Free will?

[PeterL]

I was wondering, and I don't want any fights, what the religious view of "cause and effect" versus "free will" is. The question of whether humans have free will or are directed by destiny has never been answered with certainty. Philosophers have long said that people create their own fates or destinies. On the other hand, science and logic say that everything was caused by causes that preceded the event, and those causes go back to the beginning of this universe and before. Individuals have no control of their actions, because their apparent motivations were caused by causes that go back to before the individual was born. The causes are lock within DNA and in our surroundings and in history.

Personally, I would like to think that I have some control over my life, but I am a logical person, so I see the validity of the argument that the causes came before I did.

What do you think about this? And what do the various scriptures say. I know that the Bible is undecided, and I believe that the Koran comes down for cause and effect.

[YesNo]

One of the things I came across while searching the thread on Many Worlds was Conway and Kochen's "Free will theorem" which might be relevant here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will_theorem If we are "not determined" then so would elementary particles be not determined. If one accepts this theorem and the Copenhagen Interpretation, we would then have free will. This is not a religious view, however.

I recently finished Steven Rosen's Hinduism. He portrayed karma as cause and effect. Although karma appears to be opposed to free will there are two components of it that introduce freedom: (1) the individual can make changes that alter future effects implying the individual has freedom to change and (2) Vishnu can personally offer mercy. That seems similar to the Christian concept of sin and redemption.

[PeterL]

One of the things I came across while searching the thread on Many Worlds was Conway and Kochen's "Free will theorem" which might be relevant here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will_theorem If we are "not determined" then so would elementary particles be not determined. If one accepts this theorem and the Copenhagen Interpretation, we would then have free will. This is not a religious view, however.

Thanks for posting about the theorem. Unfortunately, the first axiom for it has been demonstrated as false. Paired particles have been shown to apparently communicate instantaneously., which is the entanglement that is mentioned in the third axiom;therefore the theorem is invalid.


I recently finished Steven Rosen's Hinduism. He portrayed karma as cause and effect. Although karma appears to be opposed to free will there are two components of it that introduce freedom: (1) the individual can make changes that alter future effects implying the individual has freedom to change and (2) Vishnu can personally offer mercy. That seems similar to the Christian concept of sin and redemption.

Cause and effect work on anything and everything. The only events that are not effects of earlier causes are those that are caused by something from outside the universe. This is where I find that there is no free will. Everything was caused by earlier causes all the way back. There have been so many events that we can't necessarily tell which cuase caused a given effect in all cases, but that does n't mena that there was anything that was not caused.

[YesNo]

Thanks for posting about the theorem. Unfortunately, the first axiom for it has been demonstrated as false. Paired particles have been shown to apparently communicate instantaneously., which is the entanglement that is mentioned in the third axiom;therefore the theorem is invalid.

I do think it is the case that paired particles communicate instantaneously. That would be the non-locality part of the Copenhagen interpretation. I don't see this contradicting the theorem, but I'll have to look at it again with that in mind.




Cause and effect work on anything and everything. The only events that are not effects of earlier causes are those that are caused by something from outside the universe. This is where I find that there is no free will. Everything was caused by earlier causes all the way back. There have been so many events that we can't necessarily tell which cuase caused a given effect in all cases, but that does n't mena that there was anything that was not caused.

It seems that you are assuming what you claim to be looking for does not exist.

What would be the cause of radioactive decay? It is often described as spontaneous, which is another way of saying without any cause.

Since the universe, including space-time, had a beginning 13.73 billion years ago, there must be something outside it. It is also hard for me to imagine that our big bang was the only one that occurred.

[cafolini]

The Big Bang is a product of Hawking being contracted out by the Roman Catholics to fabricate a new genesis. The cardinalia, gasping for beath, needed to come back with an even more stupid answer to the insanity of the claim to have understood creation.

[PeterL]

I do think it is the case that paired particles communicate instantaneously. That would be the non-locality part of the Copenhagen interpretation. I don't see this contradicting the theorem, but I'll have to look at it again with that in mind.

The first axiom in the theorem has something about there being a maximum speed for the transfer of information, but entangled particles appear to transfer information instantaneously.


It seems that you are assuming what you claim to be looking for does not exist.

I am not assuming that there is no free will, but science and logic indicate that there is no free will. I was, and am, looking for some reason to believe with a reasonable level of confidence that there is free will.


What would be the cause of radioactive decay? It is often described as spontaneous, which is another way of saying without any cause.

Radioactive decay is determined by the laws on physics, but when looking at a particular atom there may not be any way to determine when or if that atom will lose a particle. That's worth looking into. I don't recall anything about why a certain atom would experience decay at any given moment. I am also considering some things that are involved in quantum mechanics.


Since the universe, including space-time, had a beginning 13.73 billion years ago, there must be something outside it. It is also hard for me to imagine that our big bang was the only one that occurred.

What happened before the Big Bang is pure guesswork. It is entirely possible that this universe has always existed, or something else. It might be fun to speculate, but until I get my time machine running I will have no real answer about it. But the most elegant answer is that it will collapse into a singularity and explode into a new universe, and it has done that infinityly many times before.

[cafolini]

The first axiom in the theorem has something about there being a maximum speed for the transfer of information, but entangled particles appear to transfer information instantaneously.



I am not assuming that there is no free will, but science and logic indicate that there is no free will. I was, and am, looking for some reason to believe with a reasonable level of confidence that there is free will.



Radioactive decay is determined by the laws on physics, but when looking at a particular atom there may not be any way to determine when or if that atom will lose a particle. That's worth looking into. I don't recall anything about why a certain atom would experience decay at any given moment. I am also considering some things that are involved in quantum mechanics.


What happened before the Big Bang is pure guesswork. It is entirely possible that this universe has always existed, or something else. It might be fun to speculate, but until I get my time machine running I will have no real answer about it. But the most elegant answer is that it will collapse into a singularity and explode into a new universe, and it has done that infinityly many times before.

O, my God. You are so inespectacularly singular. LOL

[PeterL]

O, my God. You are so inespectacularly singular. LOL

And what, if anything, does that mean?

[Ecurb]

We define words as we see fit, because we see the world in our own (possibly flawed and idiosyncratic) way. To the prisoner, being “free” means being unconfined by locked bars. To the married polyamorist, it means being unconfined by marriage vows. To the lawyer, it means an action unconstrained by other people either physically or through the threat of force.

In none of these standard uses of “free” is it relevant that sub-atomic particles reacting to one another in our brains can be said to “cause” our behaviors.
Unless we want to conclude that choosing to murder someone is as constrained by circumstance as failing to rescue a drowning man because you are handcuffed to a bike rack, we are forced to conclude that our normal use of the word “free” (as in “free will”) has little to do with sub-atomic physics.

The extent to which the laws of physics “cause” everything that happens is irrelevant to the “freedom” or lack of “freedom” of most of these behaviors. The prisoner remains less “free” than the man living in his own home; the murderer remains responsible for his choice; the man handcuffed to the bike rack is less culpable for failing to rescue the drowning man than the one who is not handcuffed.

Of course it is also true that none of us can choose to do other than what we do. We can say, “Joe CHOSE to murder his wife.” But once the murder is committed, there is no other possible “choice”. Nonetheless, the concept of “free will” is still relevant. No choice other than murder can be made – but we can imagine a different choice, and moral judgments (what “should” occur) are always a matter for the imagination.

[cafolini]

And what, if anything, does that mean?

"But the most elegant answer is that it will collapse into a singularity and explode into a new universe, and it has done that infinityly many times before."

It's so elegant. Like a Pope's hat or zuchetto.

[PeterL]

We define words as we see fit, because we see the world in our own (possibly flawed and idiosyncratic) way. To the prisoner, being “free” means being unconfined by locked bars. To the married polyamorist, it means being unconfined by marriage vows. To the lawyer, it means an action unconstrained by other people either physically or through the threat of force.

In none of these standard uses of “free” is it relevant that sub-atomic particles reacting to one another in our brains can be said to “cause” our behaviors.
Unless we want to conclude that choosing to murder someone is as constrained by circumstance as failing to rescue a drowning man because you are handcuffed to a bike rack, we are forced to conclude that our normal use of the word “free” (as in “free will”) has little to do with sub-atomic physics.

The extent to which the laws of physics “cause” everything that happens is irrelevant to the “freedom” or lack of “freedom” of most of these behaviors. The prisoner remains less “free” than the man living in his own home; the murderer remains responsible for his choice; the man handcuffed to the bike rack is less culpable for failing to rescue the drowning man than the one who is not handcuffed.

Of course it is also true that none of us can choose to do other than what we do. We can say, “Joe CHOSE to murder his wife.” But once the murder is committed, there is no other possible “choice”. Nonetheless, the concept of “free will” is still relevant. No choice other than murder can be made – but we can imagine a different choice, and moral judgments (what “should” occur) are always a matter for the imagination.

Then, to be terse, you believe that all human activities are the results of actions, observations, events, or whatever that preceded the actions, or do you?

Certainly the idea of subatomic particles having free will is absurd, but is this how the quantum level of existence applies the macro-world?

[YesNo]

The first axiom in the theorem has something about there being a maximum speed for the transfer of information, but entangled particles appear to transfer information instantaneously.

I find these things puzzling as well. As I understand it, there is a maximum speed for the transfer of information which would be the speed of light. However, non-locality supposedly does not involve transfer of information (although I don't quite follow this). In that case non-local causality occurs with entangled particles.

For example, if one of the entangled particles is tested to be "spin up", the other would have to be "spin down". Prior to the testing of either of the particles it could be either spin up or down. It is still free or not determined. Once one of them is tested, everything changes. Then the other particle has its spin determined instantaneously no matter how far apart they have been separated.



I am not assuming that there is no free will, but science and logic indicate that there is no free will. I was, and am, looking for some reason to believe with a reasonable level of confidence that there is free will.

That's why I offered the article on the free-will theorem. Apparently not all science and logic indicate there is no free will. The article was written by mathematicians using the science of quantum physics. They would not agree that there is "no free will". In this case "free will" is defined as "not determined" in some sense.



Radioactive decay is determined by the laws on physics, but when looking at a particular atom there may not be any way to determine when or if that atom will lose a particle. That's worth looking into. I don't recall anything about why a certain atom would experience decay at any given moment. I am also considering some things that are involved in quantum mechanics.

Initially, I suspect scientists assumed they could model such things statistically hoping later they would find a cause. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle cut short that search for causes. And on top of that, even more disconcerting is the non-locality we discussed above.



What happened before the Big Bang is pure guesswork. It is entirely possible that this universe has always existed, or something else. It might be fun to speculate, but until I get my time machine running I will have no real answer about it. But the most elegant answer is that it will collapse into a singularity and explode into a new universe, and it has done that infinityly many times before.

That's what I thought happened until a few years ago when OrphanPip posted a talk on one of these forums by Lawrence Krauss and introduced by Richard Dawkins. They claimed the universe had a beginning out of nothing 13.73 billion years ago and it would continue indefinitely into the future since the universe was "flat". I didn't believe it, so I started looking for some evidence for it and apparently that is the standard view of science.

The only reason I bring this up is because you mentioned causes outside our universe. Well, something is outside our universe because our universe had a beginning.

[PeterL]

I find these things puzzling as well. As I understand it, there is a maximum speed for the transfer of information which would be the speed of light. However, non-locality supposedly does not involve transfer of information (although I don't quite follow this). In that case non-local causality occurs with entangled particles.
For example, if one of the entangled particles is tested to be "spin up", the other would have to be "spin down". Prior to the testing of either of the particles it could be either spin up or down. It is still free or not determined. Once one of them is tested, everything changes. Then the other particle has its spin determined instantaneously no matter how far apart they have been separated.

I remember looking at that several years, and I decided that someone simply defined the information exchannge between entangled particles as something other than the exchange on information. And, if one tried hard, one could make entangled particles into a tool for communications. That's something for a Science Fiction novel.


That's why I offered the article on the free-will theorem. Apparently not all science and logic indicate there is no free will. The article was written by mathematicians using the science of quantum physics. They would not agree that there is "no free will". In this case "free will" is defined as "not determined" in some sense.

[QUOTE]Initially, I suspect scientists assumed they could model such things statistically hoping later they would find a cause. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle cut short that search for causes. And on top of that, even more disconcerting is the non-locality we discussed above.

I don't remember bothering to think about this before, but there probably is some way to determine when a nucleus would decay.



That's what I thought happened until a few years ago when OrphanPip posted a talk on one of these forums by Lawrence Krauss and introduced by Richard Dawkins. They claimed the universe had a beginning out of nothing 13.73 billion years ago and it would continue indefinitely into the future since the universe was "flat". I didn't believe it, so I started looking for some evidence for it and apparently that is the standard view of science.


There is disagreement whether the universe is flat, open, or closed, and there is not enough evidence to determine what it is. There also is some evidence that parts of the universe may be older than other parts, and there may have been localized spurts of "expansion". Then there is the idea of "branes", which may have interacted to create this universe any may continue to interact with it.

There's a lot to think about. I think that I stay with decay for a little while for right now.

[YesNo]

I don't remember bothering to think about this before, but there probably is some way to determine when a nucleus would decay.


There might be. I don't know if it falls into the Heisenberg uncertainty level or not.





There is disagreement whether the universe is flat, open, or closed, and there is not enough evidence to determine what it is. There also is some evidence that parts of the universe may be older than other parts, and there may have been localized spurts of "expansion". Then there is the idea of "branes", which may have interacted to create this universe any may continue to interact with it.

There's a lot to think about. I think that I stay with decay for a little while for right now.

There's a lot that is speculation. It is hard to separate the science from the fiction.

[PeterL]

There might be. I don't know if it falls into the Heisenberg uncertainty level or not.

That, is exactly what killed Heisenberg's cat. I don't think there has been any notable work in regard to what causes nuclei to decay at a given point, but I think that it would be determinable, if one could make enough observations of suittable nuclei.


There's a lot that is speculation. It is hard to separate the science from the fiction.

But the fiction and imagination are what make it interesting. As I understand it, it is thought that nothing can be determined about the period before expansion. In effect it is sating that some stuff was there, and then it expanded, and after the expansion it was the universe that we know and love. There is some great fiction about it. "Before the Universe" by ? and "Tau Zero" by Poul Anderson are the ones that first come to mind.

[Ecurb]

Then, to be terse, you believe that all human activities are the results of actions, observations, events, or whatever that preceded the actions, or do you?

Certainly the idea of subatomic particles having free will is absurd, but is this how the quantum level of existence applies the macro-world?

I think that the extent to which all human activities are "the result of" sub-atomic physical reactions is irrelevant to whether humans have "free will", based on the standard meaning of "free will". Although it may seem as if "freedom" of choice requires at least two possible choices, I think this is a mistake. This is clarified by looking at past actions. Once one has put on one's hat, one can no longer not have put on one's hat. The notion that the decision to put on a hat is based on determining factors, and that if we understood those factors perectly we would know what "caused" the hat-wearing and be able to predict it accurately may be correct, but it is not germaine to whether the hat was "freely" donned. After all, once the person has put on the hat we know that he cannot choose NOT to put on a hat that day. There is no option. Nonetheless, we can say that he freely chose to put on the hat (despite the fact that it would be impossible for him to have made any other choice).

"The result of" or "the cause of" has a particular meaning. When we refer to a "cause" we refer to a handle we can manipulate. If a car spins out on a curve and crashes, the "cause" of the crash differs depending on who is looking at the crash. To the driver, the crash was caused by going to fast around the turn. To the road engineer, the cause was insufficient banking on the curve. To the tire-maker, the cause was a lack of adhesion between the tires and the pavement. When we perform a chemistry experiment, we call the variable (the chemical we added) the "cause" of the explosion -- even though a myriad of non-variable conditions (like oxygen in the air) are necessary for the explosion.

We say the diseases are "caused" by germs. But some people get sick when exposed to germs, and others do not. So germs (in and of themselves) don't "cause" disease. Instead, because we can kill germs with antibiotics or by refrigerating and pasteurizing food, germs represent a handle we can manipulate to prevent or treat disease.

Until we can manipulate the quantum reactions from which thoughts and behaviors result, they don't "cause" our actions, given our normal use of that word.

[Sea]

I think that the extent to which all human activities are "the result of" sub-atomic physical reactions is irrelevant to whether humans have "free will", based on the standard meaning of "free will". Although it may seem as if "freedom" of choice requires at least two possible choices, I think this is a mistake. This is clarified by looking at past actions. Once one has put on one's hat, one can no longer not have put on one's hat. The notion that the decision to put on a hat is based on determining factors, and that if we understood those factors perectly we would know what "caused" the hat-wearing and be able to predict it accurately may be correct, but it is not germaine to whether the hat was "freely" donned. After all, once the person has put on the hat we know that he cannot choose NOT to put on a hat that day. There is no option. Nonetheless, we can say that he freely chose to put on the hat (despite the fact that it would be impossible for him to have made any other choice).

It seems like your compatibilism would be better outlined in terms of internal determinants, such as desires, emotions, thoughts, etc... and external determinants such as threats, prison, and moral and social obligations. Then a person would not be free from his determinants, but a will would be free as long as the person is not externally constrained.

[PeterL]

Sea has an excellent point. If someone selects a hat to wear, then there were internal reasons for that, and those reasons were determined by something that preceded the decision. The chain of cause and effect that led to the wearing of a hat begn at birth for that person, and there would have been earlier causes that led to that birth. Simply because we are not aware of a cause does not mean that there was no cause.

[Ecurb]

Sea has an excellent point. If someone selects a hat to wear, then there were internal reasons for that, and those reasons were determined by something that preceded the decision. The chain of cause and effect that led to the wearing of a hat begn at birth for that person, and there would have been earlier causes that led to that birth. Simply because we are not aware of a cause does not mean that there was no cause.


It seems I am not making myself clear. Of course there are preconditions for anything we do, but are they “causes”? As I suggested earlier, a ‘cause’ is generally used to mean some handle that we can manipulate. From a philosophy article I once read, here are the three standard definitions of “cause”:

1) A “cause” is the free and intentional act of a conscious and responsible agent. (i.e. if you shoot someone, you cause his death).

2) A “cause” is the handle we manipulate to create an effect. (i.e. if x+existing conditions = y, and x can be manipulated, we say x causes y) By this definition, if a car skids going around a curve, the "cause" may be the speed of the car (to the driver), the lack of banking on the turn (to the road engineer), or the lack of traction in the tires (to the tire maker). This definition can also be used by experimental scientists.

3) In theoretical science, a cause is something which is necessary in both existence and operation to the thing it is causing, For the rationalist, x causes y if x is an "insight" into y, so you could say the first two sides of a triangle "cause" the dimensions of the third side. For the empiricist, a cause is an observed conjunction -- all x are followed by y.

Fate vs. Free Will is a standard religious argument, based on the disagreement about whether an omniscient God contradicts the notion of free will. Obviously, an omniscient God (who may resemble an omniscient physicist of the future) will know whether the man will put his hat on before he puts his hat on. Some people would say that this contradicts the notion of free will, but I disagree. We don’t mean by “free will” that we didn’t “choose” one action over another based on some criteria (whether a conscious reason behind our choice, or some physical interaction of molecules in our brains); we mean that we are unconstrained in our choice by the forceful intervention of other people. That’s how we use the word “free”. A person who is “free” is one who is not “enslaved”. Of course such a person is still constrained by the laws of physics (he can’t fly by flapping his arms, for example), but we don’t generally say he is not “free” as a result of those laws.

We can define words any way we want, but we should agree about how we are defining them. I’m merely suggesting that even if the laws of physics are utterly determining, they do not contradict free will, as the words are generally used. Peter suggests they do (I think) using the 3rd definition of “cause” listed above. If everything has a “cause”, all of our poor hat-wearer’s actions have a “cause” – if we were just more knowledgeable, the conditions present at the Big Bang “caused” the donning of the hat just like the first two sides of a triangle “cause” the third side. In other words, such conditions might be necessary and sufficient in existence and operation to predict our hero’s donning of a hat.

I grant this possibility – I just don’t think that it contradicts “free will”, as the words are normally used, especially in this world where we are a long, long way from being able to make such accurate predictions.

[PeterL]

It seems I am not making myself clear. Of course there are preconditions for anything we do, but are they “causes”? As I suggested earlier, a ‘cause’ is generally used to mean some handle that we can manipulate. From a philosophy article I once read, here are the three standard definitions of “cause”:

1) A “cause” is the free and intentional act of a conscious and responsible agent. (i.e. if you shoot someone, you cause his death).

2) A “cause” is the handle we manipulate to create an effect. (i.e. if x+existing conditions = y, and x can be manipulated, we say x causes y) By this definition, if a car skids going around a curve, the "cause" may be the speed of the car (to the driver), the lack of banking on the turn (to the road engineer), or the lack of traction in the tires (to the tire maker). This definition can also be used by experimental scientists.

3) In theoretical science, a cause is something which is necessary in both existence and operation to the thing it is causing, For the rationalist, x causes y if x is an "insight" into y, so you could say the first two sides of a triangle "cause" the dimensions of the third side. For the empiricist, a cause is an observed conjunction -- all x are followed by y.


cause
[kawz] Show IPA noun, verb, caused, caus·ing. noun
1. a person or thing that acts, happens, or exists in such a way that some specific thing happens as a result; the producer of an effect: You have been the cause of much anxiety. What was the cause of the accident?
2. the reason or motive for some human action: The good news was a cause for rejoicing.
3. good or sufficient reason: to complain without cause; to be dismissed for cause.
4. Law.
a. a ground of legal action; the matter over which a person goes to law.
b. a case for judicial decision.
5. any subject of discussion or debate.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/cause?s=t

It appears that we are working from different definitions. I have been using "cause" under definition 1.


Fate vs. Free Will is a standard religious argument, based on the disagreement about whether an omniscient God contradicts the notion of free will. Obviously, an omniscient God (who may resemble an omniscient physicist of the future) will know whether the man will put his hat on before he puts his hat on. Some people would say that this contradicts the notion of free will, but I disagree. We don’t mean by “free will” that we didn’t “choose” one action over another based on some criteria (whether a conscious reason behind our choice, or some physical interaction of molecules in our brains); we mean that we are unconstrained in our choice by the forceful intervention of other people. That’s how we use the word “free”. A person who is “free” is one who is not “enslaved”. Of course such a person is still constrained by the laws of physics (he can’t fly by flapping his arms, for example), but we don’t generally say he is not “free” as a result of those laws.

free will
noun
1. free and independent choice; voluntary decision: You took on the responsibility of your own free will.
2. Philosophy . the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/free%20will?fromAsk=true&o=100074
I think that you are working with a very restricted opinion of what "free will" might be. Please note definition 2 from Dictionary.com.


We can define words any way we want, but we should agree about how we are defining them. I’m merely suggesting that even if the laws of physics are utterly determining, they do not contradict free will, as the words are generally used. Peter suggests they do (I think) using the 3rd definition of “cause” listed above. If everything has a “cause”, all of our poor hat-wearer’s actions have a “cause” – if we were just more knowledgeable, the conditions present at the Big Bang “caused” the donning of the hat just like the first two sides of a triangle “cause” the third side. In other words, such conditions might be necessary and sufficient in existence and operation to predict our hero’s donning of a hat.

