Quantum Theory and The Many Worlds Theory

[mal4mac]

The belief in something certainly influences how one will act, but ultimately we make a choice. I choose to believe that. Notice the choice involved.

How can you believe in something for which there is no good argument? There is no good argument for, or against, free will, so why not just suspend belief on this issue? You may have a choice, but that choice may be determined.

When I press the "Submit Reply" button to any post, I've made a choice. There is a lot influencing that choice, but the choice is mine and I must assume responsibility for it. If I have no free will, then I have no responsibility. Admittedly, we have a lot of constraints on our actions, but we are not totally constrained.

How do you know that you are not totally constrained? Why can't you be held responsible even though totally constrained? If you kill someone I don't see why you shouldn't go to prison, even if totally constrained by genetics and environment. Sending you there is likely to act as deterrent to others, and at least keeps you away from harming other people.

[Cioran]

You should seriously consider how your ulterior motives are impacting your ability to neutrally and objectively weigh the evidence on either side. .

YesNo has said, in another thread, that he is a theist. I don't know if he has said that in this thread, because I have stopped reading his posts here.

I imagine he thinks that MWI is incompatible with theism for two reasons: it seems to negate free will (this is actually debatable) and because, of course, every version of him is real. YesNo is good in one branch of the multiverse and bad in another. He, like all of us, is saint and sinner, benefactor and malefactor, helper and hit man.

So his is a fallacious argument to adverse consequences. He doesn't like what MWI implies, so it's false. That is what this is all about. LOL.


Once again, we see the fundamentally destructive and intellectually dishonest nature of vile theism on full display.

[YesNo]

How can you believe in something for which there is no good argument? There is no good argument for, or against, free will, so why not just suspend belief on this issue? You may have a choice, but that choice may be determined.

I think a good argument for free will is that we make choices.

How do you know that you are not totally constrained? Why can't you be held responsible even though totally constrained? If you kill someone I don't see why you shouldn't go to prison, even if totally constrained by genetics and environment. Sending you there is likely to act as deterrent to others, and at least keeps you away from harming other people.

I don't know that I am not totally constrained. If I were totally constrained then my experience of making a choice would have to be an illusion. It seems like I have a choice to make. Do I have some free will or don't I? I choose, and note that I am exercising my free will at the moment, to assume that I do.

[YesNo]

YesNo has said, in another thread, that he is a theist. I don't know if he has said that in this thread, because I have stopped reading his posts here.

I'm a generic panentheist: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panentheism

However, I don't have any specific religion to offer. I like a few of them, some more than others.

I imagine he thinks that MWI is incompatible with theism for two reasons: it seems to negate free will (this is actually debatable) and because, of course, every version of him is real. YesNo is good in one branch of the multiverse and bad in another. He, like all of us, is saint and sinner, benefactor and malefactor, helper and hit man.

There is only one world in our multiverse.

So his is a fallacious argument to adverse consequences. He doesn't like what MWI implies, so it's false. That is what this is all about. LOL.

What is fallacious about my arguments? Shall I summarize them again?

1) I don't see how an indeterministic theory such as QM can be modeled by a deterministic theory such as MWI.

2) Why is the atom so large without resorting to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle?

3) Why is there a wave-like interference pattern when electrons strike a detection barrier if there is a deterministic explanation for the electron's behavior in this world or others?

4) How does MWI get around the no-cloning theorem of QM when the worlds split?

Once again, we see the fundamentally destructive and intellectually dishonest nature of vile theism on full display.

As I mentioned, I am also interested in the issues of authority vs evidence.

[MorpheusSandman]

The belief in something certainly influences how one will act, but ultimately we make a choice. I choose to believe that. Notice the choice involved.

I remember us discussing various things in a thread I started on the Kalam Cosmological Argument, and one point I kept trying to stress when replying to you was that you were trying to understand early cosmology through the constraints of spacetime when, back then, no spacetime existed. There are certain intuitions we have about the way things are that are near impossible to shed when trying to think about how reality functions. That we feel like we make choices is a fact, but how does this play out in our cognition? How and why are choices actually made? You can’t keep repeating “I chose” the same way you can’t keep repeating “before spacetime,” because the issue is how/why these things came to be, how they function (“before” itself implies spacetime, “I chose” doesn’t answer the question of how/why this happens).

