Thomas Aquinas Proof for God

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Originally Posted by WyattGwyon

If I provisionally accept all of the physics and cosmology here—the one physicist/cosmologist among my friends is in Antarctica working on a telescope sensitive to variations in the universe's background radiation, so it is inconvenient to fact check—what you write obviates the need for a supreme being. Clearly, in this singularity you will have found the first cause and prime mover required by the argument without postulating a god. So, why is it you think this supports the argument for a deity?

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I take it you don't understand what an "agent" means. We're talking about something with AGENCY. The problem with a cause having no agency is thus: a timeless cause is a permanent cause, and if the universe is the consequence of a permanent entity without agency, then the universe would, itself, be permanent as it would result coincidentally with the existence of its permanent cause; thus, the universe would be eternal. The only way for a permanent entity to cause a finite effect would be to choose to cause it. The Kalam cosmological argument results in a timeless, spaceless, PERSONAL cause. And if you claim that it does not name a deity, then I applaud you for being able to understand the argument. However, if you agree that there is a timeless, spaceless, personal cause of the universe, then you don't sound like an atheist. If you claim to agree with the Kalam and insist on atheism, then I suggest that there has never been a more ridiculous atheism in the history of the world.

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Originally Posted by OrphanPip

We don't really know if everything must have a cause, we don't know what causes quantum fluctuations after all.

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I'm not trying to argue here as to understand.

I think Aquinas claimed in the First Cause argument that "some" things have a cause. I assume the only thing that doesn't have a cause is God from Aquinas' perspective, but I don't know.

However, vacuum fluctuations do not seem to have a cause. They would be spontaneous. The same would go for radioactive decay. One might then use a probabilistic model to describe these events. However, even if one uses a probabilistic model that does not mean that chance is the cause of these events. It only means we don't know what causes them.

So when a scientist says the universe or radioactive decay occurs by chance it only means that the scientist has reached a limit in his or her ability to explain what happened.

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Originally Posted by YesNo

I'm not trying to argue here as to understand.

I think Aquinas claimed in the First Cause argument that "some" things have a cause. I assume the only thing that doesn't have a cause is God from Aquinas' perspective, but I don't know.

However, vacuum fluctuations do not seem to have a cause. They would be spontaneous. The same would go for radioactive decay. One might then use a probabilistic model to describe these events. However, even if one uses a probabilistic model that does not mean that chance is the cause of these events. It only means we don't know what causes them.

So when a scientist says the universe or radioactive decay occurs by chance it only means that the scientist has reached a limit in his or her ability to explain what happened.

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The claim that we know vacuum fluctuations do not have a cause is simply untrue. There are a number of conflicting theories concerning this and no real consensus. The truth is we don't know what causes them or if they have causes. Not knowing something is hardly the same thing as knowing something to the contrary of a proposition. Try deriving the conclusion "Therefore some things have no cause" from the premise "we don't know what causes vacuum fluctuations." This is an example of how impoverished the atheist position is: they have to distort the truth in a desperate attempt to deny the conclusion of the Kalam.

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Originally Posted by stuntpickle

First of all, Aquinas does not state "the prime mover was God." Consider the following:

"Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God."

Saint Aquinas Thomas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) / From the Complete American Edition (Kindle Locations 395-396).

"Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God."

Saint Aquinas Thomas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) / From the Complete American Edition (Kindle Location 403).

"This all men speak of as God."

Saint Aquinas Thomas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) / From the Complete American Edition (Kindle Locations 412-413).

I think Aquinas is justified in assuming that everyone calls this prime mover God. You, like a lot of atheists, seem to pretend that the idea of a creator beyond the creation is some Johnny-come-lately justification of fundamentalists, when, in fact, it is one of the foundational ideas of Western culture. You do understand that there are secular scholars of the Bible, right? It is not controversial to say that practically all of Biblical scholars agree that the major contribution of the Hebrews, whose only historical accomplishment was to be conquered by Rome, was the idea of a creator who, unlike various genii inherent in natural phenomena, rivers gods, spirits of the forest, etc, was distinct from the creation. This is a fairly powerful idea--even if it is untrue. The reconciliation of Yaweh with Aristotle's prime mover is not difficult, but fairly easy since they are fundamentally the same idea. Of course, no cosmological argument ends with Yahweh because none aspires to identify the deity; however, this is what everyone generally assumes because that's essentially the definition of God--especially in the time of Aquinas.