I grant this possibility – I just don’t think that it contradicts “free will”, as the words are normally used, especially in this world where we are a long, long way from being able to make such accurate predictions.

It would violate free will, if you had a more inclusive definition of free will, such as the one that I copied from dictionary.com.

[YesNo]

That, is exactly what killed Heisenberg's cat. I don't think there has been any notable work in regard to what causes nuclei to decay at a given point, but I think that it would be determinable, if one could make enough observations of suittable nuclei.

I was looking at the Wikipedia article on determinism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism, and it appears that radioactive decay is evidence for indeterminism. To have determinism one would need to be able to state initial conditions from which any future or past state of the universe can be derived. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle would claim that such an initial state cannot be defined.

Therefore, determinism is not scientifically supported. The evidence for quantum mechanics implies that determinism is empirically false.

I would go so far as to say that it makes no sense to accept any theological conclusion that any God is able to create such an initial state even from outside the universe. No such initial state upon which one can have materialistic determinism is possible.

This non-determinism is a ground on which free will can exist within our universe. However, only something able to make a conscious choice has free will. A computer making a decision based on a random seed is not free. A virus deciding to move in one direction rather than another might be, if it is conscious. Perhaps even an electron deciding on spin up or down might be as well, if it is conscious.

Some will claim that our own consciousness is determined by our material bodies, in particular, our brains. For these people, it doesn't matter whether quantum mechanics presents an indeterministic world, we are still determined by our brains. I think that is false based on the evidence provided by near-death experiences and out-of-body experiences. The most that one can say about our brains is that they filter our consciousness. Our brains do not determine, nor create, our consciousness. With that I conclude that within this neurological filtering we can exercise, and legitimately experience ourselves as having, free will.

[PeterL]

I was looking at the Wikipedia article on determinism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism, and it appears that radioactive decay is evidence for indeterminism. To have determinism one would need to be able to state initial conditions from which any future or past state of the universe can be derived. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle would claim that such an initial state cannot be defined.
Therefore, determinism is not scientifically supported. The evidence for quantum mechanics implies that determinism is empirically false.

If the decay of a nucleus cannot be predict, then you are right and determinism has been demonstrated as false. While the prediction of decay has not happened, I believe that it could be done but not with today's technology and theories. Schrodinger's cat sounds impressive, but it an anecdotal proof.


I would go so far as to say that it makes no sense to accept any theological conclusion that any God is able to create such an initial state even from outside the universe. No such initial state upon which one can have materialistic determinism is possible.

I won't disagree here, but it quite conceivable that some the initial state might have been known to some entity, whether God or Goddess makes no difference), but determining whether that happened is far outside human possibilities at this time.


This non-determinism is a ground on which free will can exist within our universe. However, only something able to make a conscious choice has free will. A computer making a decision based on a random seed is not free. A virus deciding to move in one direction rather than another might be, if it is conscious. Perhaps even an electron deciding on spin up or down might be as well, if it is conscious.

Some will claim that our own consciousness is determined by our material bodies, in particular, our brains. For these people, it doesn't matter whether quantum mechanics presents an indeterministic world, we are still determined by our brains. I think that is false based on the evidence provided by near-death experiences and out-of-body experiences. The most that one can say about our brains is that they filter our consciousness. Our brains do not determine, nor create, our consciousness. With that I conclude that within this neurological filtering we can exercise, and legitimately experience ourselves as having, free will.

It is a matter of determining the initial state. If it is found that radioactive decay and a few other events that are thought to be completely random, are in fact predictable, if one knows the initial state of the atom, then determinism rules. As far as human consciousness goes, stack together DNA of a particular maodel with a given set of training and experience, and you will get whatever decision you see. It is easier to determine "conscious" decisions than it is to predict quantum events, because of the scale. I remain agnostic on the matter, because it appears to be that things can be determined on the macro scale, but prediction may be impossible on the quantum. But that may just ba a matter of what we can detect. That is why I am going to look around to see whether anyone has tried to inspect nuclei so closely that the conditions that precede decay can be discerned.

[osho]

What is free. Will? There is no free will and all our wills or behaviors, moods or patterns of thinking, speaking, moving, and particular sets of works have some past, and we do what we do just because some forces, something inside us command us to do what we do. We do some acts in response to the society we live in, in response to some external social or natural or cultural or religious,or any other forces and what we do result or emanate from what our body or mind want us to do. We are enslaved by our own bodily demands. If we indulge in acts of sex not just only out of our desire for propagations, not just out of our physical or emotional needs or impulses but because all these things in unison, in tandem drive us to do. Sex for example does not originate in our penis, it originates first in our head and in quick response to the command of our head our bodily parts get stimulated.

Therefore we are not doing things out of free will an our action is not always at our command and they are to a large extent in response to our social, environmental, cultural, economic conditions or forces

[PeterL]

Therefore we are not doing things out of free will an our action is not always at our command and they are to a large extent in response to our social, environmental, cultural, economic conditions or forces

This is where I tended to come out also, but there are some reasons to think that humans may have some freedom in what they think, even though their actions are determined by things outside of themselves.

[Ecurb]

It would violate free will, if you had a more inclusive definition of free will, such as the one that I copied from dictionary.com.

Not so. If there is some inorganic "cause" ("(a) thing that acts, happens, or exists in such a way that some specific thing happens as a result") to our will, we would still have to deal with the word "free". First of all, I don't think some unidentified and unknown confluence of subatomic events is normally seen as a "cause" for human behavior, so I stand by my philosophically cribbed definition as an accurate description of the way in which the word is normally used (although, of course, you are using it differently). It is possible that (as with germs being the so called "cause" of disease) future scientific developments will alter our perspective on this, but we are nowhere near that reductionist nirvana. I suppose you could offer a non-reductionist approach -- Marxism, for example. The economic infrastructure determines the remainder of culture, which determines individual personality, which determines ("causes") behavior. But we aren't there yet, either.

Second, does anyone use the word "free" so that "freedom" is limited by the inorganic "cause" of neutrinos (or whatever they are) spinning in our brains. I don't think so. The notion that (due to the laws of physics) all people are as lacking in "freedom" as slaves or convicts contradicts all normal usage of the word "free". Only when these words are used metaphorically ("he was a slave to his love for Juliet") are "freedom" and "bondage" used to suggest a freedom FROM the laws of nature. Of course nobody is free from the laws of physics (unless supernatural beings are). Therefore, if the word "free" is to mean anything as used in normal, English speech, it must mean something other than "unbounded by the laws of phsyics".

The notion that the laws of physics are omnipotent (determine all things, even human behavior) is a reasonable one (although no more reasonable than the notion that an omnipotent God determines all things). But it is a philosophical claim, not a scientific one. It is also of little relevance to human moral philosophy, behavior, or culture. Even granting this claim, "freedom" still has significant meaning, both in moral terms and in objective terms. It is (perhaps) a convenient fiction, but it is the best we can do under our current circumstances.

Here's an example. Suppose you are playing draw poker. You hold four clubs, and discard one, hoping to draw another club. There are 9 remaining clubs among the 47 unseen cards. You think, "I have a 9/47ths chance of filling my flush." This is, of course, ridiculous (from an omniscient perspective).You have either have a 100% chance of filling the flush, or a zero% chance. The cards have already been shuffled. An omniscient observer (or even a non-omnisicent one with x-ray vision) would know which card the dealer was going to deal next. Nonetheless, the poker player who won't accept the 9/47 odds might be correct (in one way) but will lose in poker, because 9/47ths is the best he can do given his imperfect knowledge -- the order of the deck is NOT random, but from the player's perspective, it is random. Free will is the best we can do with our current state of knowledge, just as 9/47ths is the best the poker player can do.


"Free Will --2. Philosophy . the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces." This definition is confusing and ambiguous. Conduct can express "personal choice" AND be "determined by physical forces". The word "simply" is what makes the definition ambiguous. Just as the odds of drawing a club are 9/47ths from one perspective, and either 0% or 100% from another, "personal choice" and "determined by physical forces" can BOTH be correct ways to look at human behavior. My whole point is that they are not mutually exclusive.

[PeterL]

"Free Will --2. Philosophy . the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces." This definition is confusing and ambiguous. Conduct can express "personal choice" AND be "determined by physical forces". The word "simply" is what makes the definition ambiguous. Just as the odds of drawing a club are 9/47ths from one perspective, and either 0% or 100% from another, "personal choice" and "determined by physical forces" can BOTH be correct ways to look at human behavior. My whole point is that they are not mutually exclusive.

I think that you assertion here rests on a definition of "personal choice". I think that you are confusing actual probablity with overall outcomes of a situation.

I fail to understand how two antithetical statements can be anything except mutually exclusive. Are you suggesting that an individual would personally choose an end result that was determined by forces outside himself and over which he had no control? That is analogous to Schrodinger's cat being able to decide whether the radiation that will cause it to die is released.

[Ecurb]

It's a matter of perspective. What is meant by "no control"? The poker player uses the odds of drawing a club as a convenient fiction to determine his tactics. Similarly, the individual "decides" whether to put his hat on or not. Since we don't know whether his choice is predetermined by the forces set in motion by the Big Bang, and since even if (as you seem to be advocating) we have a philosophical bent toward thinking that his choice IS so determined, nonetheless it's reasonable to talk about his "free choice". If some other person pointed a gun at him and said, "Put on your hat or I'll shoot," the choice would be coerced, and thus not "free". "Free personal choice" is thus meaningful, relevant, and not nonsensical or absurd. What more can we ask for in the description of an event?

YOu seem to suggest that your philosphical opinion that because the individual's "free choice" is predetermined by (as an example) the physics of the Big Bang, it cannot be either free or a choice. Why not? Is it absurd (in normal English) to say, "Joe chose to wear his hat yesterday."? Is that phrase meaningless? Of course it isn't. It suggests a certain pattern of events which we call "choice", despite the fact that only one choice is possible (precluding time travel). I'm not confusing probability with outcomes -- I'm simply saying that one (seemingly contradictory) "fact" can be true from one perspective ("It is certain that Joe will fill his flush, because the top card on the deck is a club"), while another is true from another perspective ("there is a 9/47th chance that Joe will fill his flush"). Both are accurate descriptions, from a different perspective.

That's why the laws of physics are irrelevant to free will (from OUR perspective, although not, perhaps, from some other perspective). We are like the poker player who can't see through the backs of the cards, so (from our perspective) we describe our choices as sometimes "free" and sometimes "constrained". Given that these descriptions of choices are meaningful and distinct, I don't see any reason to stop using them.

[PeterL]

It's a matter of perspective. What is meant by "no control"? The poker player uses the odds of drawing a club as a convenient fiction to determine his tactics. Similarly, the individual "decides" whether to put his hat on or not. Since we don't know whether his choice is predetermined by the forces set in motion by the Big Bang, and since even if (as you seem to be advocating) we have a philosophical bent toward thinking that his choice IS so determined, nonetheless it's reasonable to talk about his "free choice". If some other person pointed a gun at him and said, "Put on your hat or I'll shoot," the choice would be coerced, and thus not "free". "Free personal choice" is thus meaningful, relevant, and not nonsensical or absurd. What more can we ask for in the description of an event?

YOu seem to suggest that your philosphical opinion that because the individual's "free choice" is predetermined by (as an example) the physics of the Big Bang, it cannot be either free or a choice. Why not? Is it absurd (in normal English) to say, "Joe chose to wear his hat yesterday."? Is that phrase meaningless? Of course it isn't. It suggests a certain pattern of events which we call "choice", despite the fact that only one choice is possible (precluding time travel). I'm not confusing probability with outcomes -- I'm simply saying that one (seemingly contradictory) "fact" can be true from one perspective ("It is certain that Joe will fill his flush, because the top card on the deck is a club"), while another is true from another perspective ("there is a 9/47th chance that Joe will fill his flush"). Both are accurate descriptions, from a different perspective.

That's why the laws of physics are irrelevant to free will (from OUR perspective, although not, perhaps, from some other perspective). We are like the poker player who can't see through the backs of the cards, so (from our perspective) we describe our choices as sometimes "free" and sometimes "constrained". Given that these descriptions of choices are meaningful and distinct, I don't see any reason to stop using them.

I have no problem with the first two paragraphs, but when you suggested that the laws of physics are irrelevant to our free will, you lost me. I am prefectly willing to accept that for most practical purposes humans have free will, because it is impossible to see even a large psrt of the chain of cause and effect, but the physical universe, even on the quantum are the origin of humans. Humans exist only because we developed from animals that evolved, and that the animals came into existence because the laws of physics allow for self-replicating molecules, and so on back to the Big Bang (if that actually happened). All of human existence and activity is based on the laws that govern the physical universe.

Might it be better to describe out actions as either overtly determined or covertly determined?

[YesNo]

I won't disagree here, but it quite conceivable that some the initial state might have been known to some entity, whether God or Goddess makes no difference), but determining whether that happened is far outside human possibilities at this time.

The point is that if quantum mechanics is true, with Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, then such an initial state can't exist. No God can bring it into existence either.




It is a matter of determining the initial state. If it is found that radioactive decay and a few other events that are thought to be completely random, are in fact predictable, if one knows the initial state of the atom, then determinism rules.

True, if one could construct an initial state from which the past and future could be constructed, then there would be no free will. However, an initial state cannot be determined unless quantum mechanics is false.

[Ecurb]

I would suggest that there are infinite “causes” for our actions. It seems to me that yours is a modernist (scientific) worldview. Modernism is typified by some basic principles: 1) the “whole” is made up of and explained by its parts (a postmodern view would be that the whole can be more than its parts). 2) Language is referential (as opposed to gaining meaning through social usage in context). 3) Faith in the ‘real’, which exists distinctly from language, symbols and models (as opposed to the notion that reality is ALWAYS mediated through language, models and symbols.

It’s perfectly reasonable to say that if someone murders someone, he “causes” that person’s death, whether or not his behavior could in some future society be predicted by scientists as the inevitable result of the Big Bang. Humans do exist because we evolved from other animals – but I also exist because my father met my mother and they got married and decided to have sex at one particular time. One “cause” does not negate the other, just as the laws of physics do not negate free will. Was the fact that my mother and father both ended up (through a million happenstances) working for the same company, and thus met and got married inevitable ever since the beginning of the universe? I have no strong opinion about that one way or another. Nonetheless, even if it was, I don’t think it’s incorrect to say, “My mom and dad met BECAUSE they happened to get jobs at the same company.”

Since this is a literary board, I refer you to War and Peace. Here’s Tolstoy’s take (he favors a non-individual, but also non-reductionist approach to causation in history, but may be taking your side in the argument moe than mine):


When an apple has ripened and falls, why does it fall? Because of its attraction to the earth, because its stalk withers, because it is dried by the sun, because it grows heavier, because the wind shakes it, or because the boy standing below wants to eat it?

Nothing is the cause. All this is only the coincidence of conditions in which all vital organic and elemental events occur. And the botanist who finds that the apple falls because the cellular tissue decays and so forth is equally right with the child who stands under the tree and says the apple fell because he wanted to eat it and prayed for it. Equally right or wrong is he who says that Napoleon went to Moscow because he wanted to, and perished because Alexander desired his destruction, and he who says that an undermined hill weighing a million tons fell because the last navvy struck it for the last time with his mattock. In historic events the so-called great men are labels giving names to events, and like labels they have but the smallest connection with the event itself.

Every act of theirs, which appears to them an act of their own will, is in an historical sense involuntary and is related to the whole course of history and predestined from eternity.

Here’s a link to the rest of the chapter:
http://www.online-literature.com/tolstoy/war_and_peace/168/


Yes – acts appear to us as acts of will. Yes, they may be “predestined from eternity”. That makes them “in an historical sense involuntary”, or in a scientific sense involuntary, but only in those particular senses from that particular and unique perspective.

p.s. I don't know enough about quantum mechanics to get involved in that conversation, interesting as it seems.

[PeterL]

I would suggest that there are infinite “causes” for our actions. It seems to me that yours is a modernist (scientific) worldview. Modernism is typified by some basic principles: 1) the “whole” is made up of and explained by its parts (a postmodern view would be that the whole can be more than its parts). 2) Language is referential (as opposed to gaining meaning through social usage in context). 3) Faith in the ‘real’, which exists distinctly from language, symbols and models (as opposed to the notion that reality is ALWAYS mediated through language, models and symbols.

We agree on this there appear to be infinite causes. I would contend that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, but the parts determine what the whole is or can be; you can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. I think of myself as more of a Pretermodernist than a Modernist, but the differences are few.


It’s perfectly reasonable to say that if someone murders someone, he “causes” that person’s death, whether or not his behavior could in some future society be predicted by scientists as the inevitable result of the Big Bang. Humans do exist because we evolved from other animals – but I also exist because my father met my mother and they got married and decided to have sex at one particular time. One “cause” does not negate the other, just as the laws of physics do not negate free will. Was the fact that my mother and father both ended up (through a million happenstances) working for the same company, and thus met and got married inevitable ever since the beginning of the universe? I have no strong opinion about that one way or another. Nonetheless, even if it was, I don’t think it’s incorrect to say, “My mom and dad met BECAUSE they happened to get jobs at the same company.”

Determining a complete set of actual causes is probably impossible, because some of the causes in the chain of cause and effect took place long before there were observers.


Since this is a literary board, I refer you to War and Peace. Here’s Tolstoy’s take (he favors a non-individual, but also non-reductionist approach to causation in history, but may be taking your side in the argument more than mine):



Here’s a link to the rest of the chapter:
http://www.online-literature.com/tolstoy/war_and_peace/168/


Yes – acts appear to us as acts of will. Yes, they may be “predestined from eternity”. That makes them “in an historical sense involuntary”, or in a scientific sense involuntary, but only in those particular senses from that particular and unique perspective.

p.s. I don't know enough about quantum mechanics to get involved in that conversation, interesting as it seems.

In practical terms it doesn't make any difference whether there is free will, because human society, including legal systems, is based on the assumption that humans can control their actions. Proving that everything is determined will overthrow laws, morals, and commerce.

I am going to look into quantum uncertainty. As I mentioned earlier, I don't think that there has been much work on the prediction of a single atom's decay.

[YesNo]

It’s perfectly reasonable to say that if someone murders someone, he “causes” that person’s death, whether or not his behavior could in some future society be predicted by scientists as the inevitable result of the Big Bang.

No scientist will be able to make such a prediction in the future unless the current laws of physics are proven false.



Humans do exist because we evolved from other animals – but I also exist because my father met my mother and they got married and decided to have sex at one particular time. One “cause” does not negate the other, just as the laws of physics do not negate free will.

If the laws of physics implied materialistic determinism, that would negate free will. Fortunately, the laws of physics show the opposite regardless of the speculations of some physicists.



Was the fact that my mother and father both ended up (through a million happenstances) working for the same company, and thus met and got married inevitable ever since the beginning of the universe? I have no strong opinion about that one way or another. Nonetheless, even if it was, I don’t think it’s incorrect to say, “My mom and dad met BECAUSE they happened to get jobs at the same company.”

There is a summary called The Chemistry Between Us which describes the molecules that support desire in our brains giving us pleasure when we have sex and give us social memory to make our species monogamous. These are all reward mechanisms that encourage sexual activity. Your parents got together within a biological environment that contained chemical reward mechanisms encouraging them to mate.

Now if they had no free will to choose not to mate, why would these reward mechanisms exist? They wouldn't be necessary. What this implies is not only do we have free will to reject pleasure, but so do all the species in which chemical reward mechanisms are used to bias their choices one way or the other.



Yes – acts appear to us as acts of will. Yes, they may be “predestined from eternity”. That makes them “in an historical sense involuntary”, or in a scientific sense involuntary, but only in those particular senses from that particular and unique perspective.


Think about it from any reasonable God's perspective. Why would he or she want to predestine every facet of any species behavior? Where's the fun in that?

Sure the God would want to fine-tune the universe so life could exist, and the one we live in appears to be nicely tuned for our existence, but there must be some room for free will or why would that God bother at all with it?

[Ecurb]

I disagree that materialistic determinism negates free will (although I’ll grant that yours is the majority position), and I’ve just written an almost endless series of posts on the subject, so I won’t repeat myself.

As far as God is concerned, the Protestant Christian argument is about whether an omniscient God is logically compatible with free will, particularly with regard to Salvation. An omniscient God would clearly know what will happen in the future, and who is saved and who is damned. Therefore, it follows that each individual’s salvation is already determined (from God’s perspective), because He knows what it will be.

Again, whether this entirely negates free will is a debatable (I would argue that it doesn’t, you, from your comment about materialistic determinism, would argue that it does). In addition, there are complicated Theological arguments (based on the Bible) about whether humans can find their own salvation (through faith), or whether faith is God’s gift to them, and entirely determined by Him (but I can’t remember the arguments well enough to repeat them here without some research).

One more question: If chemicals in our brains are designed “to make our species monogamous”, how come we aren’t monogamous? These chemicals aren’t doing their job!

[PeterL]

No scientist will be able to make such a prediction in the future unless the current laws of physics are proven false.



If the laws of physics implied materialistic determinism, that would negate free will. Fortunately, the laws of physics show the opposite regardless of the speculations of some physicists.



There is a summary called The Chemistry Between Us which describes the molecules that support desire in our brains giving us pleasure when we have sex and give us social memory to make our species monogamous. These are all reward mechanisms that encourage sexual activity. Your parents got together within a biological environment that contained chemical reward mechanisms encouraging them to mate.

Now if they had no free will to choose not to mate, why would these reward mechanisms exist? They wouldn't be necessary. What this implies is not only do we have free will to reject pleasure, but so do all the species in which chemical reward mechanisms are used to bias their choices one way or the other.

The matter of reward for reproduction is fair, but the reward is just a small part of the whole process.

[/QUOTE]Think about it from any reasonable God's perspective. Why would he or she want to predestine every facet of any species behavior? Where's the fun in that?

Sure the God would want to fine-tune the universe so life could exist, and the one we live in appears to be nicely tuned for our existence, but there must be some room for free will or why would that God bother at all with it?[/QUOTE]

For the most part the Gods and Goddesses do not know what will happen, and even Sky Father doesn't bother to consider the chain of cause and effect. By giving things wide latitude and a diversity of different stimuli, more different things were developed than he would have thought of without really trying. I expect that things will be better the next time around.

On the other hand, I still am an agnostic about determinism.

[YesNo]

For the most part the Gods and Goddesses do not know what will happen, and even Sky Father doesn't bother to consider the chain of cause and effect. By giving things wide latitude and a diversity of different stimuli, more different things were developed than he would have thought of without really trying. I expect that things will be better the next time around.

On the other hand, I still am an agnostic about determinism.

I mention the Gods for Ecurb whom I suspect might accept them. I actually do although I don't have any particular relationship to one. The point is that no matter how powerful the God or how advanced the physicist in the future, if quantum mechanics is true and contains Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, no initial state can be constructed by either of them.

However, the more interesting part about free will is not at the quantum level. That just allows the physical possibility in this universe for free will to occur.

Sam Harris' essay "Free Will" sets the stage for the problem of consciousness. This is from page 8:


The physiologist Benjamin Libet famously used EEG to show that activity in the brain's motor cortex can be detected some 300 milliseconds before a person feels that he has decided to move. Another lab extended this work using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Subjects were asked to press one of two buttons while watching a "clock" composed of random sequence of letters appearing on a screen. They reported which letter was visible at the moment they decided to press one button or the other. The experimenters found two brain regions that contained information about which button subjects would press a full 7 to 10 seconds before the decision was consciously made.

