Free will?

[Ecurb]

Then, to be terse, you believe that all human activities are the results of actions, observations, events, or whatever that preceded the actions, or do you?

Certainly the idea of subatomic particles having free will is absurd, but is this how the quantum level of existence applies the macro-world?

I think that the extent to which all human activities are "the result of" sub-atomic physical reactions is irrelevant to whether humans have "free will", based on the standard meaning of "free will". Although it may seem as if "freedom" of choice requires at least two possible choices, I think this is a mistake. This is clarified by looking at past actions. Once one has put on one's hat, one can no longer not have put on one's hat. The notion that the decision to put on a hat is based on determining factors, and that if we understood those factors perectly we would know what "caused" the hat-wearing and be able to predict it accurately may be correct, but it is not germaine to whether the hat was "freely" donned. After all, once the person has put on the hat we know that he cannot choose NOT to put on a hat that day. There is no option. Nonetheless, we can say that he freely chose to put on the hat (despite the fact that it would be impossible for him to have made any other choice).

"The result of" or "the cause of" has a particular meaning. When we refer to a "cause" we refer to a handle we can manipulate. If a car spins out on a curve and crashes, the "cause" of the crash differs depending on who is looking at the crash. To the driver, the crash was caused by going to fast around the turn. To the road engineer, the cause was insufficient banking on the curve. To the tire-maker, the cause was a lack of adhesion between the tires and the pavement. When we perform a chemistry experiment, we call the variable (the chemical we added) the "cause" of the explosion -- even though a myriad of non-variable conditions (like oxygen in the air) are necessary for the explosion.

We say the diseases are "caused" by germs. But some people get sick when exposed to germs, and others do not. So germs (in and of themselves) don't "cause" disease. Instead, because we can kill germs with antibiotics or by refrigerating and pasteurizing food, germs represent a handle we can manipulate to prevent or treat disease.

Until we can manipulate the quantum reactions from which thoughts and behaviors result, they don't "cause" our actions, given our normal use of that word.

[Sea]

I think that the extent to which all human activities are "the result of" sub-atomic physical reactions is irrelevant to whether humans have "free will", based on the standard meaning of "free will". Although it may seem as if "freedom" of choice requires at least two possible choices, I think this is a mistake. This is clarified by looking at past actions. Once one has put on one's hat, one can no longer not have put on one's hat. The notion that the decision to put on a hat is based on determining factors, and that if we understood those factors perectly we would know what "caused" the hat-wearing and be able to predict it accurately may be correct, but it is not germaine to whether the hat was "freely" donned. After all, once the person has put on the hat we know that he cannot choose NOT to put on a hat that day. There is no option. Nonetheless, we can say that he freely chose to put on the hat (despite the fact that it would be impossible for him to have made any other choice).

It seems like your compatibilism would be better outlined in terms of internal determinants, such as desires, emotions, thoughts, etc... and external determinants such as threats, prison, and moral and social obligations. Then a person would not be free from his determinants, but a will would be free as long as the person is not externally constrained.

[PeterL]

Sea has an excellent point. If someone selects a hat to wear, then there were internal reasons for that, and those reasons were determined by something that preceded the decision. The chain of cause and effect that led to the wearing of a hat begn at birth for that person, and there would have been earlier causes that led to that birth. Simply because we are not aware of a cause does not mean that there was no cause.

[Ecurb]

Sea has an excellent point. If someone selects a hat to wear, then there were internal reasons for that, and those reasons were determined by something that preceded the decision. The chain of cause and effect that led to the wearing of a hat begn at birth for that person, and there would have been earlier causes that led to that birth. Simply because we are not aware of a cause does not mean that there was no cause.

It seems I am not making myself clear. Of course there are preconditions for anything we do, but are they “causes”? As I suggested earlier, a ‘cause’ is generally used to mean some handle that we can manipulate. From a philosophy article I once read, here are the three standard definitions of “cause”:

1) A “cause” is the free and intentional act of a conscious and responsible agent. (i.e. if you shoot someone, you cause his death).

2) A “cause” is the handle we manipulate to create an effect. (i.e. if x+existing conditions = y, and x can be manipulated, we say x causes y) By this definition, if a car skids going around a curve, the "cause" may be the speed of the car (to the driver), the lack of banking on the turn (to the road engineer), or the lack of traction in the tires (to the tire maker). This definition can also be used by experimental scientists.

