My Philosophy

Over the past few years, I have formulated my philosophy of life, a 13-page document that may be found at the following link:

https://docs.google.com/file/d/0Byh6...it?usp=sharing

In the first half of the document, I present and defend the following positions: atheism, afterlife skepticism, free will impossibilism, moral skepticism, existential skepticism and negative hedonism. The second half of the document is devoted to ways to achieve and maintain peace of mind.

I have found the entire exercise to be very beneficial personally, and I hope that you will benefit from reading the document.

I am posting my philosophy to solicit feedback so that it may be improved. I welcome any constructive criticism that you may have.

Enjoy!

This is only a comment on the free will portion of the document. You believe that none of us are responsible for our intentional actions because: (page 3)

For any agent S and intentional action A, S does A because of the way S is in certain mental respects.

The phrase "in certain mental respects" is hand waving, but I understand that to mean we are determined by some material brain changes which we are apparently not responsible for. You might want to make this more precise by checking out various philosophers who study "mind". One reference giving a wide range of viewpoints would be The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind: http://www.amazon.com/Oxford-Handboo.../dp/019959631X.

Let us assume you are right. That means you were not responsible for writing the paper which was an intentional act on your part. It also means that I am not responsible for this response that I am making because it also was an intentional act. Since neither of us are responsible for what we have written, is there any reason to continue the dialog?

Furthermore, does one even have the ability to decide whether something is true or false? That would be an intentional act and therefore determined. How do we know our assessments of truth or falsity, determined by whatever unconscious process is controlling us, are correct? The most that evolution would give us is that whatever we view as true or false gives us a greater ability to reproduce.

If what is true or false is therefore arbitrary, why bother writing a philosophy? Of course, if you are correct about free will, you had no real choice in performing that intentional activity.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

The phrase "in certain mental respects" is hand waving, but I understand that to mean we are determined by some material brain changes which we are apparently not responsible for.

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I am referring to the agent's beliefs and desires. The regress argument assumes neither physicalism nor determinism.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

Let us assume you are right. That means you were not responsible for writing the paper which was an intentional act on your part. It also means that I am not responsible for this response that I am making because it also was an intentional act. Since neither of us are responsible for what we have written, is there any reason to continue the dialog?

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Of course. Just because I cannot be ultimately responsible for my actions does not mean I cannot change my mind.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

Furthermore, does one even have the ability to decide whether something is true or false? That would be an intentional act and therefore determined. How do we know our assessments of truth or falsity, determined by whatever unconscious process is controlling us, are correct? The most that evolution would give us is that whatever we view as true or false gives us a greater ability to reproduce.

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Again, the regress argument does not assume determinism. Also, the impossibility of ultimate responsibility does not rule out rational thought processes that can consider the evidence and the arguments and evaluate whether a particular statement is true or false.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

If what is true or false is therefore arbitrary, why bother writing a philosophy?

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What is true or false is not arbitrary, as discussed above. I wrote my philosophy because it enables me to determine how to live well.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

I am referring to the agent's beliefs and desires. The regress argument assumes neither physicalism nor determinism.

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How does it avoid determinism? Or physicalism? To me this doesn't make sense. The concise version of the regress argument you state as:

More concisely, free will requires ultimate self-origination, which is impossible

Admittedly, no one has absolute free will. There are always influences and even subconscious actions that don't require a conscious choice. However, I hear you taking an extreme view that free will of any sort is impossible, that you cannot contribute adequately to any change that occurs sufficiently to be responsible for what happened. Basically, I hear you saying that you cannot make a choice of any sort and be responsible for that choice.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

Of course. Just because I cannot be ultimately responsible for my actions does not mean I cannot change my mind.

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Are you responsible for the act of changing your mind should it happen to occur? If you are not responsible, who or what is responsible for that occurring? I could suggest "evolution" or "natural selection" or "random neurons firing" as pseudo-agents whom some might see as responsible. They are pseudo-agents because they do not actually make choices themselves.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

Again, the regress argument does not assume determinism. Also, the impossibility of ultimate responsibility does not rule out rational thought processes that can consider the evidence and the arguments and evaluate whether a particular statement is true or false.

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I wonder what is required to have a "rational thought process". Do we need to make a choice in the process, for example, to remain rational since we don't have to? Do we have adequate free will to make that choice?

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

What is true or false is not arbitrary, as discussed above. I wrote my philosophy because it enables me to determine how to live well.

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If free will is impossible, how could you live your life in any other way than you find yourself living it?

It's an interesting topic. Thanks for bringing it up. I don't know the answers. I'm more trying to clarify what is involved for myself.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

How does it avoid determinism? Or physicalism? To me this doesn't make sense.

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The regress argument allows for quantum indeterminism that does not translate into macro-level indeterminism, and it allows for randomness in one's unintentional actions. Also, even if there are indeterministic/random factors involved in one's intentional actions, one cannot be responsible for such factors, so the conclusion of the argument (that ultimate responsibility is impossible) still holds.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

Admittedly, no one has absolute free will. There are always influences and even subconscious actions that don't require a conscious choice. However, I hear you taking an extreme view that free will of any sort is impossible, that you cannot contribute adequately to any change that occurs sufficiently to be responsible for what happened. Basically, I hear you saying that you cannot make a choice of any sort and be responsible for that choice.

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My view is only that free will in the way I have defined it (in terms of ultimate responsibility) is impossible. Free will of other types may still be possible.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

Are you responsible for the act of changing your mind should it happen to occur? If you are not responsible, who or what is responsible for that occurring? I could suggest "evolution" or "natural selection" or "random neurons firing" as pseudo-agents whom some might see as responsible. They are pseudo-agents because they do not actually make choices themselves.

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Yes, the regress argument establishes that one's actions are ultimately a function of factors that are completely outside of one's control, such as heredity, sensory input, and random/indeterministic factors.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

I wonder what is required to have a "rational thought process". Do we need to make a choice in the process, for example, to remain rational since we don't have to? Do we have adequate free will to make that choice?

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A rational thought process is one that employs reason. No ultimate responsibility is required for one to apply reason.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

If free will is impossible, how could you live your life in any other way than you find yourself living it?

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You could not. But this is perfectly compatible with the usefulness of a philosophy of life.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

The regress argument allows for quantum determinism that does not translate into macro-level determinism, and it allows for randomness in one's unintentional actions. Also, even if there are indeterministic/random factors involved in one's intentional actions, one cannot be responsible for such factors, so the conclusion of the argument (that ultimate responsibility is impossible) still holds.

My view is only that free will in the way I have defined it (in terms of ultimate responsibility) is impossible. Free will of other types may still be possible.

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Free will as I define it, is having the outcome of a choice you are faced with making be non-predetermined, or that you can affect the outcome.

Enter the two-face example (of batman fame). Deciding to make your choice based on a coin flip (or whatever substitute you wish for a random event) requires absolute universal determinism to make the outcome predetermined. Any randomness in the universe anywhere opens the door for free will. That you were destined to choose to leave it up to chance doesn't change the fact that the ultimate outcome isn't predetermined unless the whole universe is.

I dunno what you mean by ultimate responsibility, but it seems like a cop-out. You'd essentially have to claim that inanimate objects like the coin bear ultimate responsibility for choices, even though you selected the coin as arbiter, and you execute the action. If two-face points a gun at your head, and says you live or die based on the flip of a coin, he doesn't get to avoid ultimate responsibility for shooting you afterwards. In outsourcing your actions to chance, you are accepting responsibility for both possible outcomes. I also don't believe this constitutes an unintentional action. You've defined two intentional acts, and let chance choose which is executed.