I find Yudkowsky interesting mainly for the issue of authority vs evidence. I need to see more evidence for MWI and less rhetorical arguments in favor of it by Yudkowsky, Deutsch, or Tegmark.

If you want to look beyond the rhetoric then you probably have to dig into the math, because this is simply how most physics works. Sans that, you have to accept that your understanding will be, at the very best, incomplete, and you’ll be relying on the authority of experts. However, I think it’s rather foolish to think that these experts have missed something so trivial that would easily falsify MWI that you, in your relative ignorance of the subject, happened to discover. Which do you think is more likely: these experts have very good reasons for supporting MWI that you don’t understand, or that you understand something they don’t that falsifies MWI?

If that does not constitute "remarkable cognitive gymnastics" I don't know what does.

An interpretation that solves all the mysteries of indeterministic QMI is not “remarkable cognitive gymnastics,” no more so than saying that the Earth revolves around the sun and the appearance of the reverse is merely the product of our biased perspective.

At the moment I see him more as a fundamentalist preacher who can't see outside his own box.

What I am saying is that Yudkowsky's arguments against free will could be turned on many worlds. I consider many worlds a belief system. So how does it happen that one actually acquires such a belief system?

He pretty much details his belief system from a cognitive perspective in the whole “The Map and the Territory” Sequence.

The idea of worlds splitting needs to become more precise.

But you’re fine with the lack of precision in the classical interps? How could you determine the precision without understanding the math to begin with?

When I press the "Submit Reply" button to any post, I've made a choice. There is a lot influencing that choice, but the choice is mine and I must assume responsibility for it. If I have no free will, then I have no responsibility. Admittedly, we have a lot of constraints on our actions, but we are not totally constrained.

You didn’t answer any of my questions. The whole “no free-will, no responsibility” is a dead-end argument. Don’t pursue it. It only justifies itself by circular reasoning, in a similar way that QM is only indeterministic if you take for granted the WF collapse.

The "lack of knowledge" idea is interesting.

Indeed.

For why I have no trouble believing these mysteries, it seems that we are responsible for our actions and so there is some indeterminism and free will.

This is a fallacy known as wishful thinking. You can accept mysteries as long as they support your preferred version of reality.

As far as non-locality goes, I have heard of people who had out-of-body experiences also having non-local experiences.

No. I remember linking you in another thread to a very detailed paper that dealt with these claims and definitively debunked them.

The split between the quantum and the macro level could be explained as a point where our greater mass dominates in some way.

Except there’s no evidence for it. Increasingly larger masses are being put into quantum superposition and they all hold. As Yudkowsky says, we know that a laser aggregates as it should instead of doing something completely different. There’s no reason whatsoever to think that there’s some split besides our distorted perspective, the same distorted perspective that lead us to think that the sun revolves around the Earth and that empty space is actually empty.

Again, which is harder to believe: that we are likely to behave differently than a quantum particle or that there are many worlds with copies of us running around in them?

Fallacy of incredulity. Plus, explain any interp of QM to someone in the 19th century and see if they have a hard time believing it. Our incredulity is not an accurate gage for determining truth.

I don't think our consciousness is the only thing that makes a wave function collapse.

Then what does?

The reason I quote Feynmen is because I think what he says about the size of the atom and the inconsistency of assuming that there are deterministic mechanisms in the electron that we are unaware of make sense to me.

Well, you’re going to have to explain why Feynman is contradicting a view that he believed in his own book! Again, is it more likely that Feynman is contradicting his position or that you simply don’t understand?

[MorpheusSandman]

1) I don't see how an indeterministic theory such as QM can be modeled by a deterministic theory such as MWI.

2) Why is the atom so large without resorting to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle?

3) Why is there a wave-like interference pattern when electrons strike a detection barrier if there is a deterministic explanation for the electron's behavior in this world or others?

4) How does MWI get around the no-cloning theorem of QM when the worlds split?.

1. QM is only indeterministic IF YOU ACCEPT/TAKE FOR GRANTED THE WF COLLAPSE!

2. As far as I can remember, the size of atoms are only estimable, and I don't know what you think this has to do with MW since MW is only addressing what happens after the WF collapse. As for the size of particles, have you heard of the Higgs field?