3) In theoretical science, a cause is something which is necessary in both existence and operation to the thing it is causing, For the rationalist, x causes y if x is an "insight" into y, so you could say the first two sides of a triangle "cause" the dimensions of the third side. For the empiricist, a cause is an observed conjunction -- all x are followed by y.

Fate vs. Free Will is a standard religious argument, based on the disagreement about whether an omniscient God contradicts the notion of free will. Obviously, an omniscient God (who may resemble an omniscient physicist of the future) will know whether the man will put his hat on before he puts his hat on. Some people would say that this contradicts the notion of free will, but I disagree. We don’t mean by “free will” that we didn’t “choose” one action over another based on some criteria (whether a conscious reason behind our choice, or some physical interaction of molecules in our brains); we mean that we are unconstrained in our choice by the forceful intervention of other people. That’s how we use the word “free”. A person who is “free” is one who is not “enslaved”. Of course such a person is still constrained by the laws of physics (he can’t fly by flapping his arms, for example), but we don’t generally say he is not “free” as a result of those laws.

We can define words any way we want, but we should agree about how we are defining them. I’m merely suggesting that even if the laws of physics are utterly determining, they do not contradict free will, as the words are generally used. Peter suggests they do (I think) using the 3rd definition of “cause” listed above. If everything has a “cause”, all of our poor hat-wearer’s actions have a “cause” – if we were just more knowledgeable, the conditions present at the Big Bang “caused” the donning of the hat just like the first two sides of a triangle “cause” the third side. In other words, such conditions might be necessary and sufficient in existence and operation to predict our hero’s donning of a hat.

I grant this possibility – I just don’t think that it contradicts “free will”, as the words are normally used, especially in this world where we are a long, long way from being able to make such accurate predictions.

[PeterL]

It seems I am not making myself clear. Of course there are preconditions for anything we do, but are they “causes”? As I suggested earlier, a ‘cause’ is generally used to mean some handle that we can manipulate. From a philosophy article I once read, here are the three standard definitions of “cause”:

1) A “cause” is the free and intentional act of a conscious and responsible agent. (i.e. if you shoot someone, you cause his death).

2) A “cause” is the handle we manipulate to create an effect. (i.e. if x+existing conditions = y, and x can be manipulated, we say x causes y) By this definition, if a car skids going around a curve, the "cause" may be the speed of the car (to the driver), the lack of banking on the turn (to the road engineer), or the lack of traction in the tires (to the tire maker). This definition can also be used by experimental scientists.

3) In theoretical science, a cause is something which is necessary in both existence and operation to the thing it is causing, For the rationalist, x causes y if x is an "insight" into y, so you could say the first two sides of a triangle "cause" the dimensions of the third side. For the empiricist, a cause is an observed conjunction -- all x are followed by y.

cause
[kawz] Show IPA noun, verb, caused, caus·ing. noun
1. a person or thing that acts, happens, or exists in such a way that some specific thing happens as a result; the producer of an effect: You have been the cause of much anxiety. What was the cause of the accident?
2. the reason or motive for some human action: The good news was a cause for rejoicing.
3. good or sufficient reason: to complain without cause; to be dismissed for cause.
4. Law.
a. a ground of legal action; the matter over which a person goes to law.
b. a case for judicial decision.
5. any subject of discussion or debate.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/cause?s=t

It appears that we are working from different definitions. I have been using "cause" under definition 1.

Fate vs. Free Will is a standard religious argument, based on the disagreement about whether an omniscient God contradicts the notion of free will. Obviously, an omniscient God (who may resemble an omniscient physicist of the future) will know whether the man will put his hat on before he puts his hat on. Some people would say that this contradicts the notion of free will, but I disagree. We don’t mean by “free will” that we didn’t “choose” one action over another based on some criteria (whether a conscious reason behind our choice, or some physical interaction of molecules in our brains); we mean that we are unconstrained in our choice by the forceful intervention of other people. That’s how we use the word “free”. A person who is “free” is one who is not “enslaved”. Of course such a person is still constrained by the laws of physics (he can’t fly by flapping his arms, for example), but we don’t generally say he is not “free” as a result of those laws.

free will
noun
1. free and independent choice; voluntary decision: You took on the responsibility of your own free will.
2. Philosophy . the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces.
http://dictionary.reference.com/brow...=true&o=100074
I think that you are working with a very restricted opinion of what "free will" might be. Please note definition 2 from Dictionary.com.

