Quote:
Hitchens’ informal style, the sort of brilliant uncle talking at a party, causes trouble because it appears that he skipped generations of important philosophers and certain intellectual traditions. How do you talk about religion and truth and knowledge without bringing in explicit questions of epistemology, of what we actually say about truth? All of these questions make some of Hitchens’ argument feel amateurish, like late-night dorm room philosophizing, which can be brilliant, but rarely precise. Not that academic jargon always matters one way or the other, but to discount countless theories on what it means to know, on the meaning of truth, makes Hitchens’ arguments sound simplistic.
To give a small example, at no point does anyone question the ability to know and learn anything specific from history. What historical events, especially trends that span many centuries, are ever so clear as to point to any sort of lesson. Let’s say we did sit down and judge the value of religion throughout history. How do you go about truly gauging the effects of religion on society? What counts as variables, as evidence, even as religion? History, as all historians of today will tell you, is not a science in that sense. How do you know what to put on the scales, and how much everything weighs? To begin to use point systems attests to the impossibility of this attempt. Moreover, how do you begin to assess cause and correlation? Does religion engender evil or provide an outlet? Couldn’t any system of government or societal makeup serve as an outlet for our violent tendencies? Again, I don’t agree with any of these positions, but not to flesh out these ambiguities makes Hitchens polemical and not philosophical. Polemics, while interesting, enlightening and often compelling, rarely further the conversation.
I think this hits the nail firmly on the proverbial head when it comes to my complaints about Hitch.