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That all doesn't matter though, I never said anything of the like. I just said that Aquinas' assumption that the first cause must be a deity, imbued with conscience, omniscience, benevolence, and revealed to Abraham and subsequent prophets, is based on nothing. The ease of reconciliation with the notion of an ever existing being outside of causation doesn't demonstrate anything. Clearly he is not justified in assuming that, since not everyone has, Kant disagreed for example.

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Originally Posted by stuntpickle

There isn’t ONE cosmological argument, nor is there even ONE VARIETY. There are several different varieties—arguments from cause, essence, becoming, and contingency—which exist in nearly innumerable historical iterations. The idea that Bertrand Russell accused every single argument ever having existed or to possibly yet exist of containing the same fallacy is absurd and untrue. When I present you the Kalam cosmological argument and you offer Russell’s assertion of a fallacy, you don’t seem aware that Russell’s criticisms aren’t applicable, and because the Kalam is about as simple an argument as one can make, I’m led to believe you either have a fundamental misunderstanding of deduction or that you are so opposed to the even the idea that you must unreasonably resist.

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He didn't, he accused the arguments from contingency, like Aquinas', of it. I presented Russell as a response to Aquinas, not as a response to the Kalam argument. I don't even necessarily agree with Russell.

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Originally Posted by stuntpickle

First, you can’t claim, as you do, to have no problems with the premises but then take issue with the conclusion. The Kalam is the strongest variety of argument one can make, which is to say that it is FORCING: if the premises are true, so is the conclusion. One of the main criticisms of the New Atheists is how ridiculous it has been to witness them constantly assuming any number of worldviews to deny the conclusions.

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Read what I said carefully, I said the premises may or may not be sound. My objection to the conclusion was then based off of the possibility of the premises being unsound. Also, the Kalam argument is substantially different from Aquinas', which brings it the notion of the Judeo-Christian God. In general, I don't think the premises are necessarily sound, because it has been demonstrated that quantum fluctuations may have caused the Big Bang, which means that at least some things that exist existed prior to the singularity. This leads to two possibilities, either the QF are not causal, but they may still be, or if they are causal then it does not follow that causal chains do not extend beyond the singularity, thus it may be possible that some sort of universe existed prior to the singularity.

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Originally Posted by stuntpickle

I think you might misunderstand what a fallacy is. A fallacy concerns a formal arrangement of assertions. The reason Russell can make the accusation here is because the argument explicitly contains statements of composition. To try and apply Russell’s criticism to the Kalam cosmological argument is to take issue with the second premise: “The universe began to exist.” Moreover, it is to make an argument that the universe does not exist at all as a thing. See, the Kalam does not make the compositional statements Copleston does, but rather metaphysical judgments about “things”. The only way to apply Russell’s statement is to suggest that the only way the arrive at an idea of the universe is to commit a compositional fallacy, and if you make that assertion, you also indict current cosmology, which, itself, makes the same assumption. You see, as we will see later, Russell would argue that the statement “the universe exists” isn’t rational.

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No, the fallacy of composition is an informal fallacy, dealing not with the formal structure of the syllogism but with deduction. I didn't apply it to the Kalam argument, since I assumed we were discussing Aquinas' use of the cosmological argument to prove the existence of God. That's why I brought up Kant, Kant did not have a problem with the cosmological argument either, only the theistic conclusion of certain forms of it.

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Originally Posted by stuntpickle

You’ve got the same problem with Hume. Yes, Hume indicts induction, but Hume uses induction liberally. His assertion that all knowledge is extrapolated from sensory experience is, itself, an inductive inference. The entire basis of Hume’s worldview is based on inductive inference. And I know that you don’t believe Hume because you’re a scientist, or claim to be. If you really believed Hume, you would abandon science as a completely useless endeavor, as experimentation is, itself, an inductive endeavor. The best radical skepticism has come up with is Popper’s assertion that science does not attempt truth but a constantly revising description, which none can justify. If you really want to debar induction, then you assert that every field of human inquiry has no capacity for truth.

