Originally Posted by
Ecurb
I read a couple of short essays in "The Stone Reader in Modern Philosophy". One set of essays is an argument between Timothy Williamson (Professor at Oxford) and Alex Rosenberg (Professor at Duke) about the flaws (or lack thereof) of Naturalism. Some of the issues they discuss are similar to those in the "What is History" thread.
Rosenberg describes himself as a Naturalist: "Naturalism is the philosophical theory that treats science as our most reliable source of knowledge and the scientific method as the most effective route to knowledge." He goes on to state that science uses, "experimental / observational methods".
Williamson's objections (some of which mirror my objections in the other thread) include:
1) Mathematical proofs do not rely on observation or experiment. If mathematical proof is "a (reliable) route to knowledge", this would seem to suggest limits (at least) to Naturalism. Williamson says, "since the natural sciences depend upon mathematics, Rosenberg desires to find a place for it, but admits he doesn't know how."
2) Williamson quotes Rosenberg as saying, "We should be confident that it (physics) willdo better than any other approach at getting things right." "What things?" asks Williamson. "If he (R) means questions of physics, what reasonable person denies (it).... But if he means all questions, why should we be confident that physics will do better than history at getting right what happened at Gettysburg?" W. adds a literary example. Isn't knowing whether Mr. Collins is the "hero" of Pride and Prejudice a form of knowledge? Every normal reader who has read the book has the critical expertise to answer this question. But the question is metaphysical, depending on agreed definitions of "hero" and shared perceptions of literature. Physics (or science in general) cannot speak to them.