Freud's 'Oceanic Feeling'

[The Joker]

Evening all.

I initially posted this in the philosophy forum then realised I might have better luck with it here. Please help!

In Civilisation and its Discontents, Freud attributes the 'oceanic feeling' experienced by religious people (and posited by them as proof of God's existence) to something vestigial left over from infancy. At the stage of development where the infant cannot properly separate itself from what it perceives of the world around it (its mother's breast, its bed, the room etc.), the infant feels 'oneness' with its surroundings and this is the source of the 'oceanic feeling' which gives rise to religion.

Are there any religious people out there who would like to weigh in? Not being particularly religious myself, I wasn't aware of there being a visceral feeling associated with religiousness (is that a word?) and certainly wasn't aware that this was taken to be proof of God's existence. Basically, I'm wondering how important/prominent this feeling is in religious people and whether they take it, as Freud says they did in his day, to be proof of God's existence.

Postscript: We're all civilised people here. Any unsolicited religion-bashing/atheist-bashing will be taken as proof of your intellectual smallness, poor self-image, premature hair loss etc. etc.

[YesNo]

See Justin Barrett's "Born Believers: the science of children's religious belief" for evidence that children recognize agency prior to social conditioning. This would mean that religious belief is basically biological and not cultural. That is something that should be obvious because religious cultural expressions seem to be everywhere. They must be grounded on something universal to our species and hence biological. It takes social conditioning (aka education) to move away from it.

Whether that initial belief is childish and therefore false is another question.

[Whifflingpin]

Just possibly, religious people may be divided into those whose religion derives primarily from the visceral feeling and those who religion derives primarily from social conditioning. I stress that this is not a division between religions, but a division between religious people so, in any church or temple there will be people saying the same words, performing the same actions, professing the same beliefs, but for whom the ground of their religion is utterly dissimilar.
For myself, I acknowledge that the ground of my religion (whatever that is) is the 'oceanic feeling' wherever it comes from. I don't think it merely emotion (though I'd find it hard to justify that statement) but rather a sense of connectedness with a vast apparently orderly and organic universe, infinitely complex and interrelated in all things that can be experienced or known, be it the cosmic round or a blade of grass or a community. I don't think of that as a "proof" of God. "God" is the name given to whatever might account for it all, (or "whoever" since it is almost impossible to think of it other than anthropomorphically.)
Those for whom religion stems from social conditioning are more likely, I guess, to emphasize forms and doctrines, to seek for "purity" within their religion, or to disparage the religions of others. No-one who experiences the 'oceanic feeling' is likely to quibble (except from an exuberance of joy at being able to do so) over the number of angels who might sit on a pin.

[The Joker]

YesNo: looks like you've been reading some interesting stuff, I'm intrigued. Could you please clear up what you mean by the term 'agency'? Whifflingpin - great name. What's the reference? Also, I agree with your idea of divisions. Very interesting, I hadn't thought of there being differing ways of being religious. So you subscribe to the 'visceral' crowd? I suppose that's how I imagine Blake and Coleridge to experience their religion. They were the first glimpse I had of their being more to religion than pure doctrine (I'm Scottish - over here, religion is very much a bleak observance). I'm not convinced that a "connectedness with a vast apparently orderly and organic universe", however, is sufficient for considering oneself religious. I feel that myself but wouldn't go so far as to say I was religious. Perhaps you're missing something in your definition - or perhaps I should start reconsidering my agnostic status.

[YesNo]

YesNo: looks like you've been reading some interesting stuff, I'm intrigued. Could you please clear up what you mean by the term 'agency'?

Agency is the ability to make a choice. A child can separate agents (parents) from non-agents (toys) and, if I understood Barrett, the agents need not have bodies which leads to the religious aspect of this.

I don't think Freud claimed he ever had an oceanic feeling but that doesn't mean he understood what it was. I would think such a feeling occurs when one is simply aware of what is out there. So he had to have experienced it. He just took it for granted.

[Whifflingpin]

"I'm not convinced that a "connectedness with a vast apparently orderly and organic universe", however, is sufficient for considering oneself religious." No, probably not. Within my terms, at least, an agnostic would probably regard the universe as orderly and consider that, while it would not be frivolous to question what might underlie that order, it would be pointless to spend much effort on the question. The "connectedness with a vast apparently orderly and organic universe", however, is a sufficient starting point (among others) for religion and maybe a possible end point. In between, the religious part is where a person tries to define why the universe might be orderly and what part a human should fulfil, and actually start doing something towards achieving that part. Being religious requires effort and action arising out of the original oceanic feeling. (If social conditioning is the starting point, then the religious person might accept the definitions or doctrine ready-made and still put equal effort into carrying out the appropriate actions.)

Clearly my use of "starting point" is wrong; what I mean by "starting point" is something like "that component which comes to dominate." It's obvious enough that a greater or lesser degree of social conditioning is essential in determining the religion that anyone may adopt, if only in the negative sense that no-one could adopt a religion that he had never encountered.

As "a possible end point," the oceanic feeling may well remain after one has realized that the meaning of the universe is too great to be contained within any doctrine devised or learned by humans. The religious actions may well still continue as a response to that feeling or as a way to enhance it, even if the individual no longer accepts the specific doctrinal reasons for the actions.
(As an aside, the advice is given to religious people to continue the actions associated with their faith especially at times when that faith seems weakest. Any person in growing up is likely to go many times through the processes of rejecting a current belief, changing an attitude or whatever. In the religious life it is possible to believe something implicitly, then reject it utterly, then to realize its truth in a totally different way. This process is helped by keeping up with the forms and practices of the religion through times of doubt or unfaith.)

[Ecurb]

See Justin Barrett's "Born Believers: the science of children's religious belief" for evidence that children recognize agency prior to social conditioning. This would mean that religious belief is basically biological and not cultural. That is something that should be obvious because religious cultural expressions seem to be everywhere. They must be grounded on something universal to our species and hence biological. It takes social conditioning (aka education) to move away from it.

Whether that initial belief is childish and therefore false is another question.

The logic here is flawed. First of all, not everyone is religious. Second, all human cultures have language. Can we infer from this fact that language is "biological" instead of cultural? Would a child brought up with no human contact be able to speak? Would he be religious?

Most important, reductionist explanations such as Barrett's (as Yesno describes it in one paragraph; I've never read the book) seem "profound", but tend to have little actual value. They may explain, in some very general and vague way, why humans have a propensity for religion, but can they explain why humans practice the particular religions that they practice? The variety of religious practices and beliefs suggests that religion cannot be based on some universal, biological similarity between humans. Some religions talk about powerful Gods; others are atheistic (etc., etc.). In the other thread on this page, someone suggested that we discuss "themes" in literature because of some biological imperative. As with Barrett's theory, this may be true, but it's trivial. It has no explanatory value. Even if there is a biological propensity for religion, where does that get us in terms of understanding religion?

IN general, that's the problem with reductionist explanations for complicated phenomena. Barrett may well be right in some trivial way, but to understand Christianity we have to study theology, literature, and history, not biology (or even psychology). We might criticize Hamlet by saying, "Humans have become aware of the future and past, and therefore have an obsession with death. That explains the appeal of the play." It's all true, except that it doesn't explain the appeal of the play. It's trivial truth. Same with (it seems to me) Barrett's "explanation" of religion (or Freud's, for that matter, although Freud at least had the excuse of originality and genius).