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

I dunno what you mean by ultimate responsibility, but it seems like a cop-out. You'd essentially have to claim that inanimate objects like the coin bear ultimate responsibility for choices, even though you selected the coin as arbiter, and you execute the action.

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Not at all. I am claiming that ultimate responsibility is impossible.

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

If two-face points a gun at your head, and says you live or die based on the flip of a coin, he doesn't get to avoid ultimate responsibility for shooting you afterwards.

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But the regress argument demonstrates that all of two-face's actions--including the action of "pointing a gun at your head, and says you live or die based on the flip of a coin"--are ultimately a function of factors completely outside his control. Therefore, two-face cannot be ultimately responsible for his actions.

I don't really find determinism compelling, but if that pleases you so be it.

I find the focus odd though. You basically begin with an assertion that people aren't independent actors, have no agency, and everything they do is scripted by the universe. After that you proceed to discuss peace of mind and living well. I can't see how either matter in this theory.

In your theory, you really don't exist as an independent entity, at least, no more so than as a label. Why does it matter if you live well or not? You'll live as you were determined to, a gear in the machine, the concept of living well has no meaning. You aren't capable of living badly or well, just as you were molded to live. In this theory, I'm not sure "you" even should be recognized independently of the universe around you. The universe will act as it must, and there is no you.

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

I don't really find determinism compelling, but if that pleases you so be it.

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The regress argument does not assume determinism.

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

I find the focus odd though. You basically begin with an assertion that people aren't independent actors, have no agency, and everything they do is scripted by the universe. After that you proceed to discuss peace of mind and living well. I can't see how either matter in this theory.

In your theory, you really don't exist as an independent entity, at least, no more so than as a label. Why does it matter if you live well or not? You'll live as you were determined to, a gear in the machine, the concept of living well has no meaning. You aren't capable of living badly or well, just as you were molded to live. In this theory, I'm not sure "you" even should be recognized independently of the universe around you. The universe will act as it must, and there is no you.

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You are confusing free will impossibilism with fatalism.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

The regress argument does not assume determinism.

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You've claimed this but it isn't apparent how it's workable. To my eyes it does.

Simply, if determinism isn't in play, then your choices are not dictated by factors around you. Influenced sure, but not dictated. Influenced leaves, choice and responsibility intact.

This:

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

But the regress argument demonstrates that all of two-face's actions--including the action of "pointing a gun at your head, and says you live or die based on the flip of a coin"--are ultimately a function of factors completely outside his control.

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is not true without an assumption of determinism. In any system but a deterministic one, the above is a choice.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

You are confusing free will impossibilism with fatalism.

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I don't see how your argument differs in any respect from fatalism, but this comes down to determinism again. You seem to believe you've avoided determinism, and thus your theory isn't fatalism. I don't see it.

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

You've claimed this but it isn't apparent how it's workable. To my eyes it does.

Simply, if determinism isn't in play, then your choices are not dictated by factors around you. Influenced sure, but not dictated. Influenced leaves, choice and responsibility intact.

This:


is not true without an assumption of determinism. In any system but a deterministic one, the above is a choice.

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The regress argument allows for quantum indeterminism that does not translate into macro-level indeterminism, and it allows for randomness in one's unintentional actions. Also, even if there are indeterministic/random factors involved in one's intentional actions, one cannot be responsible for such factors, so the conclusion of the argument (that ultimate responsibility is impossible) still holds.

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

I don't see how your argument differs in any respect from fatalism, but this comes down to determinism again. You seem to believe you've avoided determinism, and thus your theory isn't fatalism. I don't see it.

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As I explained in my last post, the regress argument does not assume determinism. However, even if it did, it would not imply fatalism, since determinism does not imply fatalism.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

even if there are indeterministic/random factors involved in one's intentional actions, one cannot be responsible for such factors.

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Why not?

If you know that pushing a button may make you rich, or it may blow up the world, and you push it, how do you avoid responsibility? Morally, ethically, you clearly bear responsibility, especially if you knew the range of outcomes in advance. Causally, you must assume at least partial responsibility for your action as well. This is like the difference between first degree murder and manslaughter. You are still responsible for it even if you didn't intend for the precise outcome.

I guess I just reject this notion that you claim no responsibility for your chosen actions if you don't know the outcome in advance or if randomness (especially limited randomness) is involved. Real world law tends to support this view as well. If you unleash a monster on the world, you are responsible for any damage it causes.

You seem to like this idea of unintentional actions as a method of absolving responsibility. I don't think intentionality is required for responsibility.

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

Why not?

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Because one cannot be responsible for randomness.

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

If you know that pushing a button may make you rich, or it may blow up the world, and you push it, how do you avoid responsibility?

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As demonstrated by the regress argument, your pushing the button is ultimately a function of factors that are completely outside of your control, such as heredity, sensory input, and perhaps random/indeterministic factors. Since you cannot be responsible for these factors, you cannot be ultimately responsible for pushing the button.

You basically believe in determinism-lite, where humans do not have agency, or any free will, but get bumped in meaningless ways by randomness. The combination absolves them from responsibility for anything they do, and lacking free will, they cannot affect the future intentionally.

It is a depressing theory, but I think I'm back to this again.

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

I find the focus odd though. You basically begin with an assertion that people aren't independent actors, have no agency, and everything they do is scripted by the universe. After that you proceed to discuss peace of mind and living well. I can't see how either matter in this theory.

In your theory, you really don't exist as an independent entity, at least, no more so than as a label. Why does it matter if you live well or not? You'll live as you were determined to, a gear in the machine, the concept of living well has no meaning. You aren't capable of living badly or well, just as you were molded to live. In this theory, I'm not sure "you" even should be recognized independently of the universe around you. The universe will act as it must, and there is no you.

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And although you try to shunt it as a reference only to fatalism, it works just as well in the context of determinism-lite instead of a fully determined universe. Whether the final destination is modified by randomness or not is irrelevant.

// As an aside, it was an interesting discussion so thanks for that, but my time for the evening is done.~ Cheers.

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

You basically believe in determinism-lite, where humans do not have agency, or any free will, but get bumped in meaningless ways by randomness. The combination absolves them from responsibility for anything they do, and lacking free will, they cannot affect the future intentionally.

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All bolded phrases are incorrect. Free will impossibilism does not imply any of them.

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

It is a depressing theory

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Why?

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

I find the focus odd though. You basically begin with an assertion that people aren't independent actors, have no agency, and everything they do is scripted by the universe. After that you proceed to discuss peace of mind and living well. I can't see how either matter in this theory.

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They matter because I care about living well. I would rather enjoy life than suffer.

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

In your theory, you really don't exist as an independent entity, at least, no more so than as a label. Why does it matter if you live well or not?

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Because I care about living well. I would rather enjoy life than suffer.

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

You'll live as you were determined to, a gear in the machine, the concept of living well has no meaning. You aren't capable of living badly or well, just as you were molded to live.

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Quoted phrases are false, and not implied by free will impossibilism.

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

And although you try to shunt it as a reference only to fatalism, it works just as well in the context of determinism-lite instead of a fully determined universe.

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Not at all.

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Originally Posted by Skydaemon

As an aside, it was an interesting discussion so thanks for that, but my time for the evening is done.~ Cheers.