We can define words any way we want, but we should agree about how we are defining them. I’m merely suggesting that even if the laws of physics are utterly determining, they do not contradict free will, as the words are generally used. Peter suggests they do (I think) using the 3rd definition of “cause” listed above. If everything has a “cause”, all of our poor hat-wearer’s actions have a “cause” – if we were just more knowledgeable, the conditions present at the Big Bang “caused” the donning of the hat just like the first two sides of a triangle “cause” the third side. In other words, such conditions might be necessary and sufficient in existence and operation to predict our hero’s donning of a hat.

I grant this possibility – I just don’t think that it contradicts “free will”, as the words are normally used, especially in this world where we are a long, long way from being able to make such accurate predictions.

It would violate free will, if you had a more inclusive definition of free will, such as the one that I copied from dictionary.com.

[YesNo]

That, is exactly what killed Heisenberg's cat. I don't think there has been any notable work in regard to what causes nuclei to decay at a given point, but I think that it would be determinable, if one could make enough observations of suittable nuclei.

I was looking at the Wikipedia article on determinism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism, and it appears that radioactive decay is evidence for indeterminism. To have determinism one would need to be able to state initial conditions from which any future or past state of the universe can be derived. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle would claim that such an initial state cannot be defined.

Therefore, determinism is not scientifically supported. The evidence for quantum mechanics implies that determinism is empirically false.

I would go so far as to say that it makes no sense to accept any theological conclusion that any God is able to create such an initial state even from outside the universe. No such initial state upon which one can have materialistic determinism is possible.

This non-determinism is a ground on which free will can exist within our universe. However, only something able to make a conscious choice has free will. A computer making a decision based on a random seed is not free. A virus deciding to move in one direction rather than another might be, if it is conscious. Perhaps even an electron deciding on spin up or down might be as well, if it is conscious.

Some will claim that our own consciousness is determined by our material bodies, in particular, our brains. For these people, it doesn't matter whether quantum mechanics presents an indeterministic world, we are still determined by our brains. I think that is false based on the evidence provided by near-death experiences and out-of-body experiences. The most that one can say about our brains is that they filter our consciousness. Our brains do not determine, nor create, our consciousness. With that I conclude that within this neurological filtering we can exercise, and legitimately experience ourselves as having, free will.

[PeterL]

I was looking at the Wikipedia article on determinism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism, and it appears that radioactive decay is evidence for indeterminism. To have determinism one would need to be able to state initial conditions from which any future or past state of the universe can be derived. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle would claim that such an initial state cannot be defined.
Therefore, determinism is not scientifically supported. The evidence for quantum mechanics implies that determinism is empirically false.

If the decay of a nucleus cannot be predict, then you are right and determinism has been demonstrated as false. While the prediction of decay has not happened, I believe that it could be done but not with today's technology and theories. Schrodinger's cat sounds impressive, but it an anecdotal proof.

I would go so far as to say that it makes no sense to accept any theological conclusion that any God is able to create such an initial state even from outside the universe. No such initial state upon which one can have materialistic determinism is possible.

I won't disagree here, but it quite conceivable that some the initial state might have been known to some entity, whether God or Goddess makes no difference), but determining whether that happened is far outside human possibilities at this time.

This non-determinism is a ground on which free will can exist within our universe. However, only something able to make a conscious choice has free will. A computer making a decision based on a random seed is not free. A virus deciding to move in one direction rather than another might be, if it is conscious. Perhaps even an electron deciding on spin up or down might be as well, if it is conscious.

Some will claim that our own consciousness is determined by our material bodies, in particular, our brains. For these people, it doesn't matter whether quantum mechanics presents an indeterministic world, we are still determined by our brains. I think that is false based on the evidence provided by near-death experiences and out-of-body experiences. The most that one can say about our brains is that they filter our consciousness. Our brains do not determine, nor create, our consciousness. With that I conclude that within this neurological filtering we can exercise, and legitimately experience ourselves as having, free will.