3. Interraction of the many worlds.

4. I don't see that there's anything to get around...

[Calidore]

If you want to look beyond the rhetoric then you probably have to dig into the math, because this is simply how most physics works. Sans that, you have to accept that your understanding will be, at the very best, incomplete, and you’ll be relying on the authority of experts.

So what to do when the experts disagree? There are experts who know more than I ever will who support MW, and there are experts who know more than I ever will who don't. So who to believe, and why do we need to believe anyone? Faith, factions, stronger personalities shouldn't be the guiding forces in science.

What I'd like to know is, at what point do the beliefs start branching off from knowledge? What is known to be true, and where does the debating start?

[MorpheusSandman]

What you're asking is more about epistemology (philosophical study of knowledge) than anything. Again, I'm more or less in agreement with Yudkowsky's views on this subject, Bayes' Theory applied on a more intuitive level. When you're relying on experts, one can put one's level of confidence in any proposition in alignment with the ratio of opinions on the matter. Eg, if 60% of experts believe in MWI, then put your confidence level at 60% that MWI is true. One doesn't have to split all beliefs into binary/boolean true/false, 0/1. Bayes itself says that there can be levels, and it's more about being "less wrong" than guessing the right answer. If I want to be less wrong then I'm going to favor what the leading experts tend to favor. Of course it can't guarantee truth, but the need for such certainty is in itself a cognitive trap. However, I do find what YesNo's doing, essentially "investigating" QM and trying to make it fit his preconceived beliefs, very counter-productive, if not dishonest. I myself have admitted I don't know enough to confidently answer many of his questions, so I've simply tried to point him (like Cioran) to those that do (or seem to).

As far as belief branching off from knowledge, this happens most strongly when beliefs stop being thought of as maps and start being confused for the territory itself. If one thinks of beliefs as a map then, like with any map, there is a way to compare it with reality. If I believe there's a mountain in Colorado, I should be able to go to Colorado and see a mountain, so my belief, my map, is confirmed by seeing the mountain. People's beliefs tend to get out of whack with reality when they stop making this map/territory connection, when beliefs become disconnected from verifiable, predictable sense experience. A lot has been said against positivism and verificationism in 20th century philosophy, and Popper's notion of falsifiability could be said to be an even better way to think of it than either, but I tend to find that when you get away from either then that's where quackery and pseudo-science flourishes.

[YesNo]

1. QM is only indeterministic IF YOU ACCEPT/TAKE FOR GRANTED THE WF COLLAPSE!

The problem is with Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. That makes QM indeterministic prior to any wave function collapse. You need to show that the indeterminism even without a wave function collapse is still present as at least an illusion. What happens after the wave function collapses is irrelevant. At that point I assume the particle behaves deterministically.

Admittedly I don't believe the world splits and so I am pretty sure these parallel universes don't exist, but the problem that I have with MWI is prior to any splitting into parallel universes. MWI does not interpret an indeterministic theory at that point.

2. As far as I can remember, the size of atoms are only estimable, and I don't know what you think this has to do with MW since MW is only addressing what happens after the WF collapse. As for the size of particles, have you heard of the Higgs field?

You should be able to find Feynman's Six Easy Pieces in a library near you. Let's examine the text itself. Feynman is saying that without the uncertainty principle, the electron would fall into the center and stay with the proton. It would be tiny. Why is it so large? He claims it is because of the uncertainty principle--or in other words indeterminism.

I think you are mistaken about the MWI. It does not just interpret QM after the wave function collapses. It must be an interpretation of QM even before the collapse occurs or before the worlds split. Perhaps that is where the difficulty lies. If MWI cannot do that then in doesn't adequately interpret QM.

3. Interraction of the many worlds.

Reading Deutsch he would have particles in various worlds somehow being present in each world prior to a wave function collapse. That is the idea I am using. These individual worlds would be in superposition but each of them would be deterministic. Because they are deterministic there should be no wave interference pattern displayed in the double slit experiment, but there is.

4. I don't see that there's anything to get around...

The point is that you cannot create a copy of a quantum object, so the worlds cannot split. That means there are no copies of us or anything else in the "multiverse".