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My pleasure.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

The regress argument allows for quantum indeterminism that does not translate into macro-level indeterminism, and it allows for randomness in one's unintentional actions. Also, even if there are indeterministic/random factors involved in one's intentional actions, one cannot be responsible for such factors, so the conclusion of the argument (that ultimate responsibility is impossible) still holds.

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When I mentioned determinism, I was thinking quantum uncertainty would contradict it. Since you are aware of quantum unceertainty then we don't have to worry about strict determinism. That would not agree with current science.

One thing I've noticed about discussions of quantum uncertainty is that it gets confused with "randomness". It seems when we drop "determinism", we figure the only thing left is "randomness". One skips the possibility that some kind of "choice" is being made that introduces something new into the system. However, choices require consciousness of some sort.

The quantum particles aren't acting randomly in the sense that any of their outcomes is equally likely. They generate non-random wave patterns on the detector in a double slit experiment where they have not been measured. If one thinks of them as if they were conscious having free will (in a limited way), they could be viewed as making individual choices taking into account what the other particles have done before them. Or, more traditionally and less anthropomorphically, one could think of them as not only particles, but "waves".

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

My view is only that free will in the way I have defined it (in terms of ultimate responsibility) is impossible. Free will of other types may still be possible.

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What are those other forms of free will? Perhaps that would help me understand better.

If we consider the example of the paper you wrote. In what sense are you "responsible" for writing it? If you were not responsible, then who or what was responsible for writing it? Some theists might claim that God is ultimately responsible, but you don't acknowledge a God.

I assume you would acknowledge some responsibility, but it is only "ultimate" responsibility that you lack. However, who or what then is ultimately responsible?

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

A rational thought process is one that employs reason. No ultimate responsibility is required for one to apply reason.

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But when we argue we make a choice to be rational. We could be irrational. So some choice was made. That choice is where the will comes in. I don't see how we are not responsible in some small way for that choice. In all of this I am not saying we have complete freedom to act any way we want. There are influences, but our choices add something new to the system.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

You could not. But this is perfectly compatible with the usefulness of a philosophy of life.

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This looks like a search for meaning, but I think elsewhere in your paper you claimed that meaning was as impossible as free will.

As you can probably guess, my view is that life does have meaning, there are Gods, some of whom might even be interested in us, and we have adequate free will to assume responsibility for choices that we make since we, like other species, are conscious enough to make choices. I am finishing Alvin Plantinga's Where the Conflict Really Lies. This is a discussion of the conflict between science, religion and what he calls "naturalism".

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Originally Posted by YesNo

One skips the possibility that some kind of "choice" is being made that introduces something new into the system.

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Either the choice has an explanation (in terms of the way the agent is, mentally speaking), or it does not. If it does, it is subject to the regress. And if it does not, then it is random and the agent cannot be responsible for it.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

What are those other forms of free will? Perhaps that would help me understand better.

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This would take too long to explain. Please refer to the SEP article on free will.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

If we consider the example of the paper you wrote. In what sense are you "responsible" for writing it? If you were not responsible, then who or what was responsible for writing it? Some theists might claim that God is ultimately responsible, but you don't acknowledge a God.

I assume you would acknowledge some responsibility, but it is only "ultimate" responsibility that you lack. However, who or what then is ultimately responsible?

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No one is ultimately responsible. The conclusion of the regress argument is that ultimate responsibility is impossible.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

But when we argue we make a choice to be rational. We could be irrational. So some choice was made. That choice is where the will comes in. I don't see how we are not responsible in some small way for that choice. In all of this I am not saying we have complete freedom to act any way we want. There are influences, but our choices add something new to the system.

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But one's intentional choices are a function of the way one is, mentally speaking. And the regress looms.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

This looks like a search for meaning, but I think elsewhere in your paper you claimed that meaning was as impossible as free will.

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My philosophy is not a search for meaning. As stated on the first page of the document, the purpose of the document is to advise myself on how to live well.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

Either the choice has an explanation (in terms of the way the agent is, mentally speaking), or it does not. If it does, it is subject to the regress. And if it does not, then it is random and the agent cannot be responsible for it.

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What you are expressing is an inability to get past the deterministic/random duality. You seem to claim, by assumption or assertion, that there are only two cases. If our actions are not determined ("in terms of the way the agent is") then you claim they must be "random". There are other possibilities and quantum uncertainty illustrates it. There the patterned behavior of the particles is neither determined nor random.

With our own consciousness, we experience ourselves making choices and hence introducing an element that is neither deterministic nor random. Your claim goes counter to the evidence of our experience.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

This would take too long to explain. Please refer to the SEP article on free will.

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I know this is not easy to do, but you are making an extraordinary claim that our experience of being able to make a choice is unreliable. I am asking for more than mere assertions that the claim is true, but some argumentation. Basically, you have not convinced me not to accept my own experience over your philosophy.

The opposite of your position is not that we have absolute free will to act as individuals. It only claims we have adequate free will to be responsible while acting under various influences that blur our distinction as individuals.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

No one is ultimately responsible. The conclusion of the regress argument is that ultimate responsibility is impossible.

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How do you know that the regress argument is correct? It relies on the false duality of determinism and randomness. Even at the quantum level there is uncertainty that can be described as neither deterministic nor random. To deny that would put you in a position in opposition to current science. In terms of uncertainty, why should this not exist at the human level as well?

If there is uncertainty as well at the human level, the regress argument is faulty somewhere. I suggest it fails at the point where it claims as a mere assertion, without evidence, that "For any agent S and intentional action A, S does A because of the way S is in certain mental respects." The evidence of our experience falsifies that particular assertion. It needs to be modified to overcome the objections (evidence) of our experience and submitted for further possible falsification.

You are making an extraordinary claim that goes against the evidence of our experience. All I am asking for is some evidence, not even extraordinary evidence.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

But one's intentional choices are a function of the way one is, mentally speaking. And the regress looms.

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If you have something behaving as a "function" of something else, you have strict determinism.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

My philosophy is not a search for meaning. As stated on the first page of the document, the purpose of the document is to advise myself on how to live well.

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Again, when you ask yourself "how" to live well, you assume you have adequate free will to carry this out. If you have that free will, you are responsible, like it or not, for your choice on how to live. However, this contradicts your claims against free will.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

What you are expressing is an inability to get past the deterministic/random duality.

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Not at all. One can allow for a mixture of determinism and indeterminism. To the extent that there is an explanation for one's behavior, the regress looms. And the extent there is not, one cannot be responsible.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

With our own consciousness, we experience ourselves making choices and hence introducing an element that is neither deterministic nor random. Your claim goes counter to the evidence of our experience.

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The regress argument proves that our "experience" of free will is an illusion.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

I know this is not easy to do, but you are making an extraordinary claim that our experience of being able to make a choice is unreliable. I am asking for more than mere assertions that the claim is true, but some argumentation. Basically, you have not convinced me not to accept my own experience over your philosophy.

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The regress argument backs up my claim. Again, if you want to know more about the free will debate in general, then do your own research. A good place to start would be Galen Strawson's article on free will, which contains a defense of the regress argument:

http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014

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Originally Posted by YesNo

How do you know that the regress argument is correct? It relies on the false duality of determinism and randomness.

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False, as explained above.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

Even at the quantum level there is uncertainty that can be described as neither deterministic nor random. To deny that would put you in a position in opposition to current science. In terms of uncertainty, why should this not exist at the human level as well?