It is a matter of determining the initial state. If it is found that radioactive decay and a few other events that are thought to be completely random, are in fact predictable, if one knows the initial state of the atom, then determinism rules. As far as human consciousness goes, stack together DNA of a particular maodel with a given set of training and experience, and you will get whatever decision you see. It is easier to determine "conscious" decisions than it is to predict quantum events, because of the scale. I remain agnostic on the matter, because it appears to be that things can be determined on the macro scale, but prediction may be impossible on the quantum. But that may just ba a matter of what we can detect. That is why I am going to look around to see whether anyone has tried to inspect nuclei so closely that the conditions that precede decay can be discerned.

[osho]

What is free. Will? There is no free will and all our wills or behaviors, moods or patterns of thinking, speaking, moving, and particular sets of works have some past, and we do what we do just because some forces, something inside us command us to do what we do. We do some acts in response to the society we live in, in response to some external social or natural or cultural or religious,or any other forces and what we do result or emanate from what our body or mind want us to do. We are enslaved by our own bodily demands. If we indulge in acts of sex not just only out of our desire for propagations, not just out of our physical or emotional needs or impulses but because all these things in unison, in tandem drive us to do. Sex for example does not originate in our penis, it originates first in our head and in quick response to the command of our head our bodily parts get stimulated.

Therefore we are not doing things out of free will an our action is not always at our command and they are to a large extent in response to our social, environmental, cultural, economic conditions or forces

[PeterL]

Therefore we are not doing things out of free will an our action is not always at our command and they are to a large extent in response to our social, environmental, cultural, economic conditions or forces

This is where I tended to come out also, but there are some reasons to think that humans may have some freedom in what they think, even though their actions are determined by things outside of themselves.

[Ecurb]

It would violate free will, if you had a more inclusive definition of free will, such as the one that I copied from dictionary.com.

Not so. If there is some inorganic "cause" ("(a) thing that acts, happens, or exists in such a way that some specific thing happens as a result") to our will, we would still have to deal with the word "free". First of all, I don't think some unidentified and unknown confluence of subatomic events is normally seen as a "cause" for human behavior, so I stand by my philosophically cribbed definition as an accurate description of the way in which the word is normally used (although, of course, you are using it differently). It is possible that (as with germs being the so called "cause" of disease) future scientific developments will alter our perspective on this, but we are nowhere near that reductionist nirvana. I suppose you could offer a non-reductionist approach -- Marxism, for example. The economic infrastructure determines the remainder of culture, which determines individual personality, which determines ("causes") behavior. But we aren't there yet, either.

Second, does anyone use the word "free" so that "freedom" is limited by the inorganic "cause" of neutrinos (or whatever they are) spinning in our brains. I don't think so. The notion that (due to the laws of physics) all people are as lacking in "freedom" as slaves or convicts contradicts all normal usage of the word "free". Only when these words are used metaphorically ("he was a slave to his love for Juliet") are "freedom" and "bondage" used to suggest a freedom FROM the laws of nature. Of course nobody is free from the laws of physics (unless supernatural beings are). Therefore, if the word "free" is to mean anything as used in normal, English speech, it must mean something other than "unbounded by the laws of phsyics".

The notion that the laws of physics are omnipotent (determine all things, even human behavior) is a reasonable one (although no more reasonable than the notion that an omnipotent God determines all things). But it is a philosophical claim, not a scientific one. It is also of little relevance to human moral philosophy, behavior, or culture. Even granting this claim, "freedom" still has significant meaning, both in moral terms and in objective terms. It is (perhaps) a convenient fiction, but it is the best we can do under our current circumstances.

Here's an example. Suppose you are playing draw poker. You hold four clubs, and discard one, hoping to draw another club. There are 9 remaining clubs among the 47 unseen cards. You think, "I have a 9/47ths chance of filling my flush." This is, of course, ridiculous (from an omniscient perspective).You have either have a 100% chance of filling the flush, or a zero% chance. The cards have already been shuffled. An omniscient observer (or even a non-omnisicent one with x-ray vision) would know which card the dealer was going to deal next. Nonetheless, the poker player who won't accept the 9/47 odds might be correct (in one way) but will lose in poker, because 9/47ths is the best he can do given his imperfect knowledge -- the order of the deck is NOT random, but from the player's perspective, it is random. Free will is the best we can do with our current state of knowledge, just as 9/47ths is the best the poker player can do.


