Well, in honesty, I don't really follow your argument, YesNo. I'm not sure what the conclusion is supposed to mean, or how it derives from the premises. I don't really even understand the premises you are arguing.
I'd have to read Born's address, but I suspect what he is getting at is that determinism in a classical universe, even if true, is useful only in idealized states (as in the lab) because in tracing antecedent conditions, things get so complicated so fast that we can't trace the determinism.
This is true for all law-like statements about nature. We had to go to the moon and drop two objects of different size to determine them hitting the ground at the same time, because we needed a frictionless environment (no atmosphere, idealized) to show empirically that this is how nature behaves.
Many Worlds removes statistical indeterminacy from QM because the indeterminacy is a function of supposing there is wave function collapse. Without wave function collapse, a statement like, "there is a seventy percent chance that x will be found located at y, and a thirty percent chance that it will be found at z" resolves to seventy worlds with x at y and thirty worlds with x at z.
The goal of MW was not to restore determinism to physics. Rather, that was a consequence of the interpretation. The goal was to treat the whole universe as a quantum mechanical system, rather than arbitrarily split between a quantum world and a classical world; to show that this could be described mathematically (it can) and then to work out the ontological consequences.


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