Quantum Theory and The Many Worlds Theory

[cacian]

I'm not sure what you're asking... logical fallacies are incorrect methods of reasoning. The word "fallacy" may share a root with "false," but logic doesn't deal with whether or not propositions are true or false, it only deals with whether or not the methods used to reach conclusions from multiple propositions are correct or fallacious.

Ah I understand now.
That is why I was completely at loss with the word logic.
I see logic differently.
The logic I know is the one that starts from correct and leads to correct. Therefore logic is correct or exact at any given time all the time.
By definition logic is what determines the methods to reach an exact conclusion in other words logic consequential and therefore there is no incorrect or fallacious prepositions. It is exact with is no room for mistakes when logic is concerned.

[YesNo]

The equations do tend to simplify when you think of the sun as being in the center of our system, but that doesn't make it true.

If someone was motivated enough they would be able to patch together a "still Earth" model that gets around your objection. Just search the web, you'll find many doing this

http://primecrackpot.blogspot.co.uk/...-universe.html

Maybe the speed of light is infinite until it gets close to Earth?

As the Earth is "the special thing at the centre" you can validly concoct any model to get around any objection. The Roma Catholic church did this for a long time, and only stopped when the power base moved to the military-industrial-science complex. And the RC church have always been much more inclined to cosy up to power than to stick to their original metaphysics.

The Michelson-Morley experiment showed that light was going the same speed in the direction of motion of the Earth, and at right angles to it. Relativity was needed to explain that observation. But in a model where the Earth doesn't move the explanation of Michelson-Morley is extremely simple, it does away with the need for special relativity.

I agree. If one has to explain something one wants to believe in, whether it is geocentrism, determinism, or Santa coming down the chimney, one can always find a way to do it. It may not always convince someone else.

I'm pleased to see that even the Prime Crackpot site considers geocentrism and relativity contradictory.

Theories should be able to predict something interesting. I don't know what MWI has actually predicted. I don't even think it makes a good retrodiction of QM and classical physics. Can you imagine someone telling Newton that he needs a multiverse for physics to be viable? I wonder what Einstein would have thought about that.

I was going to try out the "bat signal argument" to defeat you, but I couldn't make it work "in reverse" It's interesting in showing how to get speeds of 2pi light years/ per second, though, and I did work hard(ish) on it, so here it is:

Paste black paper shaped like a bat onto a spotlight; the signal used to summon Batman. Broadcast the Bat-call to the cosmos. Rotate the spotlight. As the light turns, the bat shadow sweeps across the sky. Just as the rim of a bicycle wheel moves faster than its hub, so too, our bat shadow will fly faster and faster. If the spotlight takes a second to rotate, at one light year out the bat shadow will have to travel at 2pi light years per second. In the "usual" model, this does not violate relativity because a shadow carries no energy. But what about the circle of light "setting off" the bat shadow, you may ask? Isn't the light itself traveling far faster than the speed of light, through rotating in space? No! The bulbs that produce the light are spinning, but the light particles leave the source at 186,000 miles a second. Once emitted, the photons continue to travel at this speed directly away from the source.

I'm glad you explained why it doesn't contradict relativity.

Science has nothing to do with "truth"; its intent is actually to develop a set of codes that allow us to make accurate predictions about observations. Regardless of any external, objective truth.

Does that make you an instrumentalist as well? That seems like the main use for science and its limitation. Philosophy and religion can debate the truth of it all.

[Cioran]

The Michelson-Morley experiment showed that light was going the same speed in the direction of motion of the Earth, and at right angles to it. Relativity was needed to explain that observation. But in a model where the Earth doesn't move the explanation of Michelson-Morley is extremely simple, it does away with the need for special relativity.

Of course it doesn't. Even if the sun revolved around the earth, special relativity can be shown to be true regardless in hundreds of different ways. Of course, SR cannot be wholly correct, since it is subsumed by general relativity, and there still needs to be a way to reconcile GR with QM.