Because the conscious awareness occurred after the brain activity, Harris denies that we have free will defined as our conscious awareness being the only source of our free will.

Daniel Dennett disagrees with him claiming, according to Harris, "that even if our thoughts and actions are the product of unconscious causes, they are still our thoughts and actions."

I'll let that sink in.

It is here that we are confronted with what consciousness actually is. Like out-of-body experiences these particular experiments confirm, as I understand it, what intuitionists or psychics also say about consciousness.

[Cioran]

I disagree that materialistic determinism negates free will (although I’ll grant that yours is the majority position), and I’ve just written an almost endless series of posts on the subject, so I won’t repeat myself.

As far as God is concerned, the Protestant Christian argument is about whether an omniscient God is logically compatible with free will, particularly with regard to Salvation. An omniscient God would clearly know what will happen in the future, and who is saved and who is damned. Therefore, it follows that each individual’s salvation is already determined (from God’s perspective), because He knows what it will be.

Again, whether this entirely negates free will is a debatable (I would argue that it doesn’t, you, from your comment about materialistic determinism, would argue that it does).

If by hypothesis there existed an omniscient agent, defined as an agent who has complete true knowledge of all future contingent acts and events, this foreknowledge would not negate human free will. This idea of free-will negation in the presence of infallible foreknowledge represents an instance of an actual logical fallacy, known as the Modal Fallacy.

Suffice it for now to say that if this kind of God existed, then the free acts of future beings would supply the truth grounds of his prior knowledge of what those people contingently would do. The argument to what is sometimes called epistemic determinism gets the flow of truth-making backward: it supposes that God's foreknowledge of what people will do forces what they will do, but it is rather the opposite: the free acts force God's foreknowledge to be what it is.

[osho]

Free will invented by the Christendom in the middle age is just to,widen its domain since unlike any other ancient religions Christianity suffers great limitations and like Hinduism and Buddhism there is no system of meditations and that is why to widen its scope many scholars and pundits kept on adding something. Man is free to do certain things which is a childish proposition but beyond a certain limit. For instance when a person is too compressed or hard struct he becomes compelled to do things which he would have not done otherwise in a normal circumstance. Therefore the assumption that man is a accountable for every piece of act irrespective of the external circumstances is a stupid idea. The idea that he must face the punishment in this life or in the afterlife for the acts he has done is again trash.

Life is full of circumstances and these circumstances do not change though he change himself and he has to give in to these externals and that is why he has to obey things or the turn of the event in adverse environments.

[YesNo]

I disagree that materialistic determinism negates free will (although I’ll grant that yours is the majority position), and I’ve just written an almost endless series of posts on the subject, so I won’t repeat myself.

I might be wrong. That's why I'm interested in this thread.



As far as God is concerned, the Protestant Christian argument is about whether an omniscient God is logically compatible with free will, particularly with regard to Salvation. An omniscient God would clearly know what will happen in the future, and who is saved and who is damned. Therefore, it follows that each individual’s salvation is already determined (from God’s perspective), because He knows what it will be.

I assume that an omniscient God only knows what is true. For example, no matter how omniscient, that God doesn't know something to be true that is false. The initial state, or any particular state of the universe from which one could predict from it all past and future states, does not exist. It should not impair the omniscience of a God to not know something to exist that in fact doesn't exist.



Again, whether this entirely negates free will is a debatable (I would argue that it doesn’t, you, from your comment about materialistic determinism, would argue that it does). In addition, there are complicated Theological arguments (based on the Bible) about whether humans can find their own salvation (through faith), or whether faith is God’s gift to them, and entirely determined by Him (but I can’t remember the arguments well enough to repeat them here without some research).

From what I've been reading on Bhakti yoga in Hinduism, karma, or cause and effect determinism, can be overcome by individuals, that is, they "find their own salvation", or it comes from surrender to Vishnu (most likely through love of his avatar Krishna) which corresponds to "faith". The same thing you are describing in Christianity seems to be present in Hinduism.



One more question: If chemicals in our brains are designed “to make our species monogamous”, how come we aren’t monogamous? These chemicals aren’t doing their job!

Right. They don't do their job very well. All the chemicals do is provide a reward mechanism that would bias us to do one thing or the other. The existence of these reward mechanisms I see as evidence that we have free will. We just need to clarify what that is.

[Ecurb]

Cioran gave a formal explanation of the argument for the existence of free will given an omniscient God (who knows what "choice" we will make). My question to Cioran is this: suppose we have materialistic determinism. Scientists can predict what choice people will make, and they theorize that their correct predictions are based on their knowledge of causation. Does that negate free will?

Also, the (posited) omniscient God is a bit more complicated than your explanation suggests. Since the omniscient God is also the creator of the universe, and since He knew when he created the universe (being outside of time) all eventualities that would take place in that universe, He is (arguably) the "cause" of those occurences as well as the mere predicter. To what extent does this have an impact on which is contingent upon what?

[Cioran]

Cioran gave a formal explanation of the argument for the existence of free will given an omniscient God (who knows what "choice" we will make). My question to Cioran is this: suppose we have materialistic determinism. Scientists can predict what choice people will make, and they theorize that their correct predictions are based on their knowledge of causation. Does that negate free will?

Also, the (posited) omniscient God is a bit more complicated than your explanation suggests. Since the omniscient God is also the creator of the universe, and since He knew when he created the universe (being outside of time) all eventualities that would take place in that universe, He is (arguably) the "cause" of those occurences as well as the mere predicter. To what extent does this have an impact on which is contingent upon what?
I believe I made this point earlier about God's alleged omnipotence, in conjunction with the fact that he allegedly created the universe, posing the real threat to free will. But put that aside for a moment just to focus on this narrow issue of omniscience vs. free will.

The issue of omniscience v. free will can be abstracted out, and indeed it first raised its head before the invention of the Abrahamic God. It is called the Problem of Future Contingents, and was first mooted by Aristotle in his Sea Battle example.

The question is, can propositions be true today, about events that will occur in the future? And if so, what are the implications of that?

We take as a staring premise that "truth" inheres in propositions. This is called the correspondence theory of truth. Not everyone accepts it.

"Tomorrow there will be a sea battle."

If tomorrow there is a sea battle, the proposition is true, in advance of the event. If there is no sea battle, the proposition is false.

Aristotle worried that if propositions today can be true (or false) about events in the future, then fatalism ensues. Fatalism is not really the same thing as determinism, but basically it means that the universe is pre-set and it is idle to try to change the future. This is also called the Idle Argument.

This form of fatalism, or determinism, is sometimes called logical fatalism/determinism.

The argument takes the following logical form (which can be reduced to formal symbolic logic, but I'll skip that): If today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then necessarily there will be a sea battle tomorrow.

In modal logic, there are formal distinctions between necessity and contingency, possibility and actuality. The bottom line is that if a proposition is necessarily true, it cannot fail to hold in all possible circumstances. Thus if the construction outlined above is right, tomorrow's sea battle is not, as had been supposed, a contingent state of affairs. Contingency means it could have been otherwise. If it's not contingent, it's necessary. If it's necessary, it can't fail to happen. If it can't fail to happen, there is no free will and indeed no contingent acts or events exist at all, and all human action (and every other event) is preset.

Aristotle's solution was to deny that propositions today, about events in the future, can be truth-valued (either true or false). Aristotle was wrong.

If I say, "tomorrow it will rain," and it in fact rains, then I spoke truly. My proposition "tomorrow it will rain," was indeed truth-valued, returning the value TRUE, and it was true in advance of the event that it describes. Does this, however, mean what Aristotle feared --- that if it's true today that tomorrow it will rain (or that there will be a sea battle), then the rain and the sea battle must necessarily happen?

No.

The error in this way of thinking was laid bare by the invention of modal logic in the 20th century, to which of course Aristotle had no access.

Skipping over the details to make this post wieldy, the problem lies with the misapplication of the term necessarily in the equation, "If today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then necessarily there will be a sea battle tomorrow." In formal modal symbolic logic, the word "necessity" is called an operator, which acts on operands. The above equation can be divided into the antecedent ("If today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle…") and the consequent ("… then necessarily there will be a sea battle tomorrow.")

Since true propositions cannot also be false (Law of Non-Contradiction) then if it's true today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then sure enough, there will be a sea battle tomorrow.

The problem lies in ascribing necessity to the sea battle. It's not necessary; it is, was, and always will be, contingent. This is called the principle of the fixity of modal status. The modal status of a proposition cannot change. If a truth is necessary, it is, was, and always will be, necessary; and likewise if it is contingent, it is, was, and always will be, contingent.

Again, I'm going to skip over the details, but compare the following propositions:

1. If today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then tomorrow, necessarily, there will be a sea battle.

2. Necessarily, (if today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then tomorrow there will (NOT MUST!) be a sea battle.

Proposition One above is logically fallacious and Prop 2 is logically correct.

The upshot: in cases like this, necessity cannot be ascribed to the consequent of the antecedent by itself. It must be ascribed jointly to BOTH antecedent and consequent. To ascribe necessity only to the consequent constitutes the formal "modal fallacy." What it means is that necessarily, a true proposition about future events cannot fail to be true, but the event itself can go either way. If there is a sea battle, then the existence of that battle confers truth on the proposition describing it. But there could just as well NOT be a sea battle, in which case the proposition, "Today it's true that tomorrow there will NOT be a sea battle" is true instead.

This reduces to: necessarily, true propositions are true by definition. But the EVENTS that the propositions describe can go either way (free will intact); it's just that whatever way the events go, the proposition will correctly describe those events, even in advance of their occurrence.

I invite you to figure out what this means for God's alleged omniscience and human free will. You may already notice that the so-called problem for free will of God's foreknowledge all human acts is just a specialized subset of Aristotle's Problem of Future Contingents. And as just shown, there is actually no problem. If God knows today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then sure enough, there will be; but it does not have to happen. The battle is not NECESSARY. What IS necessary, is that whether people decide freely to have a sea battle or not, God will know, in advance, what free choice they make. It's not that the sea battle MUST happen. It's just that whether it happens or not, it MUST be the case that God knows in advance what will happen.

For a fuller treatment, I highly recommend this essay at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Foreknolwedge and Free Will (http://www.iep.utm.edu/foreknow/)

I'll talk about materialistic determinism, also called causal determinism, later. Causal determinism does not impugn free will, either.

[Ecurb]

All of this makes perfect sense to me. It’s similar to my earlier stated argument that if Bill put on his hat yesterday, it is still reasonable to say, “Bill FREELY CHOSE to put on his hat yesterday.” Despite the fact that Bill can no longer make any other choice, his action is compatible with free will. The only distinction is that we (perhaps arbitrarily) distinguish between past events and future events, so IT SEEMS TO US that if someone has knowledge of the future event it would violate free will, while if we have knowledge of past events it does not.

I read the article you linked (although I skimmed the parts with symbols, and merely read the English). Very interesting and well done (certainly the article explained the argument better than I did. I also read the article on Free Will. Here’s what it says about “causal determinism” (in part):


Most philosophers agree that whether or not determinism is true is a contingent matter; that is, determinism is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false. If this is so, then whether or not determinism is true becomes an empirical matter, to be discovered by investigating the way the world is, not through philosophical argumentation…. Some scientists suggest that certain parts of physics give us reason to doubt the truth of determinism. For example, the standard interpretation of Quantum Theory, the Copenhagen Interpretation, holds that the laws governing nature are indeterministic and probabilistic.

[Cioran]

All of this makes perfect sense to me. It’s similar to my earlier stated argument that if Bill put on his hat yesterday, it is still reasonable to say, “Bill FREELY CHOSE to put on his hat yesterday.” Despite the fact that Bill can no longer make any other choice, his action is compatible with free will. The only distinction is that we (perhaps arbitrarily) distinguish between past events and future events, so IT SEEMS TO US that if someone has knowledge of the future event it would violate free will, while if we have knowledge of past events it does not.

That's exactly it. God, with his perfect knowledge, would also have a perfect memory. Suppose he remembers that 2,000 years ago, some guy x killed some guy y at a brawl in ancient Rome. If you were to ask, does this perfect memory of God's mean that x HAD TO kill y, and could not have done otherwise, what would most people answer? Most would answer, correctly, NO. x could have refrained from killing y; but had he done so, then God, with his perfect memory, would remember THAT fact instead.

So it goes in other time direction, foreknowledge. This demonstration does not prove that people have free will. Maybe we are all pre-pgrammed robots. It just proves that perfect foreknowledge BY ITSELF, or anything involving epistemology (knowledge) cannot undermine freedom of will or choice.

[YALASH]

I was wondering, and I don't want any fights, what the religious view of "cause and effect" versus "free will" is. .

In the first chapter of Holy Quran, four basic attributes of God are mentioned. Al Rab (The One, Who upbrings, raises, Lord), Al Rahman (The Merciful Who grants without asking), Al Rahim (The One Who repeats mercy and WHO CREATES RESULTS), Maalik e You mud Din (The Master of Day of Judgement, The Master of glory of His Way)

== Thus there is cause and effect. There is free will within a system. There is accountability too.

== There was creation, guided evolution, set of rules ragding cause and effects were involved in the raise of universe.. [you may read more related discussion with scientific proves in online book “Revelation, Rationality, Knowledge and Truth” by fourth Ahmadiyya Khalifah]



The question of whether humans have free will or are directed by destiny has never been answered with certainty. .
Free Will: “And (by) the soul and its perfection – He revealed to it what is worng for it and what is right for it. – He (truly) prospers who purifies it.— And he who corrupts it, is ruined . ” (ch 91: v 8 to 11)

Destiny: “ Allah has decreed: Most surely I will prevail, I and My Mesengers. Verily Allah is Powerful, Mighty.” (ch 58: v 22)
But there is no Destiny which forces human for evil. God is pure.



Philosophers have long said that people create their own fates or destinies. On the other hand, science and logic say that everything was caused by causes that preceded the event, and those causes go back to the beginning of this universe and before. .

== Human has choice to lift one leg at a time logically. Lifting two legs simultaneously is not possible, it is destined.




Individuals have no control of their actions, because their apparent motivations were caused by causes that go back to before the individual was born. The causes are lock within DNA and in our surroundings and in history. .

If individual have no controls over their actions, then all criminals has be released. Crime diminishes when law and order is strict. It is the idea of accountibilty which continuously reminds one to be careful. To be careful means human has power to control him/her-self. Traits based acts are true but there is stronger inbuilt nervous system which do not let one to disintegrate. Religion tells the idea of repentance and its acceptance by God. It is Hope, it is salvation.




Personally, I would like to think that I have some control over my life, but I am a logical person, so I see the validity of the argument that the causes came before I did. .

Cause and effect plus Control. When people visit a country, they are free but they are under the law of land. Free Will works inside a vast circle.




What do you think about this? And what do the various scriptures say. I know that the Bible is undecided, and I believe that the Koran comes down for cause and effect.


Aspects with respect to Holy Quran are mentioned in http://www.online-literature.com/forums/entry.php?12853-Understanding-Fate-Divine-Destiny-Taqdir-%96-Types-Benefits-Various-Aspects
Misunderstanding about Destiny
Two incorrect views
In fact, according to Holy Quran
i- People are given choice, God does not force anything
ii- God has issued Destiny too
Knowlede of God and Destiny should not be confused as same
Types of Destiny
Relation between Destiny and (Ways and) Means
Working of certain Destinies
Change in Destiny
Destiny and Prophecies
Destiny and human effort
Acceptance of Prayers and Destiny
NEEDS TO HAVE FAITH ABOUT DESTINY / QADAR
FAITH IN DESTINY HELPS CLIMB 7 SPIRITUAL STAGES

[YesNo]

== Human has choice to lift one leg at a time logically. Lifting two legs simultaneously is not possible, it is destined.


Good point. I also thought the Quran accepted free will. Your post seems to confirm that.

I wonder how the various religions differ regarding it. At the moment it seems they are very similar.

[osho]

Freewill is a false philosophical proposition in a vortext of things since things happen and things account fo things or one event has to do with another event in the chain and what we call freewill is only a christian brainchild and in fact external factors play play significant roles. In fact events happen since they are in a chain. Things or events are intertwined,or to put it differently one event totally causes another event. For example when persons steal things there must be some reason behind the act of the event. The thief must be poor or he must have some acute problems and he is just a tool. When a person is good or bad there must be some background or something that has a role. The thieft is a social ill and the person involved in the act of the the theft must have been doing the same under some circumstances. If he or she is doing some ignoble or immoral deeds there maybe his parents. Most of what children hear from their parents will be deeply influencial and what he hears from his society and his society consists of the people he accompanies and what he does or the way he thinks or does have a role in shaping his life.
How can people do something not guided by his social environments. No child can totally protect or shield himself. Will he have free will? Does he have the capacity for discriminating the good from the bad

[Cioran]

Yalash, do you have any evidence that your make-believe Allah exists? the Koran cannot serve as evidence of its own veracity. So sorry.

[PeterL]

Good point. I also thought the Quran accepted free will. Your post seems to confirm that.

I wonder how the various religions differ regarding it. At the moment it seems they are very similar.

I thought that Islam was acceptance of the will of Allah in all things.

[YesNo]

All of the theistic religions I'm familiar with, which aren't many, value submission to the will of God no matter how that God is culturally represented. That submission, however, requires free will. It cannot be coerced. That would be no fun for either the human or the God. From a theistic perspective, we should have enough free will to make a choice to love, aka submit to, God. That is what ultimately gives life meaning for the theist.

As I was going through Harris' "Free Will", it occurred to me that Dennett is right. Regardless of whether the brain activity can be detected earlier than the person is aware of the choice, still the person acknowledges this as his or her choice. All the experiment shows is that there is more to consciousness than awareness. Also feedback mechanisms relying on personal awareness and chemical reward systems, which rely on awareness, imply that even the part of our consciousness that is aware plays some part in our choices. Our being able to make a choice is what free will is about.

[YesNo]

Freewill is a false philosophical proposition in a vortext of things since things happen and things account fo things or one event has to do with another event in the chain and what we call freewill is only a christian brainchild and in fact external factors play play significant roles.

Why do you say this is peculiarly Christian? I suspect Hinduism values it equally as much, unless I'm mistaken.

[YALASH]

Yalash, do you have any evidence that your make-believe Allah exists? the Koran cannot serve as evidence of its own veracity. So sorry.

Peace be on you.
It is interesting to note that in ‘Religious Text’ part of forum, I have to present evidence that Allah/God exists. Anyway, you are welcome.


Signature of God are everywhere, in a leaf -- in you, everywhere. If a simple book has a writer, then please be assured universe has a Maker.


In evolution, one find continous march toward a making human. Honest search about realities of life leads to the idea of Conscious Creator. It is evident from pupose, design and complexity. There are many examples of Conscious Creator’s existance; e.g, at the right time, a massive meteorite hit and brought about the end of the age of dinosaurs. The Director was behind. It was done to give chance to other forms of life to reach maximum evolution. The All-Knowing God let those big animal buried so that they gradually convert to oil for use in much latter times.


Please observe the systems of honey-bees, their colonies and making of honey which is a marvelous food. Without a Maker, such intricate systems are not possible to develop.


There are all sorts of rules; rules of physical sciences, chemical sciences etc. But mere presence of these rules donot produces anything. The User (of rules) is required to make something.


Conscious and subconscious of everyone knows God exists, but there are some curtains which force one not to proclaim. In times that spark ignites. Confess it or not, it does. Because this confession in written in our basic building blocks. Allah / God is the Light of all universe.

[YALASH]

I thought that Islam was acceptance of the will of Allah in all things.

Peace be on you. Pondering about natural phenomenon is among the Will of God:

In the creation of the heavens and earth and in the alternation of the night and the day there are indeed Signs for people of understanding. -- Those who remember Allah while standing, sitting and (lying) on their sides, and ponder over the creation of the heavens and the earth: "Our Lord, Thou hast not created this in vain; (nay), Holy art Thou; save us, then, from the punishment of the Fire."

Will of God is to grow and glow and pay rights of God and rights of people, as taught by God.

[PeterL]

Peace be on you. Pondering about natural phenomenon is among the Will of God:

In the creation of the heavens and earth and in the alternation of the night and the day there are indeed Signs for people of understanding. -- Those who remember Allah while standing, sitting and (lying) on their sides, and ponder over the creation of the heavens and the earth: "Our Lord, Thou hast not created this in vain; (nay), Holy art Thou; save us, then, from the punishment of the Fire."

Will of God is to grow and glow and pay rights of God and rights of people, as taught by God.

May the peace of the Gods and Goddesses be on you.

It was my understanding that everything that happened was the will of Allah.
from the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam:
Yea, the first Morning of Creation wrote
What the Last Dawn of Reckoning shall read.

[YesNo]

I'm getting puzzled by what theists actually believe about free will. Here's a link to an opinion claiming that "free will" is also a "christian term" reminding me of osho's comment. http://muttaqun.com/freewill.html

It seems the problem is that free will means not being controlled by prior causes or divine intervention. Here is the Quran verse sited in the link:


And had Allâh willed, He could have made you (all) one nation, but He sends astray whom He wills and guides whom He wills. But you shall certainly be called to account for what you used to do. [Qur'an 16:93]

What is the point of calling someone to account if they have no free will?

[YALASH]

Peace be on you.
There are two possible translations of this verse:

Possibility 1- And if Allah had (enforced) His Will, He would surely have made you (all) one people; but He lets go astray him who wishes (it), and guides him who wishes (it) and you shall surely be questioned concerning that which you have been doing.
[alislam.org/quran]

== >> Since Allah has granted choice, responsibility is on person, whatever person wishes.


Possibility 2 - And had Allâh willed, He could have made you (all) one nation, but He sends astray whom He wills and guides whom He wills. But you shall certainly be called to account for what you used to do. [Qur'an 16:93]

In this case better translation is:

And had Allâh willed, He could have made you (all) one nation, but He ( DECLARES) astray whom He wills and guides whom He wills. But you shall certainly be called to account for what you used to do. [Qur'an 16:93]

== >> In this case, His Will is learned from elsewhere: e.g. “Then whoso does an atom’s weight of good will see it.—And whoso does an atom’s weight of evil will (also) see it.” (ch 99:v 8-9)



WE CAN CONFIRM THE MEANING OF 'WILL' FROM EARLIER (TO VERSE UNDER DISCUSSION) VERSES TOO THEY ARE:

= Verily, Allah enjoins justice, and the doing of good to others; and giving (like) kindred; and forbids indecency and manifest evil and transgression. He admonishes you that you make heed.

= And fullfil the covenant of Allah when you have made (one), and break not your oaths after making them firm, while you have made Allah your surety. Certainly, Allah knows what you do.

= And be not like unto her who cuts up her yarn into pieces after having spun it strong by making your oaths a means of deciet between you, (for fear) lest one people become more powerful than another people. Surely Allah tries you therewith, and on the Day of Resurrection He will make clear to you that wherein you differed.

ALL THESE VERSES PRIOR TO VERSE UNDER DISCUSSION ARE MENTIONING THAT GOD IS ADVISING AND ENCOURAGING, NOT ENFORCING.

[Cioran]

Peace be on you.

