the big bang theory~ how did we get here?

[YesNo]

All of the predictive power of QM comes from the Born Rule. These probabilities make sense in the framework of Copenhagen, but not in MW (or rather: MW can't derive them). Even MW proponents admit this is a serious problem, and there are various theories out there about it, but it's far from a settled issue. Yudkowsky details the problem as well as one possible solution here that was proposed by Robin Hanson here. Cioran may have some additional information about this.

Here are two sources taken from the Wikipedia article under "Probability" related to this issue: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation

1) Adrian Kent, "Against Many-Worlds Interpretations": http://arxiv.org/pdf/gr-qc/9703089v1.pdf

2) N.P. Landsman, "The Born rule and its interpretation": http://www.math.ru.nl/~landsman/Born.pdf

[YesNo]

...
I asked you a question you did not answer: what would make this distinguishable from us feeling like we make choices because we are ignorant of deterministic processes? How would we tell the difference? It is not an extraordinary claim to say we are ignorant of deterministic processes. If I were to flip a coin, physics determines how it will land, but my finite brain cannot calculate the physics necessary to know how it will land, so my ignorance creates the 50/50 probability of the coin toss. Choices are similar; if I'm ignorant of the deterministic processes going on in my brain, then my feeling of "choice" would be identical to that ignorance. I feel a "choice" because I am "ignorant" of determinism is the same thing of the coin toss being 50/50 because I'm ignorant of the deterministic physics. This is not an extraordinary claim because it equally matches what we experience AND has support by the fact that we know we ARE ignorant of such processes outside our brains.
...
You experience the sun moving across the sky. You experience standing on a flat Earth. How is "free will" any different from those experiences?

It seems to me that Young Earth Creationists could make the same argument that you are making. They could claim that I am ignorant of some God who causes me to have as an illusion that the universe is 13.7 billion years old when it is actually only a few thousand years old. How would I tell the difference?

Well, you tell the difference by the evidence.

The sun moves across the sky because the earth turns and evidence is provided for that explanation rather than the one that the sun is doing the moving. It is the evidence that counts.

It is true that what I experience could be an illusion, but until there is other evidence presented, I have to accept my own experience.

[Calidore]

If I were to flip a coin, physics determines how it will land, but my finite brain cannot calculate the physics necessary to know how it will land, so my ignorance creates the 50/50 probability of the coin toss. Choices are similar; if I'm ignorant of the deterministic processes going on in my brain, then my feeling of "choice" would be identical to that ignorance. I feel a "choice" because I am "ignorant" of determinism is the same thing of the coin toss being 50/50 because I'm ignorant of the deterministic physics. This is not an extraordinary claim because it equally matches what we experience AND has support by the fact that we know we ARE ignorant of such processes outside our brains.

I'm afraid I don't get this one. The 50/50 probability doesn't come from our ignorance, it comes from the coin having two sides and only being able to land on one. Our inability to predict which side a coin will land on when flipped doesn't affect the 50/50 odds of it landing on either side in the slightest.

[cafolini]

Well, Voyager 1 reports that there is no change in the direction of the magnetic field.

[mal4mac]

It seems to me that Young Earth Creationists could make the same argument that you are making. They could claim that I am ignorant of some God who causes me to have as an illusion that the universe is 13.7 billion years old when it is actually only a few thousand years old. How would I tell the difference?

Well, you tell the difference by the evidence.

The sun moves across the sky because the earth turns and evidence is provided for that explanation rather than the one that the sun is doing the moving. It is the evidence that counts.

It is true that what I experience could be an illusion, but until there is other evidence presented, I have to accept my own experience.

There's actually a famous 19th century biologist, Gosse, the inventor of the aquarium, who believed that. He was leader of the Plymouth Brethren, *really* extreme fundamentalists, so had to believe that the earth was only a few thousand years old. But being an excellent biologist he couldn't discount Darwin's theory of evolution. So he had to believe that God had made it look like evolution had occurred. His son's book "Father & Son" is a great read.

So it's not only the evidence that counts, the circles you move in are likely have a great impact. Obviously he came under scathing attacks from Huxley et. al., but the Plymouth Brethren comforted him, and enabled him to maintain his strange position.