Does the earth revolve around the sun, or does the sun revolve around the earth? Can you answer the question?

Notice also that even if the earth were at the center of the solar system, the does not mean that it is stationary. As a matter of fact the earth (like everything else) has dozens of different motions, and NOTHING in the universe is ABSOLUTELY at rest; and this lack of an absolute-at-rest reference frame is what dismantles Newtonian physics and motivates relativity theory.

Not correct - this is just an illogical argument.

No, it is correct.

An ad hominem argument "appeals to feelings not reason". An example: "Everett was badly treated by his colleagues which makes me feel bad, so Everett's theory is correct." Or, "I've spent my whole life studying physics and would feel totally downhearted if it was all "just models" rather than Reality, so Everett must have discovered Reality."

How thoroughly ridiculous this is.

Yes, the above is ad hom. But so is what I quoted. If you had bothered to check, you would see that both these invalid arguments, though they share different content, have the same invalid logical form.

Now, as to the substance of your example, you are implying that these are my arguments for Everettian Many Worlds, i.e., invalid ad hom formulations. This is pure BS, of course. I have explained repeatedly why there are good grounds to accept Everett (as many and perhaps most physicists now do), and none of them have anything whatever to do with the strawman caricature you just invented above.

They have to do with facts like:

1. Wave function collapse is completely unexplained in Copenhagen and other collapse interpretations, making it unscientific and akin to magic. MW does away with wave function collapse, solving this problem.

2. In addition to wave function collapse, other unexplained (and probably unexplainable) properties of Copenhagen and other non-MWI interpretations include spooky action at a distance and indeterminacy. Spooky action at a distance and indeterminacy vanish under MWI,

3. The universe is an isolated system. Isolated systems are in superposition. Therefore, the universe is in superposition. Therefore, the parsimonious assumption is that MWI reflects how the world is.

In sum, please stop mischaracterizing my posts.

Oh, and by the way: does the sun orbit the earth, or not?

ETA: I mentioned in passing that Everett had been badly treated (at first) by the physics community, though his reputation is now fully rehabilitated. I never said, nor did I imply, nor in any way suggest, the utterly ridiculous argument that Many Worlds must be right because Everett was badly treated. Moreover, you know that I never did that, yet you allege that did so anyway, contrary to the facts.

Why?

[YesNo]

Of course it doesn't. Even if the sun revolved around the earth, special relativity can be shown to be true regardless in hundreds of different ways. Of course, SR cannot be wholly correct, since it is subsumed by general relativity, and there still needs to be a way to reconcile GR with QM.

Does the earth revolve around the sun, or does the sun revolve around the earth? Can you answer the question?

I know you are addressing, mal4mac, but I just want to say that he does make a point.

The results of the Michelson-Morley experiment suggest either that the earth is the center of the universe or there must be some other explanation. Since scientists would not accept that the earth is the center of the universe, Einstein went for a different explanation. That explanation led to predictions that worked.

Now, as to the substance of your example, you are implying that these are my arguments for Everettian Many Worlds, i.e., invalid ad hom formulations. This is pure BS, of course. I have explained repeatedly why there are good grounds to accept Everett (as many and perhaps most physicists now do), and none of them have anything whatever to do with the strawman caricature you just invented above.

I don't see any good grounds to accept Everett's many worlds theory. I don't think most physicists do either, but I don't know. They may use various sums of histories as techniques to make calculations, but that doesn't mean they accept the reality of many worlds. Even if they did, this is not a popularity contest.

Here is a comment by R. F. Streater in "Lost causes in theoretical physics" that seems to represent well my own view of the subject: http://www.mth.kcl.ac.uk/~streater/lostcauses.html#XII

There is nothing to the many-worlds theory. There are no theorems, conjectures, experimental predictions or results of any sort, other than those of Hilbert space. It is not a cogent idea.