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I'm only a scientist in the sense that I'm a microbiologist, my own beliefs are only in the pragmatic usefulness of the scientific method's ability to refine and reach increasingly useful conclusions about certain subjects. However, even if we do not take Hume to the extreme, his criticism can be nuanced to cover the fact that we really do not know if the rules of empiricism extend to the beginning of the universe. Quantum mechanics holds that space, time, and matter are interdependent and cannot exist without the other, so what would the physics of a point without space, time and matter really be like? We do not need to reject the value of induction to understand that there are problems with extending induction about our universe as it is now to the time of its formation.

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Originally Posted by stuntpickle

If I find the time, I will address your equally odd comments about Kant later.

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I don't know what there is odd about it.

1 - Kant rejects the ontological arguments for God. On the basis that he thinks "God exists" is not a real predicate.
2 - Kant thinks that cosmological arguments for God assume a definition of God based on the ontological argument.
3. - Thus, Kant rejects Aquinas' and others cosmological arguments for the existence of God.

Despite Kant himself being a theist.

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Originally Posted by OrphanPip

He didn't, he accused the arguments from contingency, like Aquinas', of it. I presented Russell as a response to Aquinas, not as a response to the Kalam argument. I don't even necessarily agree with Russell.



Read what I said carefully, I said the premises may or may not be sound. My objection to the conclusion was then based off of the possibility of the premises being unsound. Also, the Kalam argument is substantially different from Aquinas',

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Forgive me Pip, but this seems a little squirrely to me. We did seem to be having a discussion about the Kalam at some point. If we're simply discussing Aquinas, then why are you talking about Kant's refutation of the ontological argument? As far as I know, Aquinas criticized the ontological argument. Do you agree with Kant's assessment of the ontological argument, or is this simply an historical discussion we're having?

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Originally Posted by stuntpickle

Forgive me Pip, but this seems a little squirrely to me. We did seem to be having a discussion about the Kalam at some point. If we're simply discussing Aquinas, then why are you talking about Kant's refutation of the ontological argument? As far as I know, Aquinas criticized the ontological argument. Do you agree with Kant's assessment of the ontological argument, or is this simply an historical discussion we're having?

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My posts got a little jumbled, because my first response about Russell and Kant was only directed at Aquinas, and then I continued that response while discussing the Kalam argument separately in the same post, so I can see why it wasn't clear.

Aquinas criticized the ontological argument, but Kant maintained that Aquinas' unintentionally based his argument for God as the prime mover on ontological arguments for God. I think most people have problems with ontological arguments for God, I don't know whether I agree with Kant or not about Aquinas committing implicitly to it in his proof of God. I think there are other problems with assuming God as the first mover, particularly to the point of specify the Judeo-Christian God. Aquinas didn't admit the possibility, but his proof is more about Deism than really proving God.

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Originally Posted by OrphanPip

My posts got a little jumbled, because my first response about Russell and Kant was only directed at Aquinas, and then I continued that response while discussing the Kalam argument separately in the same post, so I can see why it wasn't clear.

Aquinas criticized the ontological argument, but Kant maintained that Aquinas' unintentionally based his argument for God as the prime mover on ontological arguments for God. I think most people have problems with ontological arguments for God, I don't know whether I agree with Kant or not about Aquinas committing implicitly to it in his proof of God. I think there are other problems with assuming God as the first mover, particularly to the point of specify the Judeo-Christian God. Aquinas didn't admit the possibility, but his proof is more about Deism than really proving God.

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Okay then, maybe there was some confusion.