[YesNo]

The logic here is flawed. First of all, not everyone is religious. Second, all human cultures have language. Can we infer from this fact that language is "biological" instead of cultural? Would a child brought up with no human contact be able to speak? Would he be religious?

The problem is not so much logic as empirical evidence. We would have to examine Barrett's text in detail to critique the science involved. Also Barrett is providing a summary of other people's research. I don't have the text in front of me but I would be willing to discuss it after the holidays.

(Edit: Regarding language being biological, I would think our ability to communicate the way we do has some biological foundation precisely because most of us can do this regardless of our culture. It is a skill our species has. Note, I am not saying this is a skill our genes have. That would be reductionist.)

Culture does add something to the biological motivation for religious expression just as culture adds to the ways we engage in sexual activity. Culture can even try to suppress both the religious (spiritual?) foundation as well as try to convince people not to have sex. That suppression does seem to work on some people, but if our species is innately disposed to have sex or to express religious emotion, it is a questionable thing to try to do.

There are two things I like about Barrett's research survey:

1) Religion, like sex, has a biological foundation. To really suppress religious expression you would have to destroy the human species.

2) Atheistic belief systems that maintain that the child is a blank slate who has been socialized by the child's parents or culture to have a spiritual disposition are false. Some atheistic belief systems even call such socialization "child abuse" based on their false belief in the non-spiritual disposition of the child. This conveniently allows them to promote their own social construction agenda. Atheism is the belief system that requires social construction (aka education, brainwashing, peer pressure).



Most important, reductionist explanations such as Barrett's (as Yesno describes it in one paragraph; I've never read the book) seem "profound", but tend to have little actual value. They may explain, in some very general and vague way, why humans have a propensity for religion, but can they explain why humans practice the particular religions that they practice? The variety of religious practices and beliefs suggests that religion cannot be based on some universal, biological similarity between humans. Some religions talk about powerful Gods; others are atheistic (etc., etc.). In the other thread on this page, someone suggested that we discuss "themes" in literature because of some biological imperative. As with Barrett's theory, this may be true, but it's trivial. It has no explanatory value. Even if there is a biological propensity for religion, where does that get us in terms of understanding religion?

What is "reductionist" about this view? The particular religious traditions are cultural creations. We have enough free will to reject or accept them. Is sex reductionist as well?

(Edit: Regarding where this gets us in understanding religion, it makes obsolete the belief that religion is nothing more than a means of social control, an opiate of the people used by those in power to control the masses. Similarly, recognizing the pair-bonding disposition of our species explains the babying females engage in and the protectionist attitudes of males as enhanced child-rearing dispositions rather than a social construction of gender that one can monkey with at will. Similarly, seeing a homosexual's sexual preference as a brain organization removes being gay as an ethical choice that one can be socialized into or out of. It does not mean that we are totally determined. It does not mean culture has no role to play or that every cultural expression has been good.)



IN general, that's the problem with reductionist explanations for complicated phenomena. Barrett may well be right in some trivial way, but to understand Christianity we have to study theology, literature, and history, not biology (or even psychology). We might criticize Hamlet by saying, "Humans have become aware of the future and past, and therefore have an obsession with death. That explains the appeal of the play." It's all true, except that it doesn't explain the appeal of the play. It's trivial truth. Same with (it seems to me) Barrett's "explanation" of religion (or Freud's, for that matter, although Freud at least had the excuse of originality and genius).

Barrett's position is not about Christianity. Children are not born Christians nor born Muslims nor born Buddhists. They are born believers which would make them welcome such cultural creations.

What children are not are born atheists.

[Ecurb]

2) Atheistic belief systems that maintain that the child is a blank slate who has been socialized by the child's parents or culture to have a spiritual disposition are false. Some atheistic belief systems even call such socialization "child abuse" based on their false belief in the non-spiritual disposition of the child. This conveniently allows them to promote their own social construction agenda. Atheism is the belief system that requires social construction (aka education, brainwashing, peer pressure)....

What children are not are born atheists

This is simply incorrect (not the part about how some atheists have bizarre beliefs, but the part about atheism "requiring" social construction). God is the cultural construct (or perhaps, an existential truth of which we only become aware through learning of the cultural construct). All children are atheistic before they learn the concept of God, just as they are apolitical, amoral, and non-verbal, . How could it possibly be otherwise? You can't have a political position until you learn what politics are. You can't have a moral position until you learn what morals are. And you can't be a theist until you learn what "God" means. It is true that some "strong" atheists do understand what God means, and specifically reject His existence. However, no young children are (or can be) theists -- therefore they are atheists (in a general sense).

Humans are biologically disposed toward language. Nonetheless, they are "alingusitic" until they learn a language. The same is true of religion (except that the extent to which humans are biologically disposed to become theistic is more dubious).

[YesNo]

This is simply incorrect (not the part about how some atheists have bizarre beliefs, but the part about atheism "requiring" social construction). God is the cultural construct (or perhaps, an existential truth of which we only become aware through learning of the cultural construct). All children are atheistic before they learn the concept of God, just as they are apolitical, amoral, and non-verbal, . How could it possibly be otherwise? You can't have a political position until you learn what politics are. You can't have a moral position until you learn what morals are. And you can't be a theist until you learn what "God" means. It is true that some "strong" atheists do understand what God means, and specifically reject His existence. However, no young children are (or can be) theists -- therefore they are atheists (in a general sense).

Humans are biologically disposed toward language. Nonetheless, they are "alingusitic" until they learn a language. The same is true of religion (except that the extent to which humans are biologically disposed to become theistic is more dubious).

As I understand Barrett's research survey, your position has been falsified. I will be back in mid January from vacationing with my family. If you want to look at the text I will be able to discuss it in more detail then.

How could your position be wrong? If God is real, it is possible that children could know this prior to any socialization process.

You seem to be assuming two things that might not be correct.

(1) You may be assuming that God is not real and so there can't be any evidence like that presented by Barrett. That would mean that if such evidence existed then God is real. I wouldn't go that far. All I am claiming is that atheism is not the natural state for a child but requires socialization.

(2) You may be assuming that God cannot be known except through socialization, specifically language. I don't think we know enough about language to say much here. For all I know, dogs and cats could know God should God be a reality.

Assuming Barrett's evidence is correct, an atheist could still say that this knowledge that children have is childish and it needs to be thrown away like one might throw away our common sense notions that the earth is flat or that we are actually touching something solid when we walk. Then again just because we have a naive perspective does not mean that it is wrong.

(Edit: I think the main problem is with the second assumption. Can one be theistic without a language based concept of God, no matter how vague that concept is? More generally, can one know something without language coming in prior to that knowledge? As I see it language comes late in the knowledge process and helps clarify our knowledge and exchange that knowledge with others. That social exchange can also involve social manipulation through lying or confusing metaphors. An example of knowledge that comes before one has conceptualized it through language comes from presentiment studies that measure changes in the body to see if someone can predict a future event. Another example is our knowledge of what it is like to be us. See Nagel's "What is it like to be a bat?" We know this before we can express it in language and if we attempted to express it in language we probably would not be able to.)

[Ecurb]

"All men are philosophers," said Aristotle. But he was wrong. Pre-linguistic children (and unborn fetuses) are not philosophers. Philosophy is "the study of the nature, causes, or principles of reality, knowledge, or values, based on logical reasoning." In other words, philosophy involves the study of knowledge, rather than knowledge itself. And that study (as well as the "logical reasoning" on which it is based) is facilitated through language.

