Robert007
04-10-2015, 11:19 PM
While reading An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding by Hume, I came upon a part where Hume draws a counterexample to his epistemological theory then dismisses it as insignificant.
"There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove, that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise, independent of their correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed, that the several distinct ideas of colour, which enter by the eye, or those of sound, which are conveyed by the ear, are really different from each other; though, at the same time, resembling. Now if this be true of different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour; and each shade produces a distinct idea, independent of the rest. For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the continual gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you cannot, without absurdity, deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds, except one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible, that there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colours than in any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can: And this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions; though this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit, that for it alone we should alter our general maxim." -- Hume
Why does Hume dismiss the counterexample as insignificant. According to the philosopher Pritcahrd Hume should have revised his theory, but according to the philsoopher Jenkins since the surrounding colors need to be percieved before coming up with the intermediary shade, there is no significant contradiction with Hume's theory. I am incline to support Pritchard's position, but any insight into the reason for Hume's dismissal would be greatly appreciated!
As the philosopher Broadie states,
“The reason Hume’s instance is not singular, is this: if indeed a person can have an idea of a shade of blue, though he had not had a previous impression of that shade, then we have to allow that a person could have an idea of missing shades of every other colour also; and there is no reason why we should restrict ourselves here to a consideration of only the visual one of the five sensory modalities. We could also have an idea of a missing sound, or taste, or smell, or tactile quality.”
"There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove, that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise, independent of their correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed, that the several distinct ideas of colour, which enter by the eye, or those of sound, which are conveyed by the ear, are really different from each other; though, at the same time, resembling. Now if this be true of different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour; and each shade produces a distinct idea, independent of the rest. For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the continual gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you cannot, without absurdity, deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds, except one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible, that there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colours than in any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can: And this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions; though this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit, that for it alone we should alter our general maxim." -- Hume
Why does Hume dismiss the counterexample as insignificant. According to the philosopher Pritcahrd Hume should have revised his theory, but according to the philsoopher Jenkins since the surrounding colors need to be percieved before coming up with the intermediary shade, there is no significant contradiction with Hume's theory. I am incline to support Pritchard's position, but any insight into the reason for Hume's dismissal would be greatly appreciated!
As the philosopher Broadie states,
“The reason Hume’s instance is not singular, is this: if indeed a person can have an idea of a shade of blue, though he had not had a previous impression of that shade, then we have to allow that a person could have an idea of missing shades of every other colour also; and there is no reason why we should restrict ourselves here to a consideration of only the visual one of the five sensory modalities. We could also have an idea of a missing sound, or taste, or smell, or tactile quality.”