As far as Aquinas goes, I think there's reason to believe he didn't make a fallacy of composition in his prime mover argument. I'll provide here a rough distillation of the argument:

1. Some things are in motion.
2. Nothing can move unless it first has the potential for that movement.
3. It is an act, when motion occurs.
4. Motion is the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.
5. Whatever is in motion is put in motion by another.
6. A thing can only be put in motion by something in a state of actuality.
7. A thing cannot be in potentiality and actuality at the same time in regards to the same type of motion, but can be in regards to different types of motion. (Something that is actually hot cannot be potentially hot, but it is potentially cold.)
8. Therefore, it is impossible for something to move itself.
9. Since a thing can only be put in motion by something else in motion and that thing too must be put in motion by another, and that by another, then there must be an infinite regress of movers moving things or there must be a first mover put in motion by no other.
10. An infinite regress of movers would have no first mover and, consequently, no other mover, since subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover.
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Therefore, it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, itself unmoved, and this everyone calls God.

I have taken some liberties with the language, which was a bit archaic, but I have tried to stay faithful to the original meaning.

The part Russell would have called a compositional fallacy is:

"that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover;"

Saint Aquinas Thomas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) / From the Complete American Edition (Kindle Locations 394-395).



And honestly I read that as meaning that there are things in motion only insofar as the first mover has begun initial motion. Obviously, it can be understood as a fallacy of composition, but I don't think one must interpret it that way.

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Originally Posted by stuntpickle

Okay then, maybe there was some confusion.

As far as Aquinas goes, I think there's reason to believe he didn't make a fallacy of composition in his prime mover argument. I'll provide here a rough distillation of the argument:

1. Some things are in motion.
2. Nothing can move unless it first has the potential for that movement.
3. It is an act, when motion occurs.
4. Motion is the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.
5. Whatever is in motion is put in motion by another.
6. A thing can only be put in motion by something in a state of actuality.
7. A thing cannot be in potentiality and actuality at the same time in regards to the same type of motion, but can be in regards to different types of motion. (Something that is actually hot cannot be potentially hot, but it is potentially cold.)
8. Therefore, it is impossible for something to move itself.
9. Since a thing can only be put in motion by something else in motion and that thing too must be put in motion by another, and that by another, then there must be an infinite regress of movers moving things or there must be a first mover put in motion by no other.
10. An infinite regress of movers would have no first mover and, consequently, no other mover, since subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover.

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1. If not all things are in motion, may I suggest that some are not in motion? It sorta jumps past the argument and describes an "unmoved" mover, right?

I'm going to suggest that an object not in motion is at absolute zero in terms of energy and mass, meaning it cannot in any real sense exist.

Observing such an object would prove impossible (since observation is an act upon it).

Being at absolute zero, the object would have no possible motion with which to act upon others, otherwise it would not, by definition, be truly still/unmoved.

It would not have a mass (since mass exerts a force) nor any energy (magnetic/weak/strong forces must be null for it to be truly inert/unmoved).

If such an object has no physical/observable qualities with which to act on others does it exist anywhere beyond the imagination? Even more importantly, does it possess the capability to act upon other objects ever again?

I would say no: All objects must have some level of motion with which to exist. An unmoved object can not exist. If you accept an unmoved mover as god, you're essentially saying god no longer exists (or at least no longer plays the active role various religions suggest).

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2. In having that potential it is, in some small way, in motion.
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3. An unnecessary point for this discussion really, but I suppose it could serve some overall purpose.
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7. A falling object has both potential and kinetic energy in regards to its fall: Potentially more than it has in actuality. right? As for the hot and cold reference, those are both along the same scale (the level of excitement and activity of the atoms within a substance).

Also, to speak in absolutes, an unmoved mover is another example of an object with suggested potentiality and actuality. Any action between two objects inherently involves action upon both objects.
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Also, I'm interested in your take on my earlier post regarding a fallacy of composition in the first premise, rather than the second. We do not know that all things came into existence: some (to include a prime mover, right?) may have always been, meaning we cannot assume the whole came to be.

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Originally Posted by krymsonkyng

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1. If not all things are in motion, may I suggest that some are not in motion? It sorta jumps past the argument and describes an "unmoved" mover, right?

I'm going to suggest that an object not in motion is at absolute zero in terms of energy and mass, meaning it cannot in any real sense exist.

Observing such an object would prove impossible (since observation is an act upon it).

Being at absolute zero, the object would have no possible motion with which to act upon others, otherwise it would not, by definition, be truly still/unmoved.