Nobody doubts that if God exists, people (and animals) can have "knowledge" of Him that is not based on language. He could, for example, appear in a burning bush to a baby or to a dog. However, the baby or the dog would not have a theoretical (and hence linguistic) framework with which to interpret that knowledge. They would not say, "That must be God in the bush." They wouldn't know the word (or the concept) "God", so how could they think it was God in the bush?

Instead, they would simply know that something had said, "Set my people free" out of a bush. Indeed, depending on the theoretical framework with which that "knowledge" is parsed, an adult might think, "Hmmm, must be swamp gas," or, "I must be hallucinating", or "some magician must be using prestidigitation," or, "It's God!" The knowledge of the experience is identical, but the theoretical framework is different.

So, no, I'm not assuming God is not real, nor am I assuming God cannot be "known" except through cultural constructs. Instead, I am assuming that "theism" is a philosophy, and that philosophies (as opposed to "knowledge") involve language. I agree with you that knowledge precedes language. Clearly, dogs can "know" things about reality. We might even say (incorrectly), "My dog is a hedonist", or "My dog is a pragmatist". We would be using the words imprecisely, however. We would mean, "My dog acts in ways that would be consistent with hedonism or pragmatism". But the dog could NOT be a hedonist or a pragmatist because those are philosophies explaining and arguing WHY people SHOULD act in way consistent with hedonism or pragmatism, and dogs (and small children) are incapable of explaining or arguing, both of which involve language.

So its certainly possible to have experiences with God without being a "theist", just like it's possible to act pragmatically (like my dog does) without being a "pragmatist". However, it is impossible to hold a philosophic position (like "theism") without having some understanding of what that position involves. In the case of "theism" it involves understanding the words "belief" and "God". The dog who sees God in a burning bush and starts barking at Him is not a "theist", because he is not a philosopher. He has no belief in "God" (which is an abstract and linguistic concept) -- he believes merely in his own perceptions.

[YesNo]

As I recall Barrett is not saying that children are born philosophical theists. They are born believers.

I was thinking today that children could not be born "atheists" for the very reasons you are giving. Atheism requires the concept of "theism" which children don't have. So they can't even have a position against it.

If atheism were true, one would expect children not to have any inclination toward believing at all. That they do requires explanation, if one is an atheist. If one is a theist, it offers no problem. Because of that I plan to reread that text when I get back. The evidence seems like it might be as significant as out of body experiences, psi experiences, or near and shared death experiences.

[Ecurb]

Actually, as I said before, some definitions claim "atheism" to be a positive claim that there is no God (in which case my argument does indeed apply to atheists). Other definitions simply claim that atheists do not believe in god (i.e. "a" = "are not" and "theists"). I have no idea what it means to be "born a believer", but it sounds whacky. How about unborn fetuses, are they "believers" too? How about zygotes? How does anyone know what babies (or dogs) "believe", or even what it means to "believe" to someone with the consciousness of a baby or a dog?

Also, I don't know where you get your "expectations". There are a number of quite obvious advantages to society conferred by religion and religious faith. Beliefs that are "useful" may tend to become widespread; beliefs that are "true" might become widespread only when they are useful. Children are "inclined" to believe what they are expected to believe and rewarded for believing. (We can't actually know what anyone else believes, we can only know what they SAY.) So there are a great many explanations of juvenile "belief".

[YesNo]

After discussing this with you I want to get a better understanding of what Barrett is referring to. This research looks more significant than I originally thought.

Regarding "how does anyone know" is an important question and from memory I can't answer it. The research comes from child developmental psychologists and so unborn fetuses and zygotes are not included.

The idea that "atheism" is a positive term sounds "whacky" to me perhaps like "born believer" sounds "whacky" to you. It assumes that the initial starting point is atheism, but that is exactly what Barrett's evidence puts into question.

[Ecurb]

Well, maybe it does. My public library doesn't have the book. Maybe I'll try the U of O. As far as atheism being a "positive term, that's generally referred to as "strong atheism" -- the firm belief that there is no God (rather than a simple lack of belief in God). How can a blank slate (like a baby or a zygote) "believe" in anything -- whether God, or gravity? That's what I don't understand. Of course as kids develop, they start believing in lots of things, including God.

The only reason I assume that atheism is the starting point is that all "beliefs" develop as kids learn. Kids aren't strong atheists, they just don't have an opinion about God one way or the other until someone suggests they form one.

[YesNo]

It is in the local library I use which is why I don't have it with me. I will re-read it and see if it still makes sense to me. I don't recommend purchasing the book.

What has occurred to me in our discussion is that a baby is not a blank slate. Now I know I mentioned that earlier, but I am just now surprised by the concept which is why I want to re-read the book. How do they know this? I was originally convinced.

This all sort of relates to the "oceanic feeling" which is a metaphor for a specific human experience which is a subjective event. The metaphor doesn't mean much to me, but it does assume that an adult and not a young child who could not speak had the experience. So language must be presumed. With language comes the possibility of delusion as well as clarity. Prior to language, I don't see how a delusion could form.

One metaphor that Thomas Nagel created was to talk about "what it is like to be" someone subjectively. That metaphor makes more sense to me. It refers to our subjective experience as distinct from an objective description of what we might be experiencing which loses the subjectivity in the act of expressing it in language. The oceanic feeling would be part of what it is like to be those of us who have that experience.

[Whifflingpin]

"Kids aren't strong atheists, they just don't have an opinion about God one way or the other until someone suggests they form one."

By definition they don't have the words until they have learnt language, but it would be wrong to think of them as blank slates. Months before birth they have experiences, feelings and thoughts. All children who survive have quasi-religious experience in that they are provided with sustenance, warmth and comfort from a being that is unknowable and beyond reason. At the same time as they are learning that their immediate benefactor is a human parent, so they are learning that the parent and all other parents are provided with sustenance warmth and comfort from a source that is unknowable and beyond reason. As it is natural to apply what we know to what we don't know, so it is natural to feel that the unknowable source of well-being is a super-parent. The concept of the super-parent as an explanation of the universe seems more likely to precede the rejection of such a concept than otherwise.

[Ecurb]

Children definitely have experiences and learn from birth or before. However, I doubt such experiences (other than those which are overtly religious, like going to church) induce them automatically to posit a "God".

In the mid 20th century in the U.S., cultural anthropology was dominated by the "culture and personality" school of thought. Practitioners included the most famous American anthropologists, like Margaret Meade and Ruth Benedict. Benedict wrote, "Culture is personality writ large."

This school of thought was neo-Freudian. Adult personality (the thinking went) is determined in infancy, and will therefore reflect the child-rearing practices of the culture. Child-rearing techniques and traditions will, in turn, be influenced by adult personality. So culture is personality writ large -- an endless circle in which personality influences culture, which influences personality. Freud suggested, for example, that a remote, powerful father (like those in his own Vienna in the 1800s) would tend to lead to a remote, powerful, male God (like He in Christianity).

This all sounded great. These anthropologists were no dummies, and Meade wrote books like "Coming of Age in Samoa" promoting her theories. Unfortunately, it didn't work out.