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From Wikipedia entry on quantum indeterminacy:

"Quantum indeterminacy can be quantitatively characterized by a probability distribution on the set of outcomes of measurements of an observable. The distribution is uniquely determined by the system state, and moreover quantum mechanics provides a recipe for calculating this probability distribution."

Thus quantum indeterminacy is a mixture of randomness and determinism. As explained above, such a mixture would not enable one to refute the regress argument.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

I suggest it fails at the point where it claims as a mere assertion, without evidence, that "For any agent S and intentional action A, S does A because of the way S is in certain mental respects." The evidence of our experience falsifies that particular assertion.

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How does the evidence of our experience falsify that particular assertion?

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Originally Posted by YesNo

If you have something behaving as a "function" of something else, you have strict determinism.

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With respect to one's intentional actions (actions performed for a reason), that is correct (at the macro level). To the extent that there is indeterminism in one's decisions, one's decisions are not intentional.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

Again, when you ask yourself "how" to live well, you assume you have adequate free will to carry this out.

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Not at all. Striving to live well is perfectly compatible with the impossibility of ultimate responsibility.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

Not at all. One can allow for a mixture of determinism and indeterminism. To the extent that there is an explanation for one's behavior, the regress looms. And the extent there is not, one cannot be responsible.

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Your position seems caught inside a metaphysical box. You believe there are only two cases. Either something is determined by something else or it is random. You are not questioning three key things:

1) Is anything really determined?
2) Is anything really random?
3) Could there not be other cases besides the two you accept? In other words, I see no reason to say that a free choice could not be made.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

The regress argument proves that our "experience" of free will is an illusion.

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I usually assume that when one needs to discredit experience by calling it an illusion in order to keep a metaphysics running, there must be something wrong with the metaphysics.

The experience of free will falsifies the regress argument. The regress argument needs to be modified to avoid the falsification.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

The regress argument backs up my claim. Again, if you want to know more about the free will debate in general, then do your own research. A good place to start would be Galen Strawson's article on free will, which contains a defense of the regress argument:

http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014

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The article you cite illustrates the point I am trying to make about the metaphysical box one gets in when one assumes the determinism-random duality. Here is the quote about libertarian incompatibilists with my emphasis showing the duality problem:

They hold that we are indeed free and fully morally responsible agents, and that determinism must therefore be false. Their great difficulty is to explain why the falsity of determinism is any better than the truth of determinism when it comes to establishing our free agency and moral responsibility. For suppose that not every event is determined, and that some events occur randomly, or as a matter of chance. How can our claim to moral responsibility be improved by the supposition that it is partly a matter of chance or random outcome that we and our actions are as they are?

Notice the dualism between determinism and randomness. Notice the assumption that there are only two cases. The part that I put in bold is a logical assumption, a metaphysical box constraining one's thought, not a statement of fact. One could consider it a belief statement that forms part of an unquestioned metaphysical dogma. It certainly violates everyday experience which falsifies the belief statement.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

From Wikipedia entry on quantum indeterminacy:

"Quantum indeterminacy can be quantitatively characterized by a probability distribution on the set of outcomes of measurements of an observable. The distribution is uniquely determined by the system state, and moreover quantum mechanics provides a recipe for calculating this probability distribution."

Thus quantum indeterminacy is a mixture of randomness and determinism. As explained above, such a mixture would not enable one to refute the regress argument.

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Unless the probabilities are all the same for each possible outcome the uncertain events are not random. Randomness requires a uniform distribution. So where does the randomness come in? That the Schrodinger formula determines a result is simply a property of mathematics formalism used to model reality. It is not a property of the real world.

To see this differently, consider the double slit experiment. Were the events random, there would be no wave pattern displayed on the detection screen.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

How does the evidence of our experience falsify that particular assertion?

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Evidence falsifies an assertion by its existence.

The assertion is a statement. The experience or evidence falsifies that statement because one can produce the evidence. Scientifically, we have a falsified statement. How does one get around this? One can either stop doing science and claim that the assertion is true regardless of the evidence or one can continue doing science and modify the assertion. Some metaphysicians prefer to stop doing science. They then must claim that the evidence is illusory.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

Not at all. Striving to live well is perfectly compatible with the impossibility of ultimate responsibility.

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My claim is that "striving to live well" is an act of will. If you are not responsible for that striving, who or what is? The belief that you can strive to live well and the belief in free will impossibilism are contradictory positions.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

Your position seems caught inside a metaphysical box. You believe there are only two cases. Either something is determined by something else or it is random.

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Not at all. Read my quote again. You are ignoring its content.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

The experience of free will falsifies the regress argument.

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Not if it is an illusion, which is what the regress argument proves.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

The article you cite illustrates the point I am trying to make about the metaphysical box one gets in when one assumes the determinism-random duality. Here is the quote about libertarian incompatibilists with my emphasis showing the duality problem:

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You are quoting Strawson's statement of a different position. You have not touched his regress argument.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

Unless the probabilities are all the same for each possible outcome the uncertain events are not random. Randomness requires a uniform distribution.

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Again, you are ignoring what I actually said.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

Evidence falsifies an assertion by its existence.

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Unless your experience is an illusion, which the regress argument demonstrates.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

My claim is that "striving to live well" is an act of will. If you are not responsible for that striving, who or what is? The belief that you can strive to live well and the belief in free will impossibilism are contradictory positions.

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Not at all. The regress argument demonstrates that my willingness and ability to strive to live well are ultimately a function of factors that are completely outside of my control. Therefore, I cannot be ultimately responsible for my striving to live well.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

Not at all. Read my quote again. You are ignoring its content.

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This is what you said that I responded to:

Not at all. One can allow for a mixture of determinism and indeterminism. To the extent that there is an explanation for one's behavior, the regress looms. And the extent there is not, one cannot be responsible.

It looks like there are two alternatives here. Either one has an explanation for someone's choice or it is caused by chance. The case you are missing is that one can make a choice and that is an adequate explanation. One does not need to bring in chance to explain it.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

Not if it is an illusion, which is what the regress argument proves.

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Again, I don't trust a metaphysics that claims that evidence from our experience is an illusion just because it counters the metaphysical position. This is not to say that we do not have illusions when our experience is faulty. We can have illusions. That is cleared up with other evidence. However, we can also have "delusions" which is when our metaphysical theory is faulty.

We need a way to avoid both illusions and delusions. One can expect a delusion to claim that evidence contradicting it is illusory.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

You are quoting Strawson's statement of a different position. You have not touched his regress argument.

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What I am pointing out in Strawson's comment is something that applies to the regress argument. It assumes determinism. Where determinism fails, it assumes that god-of-the-gaps, chance (randomness), must be responsible. Right up front the argument does not allow for anything or anyone to make any kind of choice, because that would involve some sort of consciousness. That's the metaphysical box it is in, the unquestioned blind spot it refuses to look at, because, if it did, the whole fantasy land it has constructed would fall apart.

And that is why the regress argument against free will fails.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

Unless your experience is an illusion, which the regress argument demonstrates.

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Basically, I have discredited the regress argument as valid by questioning its assumption that everything is either determined or the result of chance. My justification is to reference either (1) quantum uncertainty, or (2) our own experience of making choices.

One could find evidence elsewhere as well. For example, there is recent evidence that slim mold, without a brain, without "mental respects" (whatever they are), can function intelligently, that is, make choices it is responsible for: http://www.scientificamerican.com/ar...s-slime-molds/

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

Not at all. The regress argument demonstrates that my willingness and ability to strive to live well are ultimately a function of factors that are completely outside of my control. Therefore, I cannot be ultimately responsible for my striving to live well.