It would not have a mass (since mass exerts a force) nor any energy (magnetic/weak/strong forces must be null for it to be truly inert/unmoved).

If such an object has no physical/observable qualities with which to act on others does it exist anywhere beyond the imagination? Even more importantly, does it possess the capability to act upon other objects ever again?

I would say no: All objects must have some level of motion with which to exist. An unmoved object can not exist. If you accept an unmoved mover as god, you're essentially saying god no longer exists (or at least no longer plays the active role various religions suggest).

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2. In having that potential it is, in some small way, in motion.
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3. An unnecessary point for this discussion really, but I suppose it could serve some overall purpose.
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7. A falling object has both potential and kinetic energy in regards to its fall: Potentially more than it has in actuality. right? As for the hot and cold reference, those are both along the same scale (the level of excitement and activity of the atoms within a substance).

Also, to speak in absolutes, an unmoved mover is another example of an object with suggested potentiality and actuality. Any action between two objects inherently involves action upon both objects.
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Also, I'm interested in your take on my earlier post regarding a fallacy of composition in the first premise, rather than the second. We do not know that all things came into existence: some (to include a prime mover, right?) may have always been, meaning we cannot assume the whole came to be.

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First, you don't seem to understand that the prime mover argument is not about literal "motion," but about cause/change. The term "motion" is one Aquinas borrows from Aristotle. So the statements about kinetic energy are largely irrelevant. Moreover, the work of Aquinas is, by now, centuries old, and I have no interest in defending it, simply because the same arguments have much better modern articulations. The stuff about God not existing in any "real" sense is largely misguided as you don't seem to have a grasp on what "real" might mean. Is the number two real? Is love real? Is morality real? If you're a naturalist, you've got much bigger problems than the nature of God's existence.

Just to give you an idea of what sort of motion Aquinas is talking about:

"Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it."

Saint Aquinas Thomas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) / From the Complete American Edition (Kindle Locations 389-390).

The whole conversation about fallacies of composition in the Kalam cosmological argument has been ridiculous. There can't be any fallacy of composition in the first premise of the Kalam because it's a metaphysical statement in regards to "things." Moreover, you can't execute a fallacy of composition with a single statement. You have to deduce another statement.

The idea of a compositional component is so remote from the first premise that I can't believe you would even suggest it. If I say "stuff exists" I'm not talking about parts of something. The statement is so straight forward--everything that begins to exist has a cause--it blows my mind that it's such a problem for you to understand. This could only happen if you were trying to complicate the conversation. I mean, if the conclusion of the Kalam were "therefore, cupcakes have a cause" would you really suggest that the statement "everything that begins to exist has a cause" assumes a fallacy of composition because cupcakes are made from different components? The reason there can't be any fallacy about "the whole" of the universe in the first premise is because the first premise doesn't even explicitly reference the universe. If you were even going to mention it, it would have to be the second premise, but it still couldn't be a compositional fallacy because there's NO argument from composition.

Look, let me give you an example of a fallacy of composition.

1. The parts of airplanes are lightweight.
2. Therefore, airplanes are lightweight.

Try to compare that with the Kalam cosmological argument. There's nothing even remotely like that in it.

[QUOTE=stuntpickle;1096937]

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Okay then, maybe there was some confusion.

As far as Aquinas goes, I think there's reason to believe he didn't make a fallacy of composition in his prime mover argument. I'll provide here a rough distillation of the argument:

1. Some things are in motion.
2. Nothing can move unless it first has the potential for that movement.
3. It is an act, when motion occurs.
4. Motion is the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.
5. Whatever is in motion is put in motion by another.
6. A thing can only be put in motion by something in a state of actuality.
7. A thing cannot be in potentiality and actuality at the same time in regards to the same type of motion, but can be in regards to different types of motion. (Something that is actually hot cannot be potentially hot, but it is potentially cold.)
8. Therefore, it is impossible for something to move itself.
9. Since a thing can only be put in motion by something else in motion and that thing too must be put in motion by another, and that by another, then there must be an infinite regress of movers moving things or there must be a first mover put in motion by no other.
10. An infinite regress of movers would have no first mover and, consequently, no other mover, since subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover.