[cacian]

Well, Voyager 1 reports that there is no change in the direction of the magnetic field.

isn't there? I thought magnetic field is because there is changes that is. there would not be magnetism without atmospheric movement/changes.

[MorpheusSandman]

Here are two sources taken from the Wikipedia article under "Probability" related to this issue: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation

1) Adrian Kent, "Against Many-Worlds Interpretations": http://arxiv.org/pdf/gr-qc/9703089v1.pdf

2) N.P. Landsman, "The Born rule and its interpretation": http://www.math.ru.nl/~landsman/Born.pdf

The first paper was written in 1989. That's 24 years ago. I think you need to find something more recent than that would take in, you know, a quarter century worth of literature. The second is a more technical explanation of precisely what I stated regarding lack of a "generally accepted Born theory derivation to date" in MW, but even that paper states that this does not mean that such a derivation is impossible in principle. However, I think it's important to understand the difference between the two very different problems facing MWI and CI: CI can derive the Born rule, the axioms, at the expense of being compatible with everything else we know about physics; MWI cannot derive the Born rule, the axioms, but trades this for it being compatible with everything else we know about physics. Personally, I'm far more comfortable with the latter problem, which merely implies that there's something out there we don't know, as opposed to the former which essentially says "Oh, we know what's out there, even though what we know is inconsistent with everything else we know." To me, the latter problem is open to being solved, while I see no hope of the former being solved--not after almost 100 years of failed attempts at doing so. The latter could potentially be solved by technological advancements in quantum computing which is still in its infancy.

It seems to me that Young Earth Creationists could make the same argument that you are making. They could claim that I am ignorant of some God who causes me to have as an illusion that the universe is 13.7 billion years old when it is actually only a few thousand years old. How would I tell the difference?

Well, you tell the difference by the evidence.

The sun moves across the sky because the earth turns and evidence is provided for that explanation rather than the one that the sun is doing the moving. It is the evidence that counts.

There's no analogy between "illusion of free-will = ignorance of determinism" (which I'll now abbreviate to IDIF (Ignorance of Determinism equals Illusive Free will)) and the YEC claim; the YEC is proposing an additional entity that exists objectively to explain what is already explainable and consistent without that entity. That's a direct violation of the Conjunction Fallacy (Occam's Razor). In comparison, IDIF is NOT proposing an additional external entity, but is merely proposing that something we know happens (our ignorance of determinism) leads to a feeling we know we feel (our feeling of making free-willed choices). If we know the former happens, and we know the latter happens, then you have to argue why the former cannot account for the latter.

I already discussed this in a previous thread, essentially saying that a FEELING of free-will is only evidence of a feeling, not evidence for a 1:1 ontological derivation of that feeling (ie, feeling of free-will is not evidence for ontological free-will). We already have multiple examples of how our emotions, feelings, and even senses distort what is actually happening in reality. You just hand wave the "sun moving across the sky" as an example, but it illustrates an important point about how there are always hidden assumptions behind our feelings and senses being made. A feeling is evidence that a feeling exists, a sense is evidence that a sense exists; any ontological claims derived from those claims require something more than the feeling or sense by itself. That's partly why we have the scientific method: to eliminate the various biases and hidden assumptions we make that lead to incorrect conclusions.

[MorpheusSandman]

I'm afraid I don't get this one. The 50/50 probability doesn't come from our ignorance,

Oh, yes it very much does: http://lesswrong.com/lw/oj/probability_is_in_the_mind/

[Calidore]

Oh, yes it very much does: http://lesswrong.com/lw/oj/probability_is_in_the_mind/

Possibly I misunderstood. I thought you were talking about the probability of the coin landing on either side rather than the probability of one guessing which side it has landed on. All the argument and examples on that page seem to have to do with one's ability to guess an already-determined outcome rather than the physical probability of that outcome occurring in the first pace.

[MorpheusSandman]

All the argument and examples on that page seem to have to do with one's ability to guess an already-determined outcome rather than the physical probability of that outcome occurring in the first pace.