I don't know who Streater is, but what he says makes sense and there is at least one person out there who is not on the MWI bandwagon.

1. Wave function collapse is completely unexplained in Copenhagen and other collapse interpretations, making it unscientific and akin to magic. MW does away with wave function collapse, solving this problem.

I think MWI violates the conservation of mass-energy of classical physics as well as the conservation of quantum information. I don't accept some other world where Santa can shrink enough to get down the chimney as a way out of needing to meet these conservation laws across the entire multiverse whether that contains one or many universes.

2. In addition to wave function collapse, other unexplained (and probably unexplainable) properties of Copenhagen and other non-MWI interpretations include spooky action at a distance and indeterminacy. Spooky action at a distance and indeterminacy vanish under MWI,

The other worlds are even spookier and offer nothing except a way to take a reactionary position in an effort to maintain an outdated determinacy in the face of evidence against it. The fact that indeterminacy vanishes in MWI is evidence that MWI is not a model for QM.

I noticed in Deutsch's The Fabric of Reality, chapter 13, that he was complaining that physicists do not accept the MWI. He was positioning himself as some sort of scientific revolutionary, when all he looked like to me was an old-school physicist refusing to get out of the way.

3. The universe is an isolated system. Isolated systems are in superposition. Therefore, the universe is in superposition. Therefore, the parsimonious assumption is that MWI reflects how the world is.

I don't see any other worlds. The wave behavior of particles can be modeled using standard QM without resorting to other worlds. One day, we may understand more about the superposition of particle states, so there is no need to jump to a superposition of worlds to resolve anything especially since making that leap of faith gives us nothing in return.

[Cioran]

I know you are addressing, mal4mac, but I just want to say that he does make a point.

The results of the Michelson-Morley experiment suggest either that the earth is the center of the universe or there must be some other explanation. Since scientists would not accept that the earth is the center of the universe, Einstein went for a different explanation. That explanation led to predictions that worked.

Actually, his point is off tangent to what I am asking. I am asking whether he thinks the sun revolves around the earth. I am NOT asking whether he further thinks that the earth is absolutely at rest at the center of the universe.

Because, of course, we know that there is no absolute rest reference frame, and that the universe has no center! For the Michelson Morley experiment to be explained other than relativistically, it would not be enough for the sun to be orbiting the earth. In that case, the earth STILL would have multiple motions: The orbit of the solar system itself around the center of the galaxy, the movement of the galaxy as a whole, the precession motion, and so on. I dare say NO model can be constructed in which the universe has a center, and the earth is motionless in the center of it, which is also consistent with empirical facts. Therefore this undermines his claim that all we have are models. We also have reality. His argument is like saying all we have our maps. Well, yes, we have maps, but we also have territory. One shouldn't confuse the two, but it's silly to suggest that only maps exist and no territory.

I don't see any good grounds to accept Everett's many worlds theory. I don't think most physicists do either, but I don't know.

Yes, and I linked Tegmark on the wide acceptance of MW.

They may use various sums of histories as techniques to make calculations, but that doesn't mean they accept the reality of many worlds. Even if they did, this is not a popularity contest.

Right, it's not! Who said it was? I only mentioned the acceptance of MW in the physics community to rebut mal4mac's claim that no one pays attention to Everett in the physics community. Clearly, they do. Of course, even if they didn't, it wouldn't make MW wrong, anymore than the fact that most DO pay attention to it makes it right.

I'll address the rest of your points later.

I think MWI violates the conservation of mass-energy of classical physics as well as the conservation of quantum information.

No it does not. The links provided already explain this.

The other worlds are even spookier and offer nothing except a way to take a reactionary position in an effort to maintain an outdated determinacy in the face of evidence against it. The fact that indeterminacy vanishes in MWI is evidence that MWI is not a model for QM.