You, too.


It is interesting to note that in ‘Religious Text’ part of forum, I have to present evidence that Allah/God exists. Anyway, you are welcome.

You don't have to present anything. I just asked.



Signature of God are everywhere, in a leaf -- in you, everywhere. If a simple book has a writer, then please be assured universe has a Maker.

I'm sorry, no. This is the Paley's Watch fallacy. Are you familiar with Paley and pocketwatch example? And have you read the book the Blind Watchmaker?

If you do a search online, you will find a remarkable video that shows how to evolve a watch out of simple parts in rather simple and quick iterations. All that is needed to evolve a watch are two things: watch parts that reproduce with variation, and natural selection, with what might be called a fitness gradient that makes watches more able to survive and continue to reproduce. This is called descent with modification, or evolution via natural selection. The reason a book needs a writer is that books do not reproduce with variation, and hence are not subject to natural selection. Darwin demonstrated this fact of life: animals are designed without a designer



In evolution, one find continous march toward a making human.

Wholly incorrect. Human's are just a another twig on the vast tree of life. We are no more special than a frog or a worm, except in our boundless capacity for vanity and self-delusion. Our intelligence is merely our particular adaptation. I suggest reading Ernst Mayr's "What Evolution Is." The upshot is that when out ancestors came down from the trees that were vanishing during a period of climate change, they were "pre-adapted" to evolve greater brain complexity, since they were bad at everything else, and we, their descendants, are even worse: We are slow, weak, can't run very fast, can't fly, have lousy teeth, poor eyesight, etc., compared to other animals. Fortunately natural selection worked on brainpower that became our own critical adaptation.


Honest search about realities of life leads to the idea of Conscious Creator.

Honest search about the realities of life show that there is no creator or designer, and that all living things share a common ancestor and that we evolved via descent with modification. Evolution, by the way, is not a random process -- just the opposite, in fact. But a non-random process does not imply a creator or designer.


It is evident from pupose, design and complexity.

If you did a little study, you'd find that many of these so-called "designs" in biology are quite lousy, but good enough to get by, which is what you would expect from a blind evolutionary process. Do a Google on the mammalian "blind spot" and find out why we and other mammals have it. Then ask yourself: What kind of lousy designer would design an eye with a blind spot?


There are many examples of Conscious Creator’s existance; e.g, at the right time, a massive meteorite hit and brought about the end of the age of dinosaurs. The Director was behind. It was done to give chance to other forms of life to reach maximum evolution. The All-Knowing God let those big animal buried so that they gradually convert to oil for use in much latter times.

And just the other day a giant asteroid missed Earth by 15 minutes while a few hours earlier a meteorite hit Russia and caused 1,000 injuries. So? The whole universe is filled with space junk and every now and then a big rock hits earth and other planets. About a decade ago a gigantic meteor hit Jupiter and carved out a hole in its cloudtops bigger than earth itself. And? Also, if the "director" was interested in humans, why go through all the pointless rigmarole of having endless eons without humans and having to kill off dinosaurs? Why not just make humans from the start, the way that fundamentalist Christians believe he did?



Please observe the systems of honey-bees, their colonies and making of honey which is a marvelous food. Without a Maker, such intricate systems are not possible to develop.

Pure nonsense. Go read The Blind Watchmaker.



There are all sorts of rules; rules of physical sciences, chemical sciences etc. But mere presence of these rules donot produces anything. The User (of rules) is required to make something.

Codswallop and balderdash.



Conscious and subconscious of everyone knows God exists, but there are some curtains which force one not to proclaim. In times that spark ignites. Confess it or not, it does. Because this confession in written in our basic building blocks. Allah / God is the Light of all universe.

Allah is one of about nine thousand made-up Gods. BTW, out of curiosity, what do you think of the Islamists in Mali who veiled women, destroyed cultural artifacts and chopped off hands while howling praises to Allah? Are they "true Muslims," or not? If not, why not, and how does one decide who a "true Muslim" is?

[Cioran]

What is the point of calling someone to account if they have no free will?

In an earlier post, I tried to show why God's perfect foreknowledge of human acts cannot logically preclude human free will.

However, things are not that simple. God/Allah is also held to be the creator of the universe.

God/Allah, in the Christian, Islamic and Judaic traditions, all descended from, one might say evolved from, a common ancestor. They are the Abrahamic religions.

Typically, God/Allah is held to be all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-loving.

Modal logic shows why the claim that God's perfect foreknowledge of human acts cannot preclude human free will. Unfortunately for the Abrahamic theists, modal logic also shows why God's omni traits taken together -- omniscience along with omnipotence and omnibenevolence -- are inconsistent with human free will AND indict God as the direct source of all evil.

Modal logic employs a heuristic called possible worlds. For example, there are possible worlds that are actual and non-actual possible worlds. The latter are counterfactual worlds. In a possible world JFK was not assassinated, but that possible world is non-actual. On other hand, there is no possible world at which a square has three sides or a triangle four sides.

Let "Adam at the apple" stand for the introduction of evil into our world.

Using the "possible worlds" heuristic lets us understand human free will as follows: Humans can choose, of their own free will, to actualize a possible world, and make a competing possible world non-actual. If Adam was free to eat the apple or not, and chose to ate it, then by choosing to eat it he actualized a possible world of evil, and made the alternate world of "no evil" possible but non-actual.

1. God is all-knowing, all powerful and all-loving.

2. At the creation, because God is all-knowing, he would have known the entire future history of the world that he was about to create. More: he would have known, to the smallest detail, the entire potential future histories of all possible but non-actual worlds that he could have chosen to create, but did not.

3. Adam eating the apple is a contingent, not necessary, act. If it had been a necessary act, Adam would have had no choice, and could not be morally culpable for the introduction of evil.

4. God, being all powerful, can create exactly the world he wants to, without error of any kind.

5. There is a possible world at which Adam eats the apple. There is also a possible world at which he does not eat it. God can choose, with perfect knowledge and precision, to create either of those worlds.

6. God chose to create the world in which Adam ate the apple.

7. Because God chose to create the world at which Adam ate the apple, it was he, and not Adam, who actualized the world in which evil exists.

8. Conclusion: God is indicted as the author of all iniquity, and man is morally blameless. For God to punish man for evil acts when really God is the source of all evil is about the most perverse (and nonsensical) thing one could imagine.

Q. E. D.

Of course, God doesn't exist, so the worries are moot.

[YesNo]

Possibility 1- And if Allah had (enforced) His Will, He would surely have made you (all) one people; but He lets go astray him who wishes (it), and guides him who wishes (it) and you shall surely be questioned concerning that which you have been doing.
[alislam.org/quran]

== >> Since Allah has granted choice, responsibility is on person, whatever person wishes.
...
ALL THESE VERSES PRIOR TO VERSE UNDER DISCUSSION ARE MENTIONING THAT GOD IS ADVISING AND ENCOURAGING, NOT ENFORCING.
The first translation makes more sense to me. Thanks for the explanation.

[YesNo]

In an earlier post, I tried to show why God's perfect foreknowledge of human acts cannot logically preclude human free will.

However, things are not that simple. God/Allah is also held to be the creator of the universe.

God/Allah, in the Christian, Islamic and Judaic traditions, all descended from, one might say evolved from, a common ancestor. They are the Abrahamic religions.

Typically, God/Allah is held to be all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-loving.

Modal logic shows why the claim that God's perfect foreknowledge of human acts cannot preclude human free will. Unfortunately for the Abrahamic theists, modal logic also shows why God's omni traits taken together -- omniscience along with omnipotence and omnibenevolence -- are inconsistent with human free will AND indict God as the direct source of all evil.

Modal logic employs a heuristic called possible worlds. For example, there are possible worlds that are actual and non-actual possible worlds. The latter are counterfactual worlds. In a possible world JFK was not assassinated, but that possible world is non-actual. On other hand, there is no possible world at which a square has three sides or a triangle four sides.

Let "Adam at the apple" stand for the introduction of evil into our world.

Using the "possible worlds" heuristic lets us understand human free will as follows: Humans can choose, of their own free will, to actualize a possible world, and make a competing possible world non-actual. If Adam was free to eat the apple or not, and chose to ate it, then by choosing to eat it he actualized a possible world of evil, and made the alternate world of "no evil" possible but non-actual.

1. God is all-knowing, all powerful and all-loving.

2. At the creation, because God is all-knowing, he would have known the entire future history of the world that he was about to create. More: he would have known, to the smallest detail, the entire potential future histories of all possible but non-actual worlds that he could have chosen to create, but did not.

If quantum physics is correct, he can't know that. This is where the argument breaks down.



3. Adam eating the apple is a contingent, not necessary, act. If it had been a necessary act, Adam would have had no choice, and could not be morally culpable for the introduction of evil.

4. God, being all powerful, can create exactly the world he wants to, without error of any kind.

5. There is a possible world at which Adam eats the apple. There is also a possible world at which he does not eat it. God can choose, with perfect knowledge and precision, to create either of those worlds.

6. God chose to create the world in which Adam ate the apple.

7. Because God chose to create the world at which Adam ate the apple, it was he, and not Adam, who actualized the world in which evil exists.

8. Conclusion: God is indicted as the author of all iniquity, and man is morally blameless. For God to punish man for evil acts when really God is the source of all evil is about the most perverse (and nonsensical) thing one could imagine.

Q. E. D.

Of course, God doesn't exist, so the worries are moot.

Because of the big bang the likelihood that some conscious agent triggered our universe to exist is greater than the belief that it happened without a conscious agent, at least as I choose to assign the likelihoods. Call that conscious agent God. So the problem of theological determinism is quite real.

[Cioran]

If quantum physics is correct, he can't know that. This is where the argument breaks down.

Unfortunately you choose again to overlook the Many Worlds Interpretation of QM, which is fully deterministic. But regardless of whether MWI is the right interpretation of QM or not, this is of no help to the theist. If the world is random, and even God cannot know what will happen, then there is no free will because free will is inconsistent with randomness as much as it is with hard determinism. Therefore no one can be blamed for anything.




Because of the big bang the likelihood that some conscious agent triggered our universe to exist is greater than the belief that it happened without a conscious agent, at least as I choose to assign the likelihoods. Call that conscious agent God. So the problem of theological determinism is quite real.

Now you are contradicting yourself. Given the Big Bang, how is theological determinism a problem if according to you, the world is quantum random and even God cannot know what will happen?

Anyway, the Big Bang provides no support at all for a supernatural creator. There are many reasons for this, but I am not inclined to list them at the present time. Maybe later.

[YesNo]

Unfortunately you choose again to overlook the Many Worlds Interpretation of QM, which is fully deterministic. But regardless of whether MWI is the right interpretation of QM or not, this is of no help to the theist. If the world is random, and even God cannot know what will happen, then there is no free will because free will is inconsistent with randomness as much as it is with hard determinism. Therefore no one can be blamed for anything.

We've discussed the Many Worlds Interpretation elsewhere. I prefer the Copenhagen Interpretation which is non-deterministic. Since QM contains the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, QM is non-deterministic. That means the Many Worlds Interpretation, since it is deterministic, is not a valid interpretation of QM. I think that is a reasonable position to take from a scientific perspective.

I don't understand what you mean by free will being inconsistent with randomness as much as determinism. I agree with you that free will is inconsistent with determinism. Taking that position makes me an "incompatibilist". I don't understand the "compatibilist" position that claims somehow we can have both free will and determinism at the same time. It doesn't make sense to me. Also I think there is more to the "random" behavior of quantum events since they also appear rather well behaved, but the randomness does allow a ground for free will to operate. Determinism does not.




Now you are contradicting yourself. Given the Big Bang, how is theological determinism a problem if according to you, the world is quantum random and even God cannot know what will happen?

Anyway, the Big Bang provides no support at all for a supernatural creator. There are many reasons for this, but I am not inclined to list them at the present time. Maybe later.

I don't see how I am contradicting myself.

Actually, the Big Bang does provide support for a cause that started the universe. What is the likelihood that cause was a conscious agent? I set that likelihood at 100% and the likelihood that unconscious chance caused the universe to exist at 0%.

However, QM does imply that God cannot know any state of the universe from which a deterministic prediction of future or past states can be made. Why? It is not because God is not omniscient or omnipotent or omni-whatever. It is because such a state, based on Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, does not exist in the universe.

[JohnMason]

The question of whether humans have free will or are directed by destiny has never been answered with certainty.

The more i go forward in life, the more i think that we're guided by invisible forces in our choices and i'm more and more annoyed by people who claim they have a free will when, at the same time, they keep repeating the same mistakes years after years.

[PeterL]

The more i go forward in life, the more i think that we're guided by invisible forces in our choices and i'm more and more annoyed by people who claim they have a free will when, at the same time, they keep repeating the same mistakes years after years.

Similarly, I notice that there are small changes in human activity or behavior that suggests that there might be something to astrology.

That people continue making the same mistakes suggest that they are not capable of learning from their mistakes; it has nothing to do with free will.

[YesNo]

The more i go forward in life, the more i think that we're guided by invisible forces in our choices and i'm more and more annoyed by people who claim they have a free will when, at the same time, they keep repeating the same mistakes years after years.

I agree with that if the word "guided" is used in a non-deterministic sense. Also there is no point in using the word "choice" if one does not have some freedom to make a choice.

I don't think anyone who claims that free will exists insists that it is absolute. It is quite limited. It is just enough free will to function as a human being. The same would go for any other species. We aren't the only species with the ability to make a choice within the limits of our species' behavior. Now how do I know that? Because other species reproducing through sexual means have similar chemical reward systems prompting them to have sex and reproduce. This implies they have a choice to have sex or not. And that implies some freedom to choose.

[Ecurb]

Modal logic employs a heuristic called possible worlds. For example, there are possible worlds that are actual and non-actual possible worlds. The latter are counterfactual worlds. In a possible world JFK was not assassinated, but that possible world is non-actual. On other hand, there is no possible world at which a square has three sides or a triangle four sides.

Let "Adam at the apple" stand for the introduction of evil into our world.

Using the "possible worlds" heuristic lets us understand human free will as follows: Humans can choose, of their own free will, to actualize a possible world, and make a competing possible world non-actual. If Adam was free to eat the apple or not, and chose to ate it, then by choosing to eat it he actualized a possible world of evil, and made the alternate world of "no evil" possible but non-actual.

1. God is all-knowing, all powerful and all-loving.

2. At the creation, because God is all-knowing, he would have known the entire future history of the world that he was about to create. More: he would have known, to the smallest detail, the entire potential future histories of all possible but non-actual worlds that he could have chosen to create, but did not.

3. Adam eating the apple is a contingent, not necessary, act. If it had been a necessary act, Adam would have had no choice, and could not be morally culpable for the introduction of evil.

4. God, being all powerful, can create exactly the world he wants to, without error of any kind.

5. There is a possible world at which Adam eats the apple. There is also a possible world at which he does not eat it. God can choose, with perfect knowledge and precision, to create either of those worlds.

6. God chose to create the world in which Adam ate the apple.

7. Because God chose to create the world at which Adam ate the apple, it was he, and not Adam, who actualized the world in which evil exists.

8. Conclusion: God is indicted as the author of all iniquity, and man is morally blameless. For God to punish man for evil acts when really God is the source of all evil is about the most perverse (and nonsensical) thing one could imagine.

Q. E. D.

I’ve been out of town, not checking this site, but not that I’m back I don’t buy Cioran’s (formal) argument that man is “morally blameless” for all iniquity. First, I think some of the postulates are iffy. Second, I don’t think the conclusion follows from the postulates.

Of course it is obvious that if God is the “author” of everything that happens in the Universe, he is the “author of all iniquity”, as Cioran suggests. Cioran need not go through his nine steps to prove that – it’s self-evident. Nonetheless, it does not follow that “man is blameless”. Why would it? Why is it impossible for us to “blame” both an author, and one of his characters? We could say, “Robert L. Stevenson is the author of all of the iniquities of Mr. Hyde.” That’s obvious. But were we to say, “Therefore, Mr. Hyde is blameless for his murders,” that would not follow from the fact that Stevenson is the “author” of them. It remains reasonable to find Mr. Hyde (and Dr. Jekyll) morally culpable.

As far as the postulates are concerned, it seems to me that Cioran is over-simplifying. 1) God is all-knowing, all powerful and all-loving. What does this mean? We know (for example) that Odin is commonly called the “All-knowing all father”. However, the “all-knowing” bit is contradicted by the details of the story. Odin finds out what happens in the world by sending his two ravens out for reports. If he was REALLY “All-knowing”, he wouldn’t need to rely on reports from his ravens.

I’ll grant that the Christian, Jewish and Muslim God is often described in the terms Cioran uses. Nonetheless, He is also called (among other things) “ineffable” and “indescribable”. “For who can know the mind of God?” asks the Bible. So his “knowledge” and “power” may be different from that of (say) a Marvel comic superhero who was described in those same terms.

Second, an “omni” God would (presumably) know what would happen in the world He created, and could (as Cioran suggests) have created a different world. However, we puny mortals don’t know everything about our own world. What we see as horrible and evil might be logically necessary to the greater good. For example, virtues such as “courage”, “prudence” and “fortitude” would be logically impossible without such “evils” as pain, or death. The ancient Greeks, for this very reason, thought that heroism was impossible for the Gods. I’m no expert on Christian theology – but I think that the Christian approach is to think God is IN THE PROCESS of creating a perfect world, but that He can’t (i.e. it would be logically impossible) bake the cake without breaking a few eggs.

So, Cioran – of course God created a world where evil and pain are present (if he created THIS WORLD). Nonetheless, it doesn’t follow that man is “blameless” (as your own modal logic about free will indicates).

[mazHur]

When men can hold the acts of other men as culpable why should we assume that the Creator by whatever name He is called shouldn't hold his creation culpable for its acts?
God seems to be beyond human intelligence and He is 'visible' only through his signs or manifestations. According to Muslims, Man has Free Will but subordinate to Allah, the Almighty, the Omnipotent, the Omniscient, etc etc

[Cioran]

So, Cioran – of course God created a world where evil and pain are present (if he created THIS WORLD). Nonetheless, it doesn’t follow that man is “blameless” (as your own modal logic about free will indicates).

Yes, it certainly does follow, for the reasons given. If Adam eating the apple was a necessary act, this means that at all possible worlds (modal heuristic) Adam must eat the apple. If Adam must eat the apple, then he has no freedom, no choice in the matter, and hence cannot be blamed for introducing evil. We can only hold someone morally culpable if he has a choice in what he does.

However, since there is no reason to think that Adam's act is necessary, it is therefore contingent. Modally, contigency means that there are any number of possible worlds at which Adam does not eat the apple.

But, as I explained, for free will to hold in this case, it must be up to Adam, and no one else, to actualize the world in which he lives. For Adam to be morally culpbable, it is he who must actualize the world in which he eats the apple, and by his act, and his alone, make possible but non-actual the world in which he does not eat the apple.

Unfortunately for the theist, as soon as you invoke God's omnipotence and omniscience, it readily becomes obvioius that it is not Adam, but God, who actualizes the world in which Adam eats the apple. God chose to make the world in which Adam introduced evil. Thus it was God, and not Adam, who rendered possible but non-actual the world in which Adam did not eat the apple. Thus Adam's act is God's choice, not Adam's. Thus God is responsible for all evil.

You mention Odin and his ravens. Fine. If God's omni traits are just a metaphor, not to be taken seriously, then the Abrahamic theist must admit that God actually lacks some perfect trait. Then God must be redefined. I suspect most theists would not go along with this.

You also mention that for good to exist in the world, it must have some contrasting evil; otherwise good would be meaningless. This idea was explored in the Brothers Karamazov, and in much philosophical literature. It may be a perfectly valid idea. It may also be a perfectly valid idea that the evil in this world is necessary for some greater good to come. We could say, for instance, that the horrific slaughter of the Civil War was justified by the fact that it freed the slaves; not only the slaves existing at the time, but it made a better world for the millions yet unborn who otherwise would have been slaves. So perhaps the war could be justified on these terms.

The problem here, though, is that if the above is correct, then people who do evil acts ought to be commended, not condemned . Judas ought to be held a hero on this account! Since such evil acts are necessary to bring about a greater good, I trust the best place in heaven is reserved for the worst of us. This is the logic of your argument.

[Cioran]

In this vein, it must be noted that if evil is necessary for a contrasting good to exist, then Adam did a good thing in introducing evil; and, after all, his doing so was part of God's plan. So Adam should be commended, and not condemned, for doing what was needed to bring a contrastive evil to the world, that good might be recognized.

Instead, God threw a big hissy fit and evicted Adam and Eve from the Garden and imposed toil and sorrow on them. Maybe that was all an act: so that future generations could realize the good by taking Adam and Eve's punishment as a lesson. But even so, we must suppose, for the sake of logic, that Adam and Even have been rewarded in heaven for doing what God needed and wanted them to do -- bring about evil, for the sake of good.

There you have the incoherency of the Abrahamic religions.

[Cioran]

I’ll grant that the Christian, Jewish and Muslim God is often described in the terms Cioran uses. Nonetheless, He is also called (among other things) “ineffable” and “indescribable”. “For who can know the mind of God?” asks the Bible.

Sure, who could know an infinite mind? If such a mind existed, it would be ineffable.

But that's another hopeless problem for the Abrahamic religions! If God is unknowable, then why, at the same time, do the people who hold this position acribe properties to God, such as moral perfection? If you hold that God is ineffable, you cannot logically ascribe any properties to him without instantly contradicting yourself. For all we know, God may be totally evil, or beyond good and evil, or he may not care about humans at all. Perhaps he made the world because he likes empty space, of which most of the universe is made? Perhaps humans are just an accidental byproduct of the creation of empty space? Who knows? God is unknowable, after all!

[PeterL]

In this vein, it must be noted that if evil is necessary for a contrasting good to exist, then Adam did a good thing in introducing evil; and, after all, his doing so was part of God's plan. So Adam should be commended, and not condemned, for doing what was needed to bring a contrastive evil to the world, that good might be recognized.

Instead, God threw a big hissy fit and evicted Adam and Eve from the Garden and imposed toil and sorrow on them. Maybe that was all an act: so that future generations could realize the good by taking Adam and Eve's punishment as a lesson. But even so, we must suppose, for the sake of logic, that Adam and Even have been rewarded in heaven for doing what God needed and wanted them to do -- bring about evil, for the sake of good.

There you have the incoherency of the Abrahamic religions.

Amen.

There are other irrationalities in the Abrahamic religions, but this is one of the most basic.

[YesNo]

Unfortunately for the theist, as soon as you invoke God's omnipotence and omniscience, it readily becomes obvioius that it is not Adam, but God, who actualizes the world in which Adam eats the apple. God chose to make the world in which Adam introduced evil. Thus it was God, and not Adam, who rendered possible but non-actual the world in which Adam did not eat the apple. Thus Adam's act is God's choice, not Adam's. Thus God is responsible for all evil.

I don't think it is logically valid to conclude that "Adam's act is God's choice" simply because God made a choice to create the universe.

To show this is invalid consider the case where I make a free choice to buy a car. I have now rendered possible, but not actual, an opportunity for someone else to steal that car. Suppose a guy named Bill steals the car. If your argument is valid, then my act of buying the car means that I am also responsible for Bill's stealing the car.