[YesNo]

But you’re fine with the lack of precision in the classical interps? How could you determine the precision without understanding the math to begin with?

I have no problem with Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. The lack of precision doesn't bother me and from a practical perspective it doesn't stop QM from being technically useful.

No. I remember linking you in another thread to a very detailed paper that dealt with these claims and definitively debunked them.

Apparently that did not convince me.

Well, you’re going to have to explain why Feynman is contradicting a view that he believed in his own book! Again, is it more likely that Feynman is contradicting his position or that you simply don’t understand?

I have only started reading Feynman. What book are you referring to?

[MorpheusSandman]

Apparently that did not convince me.

Same could be said for any expert that disagrees with your prior beliefs. I'm seriously tiring of this game.

I have only started reading Feynman. What book are you referring to?

It's not a book, he was asked in a poll amongst leading QPs (done the year he died, IIRC) what they thought of MW, and he was in the "yes, I believe in it" camp.

[billl]

It's been a long time since I read/studied any of this, but I think it might clear things up to remember that MWI is (I think) generally considered to be a deterministic theory. That is, all of this wondering about how the wave function collapses, or how the superposition needs to be resolved and so on are, in the MWI, side-effects of being in just one of the worlds. The MWI isn't going to help you pinpoint which of the worlds you are in--from our perspective, the fate of the wave-form is as much of a mystery as ever, because we only inhabit one of the worlds. It's ridiculous to find the MWI to be disproven by our limited perspective, as far as that goes. It'd be like a person who received a certain sum of money from a deceased parent's estate concluding that there couldn't have been a will written up before the death, since they only knew the outcome afterwards. Of course, in that example the will exists in the world with us--but the basic idea is there in the analogy, I think. The mystery/uncertainty/seeming-indeterminism would result from the lack of access to existing information (although the existence of the info would be elsewhere in space-time).

I'm all for skepticism about MW, but my occasional looks at this thread haven't encountered any reasonable objections to it. I think that it might be interesting to carefully consider what "cause and effect" might mean in a deterministic framework, first of all. Does it make sense to get up in arms about measurements "causing" new worlds to suddenly become manifest? It seems strange, yes, but I think Everett and others who support the idea have probably always thought it was counter-intuitive--or would at least understand why many people would be taken aback at the idea. And I don't know if they would go along with the word "cause" being used there.

I think it's an interesting idea, but not something that gets me excited anymore. It's easier to develop enthusiasm for non-deterministic models--at least for me it is, when I'm inclined to get worked up about the subject at all. But I still have a fondness for Everett and his idea. I like what Morph said, something about not needing to commit oneself completely for or against these interpretations.

[YesNo]

The mystery/uncertainty/seeming-indeterminism would result from the lack of access to existing information (although the existence of the info would be elsewhere in space-time).

That sounds like a hidden variables theory that I think has been ruled out by the experiments verifying Bell's inequalities in testing the EPR paradox. I have heard that Bohm might have a way around that, but I don't know how that works yet or why it would be different from a hidden variables theory. The MWI does look like a hidden variables theory to me.

[billl]

No, it's not about hidden variables. The information (and it's strange for me to even call it that) would be the determined history in all the existing worlds. If I'm holding a coin and it is face up, the other side is not a "hidden variable". Similarly, if I'm in a world where the collapse went one way, the world in which it went the other way would not be a hidden variable.

[YesNo]

OK. That makes sense, billb, and is probably why MWI is not considered a hidden variables theory.

I've wondered about each of those worlds in superposition, one with the coin up and one with the coin down. As I understand it, prior to the collapse, the MWI assumption is that there are two worlds with the coins in superposition where the outcomes of the coins are definitely either up or down otherwise there is no determinism and we are back to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.

Suppose we extend that to electrons, some in our world and some in other worlds in superposition with the ones in our world, going through a double slit experiment. Some electrons head through hole 1 toward a definite target position because of determinism. Other electrons head through hole 2 toward a definite target position because of determinism. We only see detections of the electrons from our world.

Assume both holes are open and we do not measure which hole the electrons went through in our world, what pattern should we expect to see on the detector screen in our world?