With all respect, this is a total muddle. As I've already explained at least twice, determinacy in MW is a consequence of the interpretation and not either a cause of justification of it. The last sentence from the quote above is flatly wrong. QM is only indeterministic if there is wave function collapse! Which in Copenhagen and other interpretations is put in by hand without any explanation whatever of how it is supposed to work. The Schrodinger wave equation itself is fully determistic.

I noticed in Deutsch's The Fabric of Reality, chapter 13, that he was complaining that physicists do not accept the MWI. He was positioning himself as some sort of scientific revolutionary, when all he looked like to me was an old-school physicist refusing to get out of the way.

So where is your answer to Deutsch's quantum computation question?

The question turns on the ontology of these particles. If they are not real but just some kind of spooky "potential" or "probability," then they don't have mass and energy. But they do, because they are computational resources in quantum computing. Since they DO have mass and energy, they exist; if the wave function collapses them out of existence then it is Copenhagen that violates conservation because in that case matter and energy is being destroyed and not merely transformed!

I don't see any other worlds.

Right. And MWI explains why you don't see them! However, if you read the Wiki link I gave, you would have encountered a proposed experiment in which it may be possible to exchange signals between these worlds, if they exist.

The wave behavior of particles can be modeled using standard QM without resorting to other worlds.

Er, yes, it can, but that is the gist of the whole discussion: whether instrumentalism is good enough. "Shut up and calculate" may be a good predictive tool, but many, like Einstein, want to find out about the ontology of the world, if possible.

One day, we may understand more about the superposition of particle states, so there is no need to jump to a superposition of worlds to resolve anything especially since making that leap of faith gives us nothing in return.

There is no leap of faith at all, merely an interpretation that removes all the unexplained quantum weirdness.

[YesNo]

I probably can't follow what you and mal4mac are arguing about, so I won't comment further on what may or may not be the center of the universe. I've read that the universe doesn't have a center, so I'll go with that until I hear some compelling evidence against it.

I have looked at all the links you referenced, Cioran, as well as some of the items they linked to. They have not convinced me that MWI is correct, however, I have learned a lot about the details of MWI and QM in the process that I didn't realize before.

At the moment, I prefer the "shut up and calculate" instrumentalist approach when it comes to quantum superposition unless the explanation offers something that has predictive power. The quantum computation that Deutsch is researching has to do with particle superposition which occurs in the real world. That is my answer to Deutsch which I have already given: what he is studying is the particle in a superposition state in the real world. The problem is Deutsch doesn't believe that a particle can be in a superposition state. That is why he needs many worlds. My problem is that I don't believe that a many worlds superposition exists at all. I see no evidence for it at that level--nor any need for it.

[MorpheusSandman]

I see logic differently. The logic I know is the one that starts from correct and leads to correct.

There is a nuanced--some would argue pedantic--distinction to be made: All logic utilizes initial propositions that are assumed true but are not proved by the argument. Logic states that if these propositions are true, and if the argument form is valid, then the conclusion will be correct (assuming it's a deductive argument). The only way to use logic to prove the initial propositions would be to make them the conclusions of another logical argument, but then that argument will equally rest on other assumed propositions, and so on ad infinitum. The question of what propositions we should assume true is really the property of epistemology, ie, the philosophical study of knowledge. Logic is strictly just about the "rules" that govern correct reasoning in which we use assumed propositions in combination to produce new conclusive propositions.

[Cioran]

I probably can't follow what you and mal4mac are arguing about, so I won't comment further on what may or may not be the center of the universe. I've read that the universe doesn't have a center, so I'll go with that until I hear some compelling evidence against it.

I have looked at all the links you referenced, Cioran, as well as some of the items they linked to. They have not convinced me that MWI is correct, however, I have learned a lot about the details of MWI and QM in the process that I didn't realize before.