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And I have shown that the regress argument is faulty. Consider Strawson's comment about libertarian incompatibilists:

"Their great difficulty is to explain why the falsity of determinism is any better than the truth of determinism when it comes to establishing our free agency and moral responsibility."

If one gets out of the metaphysical box built by determinism and chance, there is no "great difficulty" involved.

By the way, there is another metaphysical assumption involved in these free will arguments. It basically is that we are just machines, not organisms making choices.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

The case you are missing is that one can make a choice and that is an adequate explanation.

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"Making a choice" is not an "adequate explanation". One needs an explanation as to why one made that particular choice; otherwise, the choice has no explanation, which means that one cannot be responsible for that choice.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

Again, I don't trust a metaphysics that claims that evidence from our experience is an illusion just because it counters the metaphysical position. This is not to say that we do not have illusions when our experience is faulty. We can have illusions. That is cleared up with other evidence. However, we can also have "delusions" which is when our metaphysical theory is faulty.

We need a way to avoid both illusions and delusions. One can expect a delusion to claim that evidence contradicting it is illusory.

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Whether you "trust" the regress argument is irrelevant. You have failed to refute it.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

What I am pointing out in Strawson's comment is something that applies to the regress argument.

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Again, you have failed to refute the regress argument. To do so, you must either show that one or more of its premises is not necessarily true, or that its premises do not logically entail its conclusion, or both. You have done neither.

This renders the rest of your post irrelevant.

This has been an exceedingly humorous debate between two people that know neither science or philosophy. I'm inclined to point out that, as usual in philosophy, the debaters are getting hung up on words more than actual facts: I taboo the words "determinism," "random," "regress," "choice," "responsibility," and "free will;" now, argue what you mean without using those words (and don't just substitute synonyms, like "chance" for "random"), at least until you clearly define them.

Example: A bowl of food is placed in front of me. In my mind there is an instinct to eat in order to survive. Yet, in spite of this instinct, I can either eat or not eat. Most people if they're hungry will simply eat, unless there's some competing impulse not to, such as it being a religious fasting holiday, or maybe that food is forbidden in their culture, or maybe the person is watching their weight. When people refer to "choice" they typically refer to these competing impulses between doing and not doing. From that, several questions arise:

1. Is there a physical mechanism (biology, physics, etc.) that controls that choice?
2. If so, is anyone "responsible" for that choice (more on responsibility in a moment).
3. If not, what is it that facilitates the choice?
4. If not, is anyone responsible for that choice
5. Regardless of the above issue of determinism/indeterminism, since we can't will the instinctual impulses to begin with, are we responsible regardless?

YesNo answers "no" to one, "free will" to three, and "yes" (I presume) to 4.; Philosofer says "it doesn't matter" to one and three "no" to two and four. I think both of these are wrong. I don't think either of you have really addressed 5., though perhaps it's Philosofer's implicit "yes" to five that informs his other answers. YesNo and I have been over one ad nauseam as it relates to quantum physics (I think he's demonstrably ignorant on the subject), so I won't rehash those arguments; so, for the purpose of this thread, I'll keep it to the notion of "responsibility."

For me, it's quite simple; responsibility, like, morality, is a social phenomenon. We hold people "responsible" as a means of lessening the likelihood that they'll (or others) will do things that can damage the society. Whether people "choose" to murder of their own free will, out of deterministic instinct, or out of pure chance is irrelevant; what's relevant is whether us holding murderers "responsible" via imprisonment, execution, etc. makes it less likely for people to committ murder. I'm fairly confident in saying that it does. Thought of this way, such "responsibility" is really just a means by which we have a considerable influence on the competing impulses that people have. The question "is X responsible for Y" is much less important than "if X thinks he will be responsible for Y, is X less likely to do Y?" and the obvious answer to that is "yes."

So I'm with Philosofer in that the issue of responsibility isn't tied to the determinism/indeterminism/free-will issue, but disagree with him in thinking that it's an ontological question as opposed to a social one. Really, responsibility is little more than the social equivalent of, say, pain; pain is a physical feedback system that teaches us that certain actions have consequences on our being. As a child, whether or not I'm "free" to put my hand on a hot stove is rather irrelevant to the question of whether doing so will be painful and influence me to not do it again. In that sense, I'm "responsible" in that I acted (for whatever reason) and the action had negative consequences for me. If you think of responsibility like that (and I think it's the most sensible way to think of it) then most of these issues go away.

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Originally Posted by MorpheusSandman

5. Regardless of the above issue of determinism/indeterminism, since we can't will the instinctual impulses to begin with, are we responsible regardless?

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Originally Posted by MorpheusSandman

though perhaps it's Philosofer's implicit "yes" to five that informs his other answers.

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Actually, I answer "no" to five.

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Originally Posted by MorpheusSandman

For me, it's quite simple; responsibility, like, morality, is a social phenomenon. We hold people "responsible" as a means of lessening the likelihood that they'll (or others) will do things that can damage the society. Whether people "choose" to murder of their own free will, out of deterministic instinct, or out of pure chance is irrelevant; what's relevant is whether us holding murderers "responsible" via imprisonment, execution, etc. makes it less likely for people to committ murder. I'm fairly confident in saying that it does. Thought of this way, such "responsibility" is really just a means by which we have a considerable influence on the competing impulses that people have.

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I agree that punishment for pragmatic reasons (such as deterrence, quarantine and perhaps rehabilitation) makes sense, regardless of whether ultimate responsibility exists. But if free will impossibilism is correct, then punishment for retributive reasons makes no sense. And it is clear that penal systems around the world do punish criminals at least in part for retribution. This is one practical implication of free will impossibilism that your analysis is missing. But the more significant practical implication of free will impossibilism is that it renders irrational a whole range of negative emotions, including resentment and regret (see page 6 of my document). This strongly conduces to peace of mind.

I worded that hypothetical response to 5. poorly; what I meant is that maybe because you'd answer yes to the fact that we can't will our impulses would be why you'd argue we don't have responsibility.

To me, you don't need things like "free will impossibilism" to discuss irrationality in humans, as there are entire areas of science, such as the study of biases in cognitive/neuroscience, that focus on this. Most of our emotions stem from either irrational or arational (I call "arational" those initial premises that can not find a basis in statements about how reality is: "It is important that I live" would be an arational statement) impulses. In that regard, I don't think resentment, regret, or the desire for retribution is any different than most emotions. I do agree with you that they certainly don't help one's state of mind and even if we get was we desire from them it doesn't necessarily lessen the initial pain that caused the desire. Humans, though, when they suffer irreparable wrongs will INVENT ways to create closure if not actual ones exist. It provides the illusion of reparation if not any actuality; but all humans make do with manifold illusions about reality. That people find things like determinism "depressing" is why they latch on to the possibility of free will, despite the fact that there's not a stitch of evidence that it exists. Someone like YesNo loves to come back to our experiences, despite the fact that the last few hundred years have been a steady stream of scientific discoveries that showed us how illusive our experiences are, especially in what inferences we draw from them.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

"Making a choice" is not an "adequate explanation". One needs an explanation as to why one made that particular choice; otherwise, the choice has no explanation, which means that one cannot be responsible for that choice.

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Actually, it is. The choice is the explanation. It needs no other explanation than its existence.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

Whether you "trust" the regress argument is irrelevant. You have failed to refute it.