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Proposition 5 has no basis or support in the earlier propositions. Proposition 7 is just stupid. Something that is actually hot is obviously potentially hot or it wouldn't be actually hot. So you would say Vengerov does not have the potential to be a great violinist because he is in actuality a great violinist. Ha ha hah!

I've wasted enough time here. Bye now.

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Originally Posted by WyattGwyon

Proposition 5 has no basis or support in the earlier propositions. Proposition 7 is just stupid. Something that is actually hot is obviously potentially hot or it wouldn't be actually hot. So you would say Vengerov does not have the potential to be a great violinist because he is in actuality a great violinist. Ha ha hah!

I've wasted enough time here. Bye now.

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You obviously didn't understand the propositions. Maybe it's better that you have discontinued the discussion.

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Originally Posted by WyattGwyon

Proposition 5 has no basis or support in the earlier propositions. Proposition 7 is just stupid. Something that is actually hot is obviously potentially hot or it wouldn't be actually hot. So you would say Vengerov does not have the potential to be a great violinist because he is in actuality a great violinist. Ha ha hah!

I've wasted enough time here. Bye now.

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You seem to think that every argument is syllogistic when, clearly, that's not the case. That premise five is not an entailment of a previous premise does not affect the validity of the argument; in fact, it's fairly common in lengthy arguments for assertions to appear in the middle of things. The assertion in question is no more controversial than "everything that begins to exist has a cause."

There are always difficulties when rendering prose into standard logic form. You seem to think that Aquinas actually wrote his argument in the form I have provided when, really, he wrote a paragraph in prose. Anyone could do a better job arranging the argument, even Aquinas, but when you're transcribing the argument from an existing text, you should try to stay faithful to the meaning and order of the text. Aquinas isn't simply arguing in the passage but trying to explain, and if I had left out most of the explanation, you probably wouldn't even understand what was being said.

Your example of the violinist is, I think, bad. When I get sick, I am not in a state of potential sickness; to suggest that I am is just wrong. No, I am really sick. No one who had the flu would claim to be at risk of contracting the flu because risk would no longer be a factor. You would not approach a world class violinist and tell him that, with practice and determination, he could be a decent violinist; he's already a decent violinist!

More importantly, it's absurd to dismiss a text that everyone, even secularists, agree is a major text in western culture. You seem to think that because the Summa doesn't demonstrate modern standards of logical rigor that you are justified in dismissing it out of hand. You could, on similar grounds, dismiss Plato's The Republic, which, in case you forgot, describes a proto-fascistic hell no modern person would consider a viable society. You could dismiss nearly all of literature according to your standards. The truth is that, regardless of whether you believe in God, Aquinas was smarter than you and I, and we can both learn from him by seeing how he thought. Your dismissal is fairly typical of a university freshman who thinks that, since he knows it all already, his attendance at class is purely a formality.

"The only way for a permanent entity to cause a finite effect would be to choose to cause it."

I don't understand how you come to this conclusion. I can see that it would be possible. But why must it necessarily be so.

Doesn't the ability to choose preclude it from being a permanent entity... whatever exactly that might mean.

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Originally Posted by stuntpickle

First, you don't seem to understand that the prime mover argument is not about literal "motion," but about cause/change. The term "motion" is one Aquinas borrows from Aristotle. So the statements about kinetic energy are largely irrelevant. Moreover, the work of Aquinas is, by now, centuries old, and I have no interest in defending it, simply because the same arguments have much better modern articulations. The stuff about God not existing in any "real" sense is largely misguided as you don't seem to have a grasp on what "real" might mean. Is the number two real? Is love real? Is morality real? If you're a naturalist, you've got much bigger problems than the nature of God's existence.

Just to give you an idea of what sort of motion Aquinas is talking about:

"Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it."

Saint Aquinas Thomas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) / From the Complete American Edition (Kindle Locations 389-390).