[mazHur]

I don't think it is logically valid to conclude that "Adam's act is God's choice" simply because God made a choice to create the universe.

To show this is invalid consider the case where I make a free choice to buy a car. I have now rendered possible, but not actual, an opportunity for someone else to steal that car. Suppose a guy named Bill steals the car. If your argument is valid, then my act of buying the car means that I am also responsible for Bill's stealing the car.

Good point by YesNo:)

[cafolini]

Any event is ultimately God's choice. We simply pray that His choice will be on the side of our best intentions. In God we trust.

[Cioran]

I don't think it is logically valid to conclude that "Adam's act is God's choice" simply because God made a choice to create the universe.

To show this is invalid consider the case where I make a free choice to buy a car. I have now rendered possible, but not actual, an opportunity for someone else to steal that car. Suppose a guy named Bill steals the car. If your argument is valid, then my act of buying the car means that I am also responsible for Bill's stealing the car.

Your analogy is invalid, not my argument.

You are NOT responsible for Bill stealing your car, unless you knew infallibly in advance that he would do so -- and, more: unless you were the creator of the world, and could have created a world in which Bill did NOT steal the car.

Your analogy only serves to reinforce my point: Humans are neither omnipotent nor omniscient, and cannot know the outcomes or consequences of their acts, and can only partly, if at all, achieve certain goals or bring about certain results. But God is supposedly omniscient and omnipotent. This means he infallibly knew every possible way the world could be, and could choose to create any of them. He could have created a world in which Adam chose not to sin, but he created the world in which Adam chose to sin. This means he wanted Adam to sin. More, under this scenario, Adam MUST sin, because God, not by his foreknowledge alone but by his perfect creative act, rendered it impossible for Adam to do otherwise. It's not Adam who actualized the world in which he sinned, and thereby made non-actual the world in which he did not. It was God.

[mazHur]

Of course God is omnipotent and omniscient but he does NOT control the ACTS of humans because HE has already given them FREE WILL. In YesNO case the thief is the culprit for the evil he committed enabled by his own Free Will, YesNo knowing it or not doesn't matter. Of course, God will make humans accountable for their deeds as and when he chooses to do that. Similarly, the owner of the stolen car will bring the thief to book after the act or perhaps he would have caught him in the act.
Blaming God for evil is not fair....it's we humans who choose to be good or evil as per our Free Will. The Free Will is subordinate to God's Master will which may come into action as, if or when God chooses to do that.

[Cioran]

Of course God is omnipotent and omniscient but he does NOT control the ACTS of humans because HE has already given them FREE WILL. In YesNO case the thief is the culprit for the evil he committed enabled by his own Free Will, YesNo knowing it or not doesn't matter. Of course, God will make humans accountable for their deeds as and when he chooses to do that. Similarly, the owner of the stolen car will bring the thief to book after the act or perhaps he would have caught him in the act.
Blaming God for evil is not fair....it's we humans who choose to be good or evil as per our Free Will. The Free Will is subordinate to God's Master will which may come into action as, if or when God chooses to do that.

Bearing in mind that we are dealing with hypotheticals -- God does not exist, of course -- this conversation is still fruitful as an exercise in logic and philosophy. By pure logic alone, for instance, it can be shown that God's infallible foreknowledge by itself does not and cannot preclude human free will. But in your reply, you are forgetting the other side of the coin: God created the world, and did so exactly as he intended it to be. If God created the world but made a mistake, such that evil was introduced without his consent, then he would fail to be omnipotent at the very least, and perhaps fail to be omniscient as well.

As the theistic assumption of omnipotence and omniscience, God stands wholly indicted for all evil in the world. Given his omniscience together with his omnipotence, Adam certainly does NOT have free will, and nor does anyone else. In order for Adam to have free will in eating or not eating the apple, it is required that he himself be able to actualize the world in which he ate it, and render possible but non-actual the world in which he did not eat it. In other words, Adam must be a self-creator of his own world. But he did not create the world. God did. It was God, not Adam, who had the choice of creating a world in which Adam ate the apple, or a world in which he did not. He chose to create the world in which Adam ate the apple, rendering non-actual the world in which Adam failed to eat the apple. Thus the act of apple-eating was God's will and not Adam's.

[cafolini]

Adam didn't even have free-will as to the size of the bite. ROFLMAO!

[Cioran]

Adam didn't even have free-will as to the size of the bite. ROFLMAO!

That is correct. Isn't there any old theistic saying that not a single sparrrow can fall without God knowing where, how and when it fell? Since God also made the world, he made the sparrows fall where and when he wanted them to. Many theists understand this problem and hence come up with solutions like predestination and calvinism, which solutions, unfortunately, indict God as a monster even if the calvinists would like to pretend otherwise.

[mazHur]

Bearing in mind that we are dealing with hypotheticals -- God does not exist, of course -- this conversation is still fruitful as an exercise in logic and philosophy. By pure logic alone, for instance, it can be shown that God's infallible foreknowledge by itself does not and cannot preclude human free will. But in your reply, you are forgetting the other side of the coin: God created the world, and did so exactly as he intended it to be. If God created the world but made a mistake, such that evil was introduced without his consent, then he would fail to be omnipotent at the very least, and perhaps fail to be omniscient as well.

As the theistic assumption of omnipotence and omniscience, God stands wholly indicted for all evil in the world. Given his omniscience together with his omnipotence, Adam certainly does NOT have free will, and nor does anyone else. In order for Adam to have free will in eating or not eating the apple, it is required that he himself be able to actualize the world in which he ate it, and render possible but non-actual the world in which he did not eat it. In other words, Adam must be a self-creator of his own world. But he did not create the world. God did. It was God, not Adam, who had the choice of creating a world in which Adam ate the apple, or a world in which he did not. He chose to create the world in which Adam ate the apple, rendering non-actual the world in which Adam failed to eat the apple. Thus the act of apple-eating was God's will and not Adam's.

your comments remind me of the Zoroastrian belief in division of God into Ehrman (the God of Destruction or Evil you may say) and Ishwar (God of Construction and Good) ....
We as humans yet do not know nor are likely to know the mysteries behind Creation or God. We can surmise at the most. How do we know Adam was not having Free Will or was in inchoate stage at the time of Adam or Eve eating the Apple??
When we say God is Omi-all we might mean to say he controls the Fate or Destiny of His Creation......but not their Acts because as far as humans are concerned they have been given intellect which in turn entitled them to divine gift of Free Will??

[mazHur]

That is correct. Isn't there any old theistic saying that not a single sparrrow can fall without God knowing where, how and when it fell? Since God also made the world, he made the sparrows fall where and when he wanted them to. Many theists understand this problem and hence come up with solutions like predestination and calvinism, which solutions, unfortunately, indict God as a monster even if the calvinists would like to pretend otherwise.

That sounds like Fatalistic belief. Good, Evil and Fate or Destiny are distinctly separate things. There could be more attributes to God but who knows them all??

You are vehemently trying to prove that God is responsible for Evil, right? But why do you forget about his Goodness or the Blessings He bestows on others?? God has His own ways of working beyond human intelligence......perhaps this is why axioms like ' Man proposes God disposes'', ''The Mill of God grinds slowly but surely'' came into light.

[cafolini]

That is correct. Isn't there any old theistic saying that not a single sparrrow can fall without God knowing where, how and when it fell? Since God also made the world, he made the sparrows fall where and when he wanted them to. Many theists understand this problem and hence come up with solutions like predestination and calvinism, which solutions, unfortunately, indict God as a monster even if the calvinists would like to pretend otherwise.

Bingo!!!!!!!!!

[mazHur]

Free Will-- In Islamic philosophy
According to Islamic creed, it is God’s will which has determined that this particular species of creation, known as man, has the dual ability to follow guidance or go astray, according to his own free choice, not as a result of any compulsion.
This is how God lets whomever He wills go astray and how He helps whomever He wills follow the straight path. His will helps everyone who strives to implement divine guidance, while it abandons and lets go astray anyone who stubbornly rejects guidance. It does no injustice to anyone.
A human being may follow guidance or may allow himself to go astray: both possibilities are part of his nature. Both directions have been created by God’s will. Similarly, the consequences that follow upon a person’s choice to follow one way or the other are also determined by God’s will which is active, absolute. Reckoning, judgement and reward are based on man’s choice of the course he follows. That choice is of his own making, although the ability to choose either has been planted in him by God’s will
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will

[Cioran]

Free Will-- In Islamic philosophy
According to Islamic creed, it is God’s will which has determined that this particular species of creation, known as man, has the dual ability to follow guidance or go astray, according to his own free choice, not as a result of any compulsion.
This is how God lets whomever He wills go astray and how He helps whomever He wills follow the straight path. His will helps everyone who strives to implement divine guidance, while it abandons and lets go astray anyone who stubbornly rejects guidance. It does no injustice to anyone.
A human being may follow guidance or may allow himself to go astray: both possibilities are part of his nature. Both directions have been created by God’s will. Similarly, the consequences that follow upon a person’s choice to follow one way or the other are also determined by God’s will which is active, absolute. Reckoning, judgement and reward are based on man’s choice of the course he follows. That choice is of his own making, although the ability to choose either has been planted in him by God’s will
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will

Again, alas, these assertions fail to reckon with the logical consequences of, conjointly, God being omnipotent and omniscient, and also creating the world.

For example, focus on this:


A human being may follow guidance or may allow himself to go astray: both possibilities are part of his nature. Both directions have been created by God’s will.

We could use the analogy of a fork in the road. A man comes to the fork, and one path is labeled EVIL and the other GOOD.

However, unless one is a quantum mechanical Many Worldist, there can be only one actual world.

Now, if God is omniscient, then he knows the truth value of all contingent propositions, past, present and future. He also knows counterfactual contingents -- every way that the world could have been, could be, or could be but will not be. He cannot fail to know all this and still be omniscient.

If he is omnipotent, he cannot fail to create the world that he wants.

Therefore, it is not the man that comes to the fork in the road. Long before he ever existed, God came to that fork, and had to choose whether the man would choose the EVIL path or the GOOD path. By his free act of perfect and infallible creation, God chose the path for the man. If he creates the EVIL path world it is illogical, to say nothing of monstrously unjust, for God to then punish the man for God's own creation.

[YesNo]

Your analogy is invalid, not my argument.

You are NOT responsible for Bill stealing your car, unless you knew infallibly in advance that he would do so -- and, more: unless you were the creator of the world, and could have created a world in which Bill did NOT steal the car.

Your analogy only serves to reinforce my point: Humans are neither omnipotent nor omniscient, and cannot know the outcomes or consequences of their acts, and can only partly, if at all, achieve certain goals or bring about certain results. But God is supposedly omniscient and omnipotent. This means he infallibly knew every possible way the world could be, and could choose to create any of them. He could have created a world in which Adam chose not to sin, but he created the world in which Adam chose to sin. This means he wanted Adam to sin. More, under this scenario, Adam MUST sin, because God, not by his foreknowledge alone but by his perfect creative act, rendered it impossible for Adam to do otherwise. It's not Adam who actualized the world in which he sinned, and thereby made non-actual the world in which he did not. It was God.

Let me rephrase the argument that I hear you presenting:

1) If God creates a completely deterministic universe, then he is responsible for everything that happens in that universe including any evil.
2) God created our universe as a completely deterministic universe.
3) Therefore, God is responsible for everything that happens in our universe including any evil.

That would be a valid argument.

However, the argument then fails because it is not "cogent". What it means for an argument to not be cogent is that some of the the premises, in particular premise 2 above, are not true beyond a reasonable doubt.

The universe we inhabit has been shown to be non-deterministic by quantum mechanics--beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor can a Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics bring determinism back into the universe. To maintain that would be pure pseudo-science on the order of Christian Creationism. That makes premise 2 above false beyond a reasonable doubt and that means the argument fails because it is not cogent.

I would go further and say that the argument is not "sound" because premise 2 is point-blank false, from both scientific evidence and theology, as I understand mazHur's explanation, without adding the "beyond reasonable doubt" escape clause.

You have mentioned that if God does not know what we will do in advance, then there is something wrong with his omniscience or omnipotence. That is not the case. Being omniscient does not mean knowing something to exist that does not exist. If he knew everything that could happen in the universe, he would know a complete state of the universe, which quantum mechanics says does not exist by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.

Also you mentioned God knowing when every sparrow falls. So? That is not foreknowledge which is what we are talking about.

[Cioran]

You are vehemently trying to prove that God is responsible for Evil, right?

Actually, no. I don't believe God is responsible for evil, because I don't believe that God exists. Non-existent entities cannot bear responsibility for anything.

What I'm running is what is standardly called a reductio ad absurdum (reduction to absurdity) on the set of Abrahamic theistic claims taken as a whole, showing that taken as a whole, they lead straightaway to logical contradictions or absurdity. Because they do.

[mazHur]

Again, alas, these assertions fail to reckon with the logical consequences of, conjointly, God being omnipotent and omniscient, and also creating the world.

For example, focus on this:



We could use the analogy of a fork in the road. A man comes to the fork, and one path is labeled EVIL and the other GOOD.

However, unless one is a quantum mechanical Many Worldist, there can be only one actual world.

Now, if God is omniscient, then he knows the truth value of all contingent propositions, past, present and future. He also knows counterfactual contingents -- every way that the world could have been, could be, or could be but will not be. He cannot fail to know all this and still be omniscient.

If he is omnipotent, he cannot fail to create the world that he wants.

Therefore, it is not the man that comes to the fork in the road. Long before he ever existed, God came to that fork, and had to choose whether the man would choose the EVIL path or the GOOD path. By his free act of perfect and infallible creation, God chose the path for the man. If he creates the EVIL path world it is illogical, to say nothing of monstrously unjust, for God to then punish the man for God's own creation.

You overlooked the gist of argument, viz,
That choice is of his own making, although the ability to choose either has been planted in him by God’s will

For example, killing is a crime but a soldier kills under certain conditions. Those conditions warrant his 'murder'', or may not warrant it if he chooses to exceed his limits. That is, if he kills innocent people which obviously is Evil. In both cases the High Command knows previously what the soldier is 'ordained' to do with his gun. Similarly, God Knows or has foreknowledge of man's actions but at the same time has given humans the power of making 'choice' which they can use like a good soldier who kills his warring enemy or like a bad soldier who kills innocent people.

[mazHur]

Actually, no. I don't believe God is responsible for evil, because I don't believe that God exists. Non-existent entities cannot bear responsibility for anything.

What I'm running is what is standardly called a reductio ad absurdum (reduction to absurdity) on the set of Abrahamic theistic claims taken as a whole, showing that taken as a whole, they lead straightaway to logical contradictions or absurdity. Because they do.

If you do not believe in God then it's waste of time discussing with you on the topic.
I am a believer and I have my point of view, you have yours. Keep happy with nothing ...allow others to be happy with 'something' which causes them No harm!

[Cioran]

Let me rephrase the argument that I hear you presenting:

1) If God creates a completely deterministic universe, then he is responsible for everything that happens in that universe including any evil.
2) God created our universe as a completely deterministic universe.
3) Therefore, God is responsible for everything that happens in our universe including any evil.

That would be a valid argument.

However, the argument then fails because it is not "cogent". What it means for an argument to not be cogent is that some of the the premises, in particular premise 2 above, are not true beyond a reasonable doubt.

The universe we inhabit has been shown to be non-deterministic by quantum mechanics--beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor can a Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics bring determinism back into the universe.

Of course, as has been repeatedly explained to you (with links to academic papers!) Many Worlds DOES bring determinism back to the physical world! This is not a goal of the MW meta-theory of QM, it's an inevitable consequence of it. In point of fact the Schroedinger wave equation is fully deterministic, and if all the possible events it describes are actually real then the world too is fully deterministic. MW also restores realism and locality to the universe. Moreover, as a meta-theory of QM, Many Worlds is an ongoing contender among quantum physicists (Steven Hawking endorses it) and may even be provable. I have gone over all of this with you, and I refuse to futilely rehash it again. Yours is a case of willfully wishing to misunderstand an entire body of thought.

Of course, if MW is true, then every one of us makes every possible choice in every possible circumstance -- also rendering a hash of free will and moral culpability, of course!

Assuming, however, that there is only one actual world, determinism has nothing to do with God's foreknowledge. On standard theism, God stands outside time -- sees all, past present and future.

If this theistic account is right, then even if MW were false and quantum indeterminism were absolutely true, then God would know all indeterministic outcomes! The outcomes may still be literally indeterministic, but if God sees the whole future he knows what will happen. This does not compromise true indeterminism any more than humans' knowing yesterday's indeterministic account compromises it. In fact such a case is very similar to the modal logical treatment vindicating human free will in the presence of God's infallible foreknowledge, and if I care to do so later I will formally render it.

Your argument is similar to that of Open Theism, that God cannot know the future but that this fact does not invalidate his omniscience because even an omniscient agent cannot know what does not (yet) exist (the future) But this then means the theist has to give up the claim that God stands outside of and beyond time. And there is more: we have empirical evidence that the future exists. And this existence is fully compatible with QM indeterminism, even if QM indeterminism is true (and it's false if MW is true). This is called the Parmenidian or Block Universe, and is a direct consequence of the special and general theories of relativity. It is also known as Minkowski spacetime.

[YesNo]

Of course, as has been repeatedly explained to you (with links to academic papers!) Many Worlds DOES bring determinism back to the physical world! This is not a goal of the MW meta-theory of QM, it's an inevitable consequence of it. In point of fact the Schroedinger wave equation is fully deterministic, and if all the possible events it describes are actually real then the world too is fully deterministic. MW also restores realism and locality to the universe. Moreover, as a meta-theory of QM, Many Worlds is an ongoing contender among quantum physicists (Steven Hawking endorses it) and may even be provable. I have gone over all of this with you, and I refuse to futilely rehash it again. Yours is a case of willfully wishing to misunderstand an entire body of thought.

The main reason I don't accept MW is that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is derived from the Schroedinger wave equation as well as Heisenberg's matrix approach to QM: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle

Because of that, Schoedinger's wave equation is not deterministic. So again the premises that you are using to support your argument are not true.



Of course, if MW is true, then every one of us makes every possible choice in every possible circumstance -- also rendering a hash of free will and moral culpability, of course!

However, in point of fact, MW is not true. We can skip this case.



Assuming, however, that there is only one actual world, determinism has nothing to do with God's foreknowledge. On standard theism, God stands outside time -- sees all, past present and future.

If this theistic account is right, then even if MW were false and quantum indeterminism were absolutely true, then God would know all indeterministic outcomes! The outcomes may still be literally indeterministic, but if God sees the whole future he knows what will happen. This does not compromise true indeterminism any more than humans' knowing yesterday's indeterministic account compromises it. In fact such a case is very similar to the modal logical treatment vindicating human free will in the presence of God's infallible foreknowledge, and if I care to do so later I will formally render it.

As a combinatorial exercise, assume God knows all non-deterministic outcomes. This does not mean he knows which contingency will be picked. So the conclusion that "he knows what will happen" is false.

This is what I hear you arguing.

1) I know when I flip a coin, I will get either heads or tails.
2) I flipped the coin and heads appeared.
3) Therefore, I knew in advance that heads would appear and not tails.

That does not sound like a valid argument.



Your argument is similar to that of Open Theism, that God cannot know the future but that this fact does not invalidate his omniscience because even an omniscient agent cannot know what does not (yet) exist (the future) But this then means the theist has to give up the claim that God stands outside of and beyond time. And there is more: we have empirical evidence that the future exists. And this existence is fully compatible with QM indeterminism, even if QM indeterminism is true (and it's false if MW is true). This is called the Parmenidian or Block Universe, and is a direct consequence of the special and general theories of relativity. It is also known as Minkowski spacetime.

I'm not familiar with Open Theism: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_theism

Looking at the article makes me suspect that I would have something in common with them. However, this is a group associated with Christianity and their arguments are based on Christian sacred texts rather than quantum mechanics.

[cafolini]

Get off the horses and drink your milk. ~ John Wayne
Come on my fellow Mamericans posing as adults.

[Ecurb]

Yes, it certainly does follow, for the reasons given. If Adam eating the apple was a necessary act, this means that at all possible worlds (modal heuristic) Adam must eat the apple. If Adam must eat the apple, then he has no freedom, no choice in the matter, and hence cannot be blamed for introducing evil. We can only hold someone morally culpable if he has a choice in what he does.


That depends what we mean by "choice". Did Mr. Hyde have a choice as to whether to murder those people (my memory is vague as to their number)? After all, R.L. Stevenson was pulling all the strings. Yet most people think it reasonable to say that Hyde is “evil”. What do people mean when they say that, if you are correct that if someone has no choice, he cannot be “blamed” for evil acts?

The flaw in your argument is the notion that because an omni-God is “responsible for” or “the cause of” all evil in the world (as well as everything else that happens), there cannot be other “causes”. Perhaps there are proximate causes and ultimate causes. When the car drives around the curve too fast and spins out, what is the “cause”? Is the crash due to the driver’s excessive speed? Is it due to insufficient banking on the curve? Is it due to insufficient cohesion on the part of the tires? Or is it due to the miners who mine the ore that is smelted into steel so that the car can be made in the first place? It’s reasonable to call all of these “causes” for the crash.

Similarly, calling the omni-God’s creation of the world the “cause” of all things (including evil) is reasonable – but why would that preclude other “causes” any more than calling the mining of ore the “cause” of the car wreck would preclude more proximate causes. There is a sense in which when one man shoots another, he “causes” the other man’s death – whether or not there is an omni-God who set everything in motion in the first place. Since we don’t know how this omni-God operates, we are stuck with seeing more proximate causes, if we are to see any. Like the gambler who figures the odds of drawing the 5th Diamond at 9/47ths, we must muddle by as best we can. It is perfectly reasonable (from our perspective) to talk about proximate causes to things, even if we are fatalists philosophically.

In addition, suppose there is such an omni-God as you suggest (personally, I think ascribing specific “powers” to God, as if He were simply a superhero is a bit silly, but I’ll grant some religious people do it. Muslims, for example, think painting a picture of God or Mohammed is heretical, because He can be described only through stories and metaphors.) . If you are correct that in such a situation we cannot ascribe blame to humans for their sins, then (using the same logic) neither can we ascribe error to humans in their opinions or reasoning. Both Cioran’s arguments and mine (based on Cioran’s own logic) can neither be correct nor incorrect. Such an assessment of an argument suggests the possibility of one choice being preferable, in terms of truth value, to another choice. But if we have no choice, this is not the case.

Therefore, Cioran’s argument is either meaningless, or based on a worldview that ASSUMES that there is no such omni-God. If a hidden premise in Cioran’s argument is, “P1, There is no omni-God “, then his argument is circular. If there is an omni-God, then, based on Cioran’s own statements about how a lack of choice precludes the possibility of blame (presumably for statements of fact as well as morally freighted actions), then Cioran’s argument is irrelevant.



The problem here, though, is that if the above is correct, then people who do evil acts ought to be commended, not condemned . Judas ought to be held a hero on this account! Since such evil acts are necessary to bring about a greater good, I trust the best place in heaven is reserved for the worst of us. This is the logic of your argument.

Of course Judas is held to be a hero in some Christian sects. The Gospel According to Judas is a book of Apocrypha that holds this view. Judas’ act was necessary for the resurrection.