At the moment, I prefer the "shut up and calculate" instrumentalist approach when it comes to quantum superposition unless the explanation offers something that has predictive power. The quantum computation that Deutsch is researching has to do with particle superposition which occurs in the real world. That is my answer to Deutsch which I have already given: what he is studying is the particle in a superposition state in the real world. The problem is Deutsch doesn't believe that a particle can be in a superposition state. That is why he needs many worlds. My problem is that I don't believe that a many worlds superposition exists at all. I see no evidence for it at that level--nor any need for it.

1. Theories have predictive powers, which QM does par excellence. Many Worlds, Copenhagen and the others are not theories, they are interpretations of a theory -- or, as Everett had it, a metatheory. So a charge that MW doesn't make "predictions" like a theory is irrelevant, because the same goes for all the other interpretations.

2. Non wave-function collapse interpretations do NOT state that the superpositions "exist" in the real world; they state that the superpositions are probability waves that have no properties until measured. Stuff with no properties can't be used to do number crunching. But, they can.

If you say the superposed particles DO exist in the world, then you support the multiverse! it's just that the multiverse is the whole world, whereas any particular branch of it is a small cross-section of the whole.

[YesNo]

1. Theories have predictive powers, which QM does par excellence. Many Worlds, Copenhagen and the others are not theories, they are interpretations of a theory -- or, as Everett had it, a metatheory. So a charge that MW doesn't make "predictions" like a theory is irrelevant, because the same goes for all the other interpretations.

I have no problem viewing Many Worlds as a religion. It has come up with the idea of "quantum immortality" so maybe it is not all that far from a religion. The Copenhagen interpretation appears more open to experimentation. It does not jump to conclusions about reality beyond what the evidence provides.

2. Non wave-function collapse interpretations do NOT state that the superpositions "exist" in the real world; they state that the superpositions are probability waves that have no properties until measured. Stuff with no properties can't be used to do number crunching. But, they can.

As I understand it, a single photon or electron prior to being measured is viewed as a probability wave for convenience sake, because that is all one knows about it. It is real, but the properties are not known until measured. My problem is with the statement: "Stuff with no properties can't be used to do number crunching." If quantum computing is getting results, why not? We are looking at matter-energy at a level where it does not behave in a billiard ball fashion. That is all.

If you say the superposed particles DO exist in the world, then you support the multiverse! it's just that the multiverse is the whole world, whereas any particular branch of it is a small cross-section of the whole.

The multiverse I would support has only one universe, or world, in it. It is also non-deterministic which ultimately allows the researcher enough freedom to choose an experiment.

The difference I see between the Copenhagen and Many Worlds interpretations is that CI acknowledges quantum superposition of particle states while MWI refuses to accept that. Instead, MWI prefers a billiard ball model of quantum particles. That is an old view of such particles and it is why I view MWI as essentially reactionary. To get that billiard ball model to work, they need other shadow billiard balls to create an interference wave. This requires a theoretical superposition of worlds when all one needs, indeed all the evidence requires, is a superposition of particle states.

[Cioran]

I have no problem viewing Many Worlds as a religion.

*sigh*

A metatheory is NOT a religion. it is a theory about a theory. ALL the theories about the theory of QM are metatheories. Hence, if MW is a religion, then by logical extension so are Copenhagen et all.

It has come up with the idea of "quantum immortality" so maybe it is not all that far from a religion.

Quantum immortality is an inference from the model. Max Tegmark has a different inference and so rejects Quantum Immortality, but he embraces MW.

The Copenhagen interpretation appears more open to experimentation. It does not jump to conclusions about reality beyond what the evidence provides.

Of course, this is wrong. It does make a conclusion about reality. And, as already noted, metathories are not open to experimentation, at least not until one can devise an experiment that can distinguish one metatheory from another empirically. That said, David Deutsch maintains that quantum computation empirically confirms the metatheory of MW, such that, if quantum computing failed to work, MW would be falsified as a metatheory.

As I understand it, a single photon or electron prior to being measured is viewed as a probability wave for convenience sake, because that is all one knows about it. It is real, but the properties are not known until measured.

