, such as our history of imagining things that do not exist and then assuming they do merely because we were capable of thinking about them. Clearly, our ability to think something and feel that something is not good proof that there is something OUT THERE that exists that is causing that feeling/conception.

What’s more, as it relates to the specific topic of physics, these “feelings” have never, ever been reliable as to accurately describing how reality functions. In fact, they’ve been consistently wrong and have only been corrected via the scientific method, which exists in part to not let human biases and assumptions get in the way. So it’s the not the case with the tree where “sensing tree = tree exists” is an inference that is confirmed in every way possible, it’s more a case of “feeling something subjectively = inferring something objective exists that is causing that feeling and that this assumption is true,” and such inferences are NOT historically reliable.

Finally, there’s the argument that and ignorance of determinism would produce the same feeling without corresponding to actual free-will. The argument in favor of this is that we know we are ignorant about—if you don’t want to say “deterministic” processes, let’s say “physical processes.” To go back to the case of the coin-flip, even if you’d dispute GR’s ability to predict the flip with 100% accuracy (though I see no reason to assume this given the deterministic nature of what GR is describing and its consistently proved accuracy in those contexts), you can’t deny that if we could take those physical processes into account, the probabiliy of the flip would NOT be 50/50, but more like 99.99999/0.00001. So we know that our ignorance of physical processes produces what feels like uncertainty to us, so why would you assume that our ignorance of our cognitive processes would do any differently?

[YesNo]

You did absolutely nothing to answer my questions. For this discussion, I taboo the word “choice.” You cannot say “choice.” What you have to do is break down the physical processes involved in choices (without ever using the word), show how we know what they are and how they work, and then show how a single particle can replicate those processes. GO.

I don't see how you can taboo discussion of choice. If that is what you want to do, that is your choice. I'll continue as I have.

No, not even close. Non-locality is only a quantum fact if you accept collapse/CI. Again, you cite a reference on MW that’s almost two decades old. Please read something more recent. MW is local.

I think the only way MW could be consistently local is if it were completely deterministic. Otherwise it would need non-locality somewhere, because non-locality is a quantum fact. However I don't think that determinism is possible.

Basically what you’re talking about with “trends not deterministic causes” is Hume’s Problem of Induction which states we can never move from the consistency of past observances to absolute, eternal truth. It’s a fair enough point, but then the whole argument becomes moot because you’ve disallowed for the possibility of anyone ever claiming anything is deterministic. “Oh, sure, you’ve predicted the sun will rise in the East correctly every day for your entire life, but it may turn into a snow bunny tomorrow! It’s entirely indeterministic!”

I don't think the issue of quantum uncertainty has anything to do with Hume's induction. What we have is evidence, through the double slit experiment, that the electron, or whatever quantum particle we are considering, appears to be making a choice. It is not a generalization, but a specific experiment that is causing the problem.

EDIT: On rethinking this part, Hume does seem to make it look as if one cannot logically argue that the world is deterministic. I think he is right about that, but that is not the point that quantum facts are making. They are making a stronger case that the world, in fact, is not deterministic, not simply that we cannot logically conclude that determinism is true.

Really, the fact that MW is “incomplete,” that it can’t derive the Born theories, really makes it much more open to being reconciled with GR completely, especially since it works on the same principles GR works on (locality, deterministic, real, etc.).

That actually makes MW worth rejecting.

You still haven’t argued what would make this any different from our ignorance of determinism leading to the feeling of having a choice. Why don’t you think we could function as we do without ontological choices?

It is no more useful arguing that than arguing how our ignorance of indeterminism can lead to a feeling, or rather a belief in this case, that we are determined.

The reason I don't think we can function that way is because it would require chance to generate change. Chance doesn't generate change. With chance everything stays the way it always has.

No, you’re right that they’re two separate issues, but the reason for bringing up “ignorance of determinism producing illusion of choice” is because you initially argued that our experiential feeling of choice was indeed evidence of actual choice. I argued that our ignorance of determinism would equally explain the feeling of choice and is quite consistent with what we know about the limitations of human cognition/knowledge.

The basic difference is I value my experience over another person's metaphysics. My experience is evidence. Your theory is metaphysics. As far as I'm concerned belief in MW is like believing in the tooth fairy. Neither of them exists. So if you want to counter my experience, it better be with evidence that is extraordinary and adequate to convince me.

The phrase "ignorance of determinism" assumes a metaphysics that "determinism" is true. I don't accept that metaphysics, so you will have to come up with some other argument.

I figured sooner or later you’d make this argument, but it’s a fallacious one for an obvious reason: A sense experience leading to the question of objective existence is entirely different to a subjective experience leading to the question of an objective cause of that experience. Let me try to distinguish the difference:

If you see a tree you are assuming that there is an external object producing that experience. You can help confirm it with other senses (touch, taste, smell), you can ask others to confirm it the same way, and, what’s more, you can build up a whole network of causal entanglements by which to see if the tree is/isn’t there under certain conditions (ie, blindness, lack of light, cutting it down, etc.) to see how the sense changes. So not only do you have the consistency of sight, you have the consistency of other senses, the confirmation of others, and more in-depth network including understanding how light interacts with eyes and brains. In every way we have available to us we can confirm the existence of the tree.

