Jack of Hearts
08-01-2012, 05:18 AM
This poster is going to present Kant’s argument for the claim that judgments that bring objects under the categories apply to those objects. First we will discuss the elements of a synthetic comparason and how it might be possible. To be considered is the interplay of the unity of apperceptions and how judgments are concerned with it. Secondly we will reiterate the nature of objects in presentation and how they are synthesized into experience by the judgments that bring them under the pure concepts of the understanding (categories). This poster will provide Kant’s explanation for why this is so, and conclude with the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments.
Analytic concepts are self-contained and need not go beyond themselves for definition. So long as they abide by the laws of identity and noncontradiction, analytic judgments are affirmative.For synthetic judgments, Kant writes that if a synthetic comparason is going to be made between two concepts then “something third is needed wherein alone the synthesis of two concepts could arise (A155/B194).” Because the unity of apperception is the sum total of all our presentations (Critique, pg 225) he writes that whatever it is that makes judgments possible is buried somewhere in it. The unity of appeception is a persistent sense of self that allows synthesized presentations, via judgments, into consciousness . But what are the nature of these judgments, and how are they necessary derived from apperception?
Kant writes that in order to have objects and information about objects in any meaningful way, the objects have to be given in a certain way (A156/B195). His definition of ‘being given’ is as follows: “To be given an object is nothing other than to refer the presentation of the object to experience (Critique, pg 226).” The question becomes what is it that synthesizes the appearances of objects into experience. Kant’s answer is the pure concepts of the understanding : “Hence the pure concepts of the understanding are those under which all perceptions must first be subsumed before they can serve as judgments of experience (Prolegomena, pg 44)...” He concludes by saying that the judgments that bring experience under the pure concepts of the understanding are the most important principles and that they are derived from no higher principle (Prolegomena 306).
The nature of these judgments is this: they are the principles of the form of the unity of apperception (A156/B195, A157/B156). Without them, Kant writes that “... experience would not even be cognition, but would be a rhapsody of perceptions. Such a rhapsody... would not fit together to agree with the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception.” The unity of apperception is transcendental, and therefore Kant has derived and concluded that there is a priori form at the genesis of all experience.
This arrives at Kant’s supreme principle of all synthetic judgments: “Every object is subject to the conditions necessary for synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience (A158/B197).” This follows by virtue of the fact that a priori forms preceed experience due to the immediacy and immutability of the unity of apperception. Were this not the case, and if the a priori forms did not make experience possible, Kant writes that there would be “no object in which the syntyhetic unity can establish the objective reality of their concepts (Critique, pg 227).”
Analytic concepts are self-contained and need not go beyond themselves for definition. So long as they abide by the laws of identity and noncontradiction, analytic judgments are affirmative.For synthetic judgments, Kant writes that if a synthetic comparason is going to be made between two concepts then “something third is needed wherein alone the synthesis of two concepts could arise (A155/B194).” Because the unity of apperception is the sum total of all our presentations (Critique, pg 225) he writes that whatever it is that makes judgments possible is buried somewhere in it. The unity of appeception is a persistent sense of self that allows synthesized presentations, via judgments, into consciousness . But what are the nature of these judgments, and how are they necessary derived from apperception?
Kant writes that in order to have objects and information about objects in any meaningful way, the objects have to be given in a certain way (A156/B195). His definition of ‘being given’ is as follows: “To be given an object is nothing other than to refer the presentation of the object to experience (Critique, pg 226).” The question becomes what is it that synthesizes the appearances of objects into experience. Kant’s answer is the pure concepts of the understanding : “Hence the pure concepts of the understanding are those under which all perceptions must first be subsumed before they can serve as judgments of experience (Prolegomena, pg 44)...” He concludes by saying that the judgments that bring experience under the pure concepts of the understanding are the most important principles and that they are derived from no higher principle (Prolegomena 306).
The nature of these judgments is this: they are the principles of the form of the unity of apperception (A156/B195, A157/B156). Without them, Kant writes that “... experience would not even be cognition, but would be a rhapsody of perceptions. Such a rhapsody... would not fit together to agree with the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception.” The unity of apperception is transcendental, and therefore Kant has derived and concluded that there is a priori form at the genesis of all experience.
This arrives at Kant’s supreme principle of all synthetic judgments: “Every object is subject to the conditions necessary for synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience (A158/B197).” This follows by virtue of the fact that a priori forms preceed experience due to the immediacy and immutability of the unity of apperception. Were this not the case, and if the a priori forms did not make experience possible, Kant writes that there would be “no object in which the syntyhetic unity can establish the objective reality of their concepts (Critique, pg 227).”