In the 1960s anthropologists created the "Human Relations Area Files". This was a vast data base. In the days before computers it was housed in what looked like a card catalog. It cross referenced every culture studied by anthropologists, so you could look at child rearing traditions and techniques in every culture, and religion in every culture. Guess what? The correlation that Freud (and others) predicted did not exist. Same with most of the correlations which the "Culture and Personality" school expected.

So while it may be that children, "feel that the unknowable source of well-being is a super-parent.", research suggests this kind of thinking is a dead end. It doesn't stand up to scrutiny. Many religions don't have powerful Gods who act as "super parents". Although the monotheistic religions of the Middle East do, it seems risky to think they arose out of universal childhood experiences when many religions (practiced by adults who as babies were also provided for by their parents) do not. The specific guesses which anthropologists made concerning infancy and its relation to adult religion have been falsified. The more general guesses that whifflingpin suggests seem inconsistent with the ethnographic data (i.e. the wide variety of religious practices, many of which do NOT include gods who resemble "super-parents").

[YesNo]

If the a child's propensity to accept the existence of supernatural beings cannot be traced to child-rearing and child-bearing, perhaps that is evidence that these supernatural beings in some general sense are real and this knowledge from childhood goes beyond culture. That would be the worst case scenario for atheism.

There is a site called the "Born Atheist". I found this on that site: http://bornatheist.com/explanation.html


If everyone is born atheist, then religion is learned and can be unlearned.

This covers up what is more likely the case: atheism is what is learned and so can be unlearned. Why "more likely"? Because it seems that Barrett's evidence shows children are born believers. Why are they born believers is what is puzzling me at the moment. As Whifflingpin suggests, this could be related to child bearing and rearing, but perhaps this is not enough, as Ecurb suggests, to dispose children to their natural belief.

I also found Andrew Brown's "There is no such thing as an atheist baby." http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/12/atheist-baby-richard-dawkins-babies-atheism He mentioned that some Muslims do the same thing that atheists try to get away with. They both claim that children are members of their groups by default.

There is a difference between someone "opting in" and "opting out" of a group. If one is required to opt in before they are a member of the group, then they have to make a conscious decision to enter the group. If one is a member by default, then the most one would be able to do is opt out. Children are a convenient class. They can neither opt in nor opt out. So ideologues, to the extent they can convince the gullible, can try to justify their positions by saying whatever nonsense they want about children. The children, unlike adults, cannot talk back to them.

There are two questions in my mind:

1) Are children better characterized as born believers or born atheists? According to Brown, "Everything we know from science shows that supernaturalism comes naturally to children." This would support the born believer view along with what Barrett reports. I am willing to accept that children are born believers based on on what I currently think is good scientific evidence.

2) Why are they born believers? If this cannot be traced to parental activity as Ecurb is suggesting it can't, then one has to ask if what the children are naturally believing has some truth backing it up.

[Ecurb]

2) Why are they born believers? If this cannot be traced to parental activity as Ecurb is suggesting it can't, then one has to ask if what the children are naturally believing has some truth backing it up.

This is not what I am suggesting at all. I am suggesting that REDUCTIONIST explanations for belief (in the case I mentioned the notion that belief in God can be explained by psychology related to child rearing) have generally been false.

Children believe in God for the simple reason that adults tell them to believe in God. This is also why children believe that 2+2=4, that the Pacific Ocean is bigger than the Atlantic Ocean, that objects fall at 32 feet per second squared, and that Mt Everest is the highest mountain in the world. This is so obvious that we need not even discuss it. How adults CAME to tell children about God is less obvious, and worth discussing.

To very young children, events that seem dull to us seem miraculous. The child who sees snow falling for the first time may very well think he is experiencing a miracle. I don't think this indicates children are "born believers", merely that things are new and exciting to them.

[Whifflingpin]

"So while it may be that children, "feel that the unknowable source of well-being is a super-parent.", research suggests this kind of thinking is a dead end."
It certainly does not go far to account for the multiplicity and detail of religions. It is enough to counter the idea that children are blank slates.
For brevity, I took for granted the power of other influences, including all the bad experiences. Had that not been the case, then I would have been arguing that we were all natural believers in Gaia rather than Jehovah. In fact I did not mean to imply that there would be a natural belief in monotheism of any kind but simply a pre-disposition to theism rather than atheism.

It is not sufficient to say that children believe in anything "for the simple reason that adults tell them to believe." That is simply a re-iteration of the tabula rasa view of children that has been discredited for at least as long as any Neo-Freudian view of religion. Anything adults tell must either fit in with or modify the child's world view before the child can be said to believe it. An infant will know that 2 biscuits is better than 1 biscuit long before hearing that 1+1=2, and you need to feed a child a lot of biscuits and other things before it will accept the convention that 2+2 always equals 4. This is so obvious that we need not discuss it.

Allowing that motivation is infinitely varied, how, in general, adults with a religious belief come to tell children about their belief is equally obvious. Just as mathematics or geography describe certain aspects of the world so does religion. Any parent with a religious belief will teach a child that religion along with teaching it to count or draw or whatever. That too is so obvious that we need not discuss it.

[YesNo]

This is not what I am suggesting at all. I am suggesting that REDUCTIONIST explanations for belief (in the case I mentioned the notion that belief in God can be explained by psychology related to child rearing) have generally been false.

I am taking your word for this failure of reductionist explanations. My point is that if you cannot come up with a reductionist explanation that can be backed up with empirical data then atheism is on shaky ground. You will then need a non-reductionist explanation of a child's subjective experience which could imply the reality of what some might call the "supernatural".

As I see it atheism cannot survive without reductionism. The conscious subjective experiences we are discussing, whether the oceanic feeling or a child's disposition to belief, has to be reduced to something unconscious or at least panpsychic. If it turns out that some form of consciousness from the top-down is in any way active, then atheism is false.



Children believe in God for the simple reason that adults tell them to believe in God. This is also why children believe that 2+2=4, that the Pacific Ocean is bigger than the Atlantic Ocean, that objects fall at 32 feet per second squared, and that Mt Everest is the highest mountain in the world. This is so obvious that we need not even discuss it. How adults CAME to tell children about God is less obvious, and worth discussing.

You need to provide empirical evidence for your claim that a child's disposition to believe is caused by parents talking to the child or other forms of socialization. Given Barrett's survey, this cannot be taken for granted.

However, I agree that your position needs to reduce the child's experience to an adult experience that can be delusional in order to maintain atheism.



To very young children, events that seem dull to us seem miraculous. The child who sees snow falling for the first time may very well think he is experiencing a miracle. I don't think this indicates children are "born believers", merely that things are new and exciting to them.

I will keep in mind the possibility of novelty as why Barrett considers children to be born believers. I don't remember if he addresses it or not.

Where does a child's imaginary friends come from? Do parents tell their children there are monsters in the closet? It seems to me that the role of parents with respect to the child's disposition to believe is to tame it rather than create it.

What interests me now about what I remember from Barrett is whether the evidence he reports implies that the child's knowledge can be viewed as coming from an experience of reality that we have lost. I wasn't thinking about this when I read the book the first time. If that is the case then the evidence supporting the concept of "born believer" also supports theism.

[Ecurb]

It is not sufficient to say that children believe in anything "for the simple reason that adults tell them to believe." That is simply a re-iteration of the tabula rasa view of children that has been discredited for at least as long as any Neo-Freudian view of religion. Anything adults tell must either fit in with or modify the child's world view before the child can be said to believe it. An infant will know that 2 biscuits is better than 1 biscuit long before hearing that 1+1=2, and you need to feed a child a lot of biscuits and other things before it will accept the convention that 2+2 always equals 4. This is so obvious that we need not discuss it.

