Quote:
“I have never argued that because every part of the universe has a cause the whole universe has a cause. That would be manifestly fallacious. Rather the reasons I’ve offered for thinking P1 is true are:
1. Something cannot come from nothing
To claim that something can come into being out of nothing is worse than magic. When a magician pulls a rabbit out of the hat, at least you have the magician, not to mention a hat; but to deny P1 you have to think that the whole universe just appeared at some point in the past for no reason whatsoever; but nobody sincerely believes that things, say, a horse, or an Eskimo village can pop into being without a cause.
2. If something can come into being from nothing, it becomes inexplicable why just anything or everything doesn’t come into being from nothing.
Think about it; why don’t bicycles, and Beethoven, and root beer come into being out of nothing. Why is it only universes that only pop into being from nothing. What makes nothingness so discriminatory? There can’t be anything about nothingness that favors universes for nothingness doesn’t have any properties. Nor can anything constrain nothingness since there isn’t anything to be restrained.
3. Common experience and scientific evidence confirm the truth of P1
P1 is constantly verified, and never falsified. It’s hard to understand how any atheist committed to modern science could deny that P1 is more plausibly true than false in light of the evidence. Now know well that the 3rd reason is an appeal to inductive reasoning, not reasoning by composition. It’s drawing an inductive inference about all the members of a class of things based on a sample of a class. Inductive reasoning undergirds all of science and is not to be confused by reasoning by composition, which is a fallacy.”
What jumps out of me about this whole spiel is that, one, not once does Craig make it explicit that he is using “nothing” to refer to “CAN,” (EG, would he include abstract laws? How is virtual energy even legitimately a thing? How about space and time itself? How are those “things”?) and, two, whenever he discusses his reasoning for why nothing comes from nothing he uses examples from material reality (horse, Eskimo village, bicycles, Beethoven, and root beer), of which we only know of them they came from a lot of something else. So I still insist that what I initially claimed was right: that Craig seems to use the “everything we know of in material reality comes from something, so nothing can come from CAN,” which simply doesn’t seem to follow. How is it that we use our observance of material reality, where something is always there, to argue that nothing comes from CAN when there may never have been CAN to begin with?