God is not (so bad after all)

[MorpheusSandman]

Taking an NDE at face value means that I accept it as what those experiencing it claimed it was. I don't have to explain it by saying it was some oxygen deprivation or whatever because it causes no problem on face value for my metaphysics. For others the very existence of these experiences is evidence their metaphysics is wrong. They must sanitize the evidence or else change their metaphysics. Since, as I've argued, people (including scientists) don't like changing their metaphysics, they come up with explanations so they can hang onto their metaphysics longer.

Right, so I was correct when I said that “by taking NDEs at face value” what you mean is “accepting that people are seeing into the afterlife.” I already stated that such an interpretation is EVERY BIT as much of an “explanation” as saying “oxygen deprivation” is. What’s more, we actually do know a lot about how the brain behaves (and what people experience) when they are deprived of oxygen and they tend to mirror many aspects of many NDEs; is that just a coincidence? I don’t know why you equate seeking materialistic explanations of NDEs (the same materialistic explanations that have explained many, many things people once thought were supernatural) with “sanitizing the evidence.” People are generally quite ignorant about how their own brains function, so if you go through an experience that is traumatic for your brain, why is it more natural to assume that the experience was supernatural rather than neurological? How can you rule the latter out?

To handle this mathematically, I would do the same thing that the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics has done. I would accept all of the evidence, and mathematics, that the standard Copenhagen interpretation has already provided for me and then I would add on to that the additional interpretation.

Ugh, you still have no understanding of what MW actually is. MW does not “add on to” the “standard” (lol) “Copenhagen interpretation.” If anything, it’s Copenhagen that “adds on to” the much simpler interpretation of MW, and needs to add more if it hopes to reconcile itself with General Relativity and Locality.

What the cosmic egg metaphor emphasizes is that the universe is not a deterministic machine, but contains purpose.

Which may fit nicely into your metaphysics, but has no actual, you know, evidence to support it. It’s just a blatant example of the Wishful Thinking fallacy.

Another way of looking at the difference is to consider Aristotle's four causes: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes. The deterministic machine view of the universe only uses the first two of Aristotle's causes. The cosmic egg concept allows all four to operate.

Yes, let’s look back 2300 years for insights into modern cosmology; you know, back before they even knew the Earth moved around the sun.

Are you saying that you exercised no freedom, whatsoever, when you made your post? Are you saying that you engaged in no goal-oriented activity (purpose) whatsoever as you wrote your words? Were these all illusions?

One of the major points Yudkowsky makes here (and elsewhere on Lesswrong regarding the nature of truth) is that when we ask if a proposition is true, it’s important to ask how different the world would be if it wasn’t VS if it was. EG, to list an easy example, how would things be different if the proposition “humans can fly” was true. Well, one way things would be different would be that if you jumped off a cliff you wouldn’t plummet to the ground. Now, apply that question to the nature of “free will” and “purpose.” How would things be different if there was such a real, ontological thing as free will and purpose as opposed to just a belief/feeling of these things produced by the finite algorithmic processes of our brains?

Let’s assume for a moment that we DO live in a deterministic universe where we have no ACTUAL, ontological free-will or purpose. Now, let’s assume in this universe that we are given finite, fallible brains that found it evolutionary advantageous to equate their ignorance of these deterministic process with “free-will,” and equate what those processes lead them to do as “purpose.” Now, how would that world be DIFFERENT than the world we find ourselves in? Similarly, you can do this while supposing that we live in an indeterminate universe where there is ACTUAL, ontological free-will and purpose. AFAICT, there’s no difference (at least superficially/experientially) in these two hypothetical worlds and the world we experience now.

Now, given that there’s no difference, the question then becomes which world is more likely and how do we determine that? The answer is found an old favorite known to laymen’s as Occam’s Razor, or, perhaps more technically/mathematically as The Conjunction Fallacy. To explain this, answer this illustrative question: Which of these two propositions is more likely: A) Jane is an accountant or; B) Jane is an accountant who plays jazz in her free time. The answer is A, though you’d be surprised how many get it wrong. B can never, ever be more likely than A. It can, hypothetically, be just as likely, but it can never be more likely.

The way this applies to the issue of free-will purpose is by asking the same question: Which is more likely: A) We feel we have free-will and purpose, or; B) We feel we have free-will and purpose and we actually do. The answer is the same as above: B cannot be more likely than A, and, in this case, it can’t be equally likely as we don’t know the probability of B beyond that it isn’t 100%. The point being that the proposition “we feel we have free will” is more likely because the ontological claim to free will and purpose is adding on to that proposition. So the experiential claim plus the ontological claim is less likely than just the experiential claim… unless you can think of how the world would be different if the ontological claim was true VS if it was false.

