An experience itself is not evidence alone for any cause. It is only evidence for a cause if an experience can happen differently if the supposed cause is removed, or if other variables and possible causes, are eliminated. If I see a tree, it is not evidence that an alien placed it there, especially when we have plenty of evidence of trees growing when there's a combination of seed, light, soil, and water, and no evidence that trees are planted by aliens. Similarly, if someone has a "religious experience," this is not evidence for the truth of religion, especially given that people can have similar experiences without it being related to religion at all. This article explains it quite clearly.
Again, it has nothing to do with metaphysics. If I propose the "cause" of a tree to be a combination of seed, soil, light, and water, I can "test" this propose cause by removing any of these elements and see if a tree grows. If a tree doesn't grow, then it's good evidence that the "cause" of a tree is dependent on those factors. If I say "the cause of a tree is seed, soil, light, water, and love," then I can test that by simply removing the "love" part and see if a tree grows. What's more, even if we knew nothing of how trees grew, we should automatically prefer the non-love version of this because it's simpler (that's Occam's razor). Taking it back to this case, saying that such an experience happens because of how a brain is programmed fits the given evidence and is far simpler than saying that it happens because of how a brain is programmed by some divine being, especially when the latter can't account for non-religious versions of such experiences.
A rock rolling down a hill is easily explained by the lady down the street's a witch; she did it rather than gravity.
All of these statements are just naked conjecture on your part. How in the world would you know what a deterministic machine would or wouldn't experience and how, if it all, it would be different from what we experience? I'm not talking about, say, how a sewing machine would "experience" anything, but how an AI programmed with a 1:1 digital cognition to our own would "experience" anything.
Well, at least this simplifies our QM arguments. Every time you make an argument I can just copy/paste this quote and you'll lose credibility with everyone worthwhile having credibility with.
The former statement is plain wrong, the latter is laughable in the wake of almost every significant scientific discovery in the last 200-or-so years "assaulting the evidence of our organic experiences," and all of this still has nothing to do with someone having a "religious experience."