Allowing that motivation is infinitely varied, how, in general, adults with a religious belief come to tell children about their belief is equally obvious. Just as mathematics or geography describe certain aspects of the world so does religion. Any parent with a religious belief will teach a child that religion along with teaching it to count or draw or whatever. That too is so obvious that we need not discuss it.

I agree about why adults tell children about religion. Also, my examples of arithmetic and science might not be the best ones. Myth is more equivalent to history that to science. Children surely believe that Julius Caesar was assassinated in the Senate and said, "Et tu, Brute" for the same reason they believe that Jesus died on the cross and arose from the dead -- because adults they trust tell them that's what happened. Scientific "facts" must (perhaps) fit with children's perceptions of reality (although children may not be the best of naturalists, and if you tell them that lemmings commit mass suicide they, like adults, might believe it until someone else tells them otherwise, especially since most kids never see a lemming). Nonetheless, children probably don't (and can't) confirm or falsify most scientific "facts" that they learn, and almost all historical "facts" that they learn.

Unlike science, history is not reproducible. There's no way to confirm through experience or experiment most historical "facts" children are taught. That's also true of many (but not all, as W. points out) scientific facts. Experiments comparing human infants to chimpanzee infants show that the chimps are often equal to or more advanced than the humans in mental development, problem solving, etc., until the humans learn language, at which point the humans rapidly outstrip the apes. This would seem to support my position. We learn through language.

Do any non-human animals have religions? I doubt it (but I don't know). Animals certainly seem to practice rituals, which are, in human society, often religious. Indeed (to continue an anthropology lecture) one anthropological "school" of thought was the "Myth and ritual" school, which posited that rituals preceded myths. Myths developed (acc. this school of thought) as "explanations" for the rituals. If we accept that non-human animals practice rituals, it makes sense to think rituals preceded myths (which are necessarily linguistic), although the rest of the theory is more problematic.

[Ecurb]

You need to provide empirical evidence for your claim that a child's disposition to believe is caused by parents talking to the child or other forms of socialization. Given Barrett's survey, this cannot be taken for granted.

However, I agree that your position needs to reduce the child's experience to an adult experience that can be delusional in order to maintain atheism.


.

Persuasive evidence about what children "believe" cannot exist, because we cannot determine what children believe. We can only determine what they say they believe. However, it is clear that children are rewarded for saying they believe in some things, and punished for saying they do not believe. If, for example, a first grade history test asks, "Who was th first President of the U.S.?", children who answer "George Washington" will be rewarded, and those who answer, "Mao Tse Tsung" will be punished. It's not much of a leap to suggest that a child's answers are influenced by this.

Of course it is possible that children see more clearly than adults because they lack adult prejudices (from your explanation, this seems to be Barrett's position). After all, the grownups claimed to admire the emperor's clothes, and only the child said he was naked. Nonetheless, the notion that this is a default position for religious belief seems ludicrous. That the explanation is more akin to why children believe George Washington was the first president seems far more likely.

[Whifflingpin]

"Children surely believe that Julius Caesar was assassinated in the Senate and said, "Et tu, Brute" for the same reason they believe that Jesus died on the cross and arose from the dead -- because adults they trust tell them that's what happened."
That's probably true at some stage. Maybe the interesting bit is where the growing child says "No, people don't rise from the dead" and then proceeds to "Yes, He did and we do." [Note that that is a totally different phenomenon from the child's rejection of Tooth Fairy or Father Christmas stories. Detractors from religion try to equate the various types of "non-scientific" tales that parents tell. No-one, however goes back from unbelieving in Santa Claus to believing in him, whereas periods of unbelief/re-belief/re-interpretation are a common if not essential part of learning a religion.]
But my initial argument certainly did not extend to the acquisition of specific items of doctrine. I remember, from several decades ago when I was a Sunday-school teacher, that I referred to Mary as "mother-of-God." I was corrected by an eight year old, or thereabouts, who was at a stage of being able to believe general propositions about God being the creator or loving father of all, but not doctrinal niceties like the Trinity or the status of Jesus' mother. I certainly did not consider trying to explain why I had used the phrase, but accepted the correction with thanks.

"Experiments comparing human infants to chimpanzee infants .... This would seem to support my position. We learn through language."
Possibly, but not conclusively, since "correlation does not imply causality;" human children acquire many capabilities later than other species and the fact that two sets of ability develop at about the same time does not mean they are interdependent. Anecdotally, I was watching my grandson yesterday amusing himself by dropping a balloon over a gate almost as high as himself, and retrieving it by putting his hand through the bars, pinching the balloon with one so that he could lift it far enough to reach it over the gate with his other hand. His linguistic level is to use the same word for ball as for balloon, and he has no words for soft/hard or light/heavy, but he is capable of differentiating between a ball and a balloon and amusing himself with a game with a balloon that he knows could not be played with a ball. Not much, maybe, in the way of evidence, but it suggests his problem solving skills to be ahead of his language. Obviously, anecdote notwithstanding, it would be fatuous to suggest that language is not a major tool in learning.

"Persuasive evidence about what children "believe" cannot exist, because we cannot determine what children believe."
True, but, up to a point we can remember. Again anecdotally, I remember an occasion when I was in the 9/10 age year at school on which a teacher asked the class how they pictured God (in those days we were all deemed Church of England till proven otherwise.) After a bewildered and embarrassed silence, and an attempt from one brave lad to describe God as a kind of great light in the sky, the teacher said that he thought of God as a kindly bearded human. Between his posing the question and giving the "approved" answer, I became aware that I knew that God was not only beyond the scope of my language but must also be beyond the scope of language itself and that (although I could not have used the expression) anything we said about God was in the nature of parable. It was probably two or three years later that I found that my unspoken answer was a "right" answer, and that the Incarnation, doctrinally speaking, amongst other things, is the Creator's means of making Itself known to Its creation.

[Ecurb]

Just to add to the discussion, Wiffling, I am not assuming that atheism is the default position because it is correct. I just think the concept of God is culturally constituted and learned (whether or not it is "true", the notion that time is relative is also culturally constituted and seems unnatural and counter intuitive). Would an ancient Greek, whose Zeuses and Apollos were so different from our God, have been likely to know that God "was not only beyond the scope of my language but must also be beyond the scope of language itself and that (although I could not have used the expression) anything we said about God was in the nature of parable."? I don't know, of course, but I doubt it. Man makes himself (as V. Gordon Childe entitled his book). We create culture, and we are created by culture. It is difficult to say which aspects of our "selves" are "natural" as opposed to "man made".

[YesNo]

Persuasive evidence about what children "believe" cannot exist, because we cannot determine what children believe.

Since Barrett provided evidence, evidence exists.

Until there is empirical evidence to the contrary, not just rhetoric, I am going by the following opt-in definition of an atheist:


An atheist is someone who explicitly opts-in to being an atheist. No one else is an atheist.

This excludes children since they do not have the required language skills to opt-in. It also excludes people who do not claim membership in any church, such as myself, but who have not explicitly opted-in to atheism.

By definition the concept of "born atheist" is false because the opt-in requirement is missing.