The whole conversation about fallacies of composition in the Kalam cosmological argument has been ridiculous. There can't be any fallacy of composition in the first premise of the Kalam because it's a metaphysical statement in regards to "things." Moreover, you can't execute a fallacy of composition with a single statement. You have to deduce another statement.

The idea of a compositional component is so remote from the first premise that I can't believe you would even suggest it. If I say "stuff exists" I'm not talking about parts of something. The statement is so straight forward--everything that begins to exist has a cause--it blows my mind that it's such a problem for you to understand. This could only happen if you were trying to complicate the conversation. I mean, if the conclusion of the Kalam were "therefore, cupcakes have a cause" would you really suggest that the statement "everything that begins to exist has a cause" assumes a fallacy of composition because cupcakes are made from different components? The reason there can't be any fallacy about "the whole" of the universe in the first premise is because the first premise doesn't even explicitly reference the universe. If you were even going to mention it, it would have to be the second premise, but it still couldn't be a compositional fallacy because there's NO argument from composition.

Look, let me give you an example of a fallacy of composition.

1. The parts of airplanes are lightweight.
2. Therefore, airplanes are lightweight.

Try to compare that with the Kalam cosmological argument. There's nothing even remotely like that in it.

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Let me try and spell out my argument more clearly:

1. Some things came to exist. (some things, or "stuff" being parts.)
2. Therefore, the universe came to exist. (The Universe, or reality being the whole)

Hey look, it lines up fairly well with your airplane example. Funny that.

Further trouble is, there may exist within all of reality objects that have always existed (the proposed prime mover, for example), meaning, like airplane parts that are relatively heavy (the black box, hydrolics, etc.) they throw off the unified idea of the whole.

Also, the airplane is a poor example because it relies on the totaled weight of each part to provide the false conclusion: "lightweight" is a property that is not truly independent.

Here's a better example:
1 Human cells are invisible to the naked eye. (property of parts).
2 Humans are made up of human cells. (Parts add up to equal the whole).
3 Therefore, humans are invisible to the naked eye (false conclusion regarding the whole through fallacy of composition).

What I'm arguing is that step two of the above example does not have an equivalent within Kalam's proposition. Even if it did, there would exist composition and a fallacy.

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As for God being in the same class as a symbol for entirely human constructs, like "Two", "Love", "Morality", sure. I can believe that. In fact, that's likely the most accurate assessment of any conceivable divinity. Without human perception, they are not real. They're real enough to the people who understand them, sure.

Ultimately, for me, it's the difference between software and hardware: Hardware being reality, software being an application of said hardware. Prime mover or not, gods are real enough for humans to act on. Just like the number 2. The trouble with software is that it means different things to the hardware working it. 2 in binary (10) has a whole different meaning to different viewers. Things that are real (2 apples for example) do not suffer from such variation.

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Originally Posted by krymsonkyng

Let me try and spell out my argument more clearly:

1. Some things came to exist. (some things, or "stuff" being parts.)
2. Therefore, the universe came to exist. (The Universe, or reality being the whole)

Hey look, it lines up fairly well with your airplane example. Funny that.

Further trouble is, there may exist within all of reality objects that have always existed (the proposed prime mover, for example), meaning, like airplane parts that are relatively heavy (the black box, hydrolics, etc.) they throw off the unified idea of the whole.

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I don't think I'm following all the arguments about composition in this thread, but this is my take on what is at stake.

The first statement is: "Everything that begins to exist has a cause." If something doesn't begin to exist then I think it should be called "eternal" and so doesn't need a cause.

The second statement is not a conclusion from the first, but a statement of fact assuming the big bang theory is correct: "The universe began to exist."

So if one accepts current science, the conclusion follows: "The universe had a cause".

My take on the conclusion is that there is more to reality than the stuff that came out of the big bang.

Of course, one can come up with a competing theory to the big bang. That competing theory would test the current theory and either replace it or make the current theory stronger.

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Regarding a post I made earlier about vacuum fluctuations, since they involve particles that come to exist until they annihilate each other, these particles that began to exist must have a cause which I take is the vacuum space. Then I wonder why did the vacuum make these particles come into existence at some particular point in time? Was it chance? Or is chance just a short-hand way of saying: "We don't know."