However, “acts” are not evil in and of themselves. Judas may have betrayed Jesus knowing it was necessary for the greater good, or he may have betrayed Jesus for the 50 pieces of silver. The same act can be good or evil, depending on the motive. Therefore, you don’t make your case. “Evil” is a state of mind and being, not an act. The acts might be necessary for the greater good, while the state of mind remains evil (however we want to define "evil").


But that's another hopeless problem for the Abrahamic religions! If God is unknowable, then why, at the same time, do the people who hold this position acribe properties to God, such as moral perfection? If you hold that God is ineffable, you cannot logically ascribe any properties to him without instantly contradicting yourself. For all we know, God may be totally evil, or beyond good and evil, or he may not care about humans at all. Perhaps he made the world because he likes empty space, of which most of the universe is made? Perhaps humans are just an accidental byproduct of the creation of empty space? Who knows? God is unknowable, after all!

As I said earlier, I think ascribing well-defined properties to God is silly. However, it does not follow that because one can’t understand God perfectly, or even well, one cannot understand Him at all. Indeed, the premise of Abrahamic Religions is that God is Good, not because He behaves in some manner which we puny humans delineate as good, but by postulate and definition. God cannot logically be “totally evil” in Abrahamic Religions because that contradicts one of the basic postulates of the religion.

IN addition, I think religions in general are non-logical. The French Structuralist Claude Levi-Strauss wrote about how the function of myth was to overcome contradictions, or hold two contradictory ideas at the same time. Of course this is anaethema to logicians and to some philosophers -- but while logic is a valuable tool, as G.K. Chesterton once said (in support of my argument above), "You can only find the truth with logic when you have already found it without logic."

[cafolini]

"You can only find the truth with logic when you have already found it without logic." Exactly. Assuming that by "the truth" we mean one truth, two truths, three truths ... not a totality, which must remain God's.

[PeterL]

If you can't find the truth with logic, then it is not truth.

[Ecurb]

If you can't find the truth with logic, then it is not truth.

Truth (surely) is true however one discovers it (maybe, postmodernists might disagree). Chesterton's point (I think) is that logic allows us to do no more than restate our premises in different terms. It's a valuable tool, but (as anyone who has read Lewis Carrol's logic puzzles knows) even valid deductions are only as "true" as the premises from which they are deduced. Our knowledge of the world advances through induction more than through deduction.

[PeterL]

Truth (surely) is true however one discovers it (maybe, postmodernists might disagree). Chesterton's point (I think) is that logic allows us to do no more than restate our premises in different terms. It's a valuable tool, but (as anyone who has read Lewis Carrol's logic puzzles knows) even valid deductions are only as "true" as the premises from which they are deduced. Our knowledge of the world advances through induction more than through deduction.

Regardless of the form that it takes, logical reasoning based on valid, demonstrable premises are necessary to find truth, unless one uses the phrase "religious truth". "Religious truth" need not be based on anything more than an idle comment that makes its way into a religious scripture.

I started this thread in the Religous Literature category, because there probably is more religious thought relating to free will than there is philosophical literature.

[Ecurb]

Where do you get the "valid, demonstrable premises"? If you have those, logic can restate them in enlightening ways, but logic cannot give you the valid, demonstrable premises in the first place (as Chesterton pointed out).

Also, what is a "valid" premise? Here's a link to a brief discussion: http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/tvs.html. See question 10 (and its answer) for the refutation of your statement, "If you can't find the truth with logic, then it is not truth."

[cafolini]

Truth (surely) is true however one discovers it (maybe, postmodernists might disagree). Chesterton's point (I think) is that logic allows us to do no more than restate our premises in different terms. It's a valuable tool, but (as anyone who has read Lewis Carrol's logic puzzles knows) even valid deductions are only as "true" as the premises from which they are deduced. Our knowledge of the world advances through induction more than through deduction.

Any induction is ultimately a deduction because the lab cannot and will never present all possible cases. Inductive reasoning is the most fraudulent form of reasoning. Multiple choice is the simplest form of fraud.

[PeterL]

Where do you get the "valid, demonstrable premises"? If you have those, logic can restate them in enlightening ways, but logic cannot give you the valid, demonstrable premises in the first place (as Chesterton pointed out).

The premises need to be based on observation.


Also, what is a "valid" premise? Here's a link to a brief discussion: http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/tvs.html. See question 10 (and its answer) for the refutation of your statement, "If you can't find the truth with logic, then it is not truth."

I think that you are mistaken.

[YesNo]

Sometimes the premises are formulations of one's preferred metaphysics such as Euclid's axioms.

Sometimes the premises contain at least one that comes from an opponent's metaphysics. The goal here is to assume the opponent's premise is true and then generate a contradiction. If the argument is valid, then the premise must be false since true premises in a valid argument cannot lead to a false conclusion.

I see Cioran setting up a premise that God has all knowledge and power. He assumes God can know a complete state of our universe that quantum mechanics claims does not exist. From there he thinks he can conclude that free will does not exist or God does not exist. This then justifies Cioran's own metaphysics by contradicting the metaphysics that some theists might actually have.

The problem with such approaches is that the false premise is not often correctly formulated so all one does is help the opponents reformulate their metaphysics to avoid the issue.

In this particular case, there is no God that knows the current state of the universe since if some God knew that is would "collapse the wave function" and the double slit experiment with a single electron going through the slit would generate a typical random pattern not the wave-like pattern that is actually seen.

This is another reason why the Many Worlds interpretation is also false. Not only can no God know the current state of our universe, nor can any set of alternate universes know it. If they did the wave function would collapse and we would no longer see a wave-like pattern in the double slit experiment. Since we do see that wave pattern, we can conclude that the Many Worlds interpretation along with the assumption that any God knows a deterministic state of our universe is false.

What this all means is that choice to some degree is possible in our universe. (And that helps support the metaphysics that I prefer. :) )

[Ecurb]

Premises (facts) that are based on observation are the foundation of knowledge, and deductive logic is merely the superstructure. Believing our own eyes (however) is based on inductive reasoning, not deductive (logical) reasoning. We believe our own eyes because they do not (generally) deceive us, based on our experience.

[PeterL]

Sometimes the premises are formulations of one's preferred metaphysics such as Euclid's axioms.

Sometimes the premises contain at least one that comes from an opponent's metaphysics. The goal here is to assume the opponent's premise is true and then generate a contradiction. If the argument is valid, then the premise must be false since true premises in a valid argument cannot lead to a false conclusion.

I see Cioran setting up a premise that God has all knowledge and power. He assumes God can know a complete state of our universe that quantum mechanics claims does not exist. From there he thinks he can conclude that free will does not exist or God does not exist. This then justifies Cioran's own metaphysics by contradicting the metaphysics that some theists might actually have.

The problem with such approaches is that the false premise is not often correctly formulated so all one does is help the opponents reformulate their metaphysics to avoid the issue.

In this particular case, there is no God that knows the current state of the universe since if some God knew that is would "collapse the wave function" and the double slit experiment with a single electron going through the slit would generate a typical random pattern not the wave-like pattern that is actually seen.

This is another reason why the Many Worlds interpretation is also false. Not only can no God know the current state of our universe, nor can any set of alternate universes know it. If they did the wave function would collapse and we would no longer see a wave-like pattern in the double slit experiment. Since we do see that wave pattern, we can conclude that the Many Worlds interpretation along with the assumption that any God knows a deterministic state of our universe is false.

What this all means is that choice to some degree is possible in our universe. (And that helps support the metaphysics that I prefer. :) )

You brought up several good points here, but you thoroughly mixed those with assertions of opinions. But if the god that you assume that Cioran is claiming exists does actually exist, then there is no free will. While the existence of an all-knowing, all-powerful god cannot be proven, the non-existence of such a god cannot be proven either.

The double slit diffraction argument that you cite as proof the the Many Worlds interpretation is false does not prove anything. And you are asserting, without proof, that that god does not exist.

I am not claiming that an all-powerful, all-knowing god does exist, but asserting that that god does not exist is as pointles and unprovable as claiming that it does exist.

Apparently you prefer a universe in which there is uncertainty, unpredictabliity. That's fine, and I would prefer a universe in which there is free will in some matters, but it appears that free will probably is extremely restricted.

[PeterL]

Premises (facts) that are based on observation are the foundation of knowledge, and deductive logic is merely the superstructure. Believing our own eyes (however) is based on inductive reasoning, not deductive (logical) reasoning. We believe our own eyes because they do not (generally) deceive us, based on our experience.

Yes, we have to start somewhere, and observations are the best base that we have.

[Ecurb]

While for other animals observation forms the sole foundation of knowledge, for us humans culture is an equally important foundation. Not only do we observe, but we are also educated about the observations of others. IN addition, our observations are filtered through the lens of cultural paradigms (if nothing else, they are affected by our use of language to describe and remember them).

Let's face facts: religious people believe in God for the same reason you and I believe in the Battle of Cannae -- we have been told by those whom we trust that either God exists or the Battle of Cannae occured. Here's Emily Dickenson's take:

I NEVER saw a moor,
I never saw the sea;
Yet know I how the heather looks,
And what a wave must be.

I never spoke with God, 5
Nor visited in heaven;
Yet certain am I of the spot
As if the chart were given.

[PeterL]

While for other animals observation forms the sole foundation of knowledge, for us humans culture is an equally important foundation. Not only do we observe, but we are also educated about the observations of others. IN addition, our observations are filtered through the lens of cultural paradigms (if nothing else, they are affected by our use of language to describe and remember them).

Let's face facts: religious people believe in God for the same reason you and I believe in the Battle of Cannae -- we have been told by those whom we trust that either God exists or the Battle of Cannae occured. Here's Emily Dickenson's take:

I NEVER saw a moor,
I never saw the sea;
Yet know I how the heather looks,
And what a wave must be.

I never spoke with God, 5
Nor visited in heaven;
Yet certain am I of the spot
As if the chart were given.

Yes, it is sad, but a single human can never experience or observe everything. I just hope that the things that I have gotten from others have not been too badly distorted, but my experience is that the lens of culture distorts everything.

[YesNo]

You brought up several good points here, but you thoroughly mixed those with assertions of opinions. But if the god that you assume that Cioran is claiming exists does actually exist, then there is no free will. While the existence of an all-knowing, all-powerful god cannot be proven, the non-existence of such a god cannot be proven either.

I agree that if Cioran's God exists, there is no free will. However, such a God cannot exist if the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is true. So there is no worry. Twenty-first century science eliminates that God from consideration. We don't need to consider metaphysics.



The double slit diffraction argument that you cite as proof the the Many Worlds interpretation is false does not prove anything. And you are asserting, without proof, that that god does not exist.

I think it does show that at least that description of the Many Worlds interpretation is false. It is now up to those supporting the Many Worlds interpretation to present a way for Many Worlds to not "collapse the wave function" and generate what they must view as an "illusion" when we see the wave pattern in a double slit experiment.

Actually what I provided was a proof that any Many Worlds interpretation or any God able to collapse the wave function does not exist. That doesn't mean that the God most theists worship does not exist. Nor does that mean their God is not omnipotent nor omniscient. Their God tolerates free will. There is nothing stopping that God from existing.



I am not claiming that an all-powerful, all-knowing god does exist, but asserting that that god does not exist is as pointles and unprovable as claiming that it does exist.

I think one can use reason to find out a lot about whatever exists both within and without our universe.



Apparently you prefer a universe in which there is uncertainty, unpredictabliity. That's fine, and I would prefer a universe in which there is free will in some matters, but it appears that free will probably is extremely restricted.

Regarding uncertainty, that is what the standard model of quantum mechanics tells us we have. I have to take that as evidence. My metaphysics is a preference for what would allow the "perennial philosophy" or the "sanatana dharma" to be possible. I would need for such a universe to have some free will.

[PeterL]

I agree that if Cioran's God exists, there is no free will. However, such a God cannot exist if the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is true. So there is no worry. Twenty-first century science eliminates that God from consideration. We don't need to consider metaphysics.

"If the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principal is true." I think that it is more likely that science will show that Heisenberg was mistaken, but only time will tell. Please don't take that to mean that I think that there is an infinite god; i have douts about uncertainty, but I also wonder how much of it leaks into the macro world.


I think it does show that at least that description of the Many Worlds interpretation is false. It is now up to those supporting the Many Worlds interpretation to present a way for Many Worlds to not "collapse the wave function" and generate what they must view as an "illusion" when we see the wave pattern in a double slit experiment.

Actually what I provided was a proof that any Many Worlds interpretation or any God able to collapse the wave function does not exist. That doesn't mean that the God most theists worship does not exist. Nor does that mean their God is not omnipotent nor omniscient. Their God tolerates free will. There is nothing stopping that God from existing.

And there is no reason why the wave function would not collapse in that while it would in other situations., As with so many things, it is a matter of what one is looking for. - To a man with a hammer... To apparatus for looking at waves...


I think one can use reason to find out a lot about whatever exists both within and without our universe.

I don't disagree, but one must start with observations.


Regarding uncertainty, that is what the standard model of quantum mechanics tells us we have. I have to take that as evidence. My metaphysics is a preference for what would allow the "perennial philosophy" or the "sanatana dharma" to be possible. I would need for such a universe to have some free will.

That is your preference. I would also prefer that there be free will, but the more I look at itthe less free will I see.

[YesNo]

"If the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principal is true." I think that it is more likely that science will show that Heisenberg was mistaken, but only time will tell. Please don't take that to mean that I think that there is an infinite god; i have douts about uncertainty, but I also wonder how much of it leaks into the macro world.

Because quantum mechanics and general relativity don't seem to work together these theories are likely to change.



And there is no reason why the wave function would not collapse in that while it would in other situations., As with so many things, it is a matter of what one is looking for. - To a man with a hammer... To apparatus for looking at waves...

I agree with this. The Many Worlds just needs to answer some basic questions which I see it avoiding from the literature I looked at in the thread on this topic.

Many Worlds is similar to Young Earth Creationism with regards to science. Both claim to be scientific, but they are both constructing ways to justify their particular metaphysics in opposition to scientific evidence. Many Worlds has an atheistic and deterministic metaphysics and the Creationists believe in the literal account in Genesis. Both claim that the experimental results that conflict with their positions are illusions and both give rather bizarre explanations for why we come up with this observational evidence. Because they treat evidence and experience as an illusion they undermine the scientific method itself.

Maybe they will be shown right in the future, but at the moment they are not scientific.




I don't disagree, but one must start with observations.

Observations help us refute conjectures, but we are all biased by our metaphysics or even by what we want to see become true. That is why blind experiments are popular.




That is your preference. I would also prefer that there be free will, but the more I look at itthe less free will I see.

I am actually more interested in the macro world than the quantum level. I agree with you that there appears to be little free will at the macro level. This is why I quoted Sam Harris in an earlier post in this thread who claims we have no free will regardless of quantum uncertainty because of studies showing that we are not aware of our choices until after the brain can be seen to change. Dennett disagreed with him, but at the macro level we are talking about consciousness which opens up a more interesting discussion.

[PeterL]

Because quantum mechanics and general relativity don't seem to work together these theories are likely to change.

Yes, very likely to change. I have doubts about both. I used to like Relativity, but there may be simpler explanations.


I agree with this. The Many Worlds just needs to answer some basic questions which I see it avoiding from the literature I looked at in the thread on this topic.

Many Worlds is similar to Young Earth Creationism with regards to science. Both claim to be scientific, but they are both constructing ways to justify their particular metaphysics in opposition to scientific evidence. Many Worlds has an atheistic and deterministic metaphysics and the Creationists believe in the literal account in Genesis. Both claim that the experimental results that conflict with their positions are illusions and both give rather bizarre explanations for why we come up with this observational evidence. Because they treat evidence and experience as an illusion they undermine the scientific method itself.

Maybe they will be shown right in the future, but at the moment they are not scientific.

Unfortunately, not many good scientists have tried working with Many Worlds. As far as I know, the math is valid, and it seems to agree with the physical universe as far as one can see. Philosophically, I find MW preferable to Copenhagen, but I didn't become a physicist.


Observations help us refute conjectures, but we are all biased by our metaphysics or even by what we want to see become true. That is why blind experiments are popular.

Yes, that is why MW is not popular among physicists.


I am actually more interested in the macro world than the quantum level. I agree with you that there appears to be little free will at the macro level. This is why I quoted Sam Harris in an earlier post in this thread who claims we have no free will regardless of quantum uncertainty because of studies showing that we are not aware of our choices until after the brain can be seen to change. Dennett disagreed with him, but at the macro level we are talking about consciousness which opens up a more interesting discussion.

Yes, those studies do appear to make it clear that human decisions are not free. Newtonian physics appear to make it clear that the macro level is predetermined, regardless of what I prefer.

[YesNo]

Unfortunately, not many good scientists have tried working with Many Worlds. As far as I know, the math is valid, and it seems to agree with the physical universe as far as one can see. Philosophically, I find MW preferable to Copenhagen, but I didn't become a physicist.

One doesn't need to know much about the math except that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle can be mathematically derived from Schrodinger's wave function. It is not rocket science. The math invalidates the determinism of Many Worlds.

Regarding actually seeing things, have you ever seen an alternate universe? Have you ever experienced alternate universes in any way? At least people who believe in God have religious and mystical experiences or near-death and out-of-body experiences to back their beliefs.

Many Worlds is a speculative workaround to the non-determinism in Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Conveniently, we can't see these alternate universes, but they are (1) allegedly individually deterministic, and yet (2) when they somehow, and from what I read no one really knows how, work together they are able to generate the non-deterministic wave behavior in the double slit experiment. Many Worlds illustrates the magic of pseudo-science. It is metaphysics trying to drive science.



Yes, those studies do appear to make it clear that human decisions are not free. Newtonian physics appear to make it clear that the macro level is predetermined, regardless of what I prefer.

The experiments showing signals of awareness in the person after the brain changes are detected provide more evidence about the workings of consciousness than they do about whether we have free will or not. Since we think we made the choice and the brain behavior occurred prior to our being physically aware that we made the choice, our consciousness goes beyond this awareness. This could also be viewed as evidence that the brain does not generate consciousness.

[PeterL]

One doesn't need to know much about the math except that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle can be mathematically derived from Schrodinger's wave function. It is not rocket science. The math invalidates the determinism of Many Worlds.

I was my understanding that the Copenhagen insists that the wave function collapesalthough that is not part of the math. I will confess that I have not looked at this in detail in several years, so I can't point to the exact part involved. Everett proposed that the wave function need not collapse and that the math did not support that position. The people in Copenhagen, Bohr et Al., did not agree. I'll look at it again, but I believe that Everett's position is better supposrted by the math.


Regarding actually seeing things, have you ever seen an alternate universe? Have you ever experienced alternate universes in any way? At least people who believe in God have religious and mystical experiences or near-death and out-of-body experiences to back their beliefs.


I don't know whether I have seen examples of the many worlds.



Many Worlds is a speculative workaround to the non-determinism in Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Conveniently, we can't see these alternate universes, but they are (1) allegedly individually deterministic, and yet (2) when they somehow, and from what I read no one really knows how, work together they are able to generate the non-deterministic wave behavior in the double slit experiment. Many Worlds illustrates the magic of pseudo-science. It is metaphysics trying to drive science.

As I mentioned above, Many Worlds is based on the math.



The experiments showing signals of awareness in the person after the brain changes are detected provide more evidence about the workings of consciousness than they do about whether we have free will or not. Since we think we made the choice and the brain behavior occurred prior to our being physically aware that we made the choice, our consciousness goes beyond this awareness. This could also be viewed as evidence that the brain does not generate consciousness.

Maybe

[deryk]

Deconstructing choice is masturbation. Making a meaningful decision on the other hand...

[Cioran]

One doesn't need to know much about the math except that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle can be mathematically derived from Schrodinger's wave function. It is not rocket science. The math invalidates the determinism of Many Worlds.

I realize you won't change your ways, and replying to you as such is futile. But persistent displays of willful ignorance and dishonesty demand persistent refutations. Have you read the scholarly articles on MW to which I have linked? Yes or no? If you have read and understood them, then you would realize that what you say above, yet again, is a load of tosh. That you keep repeating this plain falsehood in the face of so many corrections from me and others suggest to me that you don't care what's true. You only care about saying what you desire to be true.


Here, read the following, from here. (http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/experiments/schrodingerscat/) I'll even put the key part in bold.


Einstein and Schrödinger did not like the fundamental randomness implied by quantum mechanics. They wanted to restore determinism to physics. Indeed Schrödinger's wave equation predicts a perfectly deterministic time evolution of the wave function. Randomness enters only when a measurement is made and the wave function "collapses."

See? The wave equation of which you speak, without knowing anything about it, is fully deterministic. Randomness enters only when a measurement is made and the wave function "collapses."

How many posts, now, have I and others explained to you the simple fact that the Many Worlds is no wave-function-collapse meta-theory, or interpretation, of QM. If one does away with the wave function collapse, QM is wholly deterministic. The no-collapse postulate of QM yields the same results as the collapse postualates, so at the current time neither one can be ruled in or out as a true ontology of QM. But, of course, if you accept wave function collapse, you must accept:

1. That the human mind magically collapses it without any explanatory physical mechanism to explain how this pure miracle occurs;

2. That a mind-independent reality fails to exist; and

3. That there can be spooky action at a distance.

All of these problems go away under MW.

Now, please, stop mischaracterizing the MW. By now it is apparent that everything you have said about it is flat wrong.

[cafolini]

The BS will be circular and never-ending for those who don't realize that math is a language for physics instead of physics being a language for math. The latter is the counterfeit. You can look at math and counterfeit physics to fit the equations, or you can look at physics and use math for genuine notation. Have fun.

[Cioran]

Here's a recent article from MIT on the Many Worlds. (http://www.technologyreview.com/view/424073/multiverse-many-worlds-say-physicists/)

Amazing! Steven Hawking accepts Many Worlds, and so does Max Tegmark, a prominent physicist whose work I have linked. So does the quantum computational expert David Deutsch, whose work I have also linked. So does a plurality and perhaps a majority of physcists who work in quantum mechanics.

This is not, by the way, an illicit appeal to authority, which takes the fallacious form "x is right just because y says it is." My point is this: YesNo, with no training in math or physics, states over and over that QM rules out MW! Wow, YesNo, you better go communicate this astounding discovery to Stephen Hawking et al! I wonder how you "discovered" something that all these prominent physicists overlooked? It's true conundrum, I tells ya! :eek:

[cafolini]

Here's a recent article from MIT on the Many Worlds. (http://www.technologyreview.com/view/424073/multiverse-many-worlds-say-physicists/)

Amazing! Steven Hawking accepts Many Worlds, and so does Max Tegmark, a prominent physicist whose work I have linked. So does the quantum computational expert David Deutsch, whose work I have also linked. So does a plurality and perhaps a majority of physcists who work in quantum mechanics.

This is not, by the way, an illicit appeal to authority, which takes the fallacious form "x is right just because y says it is." My point is this: YesNo, with no training in math or physics, states over and over that QM rules out MW! Wow, YesNo, you better go communicate this astounding discovery to Stephen Hawking et al! I wonder how you "discovered" something that all these prominent physicists overlooked? It's true conundrum, I tells ya! :eek:

YesNo interpretations do not bother me, although he could have been sold quite a bit of unfounded ways of expressing ideas. But you carry 16.38 kilograms of Smirnoff in every post. And so do your prominent fellows.
YesNo is a skeptic. You are kind of a walking septic.