[Whifflingpin]

"An atheist is someone who explicitly opts-in to being an atheist. No one else is an atheist."

If that is your definition, then it would be only fair to allow Ecurb the complementary definition:

"A theist is someone who explicitly opts-in to being a theist. No one else is a theist."

These both exclude infants who do not have the required language skills to opt-in. Further, as Ecurb has pointed out, one cannot know what another person believes until that person is able to express that belief without expectation of punishment or reward, which, for most people, probably means never.

*** *** ***

"Would an ancient Greek... have been likely to know that ... anything we said about [divine things] was in the nature of parable."?
The "ancient Greeks" include a vast number of people over several centuries, and between them they seem to have expressed pretty much everything that can usefully be said on anything in philosophy or theology. I have a vague memory that Plato had made comments similar to mine, but a brief attempt to locate those comments only showed me that there are probably as many different views on what Plato said as there are on the nature of the gods. I am going to stop now, as even the emoticons by the side of the dialog box are making fun of me:rolleyes5:

[YesNo]

Yes. The definition should be expanded so it doesn't only apply to atheists. I am also annoyed with those Muslims who think I was born Muslim. Along with atheists I would include any form of theism that a group has aligned around. One has to explicitly opt-in to be counted and one can always opt-out. The point is to keep these groups from inflating their numbers at the cost of those who have not made a choice to join or stay in the group.

When it comes to "born believers" we are talking about a childhood experience of reality, perhaps related to the oceanic feeling in the OP. I don't think it is what most theistic positions would consider to be orthodox. The implied supernatural reality means that it cannot be atheism.

[Ecurb]

I'm no expert on Plato, or on the Ancient Greeks, and maybe they were a bad example (although there might be quite a gulf between Homer and Plato). Nonetheless, there are a wide variety of Gods in the history of the world, and a wide variety of atheistic religions (like Buddhism), and I'm confident that these cultures influence how young children think about the supernatural.

As far as Barrett's evidence, what is it? I admit I haven't found the book yet, but you haven't offered any evidence, yesno, you merely say Barrett does.

Here's my experience (and also a reaction to the anti-Christmas thread in "general discussions", in which yesno is a participant): rituals like Christmas create an almost supernatural thrill in young children. I'm not religious, but I still thrill to the notion that God gave his only begotten Son to save us from our sins, and my spiritual thrill may be related to the excitement I felt at Christmas as a very young children. Now this excitement is partly spiritual (even for young kids) and partly based on family fun and greed. The thrill of receiving hidden gifts as a child suggests the thrill of receiving the gift of Jesus' birth. Here are two of my favorite Christmas literary treasures:

http://www.journeywithjesus.net/PoemsAndPrayers/GK_Chesterton_House_of_Christmas.shtml

http://shortstories.co.in/the-heavenly-christmas-tree/

I like it when authors step out of their role as narrator and speak directly to their readers, as Dostoevsky does in "The Heavenly Christmas Tree". The end of the story expresses my own feelings:



Why have I made up such a story, so out of keeping with an ordinary diary,
and a writer’s above all? And I promised two stories dealing with real
events! But that is just it, I keep fancying that all this may have
happened really–that is, what took place in the cellar and on the
woodstack; but as for Christ’s Christmas tree, I cannot tell you whether
that could have happened or not.

p.s. Dostoevsky's story is quite short, and anyone who likes Christmas stories should read it.

[YesNo]

As far as Barrett's evidence, what is it? I admit I haven't found the book yet, but you haven't offered any evidence, yesno, you merely say Barrett does.

I won't be home until after January 9th. I'll see if I can summarize the evidence after that date.

When I first read the book, I thought what Barrett was trying to show was obvious. Children have monsters in the closet and imaginary friends. What I wonder now is whether childhood is a human experience that can be studied to shed light on things like the oceanic feeling. I wonder if studying childhood experiences is more like studying near and shared death experiences, mystical experiences, psi experiences and the like.



Here's my experience (and also a reaction to the anti-Christmas thread in "general discussions", in which yesno is a participant): rituals like Christmas create an almost supernatural thrill in young children. I'm not religious, but I still thrill to the notion that God gave his only begotten Son to save us from our sins, and my spiritual thrill may be related to the excitement I felt at Christmas as a very young children.

The idea of God suffering through his Son for us is very moving. That "moving" part may be what the oceanic feeling is about. I think we all feel this to some extent. We aren't machines. There is something it is like to be us and that includes being moved.

Christians do focus on the sacrifice of Jesus, but there is also too much concern for creationism, telling gay people not to have sex, claiming their way is the only way, blaming Jews rather than Romans for the crucifixion, and making up stories about weapons of mass destruction in order to invade other countries.

However, if Christians (or some other group of theists) were perfect we would be compelled by their example to join them and that would diminish diversity and the need to forgive and be forgiven.

Atheism has problems also not least of which is that I don't think there is any science to support it anymore especially after quantum physics had to give up determinism. Also given near and shared death experiences, there is more evidence for the Christian view of the resurrection of Jesus than there is for an atheistic perspective on death.


Now this excitement is partly spiritual (even for young kids) and partly based on family fun and greed. The thrill of receiving hidden gifts as a child suggests the thrill of receiving the gift of Jesus' birth. Here are two of my favorite Christmas literary treasures:

http://www.journeywithjesus.net/PoemsAndPrayers/GK_Chesterton_House_of_Christmas.shtml

http://shortstories.co.in/the-heavenly-christmas-tree/


In spite of my annoyance for some Christmas music, I do like this song: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4cP26ndrmtg&list=RDNY4J8yBf6vg&index=6

It gives me an oceanic feeling almost every time.

[YesNo]

Nonetheless, there are a wide variety of Gods in the history of the world, and a wide variety of atheistic religions (like Buddhism)...

I don't classify Buddhism as a form of atheism although western Buddhists may actually view it is a such. Regardless, it clouds the issue since it appears to be an example of an atheistic spirituality. I think that is a contradiction in terms.

Some people say they are not Christian or not Muslim or not Buddhist. That's fine. I'm not any of those things either, not that there is anything wrong with being Christian or Muslim or Buddhist. What atheists say is that they are not conscious, or, in other words, that their consciousness can be reduced to unconsciousness. That is the only form of atheism I am opposed to.

[Ecurb]

If you insist on defining words idiosyncratically, yesno, you will continue to be misunderstood.

"Supernatural" and "metaphysical" are almost identical words. (Super = meta; natural = physical.) So if we say that anyone who uses metaphysics to influence his beliefs is religious, and anyone who opposes all metaphysics is an "atheist", then your point is reasonable. However, most people would not say that atheists must eschew metaphysics.

[YesNo]

I think part of the problem is to understand what we mean by the words we use so I offer definitions.

Supernatural assumes there is a natural that the supernatural goes beyond. So the important word to clarify is what do we mean today, in our culture, by the word "natural"?

In our current culture, the natural state is believed to be materialistic and even fundamentally unconscious. It is a belief that what is real (natural) is deterministic or caused by chance if one can't get determinism to work. Consciousness in this natural view is insignificant if it can't be wished away completely.

However, if the natural state does not include consciousness, then one can expect to find all sorts of "supernatural" phenomena such as our own consciousness, psi phenomena, near and shared death experiences, or the oceanic feeling being reported because consciousness is real whether atheists like it or not. These supernatural phenomena become evidence that there is something wrong with our idea of the natural. What we believe to be natural does not include everything that is real. However, granting consciousness its proper place can quickly point to ghosts, angels, demons, deities and the "god within".