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The regress argument claims there is a deterministic explanation for each mental state. The person having that mental state has no responsibility for that state since some previous mental state determined it and so on. If one argues that reality is indeterministic, then those promoting the regress argument bring in their god-of-the-gaps, chance, or "randomness", to keep their metaphysics afloat.

The regress argument depends on either (1) strict determinism or (2) a dualism between determinism and chance. These are mere assumptions. Neither of these have support from either our own experiences nor from quantum uncertainty. They are purely metaphysical assumptions without basis in reality.

From a scientific perspective, that falsifies the regress argument.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

Again, you have failed to refute the regress argument. To do so, you must either show that one or more of its premises is not necessarily true, or that its premises do not logically entail its conclusion, or both. You have done neither.

This renders the rest of your post irrelevant.

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Indeed, I have shown that.

The determinism premise has been discredited by quantum uncertainty if not by our own experiences. The god-of-the-gaps back-up premise that if strict determinism is not true then a determinism=chance operation is in play has also been discredited by quantum uncertainty since the probabilities that quantum physics comes up are not uniform. They are not random, that is, not caused by the god-of-the-gaps Chance.

So, something else is involved besides determinism or chance. Because of that, the regress argument freeing you from responsibility for your actions does not hold.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

The determinism premise has been discredited by quantum uncertainty

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Maybe if you just keep saying this enough, on the 1,000,000th time it will actually be true! That seems to be YOUR philosophy, anyway; repeat nonsense enough so that you (and maybe one or two others) can actually believe it.

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Originally Posted by MorpheusSandman

Maybe if you just keep saying this enough, on the 1,000,000th time it will actually be true! That seems to be YOUR philosophy, anyway; repeat nonsense enough so that you (and maybe one or two others) can actually believe it.

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Is that how people who believe in many worlds convince themselves that they're right?

I've mentioned this before, but I'll say it again. I'm not trying to convince you. I want someone to challenge my positions. That's how I test them and how I get a better version of my positions. I don't care if anyone agrees with me or not.

These questions of the existence of strict determinism or its backup, chance, and its relationship to free will involve unquestioned cultural assumptions. To discuss them is challenging for people who don't want to step out of their metaphysical boxes.

These are the ones that I see at the moment rephrased as questions:

1) Does strict materialistic determinism actually exist? That is, is it possible to construct a state vector from which one can predict the entire future and claim to know the entire past. I don't think so. If it doesn't exist, the trending behavior that makes mathematical laws look deterministic needs to be rethought.

Quantum uncertainty, like it or not, has discredited this at the fundamental level. There is no reason not to assume it should be discredited everywhere.

2) Does the materialist's god-of-the-gaps, chance, exist at all? When determinism fails, this chance God is brought out to save the materialist's metaphysics, that is, fill in the gaps that determinism leaves unanswered.

Why is chance needed? If determinism fails then something must fill in the gap so that one does not have to acknowledge the existence of enough consciousness for choices to be made. Why are materialists afraid of consciousness? Why are they afraid of choices being made? Well, it would wipe out their metaphysical belief system.

Again, quantum uncertainty has discredited chance. If unconscious chance actually was behind quantum uncertainty, those many worlders would have no problem constructing the Schrodinger equation. They would simply assign all the coefficients the same value under the assumption there was a uniform (chance--unconscious) distribution.

3) Are human beings machines? We look more like organisms, but culturally some people think there is no difference between organisms and machines. It seems clear, again, like it or not, that we have sufficient will power to make choices for which we are responsible. That would mean we are not machines.

I'm hoping to name other unjustified assumptions to add to this list as our discussions progress.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

Is that how people who believe in many worlds convince themselves that they're right?

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No MW advocate I know of goes around saying that MW is true and that CI has been falsified or that CI "isn't even an interpretation." You don't get it; it's the not the fact that you advocate CI that I'm so antagonistic towards you, it's the fact that, in doing so, you insist on repeating claims like "determinism is discredited by quantum uncertainty" or "MW isn't even an interpretation" that are PATENTLY FALSE. If you want to advocate CI, it's fine that you say "MW can't derive the Born rule," because that's true, and that's a problem; but it's NOT ok for you to utter nonsense like "determinism is discredited."

That you feel the need to repeat such things suggest either gross ignorance or dishonesty; at first I leaned towards the former, because there's no crime in being ignorant and I like to think the best of people, but in your repeated insistence on repeating falsites that you've been corrected on I now have to lean towards dishonesty, and it's all the more egregious when you put up this "I'm an innocent, honest truth-seeker who want people to challenge my opinion," which is bollocks. You started out your investigation believing in your magical, mystical "conscious choice" (never mind the lunacy of suggesting how particles could possible be "conscious" when we only know of consciousness to begin with because of a material brain made up of countless such particles) and wanting to disbelieve in determinism, and what you want to believe had colored everything you've read and said on the matter.

I have no problem "discussing" this subject with people that are honest or capable of understanding it; I don't think you are. My offer stands: I'll pay you to sign up for a physics forum and discuss this with others, if only so I can have a permanent record of many others confirming exactly what I've said. If you don't want to take up the challenge, then that speaks to your lack of honesty right there.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

1) Does strict materialistic determinism actually exist? -- Quantum uncertainty, like it or not, has discredited this at the fundamental level.

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It's "discredited" this ONLY if the collapse assumption of CI is true, and, I remind you, there's not a stitch of evidence--not in the math, not in the experiments--suggesting that it is. What's more, all of the paradoxes it creates suggests the exact opposite; that there is no collapse, everything is in a state of superposition, and, in which case, the wavefunction is deterministic and decohering into different worlds upon entanglement. The "uncertainty" is precisely what we'd expect to see since we can't see into both worlds simultaneously.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

2) Does the materialist's god-of-the-gaps, chance, exist at all? When determinism fails, this chance God is brought out to save the materialist's metaphysics, that is, fill in the gaps that determinism leaves unanswered.

Why is chance needed? If determinism fails then something must fill in the gap so that one does not have to acknowledge the existence of enough consciousness for choices to be made. Why are materialists afraid of consciousness? Why are they afraid of choices being made? Well, it would wipe out their metaphysical belief system.

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:lol: You are too funny sometimes. You dislike both determinism and chance, but don't seem to get that they are mutually exclusive and things have to be one or the other. The "indeterminism" of CI is really no different than "chance." Saying that some outcomes are more likely makes it "not chance" is as silly as saying gambling isn't "chance."

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Originally Posted by YesNo

If unconscious chance actually was behind quantum uncertainty, those many worlders would have no problem constructing the Schrodinger equation. They would simply assign all the coefficients the same value under the assumption there was a uniform (chance--unconscious) distribution.

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And then you come out with pseudo-scientific garble like this that's almost credible enough to find its way into a sci-fi anime. Born is not uniform; MW recognizes this, but doesn't know why. CI doesn't know why either, but invokes a mystical "collapse" that's about as explanatory as saying "Zeus!" to explain lightning.

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Originally Posted by MorpheusSandman

No MW advocate I know of goes around saying that MW is true and that CI has been falsified or that CI "isn't even an interpretation." You don't get it; it's the not the fact that you advocate CI that I'm so antagonistic towards you, it's the fact that, in doing so, you insist on repeating claims like "determinism is discredited by quantum uncertainty" or "MW isn't even an interpretation" that are PATENTLY FALSE. If you want to advocate CI, it's fine that you say "MW can't derive the Born rule," because that's true, and that's a problem; but it's NOT ok for you to utter nonsense like "determinism is discredited."