Someone who thinks freedom and purpose are illusions has a metaphysics of deterministic materialism. I would claim that this is an example of a metaphysics blinding a true believer from seeing evidence contrary to it.

FWIW, I don’t really have an opinion on this one way or another. I think the whole question of free-will and purpose is one of those things philosophers like to ask that has no real-world meaning (ie, unanswerable questions). I also don’t think the whole “lack of freedom/purpose = deterministic materialism” is as simple as you make out as it really depends on precisely how one defines these terms. There are plenty of writings out there that have attempted to reconcile determinism and free will. One many-worlds faq offers this brief hypothesis. There’s also a whole branch of philosophy called compatibalism that thinks free-will and determinism are, well, compatible. Daniel Dennett has written a lot on this in books like Consciousness Explained, Elbow Room, and Freedom Evolves.

The claim that our freedom can be reduced to random chance and chemistry, that our freedom is an "illusion", needs evidence before I, for one, will accept it.

Perhaps “illusion” was a bad word. I don’t mean that freedom would be an illusion like, say, how magicians use sleight of hand illusions. What I mean is that it’s possible we mistake an intuitive feeling of freedom with actual (ie, ontological) freedom. It’s why I ask above about how the world would be different and all that.

Because the universe is not a deterministic machine.

You do realize that the most popular interpretations of QM today (not just MW) are deterministic, right?

Regarding how a metaphysics changes for an individual, I've already mentioned the crisis model used by Eldredge-Gould called "punctuated equilibrium". Basically, things stay in equilibrium until that is punctuated by crises and then change occurs.

I don’t see this as being an adequate description of how scientific beliefs change. I mean, I guess you could call Einstein’s eclipse experiment that proved Relativity a “punctuating crisis” for Newtonian physics, but it would only be on a metaphoric level. In general, I just don't see scientists so dogmatic when it comes to holding on to beliefs in the face of new, overwhelming evidence as do, eg, the religious.

[YesNo]

Right, so I was correct when I said that “by taking NDEs at face value” what you mean is “accepting that people are seeing into the afterlife.” I already stated that such an interpretation is EVERY BIT as much of an “explanation” as saying “oxygen deprivation” is.

Yes, it can be viewed as an interpretation. However, it is an interpretation that takes the evidence at face value.

What’s more, we actually do know a lot about how the brain behaves (and what people experience) when they are deprived of oxygen and they tend to mirror many aspects of many NDEs; is that just a coincidence? I don’t know why you equate seeking materialistic explanations of NDEs (the same materialistic explanations that have explained many, many things people once thought were supernatural) with “sanitizing the evidence.” People are generally quite ignorant about how their own brains function, so if you go through an experience that is traumatic for your brain, why is it more natural to assume that the experience was supernatural rather than neurological? How can you rule the latter out?

The only thing I want to point out is the use of "we know" and then the complementary part about other people being ignorant. Who is this "we"? It is an argument from authority and not evidence, like a modern clergy setting itself up against the laity.

Ugh, you still have no understanding of what MW actually is. MW does not “add on to” the “standard” (lol) “Copenhagen interpretation.” If anything, it’s Copenhagen that “adds on to” the much simpler interpretation of MW, and needs to add more if it hopes to reconcile itself with General Relativity and Locality.

The Copenhagen interpretation is the standard interpretation. It is also a positivist interpretation, or one that tries to offer minimal metaphysics. If it gets nonlocality and uncertainty, it faces the facts. It doesn't rush to save its metaphysics from those facts.

Which may fit nicely into your metaphysics, but has no actual, you know, evidence to support it. It’s just a blatant example of the Wishful Thinking fallacy.

I agree. It has no evidence that you accept to support it. I don't expect it to.

From my end, many worlds has no evidence that I accept to support it either.

Yes, let’s look back 2300 years for insights into modern cosmology; you know, back before they even knew the Earth moved around the sun.

The materialistic metaphysics started with Leucippus and Democritus about 2500 years ago. With quantum physics that metaphysics has come to an end. I'm just looking for a different Greek to reference. The reality might be different from what Aristotle claimed.