I still think you're misunderstanding. The outcome of the coin-flip is deterministic in that it's determined by the power of the flip, distance to the ground, gravity, wind-currents, etc. If one could calculate all of these things and control them, it would not be 50/50 which side the coin landed on, it would be 100/0. It's our inability to account and control those factors (our ignorance) that makes the flip 50/50. The probability is a result of our epistemological finiteness, not the result of the process itself (the coin flip) being probabilistic. In fact, you can even understand WHY our epistemological limitation makes it 50/50, because the fact that there are only two sides the coin can land on is what we DO know and what we CAN account for. All of the other factors are out of our frame of available knowledge. Yudkowsky discusses this in detail with many examples. One pertaining to the coin flip:

To make the coinflip experiment repeatable, as frequentists are wont to demand, we could build an automated coinflipper, and verify that the results were 50% heads and 50% tails. But maybe a robot with extra-sensitive eyes and a good grasp of physics, watching the autoflipper prepare to flip, could predict the coin's fall in advance—not with certainty, but with 90% accuracy. Then what would the real probability be?

There is no "real probability". The robot has one state of partial information. You have a different state of partial information. The coin itself has no mind, and doesn't assign a probability to anything; it just flips into the air, rotates a few times, bounces off some air molecules, and lands either heads or tails.

[YesNo]

The first paper was written in 1989. That's 24 years ago. I think you need to find something more recent than that would take in, you know, a quarter century worth of literature.

I am more interested in Kent's article. What it does is clarifies the challenge to MW that you and Yudkowski already agree exists. It is also cited currently in Wikipedia. What the 1989 date means to me is that MW has still not answered that challenge.

However, I think it's important to understand the difference between the two very different problems facing MWI and CI: CI can derive the Born rule, the axioms, at the expense of being compatible with everything else we know about physics; MWI cannot derive the Born rule, the axioms, but trades this for it being compatible with everything else we know about physics.

I agree with you that this is the situation. What this means is that CI is an interpretation for QM and MWI is not. This is the hand-waving part of MWI. It clams to be an interpretation, but it cannot generate those coefficients.

MW is not an interpretation until it can derive those coefficients.

Personally, I'm far more comfortable with the latter problem, which merely implies that there's something out there we don't know, as opposed to the former which essentially says "Oh, we know what's out there, even though what we know is inconsistent with everything else we know." To me, the latter problem is open to being solved, while I see no hope of the former being solved--not after almost 100 years of failed attempts at doing so. The latter could potentially be solved by technological advancements in quantum computing which is still in its infancy.

I think it is wishful thinking that Deutsch's program would prove anything one way or the other about MW. Here is Kent's comment on Deutsch:

Finally, we note that Deutsch’s main discussion involves thought experiments (Deutsch’s experiments 2 and 3) whose outcome is quite uncertain. Deutsch assumes that “quantum parallel processing” (which relies on pure hamiltonian evolution of the state vector) will occur during the operation of various computing devices. There is presently no compelling reason for this assumption. (Nor would we necessarily interpret the results Deutsch predicts as compelling evidence for MWI.)

If we know the former happens, and we know the latter happens, then you have to argue why the former cannot account for the latter.

The problem is we don't know. These are all metaphysical assumptions for which one attempts to gather evidence.

I already discussed this in a previous thread, essentially saying that a FEELING of free-will is only evidence of a feeling, not evidence for a 1:1 ontological derivation of that feeling (ie, feeling of free-will is not evidence for ontological free-will). We already have multiple examples of how our emotions, feelings, and even senses distort what is actually happening in reality. You just hand wave the "sun moving across the sky" as an example, but it illustrates an important point about how there are always hidden assumptions behind our feelings and senses being made. A feeling is evidence that a feeling exists, a sense is evidence that a sense exists; any ontological claims derived from those claims require something more than the feeling or sense by itself. That's partly why we have the scientific method: to eliminate the various biases and hidden assumptions we make that lead to incorrect conclusions.

I agree with you that an ontological claim that something exists requires evidence, but so does an ontological claim that something does not exist require evidence. This is especially the case when there is evidence whether that is in the form of feelings or conclusions from other science that something does exist.

There is no getting around the need to provide evidence.

[MorpheusSandman]

What the 1989 date means to me is that MW has still not answered that challenge.