If I understand this, you don't accept my tree analogy because one can actually see and verify the tree exists. That is precisely why I used it. I will admit that I can't see my ability to make a choice like I can see a tree. But neither can I see those "many worlds" you would like me to believe in.

If you don't need to provide evidence for MW, why should anyone provide evidence for anything? If MW can survive with the hand-waving of not generating the Born rule, why should anyone care what anyone believes about anything? Just like with MW, they can laugh off any criticism of their theory and say that their theory is still "incomplete" (while I laugh their theory into the garbage can).

This is why we need evidence, not repeating metaphysical dogmas.

[MorpheusSandman]

I don't see how you can taboo discussion of choice.

What I meant is this: http://lesswrong.com/lw/nu/taboo_your_words/ I'm not tabooing the discussion of choice, I'm tabooing the word itself.

However I don't think that determinism is possible.

If there is no wavefunction collapse and it’s QM all the way down, then QM would be deterministic. The only thing that makes it indeterministic is assuming first that there’s a collapse and second that humans are not in a state of superposition like particles and third that there is some split between quantum and classic worlds. It’s those assumptions that create indeterminism. Take them away and you get determinism.

I don't think the issue of quantum uncertainty has anything to do with Hume's induction.

When you said: “What we see are trends not deterministic causes.” it sounded like you were talking about Hume’s problem of induction, meaning that no matter how consistently we observe something it’s merely a trend and not proof of determinism. You keep bringing up the double-slit experiment, but why is it more logical to state that the electron “chooses” to go through one slit or the other as opposed to saying it goes through both and we only see it go through one because we are in the same state of superposition as the particle?

That actually makes MW worth rejecting.

WTF!? Why?

Chance doesn't generate change. With chance everything stays the way it always has.

Evolution says differently.

The basic difference is I value my experience over another person's metaphysics.

The issue is not your experience. It’s like I said in another thread about NDEs, nobody is questioning the experience, we’re questioning the logical inferences and conclusions being drawn from the experience. Humans are not innately good at making such inferences. One only has to investigate the history of proposed causes behind phenomena to realize this. We’ve been wrong far more often than we’ve been right, and so often the only reason we found the right answer is by removing human bias as much as possible and questioning the hidden assumptions we were making about reality via the scientific method.

So, to repeat, I’m not questioning your experience of, eg, choice, I’m questioning your inferences and conclusion that the choice is REAL as opposed to a feeling generated by the limitations in your awareness of your own cognitive processes. My “theory” is not what I’d call “metaphysics,” it’s proposing an alternate hypothesis that would explain a phenomena, the same way a spherical earth and gravity would “explain” the experience of standing on a flat earth just as well as a flat earth would.

As far as I'm concerned belief in MW is like believing in the tooth fairy.

Yes, because great minds like Feynman, Deutsch, Tegmark, Hawking, Gell-Mann, and Weinberg believe in something that’s no different than tooth fairies. It’s comments like this that make me think you are so innately biased against MW that there’s absolutely nothing nobody can say or write that would convince you. Your metaphysics is so set against them that you have completely closed your mind to all evidence and arguments.

The phrase "ignorance of determinism" assumes a metaphysics that "determinism" is true. I don't accept that metaphysics,

No, it doesn’t assume that determinism is true. You really need to look up Bayes’ Theorem, which teaches you how to deal with how conditional evidence affects the probabilities of prior propositions. In Bayes’ Theorem, you don’t say “given E(vidence), how likely is P(roposition)?” but rather “given P(roposition), how likely is E(evidence)?” and then you balance that against “given P isn’t true, how likely is E?” Under that theory you have to both assume that a proposition is and isn’t true and then consider how the evidence affects both.

So the point I’m making is along the lines of Bayes, where I say “assuming determinism is true, how likely is our feeling of choice?” and I’m saying that it’s just as likely as saying “assuming indeterminism is true, how likely is our feeling of choice?”. I think both of those statements are equally likely and you can’t privilege one over the other. If you can’t privilege one over the other, than your feeling of choice is no better evidence for determinism than indeterminism, you have to argue for indeterminism from some other source.

If I understand this, you don't accept my tree analogy because one can actually see and verify the tree exists. That is precisely why I used it. I will admit that I can't see my ability to make a choice like I can see a tree. But neither can I see those "many worlds" you would like me to believe in.

I think you understand the basics of my explanation, but it’s a bit more complicated than just seeing or not seeing. What I tried to do was show how you could build up a complex network of causal entanglement around the tree, your senses, others’ senses, and even physics like how photons, eyes, and brains work. In comparison, this causal complex is completely absent in the notion of choice because you don’t even know what goes on in your brain when making a choice. You just lump a feeling under one umbrella label and don’t investigate it any further.

As I’ve already explained, you don’t need to see the many worlds because the many worlds themselves are a consequence of believing the wavefunction is a real thing, it doesn’t collapse because QM works all the way down, and humans behave like aggregates of particles like everything else. If you believe those things, you get the many worlds even though you can’t see them and, indeed, MW explains why you can’t see them.