Let’s assume for a moment that we DO live in a deterministic universe where we have no ACTUAL, ontological free-will or purpose. Now, let’s assume in this universe that we are given finite, fallible brains that found it evolutionary advantageous to equate their ignorance of these deterministic process with “free-will,” and equate what those processes lead them to do as “purpose.” Now, how would that world be DIFFERENT than the world we find ourselves in? Similarly, you can do this while supposing that we live in an indeterminate universe where there is ACTUAL, ontological free-will and purpose. AFAICT, there’s no difference (at least superficially/experientially) in these two hypothetical worlds and the world we experience now.

The difference would be this. A deterministic universe where all change was caused by chance and chemistry where there was no choice nor goal-orientation would be lifeless. Our experience would be nothing because we wouldn't be here at all. In a universe that allowed choice and goal-orientation throughout it would allow life to exist.

The reason for the lifelessness of a deterministic universe can be derived from the combinatorial explosion of possibilities that chance would have to have available for life to exist. Since life exists, that would be another argument, beside the uncertainty of quantum physics, that the universe is not deterministic.

The anthropic argument counters and says, well, just by chance we happen to be here. There is some chance, no matter how small, and we lucked out. That's fine, but we seem to be lucking out all the time because every post we make, assuming it is by chance, is not likely. And yet we still have the conversation.

Now, given that there’s no difference, the question then becomes which world is more likely and how do we determine that? The answer is found an old favorite known to laymen’s as Occam’s Razor, or, perhaps more technically/mathematically as The Conjunction Fallacy. To explain this, answer this illustrative question: Which of these two propositions is more likely: A) Jane is an accountant or; B) Jane is an accountant who plays jazz in her free time. The answer is A, though you’d be surprised how many get it wrong. B can never, ever be more likely than A. It can, hypothetically, be just as likely, but it can never be more likely.

I don't agree that there would be no difference, however, let's look at the situation like this.

A) Jane is an accountant because she chose to study accounting and had a goal to finish her degree and get a job.

B) Jane is an accountant because the cells of her body were positioned by chance to appear at an office where she by chance successfully can perform an accounting job.

Which is more likely?

I understand where you are going with adding an additional constraint on a proposition. That should make the proposition more unlikely. I don't see how it helps clarify the free-will and goal-orientation argument.

FWIW, I don’t really have an opinion on this one way or another. I think the whole question of free-will and purpose is one of those things philosophers like to ask that has no real-world meaning (ie, unanswerable questions). I also don’t think the whole “lack of freedom/purpose = deterministic materialism” is as simple as you make out as it really depends on precisely how one defines these terms. There are plenty of writings out there that have attempted to reconcile determinism and free will. One many-worlds faq offers this brief hypothesis. There’s also a whole branch of philosophy called compatibalism that thinks free-will and determinism are, well, compatible. Daniel Dennett has written a lot on this in books like Consciousness Explained, Elbow Room, and Freedom Evolves.

I've seen some of these. The most recent essay I've read is Harris, "Free Will", who summarized Dennett's position.

You do realize that the most popular interpretations of QM today (not just MW) are deterministic, right?

There are many interpretations of quantum mechanics. I was recently reading Victor Stenger's "The Unconscious Quantum" whose position might be considered to be the opposite of Rupert Sheldrake's position in "The Science Delusion". It is from Sheldrake that I found the idea of the "cosmic egg".

I don’t see this as being an adequate description of how scientific beliefs change. I mean, I guess you could call Einstein’s eclipse experiment that proved Relativity a “punctuating crisis” for Newtonian physics, but it would only be on a metaphoric level. In general, I just don't see scientists so dogmatic when it comes to holding on to beliefs in the face of new, overwhelming evidence as do, eg, the religious.

Thomas Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" describes a similar process: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Str...ic_Revolutions

[YesNo]

1) Dawkins talks about “purpose” constantly in “The Selfish Gene” (if memory serves, it’s been a couple of decades since I read it). I assume Dawkins was sophisticated enough to be speaking metaphorically – genes don’t “want” or “try” to do anything. Nonetheless, I think his choice of language was a mistake (from a literary perspective) on his part.

I've noticed that also. The selfish gene concept can't remove itself from purpose. If it had to rely on nothing but chance, no life would occur at all.

What I wonder is, if genes can have purpose, why not people?