No, this is fully incorrect. In fact, this is a restatement of Einstein's hidden variables, which have been experimentally ruled out. The metatheory of wavefunction collapse states that these particles have no properties prior to a measurement. This is why Einstein rejected it. Copenhagen is anti-realist (it says there is no mind-independent reality) and also anti-local (it claims that effects can propagate instantaneously across the entire universe via magical wave function collapse.) MW, by contrast, restores both realism and localism to physics.

My problem is with the statement: "Stuff with no properties can't be used to do number crunching."

That would be magic, for entities without properties to do number crunching. Ergo, they have properties, which is denied by Copenhagen.

The multiverse I would support has only one universe, or world, in it. It is also non-deterministic which ultimately allows the researcher enough freedom to choose an experiment.

Yes, as I have explained, however, this on the assumption of wave function collapse. MW is a no-collapse interpretation.

The difference I see between the Copenhagen and Many Worlds interpretations is that CI acknowledges quantum superposition of particle states while MWI refuses to accept that.

It's exactly the opposite. Many Worlds acknowledges that the superpositions are real. Copenhagen treats them as abstract mathematical entities that are used only to make calculations, period

Instead, MWI prefers a billiard ball model of quantum particles. That is an old view of such particles and it is why I view MWI as essentially reactionary. To get that billiard ball model to work, they need other shadow billiard balls to create an interference wave. This requires a theoretical superposition of worlds when all one needs, indeed all the evidence requires, is a superposition of particle states.

The "billiard ball model" is ruled out under the assumption of wave function collapse. Since MWI is a no-collapse metatheory, this argument against it is wholly irrelevant.

To emphasize: not only does Many Worlds accept superposition, contrary to YesNo's characterization, it says that these superpositions never go away. Indeed, that is the whole point of the interpretation!

[YesNo]

Quantum immortality is an inference from the model. Max Tegmark has a different inference and so rejects Quantum Immortality, but he embraces MW.

Do you have a source where Tegmark's explains his view? It sounds interesting. I don't really understand quantum immortality. It seems that ultimately all of the copies of each of us will die.

Of course, this is wrong. It does make a conclusion about reality. And, as already noted, metathories are not open to experimentation, at least not until one can devise an experiment that can distinguish one metatheory from another empirically. That said, David Deutsch maintains that quantum computation empirically confirms the metatheory of MW, such that, if quantum computing failed to work, MW would be falsified as a metatheory.

It appears that a quantum computer is able to factor 21 into 3*7, so I assume it works: http://www.nature.com/nphoton/journa....2012.259.html

No, this is fully incorrect. In fact, this is a restatement of Einstein's hidden variables, which have been experimentally ruled out. The metatheory of wavefunction collapse states that these particles have no properties prior to a measurement. This is why Einstein rejected it. Copenhagen is anti-realist (it says there is no mind-independent reality) and also anti-local (it claims that effects can propagate instantaneously across the entire universe via magical wave function collapse.) MW, by contrast, restores both realism and localism to physics.

I have heard that some CI proponents involve a consciousness collapsing the wave function. I don't think that is a necessary feature of CI which I suspect at heart is a "shut up and calculate" approach. This is different than taking an anti-realist position. So, I would say the choice is not between an anti-realist version of CI and the unrealistic version that MWI presents. I would suggest that proponents of many worlds hold back on committing to a perspective until there is experimental evidence for a separate world.

As far as nonlocalism goes, this has been experimentally verified in the 1980's and it continues to be tested. A local QM metatheory could be viewed as having been falsified by these experiments.

Yes, as I have explained, however, this on the assumption of wave function collapse. MW is a no-collapse interpretation.