"Free Will --2. Philosophy . the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces." This definition is confusing and ambiguous. Conduct can express "personal choice" AND be "determined by physical forces". The word "simply" is what makes the definition ambiguous. Just as the odds of drawing a club are 9/47ths from one perspective, and either 0% or 100% from another, "personal choice" and "determined by physical forces" can BOTH be correct ways to look at human behavior. My whole point is that they are not mutually exclusive.

[PeterL]

"Free Will --2. Philosophy . the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces." This definition is confusing and ambiguous. Conduct can express "personal choice" AND be "determined by physical forces". The word "simply" is what makes the definition ambiguous. Just as the odds of drawing a club are 9/47ths from one perspective, and either 0% or 100% from another, "personal choice" and "determined by physical forces" can BOTH be correct ways to look at human behavior. My whole point is that they are not mutually exclusive.

I think that you assertion here rests on a definition of "personal choice". I think that you are confusing actual probablity with overall outcomes of a situation.

I fail to understand how two antithetical statements can be anything except mutually exclusive. Are you suggesting that an individual would personally choose an end result that was determined by forces outside himself and over which he had no control? That is analogous to Schrodinger's cat being able to decide whether the radiation that will cause it to die is released.

[Ecurb]

It's a matter of perspective. What is meant by "no control"? The poker player uses the odds of drawing a club as a convenient fiction to determine his tactics. Similarly, the individual "decides" whether to put his hat on or not. Since we don't know whether his choice is predetermined by the forces set in motion by the Big Bang, and since even if (as you seem to be advocating) we have a philosophical bent toward thinking that his choice IS so determined, nonetheless it's reasonable to talk about his "free choice". If some other person pointed a gun at him and said, "Put on your hat or I'll shoot," the choice would be coerced, and thus not "free". "Free personal choice" is thus meaningful, relevant, and not nonsensical or absurd. What more can we ask for in the description of an event?

YOu seem to suggest that your philosphical opinion that because the individual's "free choice" is predetermined by (as an example) the physics of the Big Bang, it cannot be either free or a choice. Why not? Is it absurd (in normal English) to say, "Joe chose to wear his hat yesterday."? Is that phrase meaningless? Of course it isn't. It suggests a certain pattern of events which we call "choice", despite the fact that only one choice is possible (precluding time travel). I'm not confusing probability with outcomes -- I'm simply saying that one (seemingly contradictory) "fact" can be true from one perspective ("It is certain that Joe will fill his flush, because the top card on the deck is a club"), while another is true from another perspective ("there is a 9/47th chance that Joe will fill his flush"). Both are accurate descriptions, from a different perspective.

That's why the laws of physics are irrelevant to free will (from OUR perspective, although not, perhaps, from some other perspective). We are like the poker player who can't see through the backs of the cards, so (from our perspective) we describe our choices as sometimes "free" and sometimes "constrained". Given that these descriptions of choices are meaningful and distinct, I don't see any reason to stop using them.

[PeterL]

It's a matter of perspective. What is meant by "no control"? The poker player uses the odds of drawing a club as a convenient fiction to determine his tactics. Similarly, the individual "decides" whether to put his hat on or not. Since we don't know whether his choice is predetermined by the forces set in motion by the Big Bang, and since even if (as you seem to be advocating) we have a philosophical bent toward thinking that his choice IS so determined, nonetheless it's reasonable to talk about his "free choice". If some other person pointed a gun at him and said, "Put on your hat or I'll shoot," the choice would be coerced, and thus not "free". "Free personal choice" is thus meaningful, relevant, and not nonsensical or absurd. What more can we ask for in the description of an event?

YOu seem to suggest that your philosphical opinion that because the individual's "free choice" is predetermined by (as an example) the physics of the Big Bang, it cannot be either free or a choice. Why not? Is it absurd (in normal English) to say, "Joe chose to wear his hat yesterday."? Is that phrase meaningless? Of course it isn't. It suggests a certain pattern of events which we call "choice", despite the fact that only one choice is possible (precluding time travel). I'm not confusing probability with outcomes -- I'm simply saying that one (seemingly contradictory) "fact" can be true from one perspective ("It is certain that Joe will fill his flush, because the top card on the deck is a club"), while another is true from another perspective ("there is a 9/47th chance that Joe will fill his flush"). Both are accurate descriptions, from a different perspective.