2) I like Haught’s “layered explanations” of causation. The ‘scientific explanation” (“one answer is to say it’s boiling because H2O molecules are moving around excitedly, making a transition from the liquid state to the gaseous state.”) is incomplete and trivial. The water isn’t boiling “because” molecules are moving around: we call molecules moving around, “boiling”. It’s merely a coincidence of a state of molecular motion and the word we have chosen to describe it. “Because” (in normal English) generally means something else – for example, the “cause” of something can be the intentional act of a conscious agent (the wife putting the kettle on the stove). Of course it is correct that by definition H2O molecules moving around constitutes “boiling” – but I think the word “constitutes better describes that relationship than the word “cause”.

I also liked Haught's layered explanations. The water would not be boiling if Haught's wife had not turned on the heat. Can someone reduce why she turned on the heat to chance and chemistry? Is she not allowed any free will whatsoever? Not even the free will to tell Haught to turn the water on himself?

[MorpheusSandman]

However, the “conditions” necessary for water to boil are infinite.

I guess if you consider having to account for all of cosmology, ie, why the laws of the universe and Earth are what they are, then, yes, the “conditions” would be approaching the infinite (at least to our finite brains). However, I think we can agree that on a scale from just stating intention to trying to lay out every particle in the universe, there are descriptions that are more and less complete in regards to explaining the boiling process. I still think the point stands that Haught’s “layered explanations” aren’t really “layered explanations” so much as they're either answers to different questions or very incomplete answers as to what’s actually happening.

As far as the shaky history of science, of course science progresses, in general (it sometimes regresses, too). However, my basic point was that we are still probably wrong about many things we consider to be “scientific facts”. I’ll grant it’s the best we can do – but it’s no guarantee.

The fact that the best we can do (science) is “no guarantee” is why I refer to the website “lesswrong,” so often; sure, maybe we can’t ever reach absolute, eternal certainty, but we do have measurable ways in which we can be “less wrong” about how the universe functions. Quantum physics is less wrong than Relativity, Relativity is less wrong than Newtonian physics, Newtonian physics is less wrong than everything before it. I don’t see something like that progression reversing, or us finding out that the entire field of physics has been completely wrong for the last few hundred years.

FWIW, the fact that science has been wrong about things it considered “facts” is probably why you’ll find that scientists are quite cautious, if not suspicious, of calling things “facts.” We tend to have scientific “laws” and “theories” and “interpretations” more so than “facts.” Laws are meant to merely describe how things occur (though even these descriptions can also have hidden theoretical assumptions), Theories are meant to explain why things occur (and have substantial evidence to support them), and interpretations are like theories without the testing (see the various interps of quantum physics).

to my point about “understanding reality”, it’s not just literature that can help us understand things, it’s also non-scientific academic fields, like history. History is one of the “humanities”, not one of the sciences. Eye witnesses testify in court. Historical accounts, like eye witness testimony, are not “scientific” – but surely they help us “understand reality”.

I’m not sure what you mean by “eye witnesses testimony isn’t scientific;” Eye witnesses are someone relating a reconstructed cognitive experience based on past sensory input; That process happens all the time in science (though there are usually means of repeating the experience). Yes, history is a whole other arena with its own set of epistemological problems, but even it shares a lot of the same general ideas with science on how to prove (or provide evidence) for one version of history over another. They’re even starting to incorporate Bayes’ Theory into historical studies.

Why not? Is “experiential subjectivity” unreal? Also, isn’t one postmodern concept that we cannot HELP but confuse our experiential subjectivity with objective reality (or that there is no objective reality)?

I provided two links that explained why not: One and Two. Read those (and perhaps some of the subsequent links on those pages) and get back to me. I’m not claiming that “experiential subjectivity” is unreal, I’m claiming that people incorrectly make a leap from experiential subjectivity to statements about external reality, and that’s what should be avoided. Yes, postmodernism is (a lot, anyway) about the fractured natured of multiple, subjective experiences. However, anyone that argues from that to “there is no objective reality” is just once again confusing the map with the territory. We actually CAN keep from mistaking our subjectivity with reality, the same way we can check a map’s accuracy by comparing it with the territory it’s trying to describe.

[Ecurb]

I'll agree that we can check a map's accuracy; avoiding mistaking (to phrase it slightly differently) our subjective perception of reality with reality is more difficult. We can't perceive reality EXCEPT through our senses, which ARE our subjective perceptions. (This isn't particularly profound, of course.) When we check the map, we compare it not to "reality" (whatever that is) but to our perceptions of reality, or, perhaps, to our collective perceptions of reality. WE can't approach "reality" EXCEPT as mediated by our senses.