It's exactly the opposite. Many Worlds acknowledges that the superpositions are real. Copenhagen treats them as abstract mathematical entities that are used only to make calculations, period

As I see it, MWI does not even believe in a wave function except as a calculation convenience. All MWI has are particles from many worlds interacting to give the illusion of interference patterns when a single photon goes through a double slit experiment. A superposition is a wave function that describes a particle by combining many different wave equations that are superimposed upon each other. The square of the amplitudes of the waves give the probability that that particle will take a specific value when measured. Each MWI particle should not need a wave function to describe its properties.

Again, the reality argument against CI is not strong. They are just not making any commitments. The wave function or the Heisenberg matrix or the sum of histories is just a convenience to get a useful result. It is not that there is no reality behind the math, it is that one doesn't know much more about that reality except as it behaves.

The "billiard ball model" is ruled out under the assumption of wave function collapse. Since MWI is a no-collapse metatheory, this argument against it is wholly irrelevant.

I don't understand. I am claiming that MWI is a billiard ball model because the particles all have definite properties. I thought that is what you were claiming. This is how the determinism is achieved. The many worlds are needed to explain the illusion of indeterminacy for MWI. The wave function is a measure of the indeterminacy in any particular world, but the particles in that world should be deterministic billiard balls. If that is not what MWI is saying, perhaps we should get some quotes to work from.

[Cioran]

For now, just this.

As far as nonlocalism goes, this has been experimentally verified in the 1980's and it continues to be tested. A local QM metatheory could be viewed as having been falsified by these experiments.

No. I think I've already mentioned this.

The experiments you allude to rule out a combination of realism and localism, though one or the other could still be true (though both may be false.) In fact, the experiments do more than that; they rule out realism and localism together, even if QM turns out to be a false theory.

There is, however, a huge caveat. These experiments rule out realism and localism together only on the assumption of wave-function collapse. Discarding wave function collapse, the results of these experiments, on the MW model, are fully explained in terms of both realism and localism. There are papers on this subject on the Web, some highly technical. There is also a book called Schrodingers's Kittens that addresses this.

[YesNo]

Which paper on the web are you referring to?

[Cioran]

Which paper on the web are you referring to?

Here, as one example.

Here, as one example.

Er, on a different computer than the one I originally used to post, this links goes to a Cyrillic language page first, which contains a link to the paper. Let's try again and see if it's a direct link (it went directly there on the laptop from which I originally posted).

http://quantum3000.narod.ru/papers/advanced/nonloc6.pdf

Same problem! Weird. Well, if you click on the link and get the page on cyrillic, just click on the link at the top of the page, which is the exact same link given above, then you will get the page. No idea why it is redirecting to this cyrillic stuff.

Quoted from the linked paper by Frank Tipler (which is exactly what I've been arguing since the beginning of this thread!). Since the quote function here renders quotes in italics, I've reproduced Tipler's own italics, done for emphasis, in bold instead.

Nonlocality arises if and only if we assume that the measurement of the spin of a particle "collapses the
wave function" from the linear superposition to either j ">1 j #>2 or j #>1 j ">2 in (1). If such a collapse
occurs, then measuring the spin of particle one would fix the spin of particle two. The spin of particle two
would be fixed instantaneously, even if the particles had been allowed to separate to large distances. If at the
location of particle one, we make a last minute decision to measure the spin of particle one in the left-right
direction rather than the up-down direction, then instantaneously the spin of particle two would be fixed in
the opposite direction as particle one -- if we assume that (2) collapses at the instant we measure the spin
of particle one. The mystery of quantum nonlocality lies in trying to understand how particle two changes
-- instantaneously-- in response to what has happened in the location of particle one.

There is no mystery. There is no quantum nonlocality. Particle two doesn't know what has happened
to particle one when its spin is measured. State transitions are nice and local in quantum mechanics.
These statements are true because quantum mechanics tells us that the wave function does not collapse
when the state of a system is measured. In particular, nonlocality disappears when the Many-Worlds
Interpretation (MWI) [6,7,8,16] is adopted. The MWI dispels the mysteries of quantum mechanics.

[YesNo]

I was able to get the English version.