So a paper written in 1989 that ignores 24 years worth of literature on a subject means that it's the subject that "has still not answered that challenge?" Wow... Well, I might as well cite the very first papers on QM to show that it has still not answered the challenges of General Relativity! That said, I already agreed that MWI can't derive the Born Rule in a generally acceptable way, but this is not imputing the attempts out there being made. Someone could've already hit on the right answer, but that paper would have no idea as it hasn't covered any attempts in the last quarter century!

What this means is that CI is an interpretation for QM and MWI is not. This is the hand-waving part of MWI.

So... an interpretation that conflicts with everything else we know IS an interpretation that involves no hand-waving, but not an interpretation that DOESN'T conflict with everything else we know? I see. Seems to me that the interpretation that conflicts with everything we know would be the "interpretation" doing all the hand-waving.

I think it is wishful thinking that Deutsch's program would prove anything one way or the other about MW. Here is Kent's comment on Deutsch:

Yes, Kent's comments on Deutsch 24 years ago when quantum computing was a pipe dream, compared to now when it's already in its infancy. Find me a comment of him saying this in 2013 where quantum computing is a reality, which would be the "compelling reason" for Deutsch's "assumption."

The problem is we don't know.

Way to avoid all of my arguments.

I agree with you that an ontological claim that something exists requires evidence, but so does an ontological claim that something does not exist require evidence.

The ontological claims I'm making about free-will DO have evidence. We know we are ignorant of deterministic processes, we know the multitude of ways in which our feelings and senses delude us, and we know we "feel" that we make choices. There is no reason to assume the former (ignorance plus biases) are not responsible for the latter, especially when, one, it is a simpler explanation proposing no additional entities and is consistent with what we know, and, two, we already have examples of how something similar works with probability (ie, ignorance of determinism leading to uncertainty).

[YesNo]

So a paper written in 1989 that ignores 24 years worth of literature on a subject means that it's the subject that "has still not answered that challenge?" Wow... Well, I might as well cite the very first papers on QM to show that it has still not answered the challenges of General Relativity! That said, I already agreed that MWI can't derive the Born Rule in a generally acceptable way, but this is not imputing the attempts out there being made. Someone could've already hit on the right answer, but that paper would have no idea as it hasn't covered any attempts in the last quarter century!

I would like to see a paper address more current work, if any exists, but this is what Wikipedia is currently referencing. Since I didn't see a solution to the problem on Wikipedia, I assume it has not yet been solved.

If you know of any other reference, please cite it.

So... an interpretation that conflicts with everything else we know IS an interpretation that involves no hand-waving, but not an interpretation that DOESN'T conflict with everything else we know? I see. Seems to me that the interpretation that conflicts with everything we know would be the "interpretation" doing all the hand-waving.

It is not a choice between CI and MWI. There are a lot of interpretations to choose from, but MWI cannot be an interpretation if it doesn't generate those coefficients.

This should make MWI questionable even for its supporters. How do they know it delivers what it promises? As an ideology justifying a metaphysics, it is fine. I don't expect such a metaphysics to come up with anything better since I don't think the underlying metaphysics is true.

Yes, Kent's comments on Deutsch 24 years ago when quantum computing was a pipe dream, compared to now when it's already in its infancy. Find me a comment of him saying this in 2013 where quantum computing is a reality, which would be the "compelling reason" for Deutsch's "assumption."

Do you have a more recent reference? I recall getting the same impression about Deutsch from reading Fabric of Reality that Kent did. Essentially Deutsch presents a process within our world that he claims justifies the existence of many worlds. To me it is all a claim, nothing more.

Way to avoid all of my arguments.

The ontological claims I'm making about free-will DO have evidence. We know we are ignorant of deterministic processes, we know the multitude of ways in which our feelings and senses delude us, and we know we "feel" that we make choices. There is no reason to assume the former (ignorance plus biases) are not responsible for the latter, especially when, one, it is a simpler explanation proposing no additional entities and is consistent with what we know, and, two, we already have examples of how something similar works with probability (ie, ignorance of determinism leading to uncertainty).

What you are arguing is that I could be ignorant of what I think is true or what I experience could be an illusion. I am not doubting that. The same applies to your position. What I am doubting is that this particular alternative, determinism, that you are promoting is itself anything more than an illusion. It sounds to me like an obsolete metaphysics that is trying to promote itself without evidence.