If one allows the natural state to include consciousness, then there is no need for a supernatural.

Perhaps you don't like my definition of atheism as the view that we are not conscious or that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of what atheists believe to be unconscious and materialistic? I imagine that atheists like to think they are righteously opposed to the nonsense of Zeus, Jesus, Buddha or Allah. What they are really opposed to is their own consciousness.

[Ecurb]

Not all atheists are strict materialists. I agree with you that there are flaws in strictly materialistic determinism. I remember C.S. Lewis argued that materialists have no grounds for saying some beliefs are "truer" than others -- all beliefs are simply the results of neurons firing in our brains. In addition, Goedel's Proof suggests that materialism cannot be both consistent and complete. WE need to make metaphysical (supermaterialist) judgments ABOUT materialism in order for it to have philosophical merit.

We cannot assume based on this that God (or Gods) exist.

[YesNo]

I agree with you that some people who call themselves atheists aren't materialists. For example, I suspect Thomas Nagel would call himself an atheist but he tries to account for consciousness by introducing panpsychism. In this way he salvages a bottom-up reductionism which does not require conscious deities and avoids a top-down explanation of consciousness which would need those deities (or demons). If one looks at the indeterminism of a quantum particle as the particle making a choice that is where I could see his panpsychism getting a scientific justification.

I am trying to push atheism in general into a corner by claiming that it effectively says we are "not conscious". There are ways one might try to avoid that corner. Nagel's panpsychism would be one way.

I think the reality of our consciousness forms a base on which we can assert the reality of other consciousnesses perhaps those containing our own. For example, is our species as a whole conscious? I see consciousness characterized objectively as an ability to make a choice no matter how constrained. If we can observe something make a choice then I would consider it conscious. Was our species the result of another species making an evolutionary choice to split off our species? I think it was and that is how I view Eldredge's punctuated equilibria theory of Darwinian evolution. But are choices possible in an atheistic conception of reality? Or is it all explained by determinism or chance?

One piece of evidence for a God-like consciousness is that our universe is finite and it had a beginning. Was there a choice involved in its start? If so, that would imply a God-like consciousness. That is still far from a loving God or a God that sustains the universe. It could be a demon, but it would still be conscious. It could also be loving.

Based on current science I can see at least three places where choices are made and consciousness implied: (1) the indeterminism of quantum reality could be a choice providing a foundation for atheistic panpsychism, (2) punctuated equilibria involves a choice at the species level to split off other species, and (3) the big bang implies a choice made to start the universe.

[YesNo]

Here is the Wikipedia article on the "Oceanic Feeling": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oceanic_feeling

On the one hand we have Romain Rolland describe a specific experience as the foundation for religiosity. Freud doesn't recognize that experience as something he felt and explained it away as a remnant of infantile consciousness.

What I get from this is Freud would probably not have as much trouble with Barrett as some atheists do today. I think he was right about Rolland's view. This specialized experience can't be the "source of all religious energy". However, it might be a source of some religious creativity for those who have had the experience.

What I suspect is the source of religious energy is more general like having subjectivity itself whatever the content of that subjectivity may be. This means one does not have to be enlightened with a special experience to motivate religious interest. One just has to be conscious. Perhaps one way to have an oceanic experience is to not take one's consciousness for granted, but rather to pay attention to it.

[mortalterror]

In regards to the OP, I read that book in college about fifteen years ago. Unfortunately for Freud, most of his theories have been discredited in the century since he wrote them. Freud happens to be one of the founders of psychology, which pretty much makes him required reading even today, which has the dolorous habit of perpetuating some of his nineteenth century biases. He was a pretty staunch atheist and so his theories sometimes reflect those beliefs more than they do good science or careful observation. For instance, his major colleagues at the turn of the century Carl Jung and William James had a great deal more respect for religion and religious experiences. One must wonder, would the current state of psychiatry be quite as materialistic/atheistic today if one of them were considered the core of the curriculum.

Currently, I think that Freud's Oceanic Feeling would contrast well with Abraham Maslow's Peak Experiences, everyday moments of euphoria and sublime ecstasy which most people experience from time to time. "One could say that the nineteenth-century atheist had burnt down the house instead of remodeling it. He had thrown out the religious questions with the religious answers, because he had to reject the religious answers. That is, he turned his back on the whole religious enterprise because organized religion presented him with a set of answers which he could not intellectually accept--which rested on no evidence which a self-respecting scientist could swallow. But what the more sophisticated scientist is now in the process of learning is that though he must disagree with most of the answers to the religious questions which have been given by organized religion, it is increasingly clear that the religious questions themselves--and religious quests, the religious yearnings, the religious needs themselves--are perfectly respectable scientifically, that they are rooted deep in human nature, that they can be studied, described, examined in a scientific way, and that the churches were trying to answer perfectly sound human questions." - A.H. Maslow 'Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences' p.18.

Freud tries to explain away all religion as motivated by a fear of death, and failing that he throws in his 'Oceanic feeling' to explain religious feelings of joy which are not accounted for by fear. William James' answer to him in Varieties of Religious Experience was thus "Scientific theories are organically conditioned just as much as religious emotions are; and if we only knew the facts intimately enough, we should doubtless see 'the liver' determining the dicta of the sturdy atheist as decisively as it does that of the Methodist under conviction anxious about his soul. When it alters in one way the blood that percolates it, we get the methodist, when in another way, we get the atheist form of mind. So of all our raptures and our drynesses, our longings and pantings, our questions and beliefs. They are equally organically founded, be they of religious or of non-religious content.

To plead the organic causation of a religious state of mind, then, in refutation of its claim to possess superior spiritual value, is quite illogical and arbitrary, unless one have already worked out in advance some psycho-physical theory connecting spiritual values in general with determinate sorts of physiological change. Otherwise none of our thoughts and feelings, not even our scientific doctrines, not even our dis-beliefs, could retain any value as revelations of the truth, for every one of them without exception flows from the state of their possessor's body at the time.

It is needless to say that medical materialism draws in point of fact no such sweeping skeptical conclusion. It is sure, just as every simple man is sure, that some states of mind are inwardly superior to others, and reveal to us more truth, and in this it simply makes use of an ordinary spiritual judgment. It has no physiological theory of the production of these its favorite states, by which it may accredit them; and its attempt to discredit the states which it dislikes, by vaguely associating them with nerves and liver, and connecting them with names connoting bodily affliction, is altogether illogical and inconsistent."

If a belief in the supernatural can be the function of a malfunctioning brain, then so can atheistic disbelief. Indeed, in Faith of the Fatherless professor Paul C. Vitz even posits the assumption that atheists are frequently born out of unhappy relationships with father figures. If I understand the theory, then atheists are projecting their antagonistic relationship with their fathers onto the ultimate father figure of God and trying to symbolically castrate him by rejecting his existence and power over them. If St. Paul was an epileptic, and George Fox a psychotic, then we might just as easily explain away Freud's theories as the ravings of a coke fiend, or Frederick Nietzsche's philosophy as the fevered dreams of a syphilitic brain.

Returning to Freud's 'Oceanic Feeling' as William James points out in section 2 of Varieties of Religious Experience, there is no single emotion or personality type associated with religiosity. There are as many religious states as there are religions and they run the gamut from sobriety to euphoria. Trying to pigeon hole religion into just an 'oceanic feeling' is to oversimplify things.