That's why the laws of physics are irrelevant to free will (from OUR perspective, although not, perhaps, from some other perspective). We are like the poker player who can't see through the backs of the cards, so (from our perspective) we describe our choices as sometimes "free" and sometimes "constrained". Given that these descriptions of choices are meaningful and distinct, I don't see any reason to stop using them.

I have no problem with the first two paragraphs, but when you suggested that the laws of physics are irrelevant to our free will, you lost me. I am prefectly willing to accept that for most practical purposes humans have free will, because it is impossible to see even a large psrt of the chain of cause and effect, but the physical universe, even on the quantum are the origin of humans. Humans exist only because we developed from animals that evolved, and that the animals came into existence because the laws of physics allow for self-replicating molecules, and so on back to the Big Bang (if that actually happened). All of human existence and activity is based on the laws that govern the physical universe.

Might it be better to describe out actions as either overtly determined or covertly determined?

[YesNo]

I won't disagree here, but it quite conceivable that some the initial state might have been known to some entity, whether God or Goddess makes no difference), but determining whether that happened is far outside human possibilities at this time.

The point is that if quantum mechanics is true, with Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, then such an initial state can't exist. No God can bring it into existence either.

It is a matter of determining the initial state. If it is found that radioactive decay and a few other events that are thought to be completely random, are in fact predictable, if one knows the initial state of the atom, then determinism rules.

True, if one could construct an initial state from which the past and future could be constructed, then there would be no free will. However, an initial state cannot be determined unless quantum mechanics is false.

[Ecurb]

I would suggest that there are infinite “causes” for our actions. It seems to me that yours is a modernist (scientific) worldview. Modernism is typified by some basic principles: 1) the “whole” is made up of and explained by its parts (a postmodern view would be that the whole can be more than its parts). 2) Language is referential (as opposed to gaining meaning through social usage in context). 3) Faith in the ‘real’, which exists distinctly from language, symbols and models (as opposed to the notion that reality is ALWAYS mediated through language, models and symbols.

It’s perfectly reasonable to say that if someone murders someone, he “causes” that person’s death, whether or not his behavior could in some future society be predicted by scientists as the inevitable result of the Big Bang. Humans do exist because we evolved from other animals – but I also exist because my father met my mother and they got married and decided to have sex at one particular time. One “cause” does not negate the other, just as the laws of physics do not negate free will. Was the fact that my mother and father both ended up (through a million happenstances) working for the same company, and thus met and got married inevitable ever since the beginning of the universe? I have no strong opinion about that one way or another. Nonetheless, even if it was, I don’t think it’s incorrect to say, “My mom and dad met BECAUSE they happened to get jobs at the same company.”

Since this is a literary board, I refer you to War and Peace. Here’s Tolstoy’s take (he favors a non-individual, but also non-reductionist approach to causation in history, but may be taking your side in the argument moe than mine):

When an apple has ripened and falls, why does it fall? Because of its attraction to the earth, because its stalk withers, because it is dried by the sun, because it grows heavier, because the wind shakes it, or because the boy standing below wants to eat it?

Nothing is the cause. All this is only the coincidence of conditions in which all vital organic and elemental events occur. And the botanist who finds that the apple falls because the cellular tissue decays and so forth is equally right with the child who stands under the tree and says the apple fell because he wanted to eat it and prayed for it. Equally right or wrong is he who says that Napoleon went to Moscow because he wanted to, and perished because Alexander desired his destruction, and he who says that an undermined hill weighing a million tons fell because the last navvy struck it for the last time with his mattock. In historic events the so-called great men are labels giving names to events, and like labels they have but the smallest connection with the event itself.

Every act of theirs, which appears to them an act of their own will, is in an historical sense involuntary and is related to the whole course of history and predestined from eternity.

Here’s a link to the rest of the chapter:
http://www.online-literature.com/tol...and_peace/168/


Yes – acts appear to us as acts of will. Yes, they may be “predestined from eternity”. That makes them “in an historical sense involuntary”, or in a scientific sense involuntary, but only in those particular senses from that particular and unique perspective.

p.s. I don't know enough about quantum mechanics to get involved in that conversation, interesting as it seems.