The problem is that different propositions require different kinds of evidence. You can’t pretend like they’re all equal.

If you don't need to provide evidence for MW, why should anyone provide evidence for anything? If MW can survive with the hand-waving of not generating the Born rule, why should anyone care what anyone believes about anything?

But I HAVE provided evidence for MW! To recap:

1. MW’s first basic claim is that QM works all the way down, which would mean everything is in a state of superposition. So far, this has been confirmed by every test done on molecules with 2424 particles. There is no evidence for a “collapse” that separates the quantum and classic worlds.

2. MW’s second basic claim is that the wavefunction is real, which would mean that we should be able to use it to make the exact kind of predictions we’re able to make.

3. MW is compatible with everything we know about classic physics, the same classic physics that have been consistently accurate in modeling large objects in spacetime. The only exception is gravity; however, in being deterministic, local, and real, MW is at least capable of being reconciled with gravity as we learn more.

4. MW being compatible with classic physics would follow the pattern of a more comprehensive theory subsuming an approximate theory, the same way GR did with Newtonian Physics and modern evolution did with Darwinian evolution.

Compare with CI:

1. CI claims that there is a collapse and that this collapse separates the indeterministic world of QM with the deterministic world of GR. So far, this collapse/split has NOT been found in any tests that have been done, and it is certainly not required in any of the mathematical formulas.

2. CI treats the wavefunction as non-real, and if it’s non-real then we shouldn’t be able to make the predictions that we do.

3. CI is incompatible with everything we know about classic physics.

4. CI being incompatible with classic physics would be the first time in the history of science that a new theory completely contradicted a previous, merely approximate theory. What’s more, it would be the first time that we found that things work differently at different levels, despite the fact that classical physics works exactly like we’d expect if it was QM all the way down.

The ONLY advantage CI has is that it can derive the Born rule, but it does this by assuming things that is has absolutely no reason/evidence for assuming. It’s not all that different than assuming the existence of God to explain lightning before we knew about meteorology and electricity. Sure, it explains lightning, but there’s no reason for assuming its true. What’s more, there’s no reason to assume that MW can’t derive the Born rule as technology, especially quantum computing, advances.

[YesNo]

What I meant is this: http://lesswrong.com/lw/nu/taboo_your_words/ I'm not tabooing the discussion of choice, I'm tabooing the word itself.

I don't have time to respond to everything, but here are some quick comments.

I see now that you are playing a game called "taboo" which I was unaware of. My use of the word "choice" was to play a similar game. I was trying to "taboo" the notion of "wave function collapse". It doesn't seem fruitful to use this any more since it is unclear what it means.

Yudkowski wrote the following in the link you cited.

The illusion of unity across religions can be dispelled by making the term "God" taboo, and asking them to say what it is they believe in...

I think the use of the word "God" should also be restricted to something else. I am more inclined to be interested in someone's view of the universe than their view of God.

If there is no wavefunction collapse and it’s QM all the way down, then QM would be deterministic. The only thing that makes it indeterministic is assuming first that there’s a collapse and second that humans are not in a state of superposition like particles and third that there is some split between quantum and classic worlds. It’s those assumptions that create indeterminism. Take them away and you get determinism.

I think you are caught in a misconception here about wave function collapse. The world is not divided between the indeterministic quantum world and the deterministic world after some sort of collapse. The whole world allows for indeterminism, however, to do that for various organisms one needs some stability which comes from a pseudo-determinism.

As far as I'm concerned, I've "tabooed" the phrase "wave function collapse".

When you said: “What we see are trends not deterministic causes.” it sounded like you were talking about Hume’s problem of induction, meaning that no matter how consistently we observe something it’s merely a trend and not proof of determinism. You keep bringing up the double-slit experiment, but why is it more logical to state that the electron “chooses” to go through one slit or the other as opposed to saying it goes through both and we only see it go through one because we are in the same state of superposition as the particle?

If we don't have some stability, which determinism would provide, we could not make any interesting choices. If we have determinism we can't make any choices. That is where the idea of "trending" comes in and I got it from Sheldrake.

Regarding the electron we have to be careful not to assume we know what it does. I don't think it is accurate to say that it goes through all paths (as Feynman claim) although that would allow one to make perhaps easier calculations of the probabilities. This is why I like CI. It keeps the problem in the forefront rather than trying to resolve it too quickly. It doesn't appear that the electron exists as either a particle or a field. So jumping to a metaphor of either particle or wave boxes our understanding.

WTF!? Why?

The question is why I think one should reject MW because it fails to come up with the Born rule. The reason is because we are talking about quantum facts which are not intuitive. We need to not add on intuitive assumptions about reality, because they get in the way of understanding those facts. The problem is not to come up with a solution that fits past science. That science is over except where it has been shown to be technologically useful.

Evolution says differently.

I don't think so. Chance is used as a solution of last resort far too often in science. If reality is deterministic, there is no chance involved. If reality is not deterministic one needs to consider "choice" and "purpose" rather than chance as explanations.