But is there such thing as an essence or substance in the metaphysical aspect of the term? The soul? But then again, there is no a priori basis for such knowledge, and so it's stays in the domain of speculation.
Yes, perhaps you could see it as a problem of semantics, although I don't think it's limited only to semantics. I wouldn't say my stance is only of "non-knowledge". I can say: "God doesn't exist (keeping in mind the eternal, but not used practically, doubt) because there is no bases for such a belief. I might as well believe in chimeras." It is not just an "I don't know" it is a "There is no reason to believe, therefore I don't believe." I don't think the difference is only semantic, but whatever this doesn't really matter after all.Quote:
Then the difficulty here is merely one of semantics. Your position is truly one of agnosticism, a "non-knowledge." This would be one where you would neither affirm nor deny because you have not received information. Of course that opens the whole question of what constitutes valid information...
Yes, yes, I believe we were then saying the same thing, and scientific method says the same as well. This is my main concern as well, I do not care whatever people might believe in, but it's the dogmatism that is my main concern.Quote:
You misunderstood my position. I did NOT claim that ALL observations are to be doubted, but the reasonable position that not all observations are true. Therefore we must always take a position that all knowledge is provisional, since we are never precisely sure where error will creep in. I am no fan of dogmatic religion of any stripe, either. I firmly believe that much, if not all, of the trouble that religious belief has caused in the world is precisely because people act as though there is no doubt as to what the truth is. My position is we should always leave room for doubt in recognition of our inability to know anything perfectly. This does not deny that we can know things, merely that we know them as well as we think we do.
Well whatever the name given to it, I can understand it. Tell me 2+2=5, and tell me it's Aristotelian physics, if I understand that 2+2=5 doesn't work, well I have understood what it is, after this it's simply a matter of name.Quote:
You are missing my point. You could not understand what Aristotelian physics is without having faith that what you were told Aristotelian physics constitutes really was the physics of Aristotle. You had to have faith people weren't pulling your leg and that there was really an Aristotelian physics to understand at all.
Oh and I think, concerning his metaphysics, that he was pulling our leg, he simply wanted to confuse people :p
I don't use the term faith concerning axioms, a priori knowledge or empirical knowledge. There is a huge difference whether you simply use the term "faith" loosely or applied to different "categories" of knowledge.Quote:
In other words, this is the same position that you argued correctly above, that one must have faith in something in order to have any possibility of knowledge.
Yes, that is true, at least provisionally, at least, my main concern, however is that this knowledge understood through faith (such knowledge is inevitable to progress) should be taken as such and not scientifically or dogmatically, but as a theory.Quote:
Considering the limits of time, space and humans, we must inevitably come to understand some things through faith (not necessarily religious).
But here's another distinction: The existence of Oakland or Montreal (I'm in Montreal :p ) exist, is empirical data.Quote:
For example, I have faith in my senses that New York City exists (I am in New York City) but I have to trust other people that Oakland, California exists (though Gertrude Stein famously remarked of the city, "There is no there, there.")
Alright, only, for the second part, philosophy didn't grew out of religious beliefs, philosophy was adapted to religious beliefs and mostly developed in parallel while being interested in theological questions (intrusion almost always fought by theologians during the whole Middle-Age).Quote:
No, I said that SCIENCE is not equipped to answer ontological questions. Clearly theology is an attempt to deal with ontological issues.
Philosophy and theology were not so much confused as that philosophy grew out of religious beliefs.
[QUOTE]Mendeleev predicted the existence of an element he labelled eka-silicon that was unknown to science. It subsequently was discovered and found to have the properties Mendeleev predicted. In a touch of historical irony, it was named Germanium. The neutrino was postulated to exist before it was actually detected. Pluto was predicted to exist based on perturbations of orbits of the planets. In all these cases there was good theoretical work even without direct observational proof that the particles existed.[/QUOTE¸]
Yes, I don't think we're disagreeing here, only for these "predictions" there is empirical data leading to these conclusions. If a hunter sees a fresh deer track in the woods, he doesn't need to see the deer to know there is most probably one close.
Yes, but I simply consider an axiom based on demonstrable or empirical knowledge applied to a scientifically conceptual world more worthy to be taken as scientific knowledge than what some book with shady origins might give me as purely metaphysical dogmatic knowledge, and that is without many other historical considerations that would reduce the dogmatic value of such knowledge.Quote:
The question here appears, at least on one level, of what we are to take as our axioms and which to exclude. Nothing at all wrong with that as the utility of Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries shows. My point here is not to say that one set of axioms has any privileged position, in fact I hold the contrary position. What I am arguing for is merely a recognition that a scientific, or a materialistic, or a religious, or a (fill in the blank) conception involves a selection of axioms. This selection determines what kind of questions can be fruitfully asked within the conceptual model. The basis of judgment on the particular model should be how well it answers the questions that belong to the set of well-formed questions that can be posed within the model.
Yes there was. That there was a perturbation on the orbit of planets which would coincide with the existence of a planet of x mass with x orbit, is empirical knowledge. If you see a puzzle with a piece missing in the middle, you can probably deduce: that there is a piece missing, the shape of the piece and even generally how the piece will look like - based on it's interaction with others. I do not need to see the piece itself.Quote:
Spoken like an Aristotelian! Unfortunately it does not always work like that. As shown above for germanium and neutrinos, there was no empirical demonstration of the existence of the particles before they were postulated.
EDIT: Wow this is getting to be big messages, there is a few parts however that are pretty much done, agreed and understood, or perhaps less relevant to the discussion, so let's cut them down :P