[Cioran]

YesNo interpretations do not bother me, although he could have been sold quite a bit of unfounded ways of expressing ideas. But you carry 16.38 kilograms of Smirnoff in every post. And so do your prominent fellows.
YesNo is a skeptic. You are kind of a walking septic.

Sorry, this is not the issue at all. YesNo is NOT a "skeptic." What he is saying is simply wrong. He is confused. And so are you, it would appear.

He is saying that MW is inconsistent with QM, and since QM is true, MW is false. This is just, again, wrong.

The issue is not whether MW is true or not. That's irrelevant. The issue is that he is mischarcterizing the relation between MW (a proposed interpretation of QM) and QM.

Yes, MW, is inconsistent with the indeterminacy, the non-localism and the anti-realism of the standard Copenhagen interpretation. But that's not because MW is inconsistent with QM. It's because the MW interpretation is inconsistent with the Copenhagen interpreation! If you accept Copenhagen, you accept the postulate of the wave-function collapse upon measurement, and with it you must also accept anti-localism, indeterminacy and anti-realism.

The Many Worlds interpretation simply shows that indeterminism in QM holds IF AND ONLY IF the Copenhagen interpreation is correct. If the Many Worlds interpretation is correct, then QM is a fully deterministic theory.

The problem is that YesNo keeps saying that MW is false because QM is indeterministic. This is called circular reasoning, or begging the question. His statement makes sense only if in fact the wave function collapse postulate is correct, but that is precisely what is at issue! If wave function collapse is correct, then QM is indeterministic. But if it is not correct, and MW is true, then QM is deterministic, not indeterministic.

[PeterL]

Yes, MW, is inconsistent with the indeterminacy, the non-localism and the anti-realism of the standard Copenhagen interpretation. But that's not because MW is inconsistent with QM. It's because the MW interpretation is inconsistent with the Copenhagen interpreation! If you accept Copenhagen, you accept the postulate of the wave-function collapse upon measurement, and with it you must also accept anti-localism, indeterminacy and anti-realism.

The Many Worlds interpretation simply shows that indeterminism in QM holds IF AND ONLY IF the Copenhagen interpreation is correct. If the Many Worlds interpretation is correct, then QM is a fully deterministic theory.


That is the issue, an it has been the issue since Everett developed the Many Worlds Interpretation. As I understand it, the Copenhagen School retained it interpretation because they wanted it to be right, and Bohr didn't like MW, not because there was any mathematical reason for rejecting MW.

[Cioran]

Maybe this analogy will help YesNo see the mistake is his continuously making on this issue, now carried here from another thread. (Or it won’t, if he is simply being disingenuous) The following, of course, was a real historical debate.

We observe dawn, and then the movement of the sun across the sky, and then later dusk. At one time there were two conceptual frameworks that accounted for this observed and undeniable phenomenon, as well as other phenomenon such as the apparent movement of the stars:

1. The sun revolves around the earth. (Ptolemaic system)

2. The earth turns on its axis and revolves around the sun. (Copernican system)

These are completely different interpretations of the observed phenomenon. Yet both adequately explained what was observed. It was only later, when more information could be gathered, that one could decide which was correct. But obviously, only one could be correct and not both.

Likewise, today, we have a theory, QM, and we have two conceptual frameworks that represent it. One framework, Many Worlds, is deterministic. The other framework, Copenhagen, is indeterministic. Yet, just as in the case with the Ptolemaic and the Copernican systems, QM works perfectly well regardless of which conceptual framework we adopt. Both MW and Copenhagen adequately explain what we observe in QM.

The issue isn’t whether YesNo thinks MW is false. He is entitled to his opinion and his skepticism. The issue is this: When YesNo asserts that “Many Worlds if false because QM is indeterministic,” he is saying something equivalent to: “The Copernican system is false, because the sun revolves around the earth.” Or, more simply: “The Copernican system is incompatible with the Ptolemaic system, and is therefore is false.”

Is the error here not obvious? If one were to make this claim, one would be assuming the truth of the very proposition that is in dispute: One would be assuming the truth of the Ptolemaic system. Of course, IF the Ptolemaic system were true, then obviously the Copernican system would be false. But whether or not the Ptolemaic system was true, was (at one time) precisely the point in dispute. And whether QM is indeterministic or deterministic today, is precisely the point in dispute. It is indeterministic if Copenhagen is true, and deterministic if Many Worlds is true. Since we do not have enough information to know which interpretation is correct, we simply do not know whether QM is a deterministic or an indeterministic theory.

If I were to mimic YesNo’s approach, I would simply declare that Copenhagen is false because MW shows that QM is deterministic!

[YesNo]

If I were to mimic YesNo’s approach, I would simply declare that Copenhagen is false because MW shows that QM is deterministic!

I think the implied assumption here is that the Copenhagen interpretation and the Many World interpretation are on the same level. Pick one or pick the other. I don't think they are on the same level just because people call both of them "interpretations".

I see the Copenhagen interpretation more as a description of experimental results without trying to add on top of that any particular metaphysics. I see the Many Worlds interpretation as a deterministic metaphysics trying to come up with some explanation for the experimental results that would keep it alive.

Let me give an example. Suppose you see presents under the Christmas tree and you interpret your experience as:


Someone put presents under the Christmas tree.

That would be an interpretation in line with the Copenhagen interpretation.

However, others who believe in Santa Claus, who have a metaphysics that there is some guy with reindeer who deliver presents to every home on Christmas eve, would interpret the result of there being presents under the tree as:


Santa came down the chimney and put the presents under the Christmas tree.

That is how I view the Many Worlds interpretation. It is the Santa Claus interpretation of quantum mechanics.

[cafolini]

I think the implied assumption here is that the Copenhagen interpretation and the Many World interpretation are on the same level. Pick one or pick the other. I don't think they are on the same level just because people call both of them "interpretations".

I see the Copenhagen interpretation more as a description of experimental results without trying to add on top of that any particular metaphysics. I see the Many Worlds interpretation as a deterministic metaphysics trying to come up with some explanation for the experimental results that would keep it alive.

Let me give an example. Suppose you see presents under the Christmas tree and you interpret your experience as:


Someone put presents under the Christmas tree.

That would be an interpretation in line with the Copenhagen interpretation.

However, others who believe in Santa Claus, who have a metaphysics that there is some guy with reindeer who deliver presents to every home on Christmas eve, would interpret the result of there being presents under the tree as:


Santa came down the chimney and put the presents under the Christmas tree.

That is how I view the Many Worlds interpretation. It is the Santa Claus interpretation of quantum mechanics.

I think you make good points here. 16.38 Smirnoff can't grasp it?

[PeterL]

I think the implied assumption here is that the Copenhagen interpretation and the Many World interpretation are on the same level. Pick one or pick the other. I don't think they are on the same level just because people call both of them "interpretations".

I see the Copenhagen interpretation more as a description of experimental results without trying to add on top of that any particular metaphysics. I see the Many Worlds interpretation as a deterministic metaphysics trying to come up with some explanation for the experimental results that would keep it alive.

The Copenhagen interpretation assumes that the wave function collapses, because Bohr wanted free will. Everett didn't present the Many Worlds Interpretation because he wanted determinism; it was because there is npthing in the math that requires that the wave function collapse. If one examines both, then one will find equally valis math, and both agree with observable reality, unless you demand that yous see all possible worlds at all times.


Let me give an example. Suppose you see presents under the Christmas tree and you interpret your experience as:


Someone put presents under the Christmas tree.

That would be an interpretation in line with the Copenhagen interpretation.

However, others who believe in Santa Claus, who have a metaphysics that there is some guy with reindeer who deliver presents to every home on Christmas eve, would interpret the result of there being presents under the tree as:


Santa came down the chimney and put the presents under the Christmas tree.

That is how I view the Many Worlds interpretation. It is the Santa Claus interpretation of quantum mechanics.

This is not a good analogy. The Copenhagen Interpretation would say that Daddy put the presents there. The Many Worlds Interpretation would say that the presents are there, and there are many people who might have put them there: Mommy, Daddy, Aunt Sue, etc. and we don't know who is guilty, because they were all there and had presents.

If MW is the Santa Claus interpretation, then DI is the warm bed with teddy bear solution.

[YesNo]

I'm glad you liked it, cafolini, with or without the vodka.

I was trying to figure out just what the Copenhagen interpretation is, when I read this in Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copenhagen_interpretation) which seemed to compare the two interpretations nicely.


So if an electron passes through a double slit apparatus there are various probabilities for where on the detection screen that individual electron will hit. But once it has hit, there is no longer any probability whatsoever that it will hit somewhere else. Many-worlds interpretations say that an electron hits wherever there is a possibility that it might hit, and that each of these hits occurs in a separate universe.

So, if I'm getting this right, when an electron hits the detection screen in the Copenhagen interpretation it just hits the detection screen at a particular location and its chance of hitting the detection screen at some other point drops to zero. That's what "wave function collapse" means.

In the Many Worlds interpretation, since hitting the detection screen involves non-determinism at the level of an electron, it has to come up with as many alternate universes as there are places where that electron could hit. That's what "non-collapse" of the wave function means.

I can't think of anything more damaging to an interpretation than to have to posit the creation of perhaps trillions of new universes every time a scientist shoots an electron through a double slit experiment.

[YesNo]

The Copenhagen interpretation assumes that the wave function collapses, because Bohr wanted free will. Everett didn't present the Many Worlds Interpretation because he wanted determinism; it was because there is npthing in the math that requires that the wave function collapse. If one examines both, then one will find equally valis math, and both agree with observable reality, unless you demand that yous see all possible worlds at all times.

What requires the wave function to collapse is the electron hits the detection screen or some other change occurs implying that something definite actually happened. The wave function presenting the probabilities where the electron will hit is no longer needed because we now know where it landed and we have a 100% probability of the result.

You are making an assumption that both interpretations use equally valid math. I don't know if that is the case or not. I can see how one might be able to split the wave function into pieces, provided there is a suitable basis which better be uniquely determined, one for each hypothetical alternate universe because of the linearity of the function, but I don't see how the math can put them back together again to generate what Many Worlds must interpret as an illusion of a wave pattern on the detection screen.

What part of the math generates the ultimate wave pattern after many of these single-fired electrons hit the detection screen? The problem here is that if each of the alternate universes knows where its electron will hit, it has already "collapsed the wave function" for its electron. All one will get is the expected random pattern on the detection screen, not that unexpected wave pattern. Many Worlds has to explain the wave pattern without hand-waving, without taking polls of who is currently supporting it, without pseudo-scientific magic, and do all this with its spooky alternate universes.

It is sort of like what happens when the kid asks the parent, "Well, how does Santa actually get down the chimney?" And his parents make up some BS they hope the kid will swallow.



This is not a good analogy. The Copenhagen Interpretation would say that Daddy put the presents there. The Many Worlds Interpretation would say that the presents are there, and there are many people who might have put them there: Mommy, Daddy, Aunt Sue, etc. and we don't know who is guilty, because they were all there and had presents.

If MW is the Santa Claus interpretation, then DI is the warm bed with teddy bear solution.

A better analogy would be to use Young Earth Creationism, but I didn't find it as amusing at the time: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Young_Earth_creationism

[PeterL]

What requires the wave function to collapse is the electron hits the detection screen or some other change occurs implying that something definite actually happened. The wave function presenting the probabilities where the electron will hit is no longer needed because we now know where it landed and we have a 100% probability of the result.

While the electron is detected in a certain place, that does not mean that the other probabilities disappear. it simply means that they were not detected. That’s all.


You are making an assumption that both interpretations use equally valid math. I don't know if that is the case or not. I can see how one might be able to split the wave function into pieces, provided there is a suitable basis which better be uniquely determined, one for each hypothetical alternate universe because of the linearity of the function, but I don't see how the math can put them back together again to generate what Many Worlds must interpret as an illusion of a wave pattern on the detection screen.

I am not assuming that they use the same math. I know that they are using the same math. The difference is in how they interpret the fact that electrons can be observed in one place.


What part of the math generates the ultimate wave pattern after many of these single-fired electrons hit the detection screen? The problem here is that if each of the alternate universes knows where its electron will hit, it has already "collapsed the wave function" for its electron. All one will get is the expected random pattern on the detection screen, not that unexpected wave pattern. Many Worlds has to explain the wave pattern without hand-waving, without taking polls of who is currently supporting it, without pseudo-scientific magic, and do all this with its spooky alternate universes.

That an electron has been detected in a given place makes no difference to the math.


It is sort of like what happens when the kid asks the parent, "Well, how does Santa actually get down the chimney?" And his parents make up some BS they hope the kid will swallow.

A better analogy would be to use Young Earth Creationism, but I didn't find it as amusing at the time: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Young_Earth_creationism

Yes, there is a religious quality to the Copenhagen versus Many Worlds interpretations of QM.

If you want to look strictly at the math, then MW is better, because it does not claim that anything happens that is not clear in the math. If you look at "real world" results, then Copenhagen in is better, because it agrees with what we see, maybe.

[cafolini]

I'm glad you liked it, cafolini, with or without the vodka.

I was trying to figure out just what the Copenhagen interpretation is, when I read this in Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copenhagen_interpretation) which seemed to compare the two interpretations nicely.


So if an electron passes through a double slit apparatus there are various probabilities for where on the detection screen that individual electron will hit. But once it has hit, there is no longer any probability whatsoever that it will hit somewhere else. Many-worlds interpretations say that an electron hits wherever there is a possibility that it might hit, and that each of these hits occurs in a separate universe.

So, if I'm getting this right, when an electron hits the detection screen in the Copenhagen interpretation it just hits the detection screen at a particular location and its chance of hitting the detection screen at some other point drops to zero. That's what "wave function collapse" means.

In the Many Worlds interpretation, since hitting the detection screen involves non-determinism at the level of an electron, it has to come up with as many alternate universes as there are places where that electron could hit. That's what "non-collapse" of the wave function means.

I can't think of anything more damaging to an interpretation than to have to posit the creation of perhaps trillions of new universes every time a scientist shoots an electron through a double slit experiment.

I tend to agree, in fact. Good points.

[Cioran]

If you want to look strictly at the math, then MW is better, because it does not claim that anything happens that is not clear in the math. If you look at "real world" results, then Copenhagen in is better, because it agrees with what we see, maybe.

Yes! Exactly!

I haven't been able to bestir myself to read the latest from YesNo, and don't know if I care to aggravate myself to do so, but here you have hit the nail on the head. If YesNo is suggesting that the math supports Copenhagen and does not support MW, he is, as he usually is, dead wrong. MW and Copenhagen both are perfectly consistent with the observed results and predictions of QM. However! Nothing in the math predicts or models a wave function collapse, which is what Copenhagen needs to defeat Many Worlds. Thus YesNo has got it exactly backward (what a suprise!) again. MW is just all math! It's Copenhagen that puts in a totally unexplained wave function collapse, which not only fails to be supported by the math, but physically speaking, has no explanation whatsoever. It's pure magic!


Copenhagen is Santa Claus, of course!

[PeterL]

Yes! Exactly!

I haven't been able to bestir myself to read the latest from YesNo, and don't know if I care to aggravate myself to do so, but here you have hit the nail on the head. If YesNo is suggesting that the math supports Copenhagen and does not support MW, he is, as he usually is, dead wrong. MW and Copenhagen both are perfectly consistent with the observed results and predictions of QM. However! Nothing in the math predicts or models a wave function collapse, which is what Copenhagen needs to defeat Many Worlds. Thus YesNo has got it exactly backward (what a suprise!) again. MW is just all math! It's Copenhagen that puts in a totally unexplained wave function collapse, which not only fails to be supported by the math, but physically speaking, has no explanation whatsoever. It's pure magic!


Yes, Bohr wanted to make QM matcvh the observed world, but there was no need for that. There is nor reason for the wave function to collapse to explain what is observed. Just because the electron is observed in one place says nothing about its wave-like nature.

[Cioran]

Here, read this. (http://www.askamathematician.com/2010/10/q-copenhagen-or-many-worlds/):ihih:


The Copenhagen interpretation requires that new laws be created that, in addition to being impossible, are completely unnecessary, physically unfeasible, and utterly unjustifiable. The basic laws of quantum mechanics, when applied at all scales, give you the Many Worlds interpretation. No fancy rules, no awkward questions. Even better, what seems to be wave function collapse in Copenhagen is actually described by the Many Worlds approach. So why choose the Copenhagen interpretation over Many Worlds? No damn reason at all.

See? It’s Copenhagen that requires you put in extra stuff apart from the math, not MW! And it’s Copenhagen that postulates a totally magical, wholly unexplained, Santa Claus-like wave function collapse! It’s Copenhagen that makes the audacious, wholly unexplained and unexplainable assertion that human consciousness transforms the whole universe every time someone measures something!

YesNo seems to be arguing that MW must be wrong because he wants it to be wrong. Apart from this sort of behavior being really annoying, one must ask why it's important to him that MW be false? I think it's because he believes that free will is vindicated if the universe is indeterministic, as implied by Copenhagen.

But it's not! I guess YesNo has failed to notice that a universe based on hard indeterminism is exactly as fatal for free will as one based on hard determinism!

[cafolini]

Here, read this. (http://www.askamathematician.com/2010/10/q-copenhagen-or-many-worlds/):ihih:



See? It’s Copenhagen that requires you put in extra stuff apart from the math, not MW! And it’s Copenhagen that postulates a totally magical, wholly unexplained, Santa Claus-like wave function collapse! It’s Copenhagen that makes the audacious, wholly unexplained and unexplainable assertion that human consciousness transforms the whole universe every time someone measures something!

YesNo seems to be arguing that MW must be wrong because he wants it to be wrong. Apart from this sort of behavior being really annoying, one must ask why it's important to him that MW be false? I think it's because he believes that free will is vindicated if the universe is indeterministic, as implied by Copenhagen.

But it's not! I guess YesNo has failed to notice that a universe based on hard indeterminism is exactly as fatal for free will as one based on hard determinism!

It comes to a point where anything goes with Smirnoff. LOL

[cafolini]

Yes, Bohr wanted to make QM matcvh the observed world, but there was no need for that. There is nor reason for the wave function to collapse to explain what is observed. Just because the electron is observed in one place says nothing about its wave-like nature.

The electron does not have a wavelike nature. Waves are a mathematical notation of pulses that has nothing to do with the intrinsic nature of the electron. Don't be ridiculous. Just drink your pood and relax. Bohr was correct and that's why he could not take the retarded position of Einsteinsaurus. Only one world out there and a few exceptionally retarded interpretations wanting to take physics as the language for math. QM is as solid as the principle of uncertainty which simply states that you cannot fotograph the electron and know its actual location at the same time. No more. Watch your breathing.

[Cioran]

It comes to a point where anything goes with Smirnoff. LOL

That's right, parade your shallow understanding of the topic with snarky one-liners while the rest of us try to educate you. Futilely, no doubt.

[Cioran]

The electron does not have a wavelike nature.

Demonstrably incorrect, and evidence of your shallow grasp of this topic. Everything has a wavelike nature, including you. This has been empirically demonstraed. I don't know if you even know what the two-slit experiment is, but in it, objects as large as Buckyballs have been "waved" through the two slits. So sorry for your claim.

[Cioran]

For any lurkers or participants who would like to know more about this fascinating topic, here (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/physics/many-worlds-theory-today.html) is transcript a show that NOVA did a few years ago on the Many Worlds, very friendly to the lay reader.

[cafolini]

Demonstrably incorrect, and evidence of your shallow grasp of this topic. Everything has a wavelike nature, including you. This has been empirically demonstraed. I don't know if you even know what the two-slit experiment is, but in it, objects as large as Buckyballs have been "waved" through the two slits. So sorry for your claim.

When you quote me, please show the entire quote. I know it must be difficult with so much vodka.

[cafolini]

The electron does not have a wavelike nature. Waves are a mathematical notation of pulses that has nothing to do with the intrinsic nature of the electron. Don't be ridiculous. Just drink your pood and relax. Bohr was correct and that's why he could not take the retarded position of Einsteinsaurus. Only one world out there and a few exceptionally retarded interpretations wanting to take physics as the language for math. QM is as solid as the principle of uncertainty which simply states that you cannot fotograph the electron and know its actual location at the same time. No more. Watch your breathing.

[Cioran]

When you quote me, please show the entire quote. I know it must be difficult with so much vodka.

Do the rules here allow this sort of posting?

[Cioran]

The electron does not have a wavelike nature. Waves are a mathematical notation of pulses that has nothing to do with the intrinsic nature of the electron.

By all means, continue to parade your ignorance. For the rest of you who want to learn something, and unlike cafolini are able to do so, I reccomend this wonderful video (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DfPeprQ7oGc) which demonstrates a real experiement that has been done repeatedly for decades. The experiment emprically demonstrates that electrons have a wave-like nature -- which cafolini just denied.

By the way, cafolini, does light have a wave-like nature? Hmm?

LOL

[Buh4Bee]

Do the rules here allow this sort of posting?

It simply depends on if you can hold your vodka and exactly what you post.

[YesNo]

While the electron is detected in a certain place, that does not mean that the other probabilities disappear. it simply means that they were not detected. That’s all.

If you know the electron is in a certain place, the probability of it being there increases to 100% and the probability of it being elsewhere collapses to 0%. The other probabilities are still there, but they are now 0%.




Yes, there is a religious quality to the Copenhagen versus Many Worlds interpretations of QM.

If you want to look strictly at the math, then MW is better, because it does not claim that anything happens that is not clear in the math. If you look at "real world" results, then Copenhagen in is better, because it agrees with what we see, maybe.

Good. We agree. If we look at the evidence in the real world, Copenhagen is better.

[Cioran]

My goodness! Lookie here! Electron waves! (http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/debrog.html)

Who's drinking vodka now, Calofini?

[Cioran]

If you know the electron is in a certain place, the probability of it being there increases to 100% and the probability of it being elsewhere collapses to 0%. The other probabilities are still there, but they are now 0%.


1. Where was the electron before it was detected?

2. What was the electron before it was detected?

3. How did the act of measurement force the electron to declare its location?

[YesNo]

By all means, continue to parade your ignorance. For the rest of you who want to learn something, and unlike cafolini are able to do so, I reccomend this wonderful video (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DfPeprQ7oGc) which demonstrates a real experiement that has been done repeatedly for decades. The experiment emprically demonstrates that electrons have a wave-like nature -- which cafolini just denied.

By the way, cafolini, does light have a wave-like nature? Hmm?


Based on the video you linked to with Dr. Quantum, it looks like the electron is neither a wave nor a particle or both or something else. Also watch this video starting about 3:47 and you will get what happens if the electron is observed. It now displays a particle pattern on the detection screen and not a wave pattern. At the very end of the video, Dr. Quantum says, "The observer collapsed the wave function simply by observing."

[Cioran]

Based on the video you linked to with Dr. Quantum, it looks like the electron is neither a wave nor a particle or both or something else. Also watch this video starting about 3:47 and you will get what happens if the electron is observed. It now displays a particle pattern on the detection screen and not a wave pattern. At the very end of the video, Dr. Quantum says, "The observer collapsed the wave function simply by observing."

Yes. This is the issue. The observer collapsed the wave function simply by looking. How did he do that? Is it magic?