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If you want me to think about this differently you will need to provide reasons or evidence. Otherwise, I will take the opportunity to summarize my latest understanding of the subject:

1) MW is not an interpretation of QM. Why? Because MW cannot formulate the Schrodinger equation from within the "interpretation". Without the Schrodinger equation, MW cannot claim to be in agreement with QM. What's "false" about that?

2) The Heisenburg uncertainty principle is derived mathematically from the Schrodinger equation. One of the points Bohm and Hiley made in The Undivided Universe, in the chapter criticizing many worlds, was to question whether the MW position actually removed uncertainty.

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Originally Posted by MorpheusSandman

That you feel the need to repeat such things suggest either gross ignorance or dishonesty; at first I leaned towards the former, because there's no crime in being ignorant and I like to think the best of people, but in your repeated insistence on repeating falsites that you've been corrected on I now have to lean towards dishonesty, and it's all the more egregious when you put up this "I'm an innocent, honest truth-seeker who want people to challenge my opinion," which is bollocks. You started out your investigation believing in your magical, mystical "conscious choice" (never mind the lunacy of suggesting how particles could possible be "conscious" when we only know of consciousness to begin with because of a material brain made up of countless such particles) and wanting to disbelieve in determinism, and what you want to believe had colored everything you've read and said on the matter.

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Regarding the claim that consciousness requires a material brain, this seems to me to be falsified by the behavior of slime mold that appears intelligent enough to make choices and yet doesn't have a material brain at all.

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Originally Posted by MorpheusSandman

It's "discredited" this ONLY if the collapse assumption of CI is true, and, I remind you, there's not a stitch of evidence--not in the math, not in the experiments--suggesting that it is. What's more, all of the paradoxes it creates suggests the exact opposite; that there is no collapse, everything is in a state of superposition, and, in which case, the wavefunction is deterministic and decohering into different worlds upon entanglement. The "uncertainty" is precisely what we'd expect to see since we can't see into both worlds simultaneously.

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If everything is in a state of superposition then determinism has been removed not only at the quantum level but at all levels. I think that might be the case, but I don't think it helps your argument against uncertainty.

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Originally Posted by MorpheusSandman

:lol: You are too funny sometimes.

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Thank you.

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Originally Posted by MorpheusSandman

You dislike both determinism and chance, but don't seem to get that they are mutually exclusive and things have to be one or the other. The "indeterminism" of CI is really no different than "chance." Saying that some outcomes are more likely makes it "not chance" is as silly as saying gambling isn't "chance."

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The point I am trying to make is that the view that determinism and chance are mutually exclusion is a metaphysical assumption that clouds one's thinking. This is why Pilosofer123 can't see past "free will impossibilism" leading to the view that our ability to make a choice as an illusion.

This is my view:

(1) Strict determinism is a metaphysical delusion. Things "trend" and from here we get approximate mathematical laws. I am using my understanding of Rupert Sheldrake's position regarding this, although I don't know if I understand Sheldrake completely.

(2) Uniformly distributed chance is rare in nature. If the chance event is not uniformly distributed, there is no guarantee that something else isn't going on. If the metaphysics one promotes must avoid conscious input of one sort or another, the materialist's god-of-the-gaps Chance must be a uniform distribution to even get off the ground as a viable position that does away with consciousness.

(3) Consciousness is fundamental. I think panpsychism, as a current philosophy of mind, is more likely true than not: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism It fits reality better.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

If you want me to think about this differently you will need to provide reasons or evidence.

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I have. Repeatedly. You've ignored it. I have no reason of thinking you'll change now.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

1) MW is not an interpretation of QM. Why? Because MW cannot formulate the Schrodinger equation from within the "interpretation". Without the Schrodinger equation, MW cannot claim to be in agreement with QM. What's "false" about that?

2) The Heisenburg uncertainty principle is derived mathematically from the Schrodinger equation. One of the points Bohm and Hiley made in The Undivided Universe, in the chapter criticizing many worlds, was to question whether the MW position actually removed uncertainty.

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1) You don't seem to get that Shrodinger is DESCRIPTIVE, while Born, which derives Shrodinger, is EXPLANATORY. How to explain the difference... imagine you're an alien that's just discovered human automobiles. After much testing, you can describe what they do, but you don't understand how/why they do it (via combustion). Even if you don't understand how/why it works, you can still describe what it does. Shrodinger is describing what the car does; Born is explaining why it does it.

You have this wonky notion that MW needs to "explain" Shrodinger (via Born) in order for it to be an interpretation. This is classic YesNo nonsense, especially when you consider that CI's "collapse" only "explains" Born by assuming something it has no reason to assume, and a great many reasons NOT to assume it. It would be like saying that the alien that shouts "gremlins!" to explain how a car runs is a legitimate interpretation, while an alien that says "it probably has something to do with that oily, transparent liquid, but I don't know what" isn't a legitimate interpretation.

I'll repeat this simple important fact: MW can't derive Born, but CI only derives Born at the expense of creating paradoxes and assuming something (a collapse) not validated by math or testing. An advocate of EITHER interp has to argue why their approach is better, and why the problems inherent in their approach aren't that serious. The way I see it, MW has one problem that's potentially solvable; CI has multiple problems that probably aren't. You always seem to gloss over the manifold problems in CI as if they don't exist. To me, MW not being able to derive Born is relatively MINOR compared to all the craziness of CI. Even invoking your magical, mystical "conscious choice" doesn't explain how particles can affect each other thousands of miles away at thousands of times faster than the speed of light.

2) MW would not remove uncertainty from a subjective standpoint. HUP merely expresses the limits of our knowledge before observation: "you can know this much, be this precise about the future, but no more until you actually get entangled with the particles." I have no idea why Bohm or Hiley would think MW removes uncertainty, unless they (maybe like you) don't get this crucial difference between the objective determinacy of Shrodinger VS the subjective indeterminacy of HUP.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

Regarding the claim that consciousness requires a material brain, this seems to me to be falsified by the behavior of slime mold that appears intelligent enough to make choices and yet doesn't have a material brain at all.

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You misquoted me; what I said was: "WE only know of consciousness to begin with because of a material brain made up of countless such particles," meaning that our experience of consciousness is tied to our brains. We have no clue what "experience" a slime mold has, whether it counts as consciousness or makes choice or if it's just a blob of DNA acting and reacting. Even the slime mold is made up of countless particles that make up the nuclei, proteins, DNA, etc. These are far from singular particles; they're still highly complex, organic, organized, life (comparatively, at least).

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Originally Posted by YesNo

If everything is in a state of superposition then determinism has been removed not only at the quantum level but at all levels. I think that might be the case...

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Absolutely false. Remember that the wavefunction IS deterministic, so if everything is in superposition then it's evolving according to that deterministic formula. CI NEEDS the collapse in order to make the wavefunction indeterministic. No collapse, no indeterminism; all you have left is observer uncertainty, which is not the same. This is another fundamental point you've never understood: MW as its simplest is saying "everything is in superposition." If that's true, then MW is true. So you can't think that "everything is in superposition" is a true statement without also thinking MW is true; they're the same thing.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

This is my view:

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Yeah, it's a complete mess right from the get-go. There are no "approximate mathematical laws." Those used in QM are ridiculously precise. Rupert Sheldrake is a first-rate charlatan promoting pseudoscience (and this is not my opinion, but that of the scientific community at large). "Uniform chance" is a nonsense term, and saying "consciousness is fundamental" is what Wittgenstein would call a meaningless statement.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

Actually, it is. The choice is the explanation. It needs no other explanation than its existence.