[YesNo]

If a belief in the supernatural can be the function of a malfunctioning brain, then so can atheistic disbelief. Indeed, in Faith of the Fatherless professor Paul C. Vitz even posits the assumption that atheists are frequently born out of unhappy relationships with father figures. If I understand the theory, then atheists are projecting their antagonistic relationship with their fathers onto the ultimate father figure of God and trying to symbolically castrate him by rejecting his existence and power over them. If St. Paul was an epileptic, and George Fox a psychotic, then we might just as easily explain away Freud's theories as the ravings of a coke fiend, or Frederick Nietzsche's philosophy as the fevered dreams of a syphilitic brain.


Yes. If religious belief can be reduced to a malfunctioning brain, so can an atheistic (dis)belief. If one form of belief can be reduced to unconscious processes so can the other.

Is there any real conscious experience? Or is it all an illusion of something unconscious? And how can that unconscious substance have illusions?

Which makes me wonder, Is the following a correct statement? If atheism is true, then we are not conscious.

[mortalterror]

As far as Barrett's evidence, what is it? I admit I haven't found the book yet, but you haven't offered any evidence, yesno, you merely say Barrett does.
I haven't read Barrett's book either but he is not alone in his findings. Paul Bloom, Yale professor of psychology, author of Descartes Babies writes in his essay Religion is Natural (a series of quotes follow) -

But in the last few years, there has been an emerging body of research exploring children's grasp of certain universal religious ideas. Some recent findings suggest that two foundational aspects of religious belief - belief in divine agents and belief in mind-body dualism - come naturally to young children.

The most dramatic demonstration of childhood dualism concerns the development of afterlife beliefs. Bering and Bjorklund (2004) told children of different ages stories about a mouse that died, and asked about the persistence of certain properties. When asked about biological properties of the mouse, the children appreciated the effects of death, including that the brain no longer worked. But when asked about the psychological properties, most of the children said that these would continue - the dead mouse can have feelings of hunger, think thoughts, and hold desires. The body was gone, but the soul survives. And children believe this more than adults do, suggesting that while we have to learn the specific sort of afterlife that people in our culture believe in (heaven, reincarnation, spirit world, and so on), the notion that consciousness is separable from the body is not learned at all; it comes for free.

Stewart Guthrie (1993)... presents anecdotes and experiments showing that people attribute human characteristics to a striking range of real-world entities;... This capacity to attribute agency based on minimal cues is not a late-emerging developing accomplishment. One can get the same sorts of intentional attributions even in babies (e.g. Csibra, Biro, Koos & Gerge;u. 2003; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000).

One of the most interesting discoveries in the developmental psychology of religion is that this bias toward creationism appears to be cognitively natural. Four-year-olds insist that everything has a purpose, including things like lions ('to go in the zoo') and clouds ('for raining'). When asked to explain why a bunch of rocks are pointy, adults prefer a physical explanation, while children choose functional answers, such as 'so that animals could scratch on them when they get itchy'. Based on such findings, Kelemen has proposed that children are prone to 'promiscuous teleology' - they tend, more so than adults, to see the world in terms of design and purpose (see Kelemen, 2004, for review). Other research finds that when children are directly asked about the origin of animals and people, they tend to prefer explanations that involve an intentional creator, even if the adults who raised them do not (Evans, 2000, 2001).

The proposal here is that there are certain early-emerging cognitive biases that give rise to religious belief. These include body-soul dualism and a hyper-sensitivity to signs of agency and design. These biases make it natural to believe in Gods and spirits, in an afterlife, and in the divine creation of the universe. These are the seeds from which religion grows.

[Ecurb]

The idea that consciousness is "metaphysical" (i.e. "supernatural") is clearly natural and reasonable for both children and adults. The notion of "agency" is also common among humans. E.E. Evans Pritchard, in his classic ethnography, reported that the Azande claimed that all bad things that happened to people were the result of witchcraft. If a house collapsed and killed its inhabitants, the Azande were not so naive as to deny that rotten timbers in the frame were involved, but nonetheless ascribed the fact that the falling house killed some people to witches.

Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny was a standard anthropological metaphor in Evans-Pritchard's England, from biology -- the fact that human fetuses resemble first one-celled creatures, then amphibians, then lower mammals, etc. was extended to "explain" human culture by early anthropologists. "Primitive" cultures (like the Azande) were "infantile" in (as one example) their notions about agency. Modern anthropologists eschew the metaphor, perhaps because it is politically incorrect, or perhaps because it fails to explain the wide variety of beliefs in "primitive" cultures.

IN any event, interesting posts, MT.

[YesNo]

I doubt that "metaphysics" and "supernatural" are interchangeable. As I see it, metaphysics is a rational consideration of being while the supernatural is whatever a particular culture does not consider natural regardless of any rational explanation. I suspect the Azande would have a smaller set of supernatural phenomena than we would have although from our perspective they might be characterized as believing in the supernatural. Did the Azande consider witchcraft to be a natural part of their world?

I think you have the idea of agency correct. I am going to try to get Barrett's book from the library tomorrow. The involvement of witches is one problem that needs to be addressed if one takes consciousness more seriously. If we acknowledge that people can harm others in ways we may not currently accept, how do we protect against that while maintaining civil liberties?

[YesNo]

Justin Barrett's "Born Believers" is divided into two parts. The first part considers the evidence and the second the implications.

The question is how naturally are children able to identify "agents"? Agents are anything that can intend to do something. Non-agents just sit there and wait for an agent to act on them. These agents can be human, animal or non-material like an imaginary friend. The first evidence is to establish how easy a child can distinguish between an agent and a non-agent.

One of the methods to get information is through "preferential looking" originated by Robert Franz about 50 years ago: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preferential_looking This evidence measures how long a child pays attention to a set of stimuli.

One of the problems for this research is that it is not clear what is being studied. Do we have innate nature? Can everything be reduced to the environment? Does reduction make sense at all? Elizabeth S. Spelke and Katherine D. Kinzler describe what is being studied as a "core knowledge" which doesn't fit into the previous categories: http://www.psy.cmu.edu/~siegler/710-Spelke2007.pdf It is probably good that one gets past old metaphors. Barrett wants to leave the physical "hardwiring" to the electricians. Also a reductionism to what a culture tells children to believe is questioned because children don't believe everything they are told.

I am currently looking at the concept of imaginary friends and Bradley Wigger is one of the researchers mentioned. That is where I have stopped.

When I read scientific surveys I try to identify whether the author has a bias. Barrett seems to have a theistic bias. So his evidence has to get past this bias. Spelke seems to have a feminist bias. There is nothing wrong with these biases. They motivate research, but one needs to make sure the evidence justifies the bias and not the other way around. Although Barrett is aware that he is writing a popular presentation his audience is mainly professionals. He wants to motivate the way they see their research so further questions can be asked that help answer questions Barrett is interested in. In a footnote to his introduction Barrett writes (p260):


I am the first to concede that alternative glosses of the data to date may be reasonable and new data may change the state of the art as presented here. Nevertheless, for clarity and to put in sharp relief where the critical issues for future scientific research lie, I present a strong version of the thesis that children are naturally born believers.

My view is that all science surveys are literature so I have no problem with that.