The only reason I mention eye witnesses is that they (it seems to me) are analagous to historical accounts, whereas forensic evidence (DNA, fingerprints, physical evidence) is analagous to science. Of course there are gray areas, and scientists "witness" the results of their experiments, etc., etc. In general, though, history departments are listed as Humanities, not Sciences.

[MorpheusSandman]

I'll agree that we can check a map's accuracy; avoiding mistaking (to phrase it slightly differently) our subjective perception of reality with reality is more difficult. We can't perceive reality EXCEPT through our senses, which ARE our subjective perceptions.

It's true that our senses aren't perfect, however, the only assumption one has to make is that our perceptions change if reality changes. As long as that assumption is correct, then we can have a model of reality in our heads (the map), and then test that map to see if what we've drawn on it reflects our experience of the territory (reality). EG, if I believe that if I flip the light switch a few feet away from me a light will come on, that's a statement about my cognitive "map" of reality. The way I test this is to flip the switch and see if I see (sense) the light come on. If my belief/map is correct, then it should correctly predict what I will experience. It's implied that in every map/territory discussion that the map is our beliefs and the territory is our sense-experience predicted by those beliefs. Lesswrong says it better than I can:

The map is not the territory metaphorically illustrates the differences between belief and reality. The phrase was coined by Alfred Korzybski. Our perception of the world is being generated by our brain and can be considered as a 'map' of reality written in neural patterns. Reality exists outside our mind but we can construct models of this 'territory' based on what we glimpse through our senses.

The metaphor is useful for illustrating several ideas in a more intuitive way:

Scribbling on the map does not change the territory: If you change what you believe about an object, that is a change in the pattern of neurons in your brain. The real object will not change because of this edit. Granted you could act on the world to bring about changes to it but you can't do that by simply believing it to be a different way. For example, you could send a ball to the other side of a field by kicking it but you cannot send the ball across the field by believing it is on the other side of the field (unless you are connected to a machine that scans your brain an kicks the ball when you believe it's on the other side, but let's not be pedantic). The strategy that normally gives most control over reality is one where the 'map' is aligned to match the 'territory' as closely as possible. This way you can create accurate models and predict what will happen as a consequence of your actions. eg: If you know where the ball is, and you know what will happen if you kick it, and you want it on the other side of the field you can decide to kick it to achieve the desired end state of ball being across the field. Wishing the ball across the field would be futile. For some strange reasons (but explainable at least in principle, nothing is strange if you truly understand it), humans are wired to sometimes let their beliefs slip into what they would like to believe instead of what the evidence suggests. That is like erasing a mountain off a map because you would like to pass there or drawing an oasis on the map in a desert because you would like some water.

The map is a separate object from the territory and the map exists as an object inside the territory: The analogy encourages us to look from a frame of reference other than from the inside outward and hopefully realize that not only do we cause things to happen, and things cause other things to happen, but also things have caused us to be the way we are. For example, Why is the sky so blue and beautiful? It must have been made like that just for me. It was made beautiful so that I would enjoy looking at it. Except it's the other way around. The sky was not made to fit our sense of beauty, the sky was here before us, we have a sense of beauty that evolved to fit the sky because the sky happened to be blue! In a sense the sky caused us to be what we are (creatures who mostly agree that a blue sky is beautiful).

[cafolini]

It's true that our senses aren't perfect, however, the only assumption one has to make is that our perceptions change if reality changes. As long as that assumption is correct, then we can have a model of reality in our heads (the map), and then test that map to see if what we've drawn on it reflects our experience of the territory (reality). EG, if I believe that if I flip the light switch a few feet away from me a light will come on, that's a statement about my cognitive "map" of reality. The way I test this is to flip the switch and see if I see (sense) the light come on. If my belief/map is correct, then it should correctly predict what I will experience. It's implied that in every map/territory discussion that the map is our beliefs and the territory is our sense-experience predicted by those beliefs. Lesswrong says it better than I can:

I think our senses are indeed perfect. Otherwise we can have no God.

[MorpheusSandman]

I think our senses are indeed perfect. Otherwise we can have no God.

You should watch the NatGeo show Brain Games. It mostly takes what researchers have learned about how the human brain/senses function and makes it into an entertaining, half-hour show that's trying to perform the public service of telling people just how stupid they are. But if the Modus Ponens Logical argument you're making is that without perfect senses, there is no God, then, congratulations! You just proved there's no God! Anyone that believes our senses are perfect knows nil about neuroscience and sense perception.