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If the choice has no explanation, then it is non-rational (not based on reason). And it makes no sense to hold someone responsible for a non-rational choice.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

The regress argument claims there is a deterministic explanation for each mental state. The person having that mental state has no responsibility for that state since some previous mental state determined it and so on. If one argues that reality is indeterministic, then those promoting the regress argument bring in their god-of-the-gaps, chance, or "randomness", to keep their metaphysics afloat.

The regress argument depends on either (1) strict determinism or (2) a dualism between determinism and chance. These are mere assumptions. Neither of these have support from either our own experiences nor from quantum uncertainty. They are purely metaphysical assumptions without basis in reality.

From a scientific perspective, that falsifies the regress argument.

Indeed, I have shown that.

The determinism premise has been discredited by quantum uncertainty if not by our own experiences. The god-of-the-gaps back-up premise that if strict determinism is not true then a determinism=chance operation is in play has also been discredited by quantum uncertainty since the probabilities that quantum physics comes up are not uniform. They are not random, that is, not caused by the god-of-the-gaps Chance.

So, something else is involved besides determinism or chance. Because of that, the regress argument freeing you from responsibility for your actions does not hold.

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The regress argument has no "determinism premise". As I explained in post #12, the regress argument does not assume determinism.

So again, in order to refute the regress argument, you must either show that one or more of its premises is not necessarily true, or you must show that its premises do not logically entail its conclusion. You have done neither, so the argument stands.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

If the choice has no explanation, then it is non-rational (not based on reason). And it makes no sense to hold someone responsible for a non-rational choice.

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At least you seem to agree that choices can be made. If one wants an "explanation" for the choice, one might be able to bring back Aristotle's four causes (explanations) and use them.

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Originally Posted by Philosofer123

The regress argument has no "determinism premise". As I explained in post #12, the regress argument does not assume determinism.

So again, in order to refute the regress argument, you must either show that one or more of its premises is not necessarily true, or you must show that its premises do not logically entail its conclusion. You have done neither, so the argument stands.

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What your position depends on is a dichotomy between determinism and chance. If something is not deterministic, then the god-of-the-gaps chance is invoked to explain it. There are two problems with that: (1) there may be more going on than determinism and chance and (2) both determinism and chance may be soft, that is, not having any reality except as approximations.

Actually, I have refuted the regress argument. The regress argument is based upon a metaphysical assumption that you need to justify now that I have pointed it out.

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Originally Posted by MorpheusSandman

You have this wonky notion that MW needs to "explain" Shrodinger (via Born) in order for it to be an interpretation. This is classic YesNo nonsense, especially when you consider that CI's "collapse" only "explains" Born by assuming something it has no reason to assume, and a great many reasons NOT to assume it.

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What MW needs to do is find the coefficients of the Schrodinger equation without copying those from Copenhagen. It does not need to explain the equation.

I don't think MW will ever be able to do this. The reason is that, assuming there are many worlds, one would have to find a position outside the universe of worlds from which to measure the probability of specific events after a test was run. That requires taking a supernatural position or having a supernatural agent of some sort willing to make those measurements and willing to communicate them to us. One cannot trust the results of an experiment performed in one of those worlds, like the real world we are living in.

So why trust Copenhagen over MW? Well, they can find those coefficients. What is more, they run a test and they can use the results of that test to predict the probability of something happening the next time and the next time. All in one world. All without the need of a supernatural agent. If MW trusts the results of its experiments, it is making a major assumption that the world we are living in will give us useful results. I suppose you could say, because QM works at all, MW must be false.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

What MW needs to do is find the coefficients of the Schrodinger equation without copying those from Copenhagen. It does not need to explain the equation.

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These two things are essentially identical, since Born explains Schrodinger; for MW to derive Born would be to explain Schrodinger, they go hand in hand.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

I don't think MW will ever be able to do this.

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Most thought we'd never fly to the moon or figure out what caused lightning; you underestimate the cleverness and resourcefulness of science. Quantum computing may very well be able to derive Born via MW. There are already plenty of plausible ideas out there how to get Born from MW: http://hanson.gmu.edu/mangledworlds.html

FWIW, it's not necessarily necessary (heh) to be outside the "worlds" in order to derive Born. I mean, if MW is right then the wavefunction is already, in a sense, us glimpsing multiple worlds contained in a point. The problem is the barrier we run up against when we become entangled with the wavefunction. If you have something that can crunch enough numbers then it's entirely possible it could measure without the same effects of entanglement and we'd have a new way of testing. Anyway, I'm not betting against anything they'll be able to find out through it in, say, 25-50 years time. Who knows, we may all be completely wrong.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

So why trust Copenhagen over MW? Well, they can find those coefficients.

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Yes, I've already stated this; but you ignore that they "find those coefficients" by assuming a collapse that they have no justification for assuming either via math or via testing, and this assumption also creates contradictions and paradoxes that 100 years of physics have yet to solve. So, you need to address these problems rather than just touting its one "success"

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Originally Posted by YesNo

I suppose you could say, because QM works at all, MW must be false.

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:lol: MW makes the same predictions CI does! Neither are experimentally distinguishable from each other! Again, that MW can't explain Schrodinger via Born doesn't prevent it from using Born any more than my hypothetical aliens not being able to explain how the car runs prevent them from driving the car. QM "working" is not an argument for either interpretation.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

If one wants an "explanation" for the choice, one might be able to bring back Aristotle's four causes (explanations) and use them.

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Yes, I'm sure a guy that lived thousands of years ago before the advent of modern science had "choice" all figured out. Hint: most all dead philosophers were wrong on most every major topic concerning reality as-it-is (ie, not necessarily about ethics and similar subjects, which don't correspond to how reality is, but how we want it to be).

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Originally Posted by YesNo

There are two problems with that: (1) there may be more going on than determinism and chance and (2) both determinism and chance may be soft, that is, not having any reality except as approximations.

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(1) What else is going on? (2) The terms "determinism" and "chance" themselves are just approximations of language, they're already about as "soft" as it gets; but I've yet to see you present any plausible way in which they can co-exist. The closest you get is CI which says that QM is all about "chance" but classical mechanics is all "deterministic" and there's some magical "collapse" where the former becomes the latter.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

At least you seem to agree that choices can be made. If one wants an "explanation" for the choice, one might be able to bring back Aristotle's four causes (explanations) and use them.

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The explanation that is required for rational choice is an explanation in terms of one's reasoning process. To the extent such an explanation is not available, the choice is non-rational, and one cannot be responsible for non-rational choices. And to the extent such an explanation is available, the regress looms. Aristotle can't help you here.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

What your position depends on is a dichotomy between determinism and chance. If something is not deterministic, then the god-of-the-gaps chance is invoked to explain it. There are two problems with that: (1) there may be more going on than determinism and chance and (2) both determinism and chance may be soft, that is, not having any reality except as approximations.

Actually, I have refuted the regress argument. The regress argument is based upon a metaphysical assumption that you need to justify now that I have pointed it out.

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The dichotomy is not between determinism and chance, but between one's choices being explainable in terms of one's reasoning process or not. To the extent such an explanation is not available, the choice is non-rational, and one cannot be responsible for non-rational choices. And to the extent such an explanation is available, the regress looms.