
Originally Posted by
Cioran
YesNo, honestly, you don't understand these ideas. You've got everything mixed up, as you've demonstrated over and over again. And I have pointed out your confusion over and over, and you have not met these points. I suggest you educate yourself more fully on these ideas and then comment on them.
I admit that I don't understand these ideas and that's why I find the thread interesting. I'm trying to un-mix things in my mind.
The only reason I mentioned the Wikipedia article is that I thought you were quoting him as an authority. He's doesn't have much authority, but I don't actually care. Regardless of who he is, I'm still trying to make sense out of the ideas in the article he posted. I don't consider the Wikipedia article evidence that he is wrong in the particular article you cited.
Essentially the article says, if you accept MWI, the EPR paradox loses its non-locality and anti-realist features. That's not a surprise claim for an MWI proponent to make. I'm still confused by the argument since it seems to involve the confirmation step as well to make this work. In other words, and I might have this wrong, MWI would always lead one to think that one got the nonlocal answer, even if one didn't, after the experiment was confirmed, but it is only the local answer in the appropriate world. That part I'm still puzzled by because I don't think the confirmation should matter. Of course, I might be completely misunderstanding it.
One thing I've learned from the article is that I didn't understand what the term "realism" meant before. Here's what I think it means based on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_locality:
Local realism is the combination of the principle of locality with the "realistic" assumption that all objects must objectively have a pre-existing value for any possible measurement before the measurement is made. And so be time independent.
I started searching the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy rather than Wikipedia for information. Here's an initial link: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/
Regarding the Tipler article, I've run into two problems:
ONE
With entangled particles separated by great distances where spin up or down is being measured, I realize that there are two outcomes predicted by EPR but there are four worlds involved. We get the following four outcomes:
(up)(up) + (up)(down) + (down)(up) + (down)(down)
Only the ones in red are permitted by QM for the entangled particles since their outcomes are initially entangled to give opposite results. My problem is I don't see what happens to the other two worlds in the final result. How are they eliminated so that MWI agrees with QM results?
TWO
It appears having probabilities that cannot be represented as rational numbers is a problem for MWI based on this comment from Tipler:
Applying the Principle of Indifference to this new set of coefficients yields the BI for the coefficients in the original basis. Continuity in the Hilbert space of wave functions yields the BI for irrational coefficients (although it is a presupposition of the MWI that only coefficients with rational squares are allowed since irrational squares would imply an irrational number of worlds). In particular, the percentage of worlds with the value of a given basis vector is given by the square of the coefficient.
The WMI technique of simulating probabilities in the universe is to assume that the probabilities are represented as rational numbers. They use the Principle of Indifference and take the least common multiple of the denominators of the probabilities and construct the appropriate number of worlds for each outcome. If the probabilities can only be represented as irrational numbers then there is no least common multiple of the denominators since the probabilities cannot be represented in that manner. This is the problem emphasized in bold above.
There are two concerns with this MWI view of probability:
1) Why can't probabilities be represented as irrational numbers in a universe where realism is supposed to be true? Even a 50-50 chance may only be an approximation. One cannot assume for any coin in one's pocket that it has not been irregularly worn enough that the real probability is not something like 50.000000001-49.999999999 or something requiring even infinitely many decimals to correctly represent it. It seems that WMI requires reality to come in rational numbers.
2) Why does MWI think it can get out of problems such as probability, non-locality, or realism by just creating additional worlds whenever it feels like?