[The Atheist]

I think our senses are indeed perfect. Otherwise we can have no God.

Ah, so that explains why I have no god! I make no claims as to perfection.

Do all theists have perfect senses, or just the god's chosen?

[cafolini]

Ah, so that explains why I have no god! I make no claims as to perfection.

Do all theists have perfect senses, or just the god's chosen?

This has nothing to do with theists. They were all atheists long before you came across the word "atheist." How could they otherwise know so much? LOL

This has to do with equality before The Lord. Otherwise any god would be evil to us.

[Ecurb]

"Language has a tyranny on thought." -- The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. I understand your point about the map and the territory, Morpheus, but it's not that simple. Since language (and this is just one example) is akin to "the map", if it influences how we perceive "the territory" as Sapir and Whorf suggest, then, although the map is still "not the territory" the distinction between the map and the territory (or, at least, the territory as we perceive it to the best of our abilities) is not absolute either. The map (language) influences our perception of the territory, and we can only know the territory through our perception of it. In this case, although scribbling on the map (i.e. developing new words or new grammars) doesn't change the territory, it changes how we see the territory.

[cafolini]

"Language has a tyranny on thought." -- The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. I understand your point about the map and the territory, Morpheus, but it's not that simple. Since language (and this is just one example) is akin the "the map", if it influences how we perceive "the territory" as Sapir and Whorf suggest, then, although the map is still "not the territory" the distinction between the map and the territory (or, at least, the territory as we perceive it to the best of our abilities) is not absolute either. The map (language) influences our perception of the territory, and we can only know the territory through our perception of it. In this case, although scribbling on the map (i.e. developing new words or new grammars) doesn't change the territory, it changes how we see the territory.

Life is not the one we lived, but the one we remember. ~ G. G. Marquez

[Cioran]

Taking an NDE at face value means that I accept it as what those experiencing it claimed it was. I don't have to explain it by saying it was some oxygen deprivation or whatever because it causes no problem on face value for my metaphysics.

So, IOW, you take an NDE at face value because you want it to be evidence of an afterlife, and blithely ignore all the evidence of its naturalistic cause?

For others the very existence of these experiences is evidence their metaphysics is wrong.

Totally false. We can and have duplicated the NDE experience through natural means.

They must sanitize the evidence or else change their metaphysics.

As noted, NDE's can be naturally induced in subjects who are not at death.

To handle this mathematically, I would do the same thing that the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics has done. I would accept all of the evidence, and mathematics, that the standard Copenhagen interpretation has already provided for me and then I would add on to that the additional interpretation.

The many worlds formulation is the only interpretation of QM that does NOT "add on" something inexplicable to the equation. It is the most parsimonious and elegant solution to the ontology of QM available.

What the cosmic egg metaphor emphasizes is that the universe is not a deterministic machine, but contains purpose. This is different from "intelligent design" which assumes the universe is a machine that needs to be designed. Another way of looking at the difference is to consider Aristotle's four causes: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes. The deterministic machine view of the universe only uses the first two of Aristotle's causes. The cosmic egg concept allows all four to operate.

What makes you think some metaphor that you happen to like in any way reflects reality? Wishful thinking?

[Cioran]

I've noticed that also. The selfish gene concept can't remove itself from purpose. If it had to rely on nothing but chance, no life would occur at all.

What I wonder is, if genes can have purpose, why not people?

Genes do not have a purpose. Where did you ever get this ridiculous idea?

[YesNo]

Genes do not have a purpose. Where did you ever get this ridiculous idea?

I got it from Dawkins. The "selfish gene" is a gene with purpose, because it is selfish. Of course, this selfishness is a metaphor, but for Dawkins to resort to metaphor is a sign his ideas aren't clear and implies that a materialism that claims to be able to reduce everything to chance and physics-chemistry is not true.

The idea that Ecurb expressed, and I agree with, is also summarized in Rupert Sheldrake's The Science Delusion, p. 164:

What Dawkins does is to project on to the DNA molecules the purposive vital factors of vitalism, trying to squeeze the soul into chemical genes, which are thereby endowed with instructions, plans, purposes and intentions they cannot possibly have. He admits that these are metaphors, adding, 'Incidentally, there is of course no "architect".' But despite occasional disclaimers, the entire force of his argument depends on anthropocentric metaphors and molecules that have come to life. He is a vitalist in molecular clothing.

Sheldrake prefers a model of "morphic resonance".