[Calidore]

The outcome of the coin-flip is deterministic in that it's determined by the power of the flip, distance to the ground, gravity, wind-currents, etc.

True.

If one could calculate all of these things and control them, it would not be 50/50 which side the coin landed on, it would be 100/0.

True as an "if" statement, but as the if isn't applicable, since we can't, the statement is irrelevant. And anyway...

It's our inability to account and control those factors (our ignorance) that makes the flip 50/50. The probability is a result of our epistemological finiteness, not the result of the process itself (the coin flip) being probabilistic.

This isn't true. The coin has two sides and will land on one. Base chance 50/50. In fact, "it's our inability to account and control those factors (our ignorance) that" prevents us from making the odds anything other than 50/50. Not the same thing.

To make the coinflip experiment repeatable, as frequentists are wont to demand, we could build an automated coinflipper, and verify that the results were 50% heads and 50% tails. But maybe a robot with extra-sensitive eyes and a good grasp of physics, watching the autoflipper prepare to flip, could predict the coin's fall in advance—not with certainty, but with 90% accuracy. Then what would the real probability be?

Another "if", and here's he's talking about predicting, rather than affecting, an admitted 50/50 outcome.

The coin itself has no mind, and doesn't assign a probability to anything; it just flips into the air, rotates a few times, bounces off some air molecules, and lands either heads or tails.

Yes.

The other examples on that page (the kids and the cards) also are talking about the changing odds of correctly guessing the answer (number of boys, number of aces) based on adding to the information you have, not the odds of her having that number of boys or the cardholder having that number of aces in the first place.

[MorpheusSandman]

I There are a lot of interpretations to choose from,

The two major choices are collapse VS decoherence; there are several variations on those two basic camps. All decoherence models that I know involve some version of MW (Many Histories, eg), because that's what it is.

MWI cannot be an interpretation if it doesn't generate those coefficients.

This should make MWI questionable even for its supporters. How do they know it delivers what it promises?

The first statement is just nonsense; by that token I can claim CI cannot be an interpretation because it conflicts with every other model of physics and simply assumes the existence of something (the collapse) for which there is no evidence for assuming. In a way, the two interpretations presents the two sides of Godel's Incompleteness Theorems about the inability of mathematical models to be both complete and consistent. CI is complete but inconsistent; MW is incomplete but consistent. I take consistency over completeness as all the lack of completeness implies is that there's something we don't know; inconsistency, however, implies we don't know what we know, which is oxymoronic.

MW is questionable to its supporters, including myself. That something is questionable has no bearing on whether or not it's better than other alternatives. Look at Yudkowsky's page on the Born Rule; he reviews the solution offered by Hanson and gives it "less than a 50% probability of being true," but then states that that probability would be less if there was any other explanation that was even remotely as reductive and mathematically elegant. IE, stating that one model is the best out there is not tantamount to saying it's perfect and has no problems or, indeed, even that it has a better than a 50/50 probability of being true.

Similarly, MW proponents do not deny it has problems, but what we claim is that those problems are lesser than those of CI. Post after post you've blatantly ignored the seemingly insurmountable problems with CI and have spent most of your time picking problems with MW that aren't even problems. The Born Rule is a problem; not an insurmountable one, but a significant one. I find that problem less significant than those by CI. It's like one is staring at a dam; MW has a good-sized crack that needs to be attended to, while CI is completely crumbling. Sure, they're both problems, but not even remotely in the same ballpark.

Do you have a more recent reference?

No, but I'm pretty sure Cioran would.

What you are arguing is that I could be ignorant of what I think is true or what I experience could be an illusion. I am not doubting that. The same applies to your position.

Errr, that sounds like a garbled mess. Even if you take CI to be true then you have to believe that our world is deterministic on the macro level, because CI creates a split between the "indeterminstic" world of particles and the "deterministic" world of Einstein's GR. So even under CI it would be true that we are ignorant of certain deterministic processes and that this ignorance creates the appearance of probability; so why would "choice" not be the same thing? I'm not saying we COULD be ignorant of something, I'm saying we demonstrably ARE ignorant of certain deterministic processes, and drawing an inference between the probability that ignorance creates and the feeling of choice it would similarly create for us. You have to show why that inference is not valid.