I linked the video to demonstrate to Calofini that the electron IS a wave; it becomes a point particle at the moment of measurement. This is the Copenhagen assumption. And it is perfectly fine to assume this if you wish, because you can then go on to do science perfectly well. But you get the exact same scientific results with MW.

Bear in mind that if yoiu think MW is strange, how strange do you think Copenhagen is? The observer magically collapses the wave function, with no explanation how or why this miracle takes place. The electron has no properties at all until measured -- this is a postulate of Copenhagen! It only has a probability distribution, exemplifed by its wave state. And, by collapsing a wave function at one end of the universe, you can instantaneously dictate the properties of another particle with which the first particle is entangled, even if it is on the other side of the universe!

So your Copenahgen says that there is no mind-independent reality, no cause and effect and that there is instantaneous action at a distance!

The video was showing an experiment, and not doing philosophy. Many Worlds fully explains what was shown on the video, just in a different way. And in the MW way, there is no wave function collapse, no indeterminism and no spooky action at a distance. I'd say Copenhagen is much weirder than MW -- though weirdness does not determine the truth or falsity of reality, obviously.

[PeterL]

If you know the electron is in a certain place, the probability of it being there increases to 100% and the probability of it being elsewhere collapses to 0%. The other probabilities are still there, but they are now 0%.


How certain of that are you? Is the ollapse a long term effect, or is it something that happens only as long as that observer is watching? What happened to the rest of the wavelike form?


Good. We agree. If we look at the evidence in the real world, Copenhagen is better.

I thought that I hedged that enough to make it clear that the Copenhagen Interpretation is as uncertain as anything can be. The particle-like form of the electron may just be an artifact of observation; that is, the electrons may simply be doing that to amused observers.

[Cioran]

Good. We agree. If we look at the evidence in the real world, Copenhagen is better.

What you expressing here is a naive form of empiricism. You could also say as follows. Good, we agree then, the earth is flat because it looks that way. Good, we agree then, the sun circles the earth, because it looks that way. Good, we agree then, space and time are absolute and not relative, because it looks that way.

The naive form of empiricism you are advocating here is especially weak with respect to this debate, because MW explains why it looks as if there is only a single world, why it looks as if there is no mind-independent reality, why it looks as if indeterminism reigns and why it looks as if there is "spooky action at a distance." The key modifier is, looks as if things are this way. MW shows why things look to be that way, but are not.

[cafolini]

How certain of that are you? Is the ollapse a long term effect, or is it something that happens only as long as that observer is watching? What happened to the rest of the wavelike form?



I thought that I hedged that enough to make it clear that the Copenhagen Interpretation is as uncertain as anything can be. The particle-like form of the electron may just be an artifact of observation; that is, the electrons may simply be doing that to amused observers.

What the electron is as it travels was very well determined in the polarities of a simple battery. The electron travels from negative to positive on the outer orbit. Nothing throws in more confusion than the idea that you can think of electricity flowing from positive to negative. That's for the birds. Positive is lack of charge.Negative is excess charge. When you close the circuit, electrons flow to the positive end. If you close the circuit with your body you could get electrocuted, burned by the electrons, if the voltage is high enough. At 120 volts, changes are that you will suffer burns and a reflexive kick. But in places where the voltage is 220 volts, you are easily electrocuted, because you helplessly stick to it.

Why do you think that in a transistor the source of electrons helped by the bias is called the emitter? You should study very carefully the ins and outs of digital electronics.
And study the life and works of Tesla also. It will do you some good. Study the frequency transformer. Learn, learn, learn. Cut the Smirnoff. Drink a good Johnny black label. And have some artichoke juice for the liver. LOL

[YesNo]

I linked the video to demonstrate to Calofini that the electron IS a wave; it becomes a point particle at the moment of measurement. This is the Copenhagen assumption. And it is perfectly fine to assume this if you wish, because you can then go on to do science perfectly well. But you get the exact same scientific results with MW.

Do waves start acting like particles when you look at them? No. So the electron is also not a wave, because it is also not acting like one. The electron presents a pattern like a wave on the detection screen, but shine a photon on it and it presents a pattern like a particle would.

An electron is whatever behaves the way an electron behaves. I can't see it as either a wave or a particle.



Bear in mind that if yoiu think MW is strange, how strange do you think Copenhagen is? The observer magically collapses the wave function, with no explanation how or why this miracle takes place. The electron has no properties at all until measured -- this is a postulate of Copenhagen! It only has a probability distribution, exemplifed by its wave state. And, by collapsing a wave function at one end of the universe, you can instantaneously dictate the properties of another particle with which the first particle is entangled, even if it is on the other side of the universe!

I guess the alternative would be to magically split into trillions of spooky alternate universes without any explanation how or why that miracle happens.



So your Copenahgen says that there is no mind-independent reality, no cause and effect and that there is instantaneous action at a distance!

The video was showing an experiment, and not doing philosophy. Many Worlds fully explains what was shown on the video, just in a different way. And in the MW way, there is no wave function collapse, no indeterminism and no spooky action at a distance. I'd say Copenhagen is much weirder than MW -- though weirdness does not determine the truth or falsity of reality, obviously.

How do you really know there is no non-determinism with Many Worlds? I know that is the Many Worlds dogma, and you are welcome to your metaphysics, but does it deliver?

[YesNo]

What you expressing here is a naive form of empiricism. You could also say as follows. Good, we agree then, the earth is flat because it looks that way. Good, we agree then, the sun circles the earth, because it looks that way. Good, we agree then, space and time are absolute and not relative, because it looks that way.

The naive form of empiricism you are advocating here is especially weak with respect to this debate, because MW explains why it looks as if there is only a single world, why it looks as if there is no mind-independent reality, why it looks as if indeterminism reigns and why it looks as if there is "spooky action at a distance." The key modifier is, ]looks as if things are this way[/B]. MW shows why things look to be that way, but are not.

The Young Earth Creationists also explain why it looks as if our universe is 13.7 billion years old, but in their view is not. They love to explain why things look to be one way, but according to their metaphysics is not. It sounds as if your position and theirs have something structurally in common.

One of the good things about empiricism is that it brings one back down to earth.

[osho]

To say we can have free will under all circumstances is a stupid idea. Can we keep on fasting for ever if we have freewill. In fact man is a slave of circumstances. Men are basically animals an I do not think animals have free will.

[YesNo]

I don't think anyone claiming that we have free will, osho, claims that we have absolute free will under all circumstances. The question might be better put, "Do we have any free will?" If the world is deterministic then we don't.

Perhaps the question is even better put as, "Do we have enough free will?" Then the next question would be, "Enough for what?" An initial answer to that might be, "Enough to relate responsibly to each other, the universe and whatever else there is to relate to."

I look at the quantum argument as just setting up the necessary grounds for free will. If the world is deterministic at the quantum level, then there is no need to discuss free will further. It turns out that is not the case. So the necessary conditions for free will are present. Once we establish that, we can ask what the sufficient conditions are for free will. That would lead us into discussions about consciousness which might be generally defined as that which can make a choice.

[PeterL]

What the electron is as it travels was very well determined in the polarities of a simple battery. The electron travels from negative to positive on the outer orbit. Nothing throws in more confusion than the idea that you can think of electricity flowing from positive to negative. That's for the birds. Positive is lack of charge.Negative is excess charge. When you close the circuit, electrons flow to the positive end. If you close the circuit with your body you could get electrocuted, burned by the electrons, if the voltage is high enough. At 120 volts, changes are that you will suffer burns and a reflexive kick. But in places where the voltage is 220 volts, you are easily electrocuted, because you helplessly stick to it.

Why do you think that in a transistor the source of electrons helped by the bias is called the emitter? You should study very carefully the ins and outs of digital electronics.
And study the life and works of Tesla also. It will do you some good. Study the frequency transformer. Learn, learn, learn. Cut the Smirnoff. Drink a good Johnny black label. And have some artichoke juice for the liver. LOL

This is completely irrelevant.

You may consume booze, but I do not.

[cafolini]

I don't think anyone claiming that we have free will, osho, claims that we have absolute free will under all circumstances. The question might be better put, "Do we have any free will?" If the world is deterministic then we don't.

Perhaps the question is even better put as, "Do we have enough free will?" Then the next question would be, "Enough for what?" An initial answer to that might be, "Enough to relate responsibly to each other, the universe and whatever else there is to relate to."

I look at the quantum argument as just setting up the necessary grounds for free will. If the world is deterministic at the quantum level, then there is no need to discuss free will further. It turns out that is not the case. So the necessary conditions for free will are present. Once we establish that, we can ask what the sufficient conditions are for free will. That would lead us into discussions about consciousness which might be generally defined as that which can make a choice.

Firstly, we don't know a UNI-VERSE. That's what I call the verse of the UNI. Infinity + x = infinity. And if we were to reach a place where we cannot go beyond, there is always an undetermined behind.

So, the universe is already too much for us to handle and we know diddly-squat about it, except that we are talking about infinity without being knowledgeable. So this is the key to understanding that the only freewill we could have must be in the choices we can make about things we know about and can be demonstrated in the lab as facts. But they are given and we can only choose among those which are given a-priori. Our freewill is a choice among multiple choices. If we try to induce from postulated multiple choices, we close all possibilities of more and we commit inductive fraud upon our conclusions.

So we are ultimately deductive animals and our freewill is limited by the choices we are able to see and the need (forcefully) to make choices ruled by circunstances pertaining to our environment. We must act. That we know. In acting we choose what we can in accordance with what we are permitted to see with a moment's religiosity. And we pray to God that we are making the best choices. But ultimately we know diddly-squat about the matter. And it is precisely that inability to see beyond that makes us religious whether we like it or not.

Hey, if some of the freaks around make a movie out of this, please call it C A Cafolini. Or maybe Warren Buffet.

[Cioran]

Do waves start acting like particles when you look at them? No.

Yes! That is exactly what they do -- according to Copenhagen! Maybe you should view the video again. This is called the measurement problem -- maybe you should Google that. This is also what is called wave function collapse, according to Copenhagen. According to Copenhagen, prior to measurement, the electron is a wave of probability, not a "thing" at all. It is only upon measurement that the wave function "collapses" to a point particle. This is your interpretation that you favor -- if you favor it, maybe you ought to learn what it actually says!

MW avoids all this mystic mumbo jumbo by simply postulating, in accordance with the actual math (which does not model any wave function collapse) that the wave is all that there is, and it never collapses. When an experiment is conducted, different versions of the experimenters get quantum entangled with different outcomes, so it seems as if there is wave function collapse and a single world, but there is not.

[Cioran]

btw, YesNo, if you wish to maintain that waves do not start acting like particles when you look at them, then this means you agree with the Many Worlds interpretation.

[cafolini]

Cioran sounds like hard salami and cheese. Why didn't you choose Dong?

[Cioran]

I guess the alternative would be to magically split into trillions of spooky alternate universes without any explanation how or why that miracle happens.

No. I know the term "split" is used even by MW advocates, but as was already explained to you in a paper by the physcist Max Tegmark to which I linked, this is a misconception. If you wish to discuss this subject, I suggest you make at least a pretense at learning about it.




How do you really know there is no non-determinism with Many Worlds? I know that is the Many Worlds dogma, and you are welcome to your metaphysics, but does it deliver?

First, Many Worlds is not a "dogma." As has been repeatedly explained to you, it is a meta-theory (theory about a theory) or an interpretation of the ontology of QM which is perfectly consistent with all QM predictions, and, unlike Copenhagen, does not have to add extra assumptions, like wave-function collapse, which is not in the math. The reason that is is determinsitic is because it is modeled by the Schroedinger wave equation, which is deterministic. This was also explained to you. Do you ever read the information that is given to you?

[Cioran]

I guess the alternative would be to magically split into trillions of spooky alternate universes without any explanation how or why that miracle happens.

If you want to make an honest effort at understanding, as opposed to spouting dogma, go here (http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf) and read the short section called "The Everett Postulate," which is about half a page in length. Of course I already linked this paper to you, didn't I?

[cafolini]

Yes! That is exactly what they do -- according to Copenhagen! Maybe you should view the video again. This is called the measurement problem -- maybe you should Google that. This is also what is called wave function collapse, according to Copenhagen. According to Copenhagen, prior to measurement, the electron is a wave of probability, not a "thing" at all. It is only upon measurement that the wave function "collapses" to a point particle. This is your interpretation that you favor -- if you favor it, maybe you ought to learn what it actually says!

MW avoids all this mystic mumbo jumbo by simply postulating, in accordance with the actual math (which does not model any wave function collapse) that the wave is all that there is, and it never collapses. When an experiment is conducted, different versions of the experimenters get quantum entangled with different outcomes, so it seems as if there is wave function collapse and a single world, but there is not.

Waves are a mathematical representation of pulses that have nothing to do with particles. So, how could you look at that representation and see particles? Of course not. You only see particles when you look at particles. Get the 220 Dong out of the Danish. Then you can eat the Danish without getting mentally electrocuted. ROFLMAO?

[Cioran]

Waves are a mathematical representation of pulses that have nothing to do with particles. So, how could you look at that representation and see particles? Of course not. You only see particles when you look at particles. Get the 220 Dong out of the Danish. Then you can eat the Danish without getting mentally electrocuted. ROFLMAO?

You said there were no such thing as electron waves. I have shown you that there electron waves. So you are making a fool of yourself.

Do you have any idea where QM came from in the first place? Have you ever heard of the blackbody problem or the ultraviolent catastrophe?

LOL

You are too foolish to bother with.

[YesNo]

So we are ultimately deductive animals and our freewill is limited by the choices we are able to see and the need (forcefully) to make choices ruled by circunstances pertaining to our environment. We must act. That we know. In acting we choose what we can in accordance with what we are permitted to see with a moment's religiosity. And we pray to God that we are making the best choices. But ultimately we know diddly-squat about the matter. And it is precisely that inability to see beyond that makes us religious whether we like it or not.


I don't think we have much more free choice than that. It is quite limited. However, I assume it is adequate, but I don't know how to show that it actually is or is not adequate. I also wonder to what extent we can increase our ability to be free in any way.

[Calidore]

So if I'm understanding this correctly, we have one theory that says that we can bring things into and out of being simply by looking at them, and another that says for any action by anything, from the subatomic to a whale to a natural phenomenon like an earthquake, an entire universe is spontaneously created for every other possibility. And both sides think the other's theory is silly.

[YesNo]

Yes! That is exactly what they do -- according to Copenhagen! Maybe you should view the video again. This is called the measurement problem -- maybe you should Google that. This is also what is called wave function collapse, according to Copenhagen. According to Copenhagen, prior to measurement, the electron is a wave of probability, not a "thing" at all. It is only upon measurement that the wave function "collapses" to a point particle. This is your interpretation that you favor -- if you favor it, maybe you ought to learn what it actually says!

MW avoids all this mystic mumbo jumbo by simply postulating, in accordance with the actual math (which does not model any wave function collapse) that the wave is all that there is, and it never collapses. When an experiment is conducted, different versions of the experimenters get quantum entangled with different outcomes, so it seems as if there is wave function collapse and a single world, but there is not.

I think there is a misunderstanding here.

You claimed that the electron is a wave, and they do display a wave-like pattern on a detection screen in a double slit experiment. However, when photons strike the electrons allowing you to observe them prior to hitting the screen, the wave-like pattern on the detection screen changes to a particle-pattern.

Is that how a real wave behaves? Try it. Push water through the double slit experiment. It gives the expected wave-like interference pattern on the detection screen displayed as height of the wave. That is how a wave behaves. Now look at the water as it goes through the double slit. Does the wave pattern on the detection screen change to a particle pattern? No. It does not behave the way the flow of electrons behave.

The words "wave" or "particle" are at best metaphors for what an electron really is.

[YesNo]

First, Many Worlds is not a "dogma." As has been repeatedly explained to you, it is a meta-theory (theory about a theory) or an interpretation of the ontology of QM which is perfectly consistent with all QM predictions, and, unlike Copenhagen, does not have to add extra assumptions, like wave-function collapse, which is not in the math. The reason that is is determinsitic is because it is modeled by the Schroedinger wave equation, which is deterministic. This was also explained to you. Do you ever read the information that is given to you?

I don't worship mathematics. It is at best a tool. Change the axioms and you get different results. I think that was discovered in the 19th century when Euclid's parallel postulate was modified. Soon there were different geometries. The fact that mathematics could come up with logically consistent alternate geometries to Euclid's meant that what was logically proven now had to be tested by experiment before it could be accepted as real.

To use the terms of the Tegmark paper that you repeatedly cite, any mathematics formed under his "Platonic paradigm" must be tested by physical evidence before it can be trusted to be physically real whether Tegmark likes it or not. The Platonic paradigm is useless. It was rejected over 150 years ago.

[cafolini]

So if I'm understanding this correctly, we have one theory that says that we can bring things into and out of being simply by looking at them, and another that says for any action by anything, from the subatomic to a whale to a natural phenomenon like an earthquake, an entire universe is spontaneously created for every other possibility. And both sides think the other's theory is silly.

Precisely. And analogously to how Henry Ford put it, if you think it's silly, it is, and if you think it is not silly, it is not. Looks like we are also bird watching without Audobon. LOL

[PeterL]

So if I'm understanding this correctly, we have one theory that says that we can bring things into and out of being simply by looking at them, and another that says for any action by anything, from the subatomic to a whale to a natural phenomenon like an earthquake, an entire universe is spontaneously created for every other possibility. And both sides think the other's theory is silly.

No, that is not it.

The Copenhagen Interpretation says that the wave ceases to be a wave when it is measured.

The Many Worlds Interpretation says that the wave continues to exist when it is measured, and that just one of many possibilities was measured.

Nothing was created from nothing, and there are no additional universes created unless that is necessary.

[cafolini]

Nothing was created from nothing? More nothing than nothing? From nothing? LOL

[YesNo]

The Copenhagen Interpretation says that the wave ceases to be a wave when it is measured.


This is somewhat different from Calidore's question, but do you see the electron as physically being a "wave" because a "wave function" models probabilities related to it? They are also modeled by Heisenberg's matrix formulation which I understand is equivalent to Schroedinger's wave function. Because of Heisenberg's formulation would the electron physically be a "matrix" as well?

This is related to other posts in this thread about the Platonic paradigm and mathematics and whether the electron actually is a "wave" rather than just displaying some wave-like behavior.

[cafolini]

There is no wave behavior displayed by the electron. The imagination without knowledge is like a toilet without water. The wave happens in the toilet. Mathematics can be used for calculation, but it has absolutely no bearing on physics. To offer a mathematical model to affect physical facts is bad musicology.

And again: Nothing comes from nothing? More nothing than nothing? LOL

[PeterL]

This is somewhat different from Calidore's question, but do you see the electron as physically being a "wave" because a "wave function" models probabilities related to it? They are also modeled by Heisenberg's matrix formulation which I understand is equivalent to Schroedinger's wave function. Because of Heisenberg's formulation would the electron physically be a "matrix" as well?


It is also different from what I wanted people to understand. The precise nature of subatomic particles is not truly known; although there are many descriptions of them. They are described by analogy as having wave-like" and "particle-like" characteristic, but they are different from waves and from particles. When they are detected as individual things, they show the characteristics of particles, but at other times they show the characteristics of waves. I do not consider electrons to be either waves or particles. How about you?

[cafolini]

Schroedinger's wave function was a mathematical notation, not a physical description. Also, subatomic particles have absolutely nothing to do with atomic particles like the free electrons in the outer orbit of a wire.
Another interesting situation is Einsteinsaurus description of space as netted, which was taken again and again by the prominent blind to be the make of actual, physical space. Ridiculous at max.

[YesNo]

It is also different from what I wanted people to understand. The precise nature of subatomic particles is not truly known; although there are many descriptions of them. They are described by analogy as having wave-like" and "particle-like" characteristic, but they are different from waves and from particles. When they are detected as individual things, they show the characteristics of particles, but at other times they show the characteristics of waves. I do not consider electrons to be either waves or particles. How about you?

I agree. It looks like cafolini and Cioran would agree as well.

[cafolini]

If we are going to use fantasy, let's have a genuine purpose. Faraday and Coulomb advise to cut down the vodka. You are not cool when you are loaded. LOL

I'm going to have to hire some more assistants to respond just as fast as you fart.

[YesNo]

I've started reading Roland Omnes, Quantum Philosophy, as a result of this thread. He is not in favor of Many Worlds, and describes it as a metaphysics claiming "reality is not unique" and since it cannot be verified it is outside science entirely. The view he supports is "reality is unique." What one misses in any measurement is the "uniqueness of facts." That means there is no unique state of events.

I don't see how one can come up with a unique state of events even in a Many Worlds environment since these worlds would manifest themselves when decoherence occurs which happens in the measuring device when a measurement is performed which would be needed to get the state information. Also one cannot get all the information from one measurement because of complementarity. So I don't see how a deterministic state can even be constructed in a Many Worlds environment.

Suppose it turned out, because Many Worlds violated a hidden variables constraint, or because a unique state could not be calculated, or for some other reason, that Many Worlds could not introduce determinism back into science, that is it could not deliver on its promise, what value would it have even as a metaphysics?

[cafolini]

To continue with the fantasy for a genuine purpose, received a message from Ohm: just let it be. Do not need alternate current. Vodkadriven CapacitBobo responded: Ladies and Farters, I'm losing charges into an open circuit.

[cacian]

To continue with the fantasy for a genuine purpose, received a message from Ohm: just let it be. Do not need alternate current. Vodkadriven CapacitBobo responded: Ladies and Farters, I'm losing charges into an open circuit.

Sorry? is that a loss of free will speech?!

[YesNo]

I was in a rush yesterday since the library was about to close when the first thing I saw was Omnes work and so I checked it out. So far he seems pretty good. A spur of the moment, let-it-be, decision seemed almost providential. I think I'm finally figuring out what "decoherence" is.

I'll have to thank Ohm.

[Cioran]

Precisely. And analogously to how Henry Ford put it, if you think it's silly, it is, and if you think it is not silly, it is not. Looks like we are also bird watching without Audobon. LOL

Except, as usual, you, and now Calidore, are not understanding it correctly. Derp! Read what PeterL wrote!

[Cioran]

There is no wave behavior displayed by the electron. LOL

LOL, indeed. Did you google up the "blackbody problem" and "ultraviolet catastrophe" as I recommended? No, of course you didn't!

Long story short: if the electron did not behave as a standing wave, the universe would fail to exist. Derp!

[cafolini]

There is no loss of free will provided we choose from the determined possibilities given by God, which also include the free will to fart.

Quanta has nothing to do with electron behaviour. It has to do with particles as they travel in space. Sine waves are the mathematical notations to describe the packets, the quanta. The quanta is the reality of QM, not the notation. The notation, posing as QM is the great, nebulous fart of the prominent blind.

It looks like the deluge of nebula about the subject is due anytime, as the farters do their useless research of a few new words. This gives time to hire my assitants before the farts start hitting the fun. LOL

[cafolini]

LOL, indeed. Did you google up the "blackbody problem" and "ultraviolet catastrophe" as I recommended? No, of course you didn't!

Long story short: if the electron did not behave as a standing wave, the universe would fail to exist. Derp!

The universe failed to occur a long time ago. But it will never fail to be or exist, because the Verse of the UNI is a prominent blind fart.