Thomas Aquinas Proof for God

[irishpixieb]

Now, I've been looking through the forum and been thinking that'll I start a thread on WHY God exists. But, what fun would that be? So, I've put a link to Thomas Aquinas' 5 Proofs for God and I just wanted to hear the arguments against it from those who don't believe in "The Prime Mover"! :smile5:

[YesNo]

So what are the 5 proofs? I haven't read anything by Aquinas.

[Charles Darnay]

http://jcu.edu/philosophy/Gensler/RE/r-b2--00.htm

This puts it very simply.


I could argue against them - but I have surpassed my willingness to discuss religion on this forum for the next little while.

That being said, Summa Theologica is a great text - regardless of religious belief (unless the thought of God drives you into an instant rage).

[JuniperWoolf]

Points one and two: why is it assumed that the "mover" or "cause" has to have a conciousness?

Likewise, in point four, it states that some "things" are greater than others, which is certainly true, but why is the greatest "thing" assumed to have a conciousness?

[Charles Darnay]

That would be the main argument, yes. But here's the thing about Aquinas - my experience with him at least.

Most people who are introduced to Aquinas are introduced to the 5 points (in similar fashion to which I posted them). And if you are not a staunch theist, you will probably have a similar reaction to Juniper.....this was my reaction. I strongly disliked Aquinas until i was forced (sort of...it was for history class) to read the Summa.

The text is full of holes....but Aquinas pretty much admits that in the text. That somehow for me gave it value.

Besides who can argue with the textual 12th century hug of science and religion....despite the holes.

[OrphanPip]

#1 to #3 are taken directly from Aristotle, except Aquinas transcribes in the Christian God for no good reason. Bertrand Russel's response to these arguments is that it commits the fallacy of composition. Russel argued there is no reason to think the universe needed a cause, just because aspects of the universe have a cause.

Junniper is echoing Kant's refutation of the cosmological argument, which was that the argument that the greatest of things is God is flawed because it is just a rearranged ontological argument, and ontological arguments are flawed because they can only operate off of the a priori assumption of God's existence.

[JCamilo]

Basically it works if you have faith, Aquinas merit is the capacity to build logical arguments to justify faith. It is more how he says, that what he says. It is so well constructed that many people still appeal to first cause until today as granted as a good argument, without considering they may be reducing their god to the fart that started all.

[YesNo]

It looks like 1, 2, 3 and 5 are related to the argument that the big bang implies the existence of something like a God.

Even if one does not want a God involved in the creation of the universe 13.73 billion years ago, one needs some other cause or one needs to argue that the big bang did not occur.

Assuming we accept the big bang, a non-God type cause for it would need to have three characteristics. Let's use vacuum fluctuations as an example.

1) The vacuum fluctuations would need some sort of eternal space in which to operate that does not require a cause so there is no infinite regression of causes having all burnt out by now. This seems to be related to Aquinas' first three arguments.

2) Vacuum fluctuations have to be able to create a universe out of nothing. They do seem to be able to create paired particles briefly out of nothing before they annihilate each other, but I don't know how large these particles can be. This would be related to Aquinas' first two arguments.

3) Vacuum fluctuations have to have some controlling mechanism since we do not see randomly created universes all over the place. This would be related to Aquinas' fifth argument. One control mechanism would be some consciousness that made a choice, but that would lead almost directly to a God. I suspect the multiverse is another way of hiding these universes from view while at the same time allowing non-conscious chance to run randomly. The fact that we can't see these other universes becomes a problem with verifying this idea.

[cafolini]

Basically it works if you have faith, Aquinas merit is the capacity to build logical arguments to justify faith. It is more how he says, that what he says. It is so well constructed that many people still appeal to first cause until today as granted as a good argument, without considering they may be reducing their god to the fart that started all.

Big banging at the void.:leaving:

[Darcy88]

YesNo "The fact that we can't see these other universes becomes a problem with verifying this idea."

If the multiverse theory makes sense scientifically, and many cosmologists seem to think it does, then our inability to verify the existence of these other universes ought not push us towards the explanation of it being God's will that began the cosmos. You can't see God either and He makes absolutely no sense scientifically.

[YesNo]

YesNo "The fact that we can't see these other universes becomes a problem with verifying this idea."

If the multiverse theory makes sense scientifically, and many cosmologists seem to think it does, then our inability to verify the existence of these other universes ought not push us towards the explanation of it being God's will that began the cosmos. You can't see God either and He makes absolutely no sense scientifically.
I don't know if any cosmologist considers the multiverse more than speculation. It might be possible to conduct an experiment that gave indirect evidence for or against this, but I have not heard of any.

What makes me think that a choice was made in the creation of the universe is the currently existing evidence from near and shared death experiences. This doesn't directly point to any specific God, but it does suggest more is going on than an atheist would like to admit.

[Darcy88]

I don't know if any cosmologist considers the multiverse more than speculation. It might be possible to conduct an experiment that gave indirect evidence for or against this, but I have not heard of any.

What makes me think that a choice was made in the creation of the universe is the currently existing evidence from near and shared death experiences. This doesn't directly point to any specific God, but it does suggest more is going on than an atheist would like to admit.

And yet those near death experiences have been replicated in the laboratory by stimulating certain regions of the brain. I'll look for a source on that.

[YesNo]

And yet those near death experiences have been replicated in the laboratory by stimulating certain regions of the brain. I'll look for a source on that.
I think they have been linked to a region of the brain associated with REM sleep. Vision and hearing is also linked to the brain through the eyes and ears.

This doesn't discredit them. Actually, it raises them from ideas to experiences. Going further, if some other species has a similar brain structure, they may be expected to experience similar things. Again, that doesn't discredit the experience.

[Darcy88]

I think they have been linked to a region of the brain associated with REM sleep. Vision and hearing is also linked to the brain through the eyes and ears.

This doesn't discredit them. Actually, it raises them from ideas to experiences. Going further, if some other species has a similar brain structure, they may be expected to experience similar things. Again, that doesn't discredit the experience.

I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "discredit," but if those experiences can be demonstrated to have a physical cause then it does disprove the claim that they are evidence of the supernatural.

[YesNo]

I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "discredit," but if those experiences can be demonstrated to have a physical cause then it does disprove the claim that they are evidence of the supernatural.
I don't think these experiences are "supernatural", but that would depend on what one means by "natural". There's more to nature than what popped out of the big bang or that popping would not have occurred.

They are experiences, and not just fanciful ideas, and so they have some cause. Claiming they had no cause would be one way to "discredit" them.

[stuntpickle]

#1 to #3 are taken directly from Aristotle, except Aquinas transcribes in the Christian God for no good reason. Bertrand Russel's response to these arguments is that it commits the fallacy of composition. Russel argued there is no reason to think the universe needed a cause, just because aspects of the universe have a cause.

Junniper is echoing Kant's refutation of the cosmological argument, which was that the argument that the greatest of things is God is flawed because it is just a rearranged ontological argument, and ontological arguments are flawed because they can only operate off of the a priori assumption of God's existence.

Pip, with all due respect, I think you have misunderstood a great deal. I will assume when you generally refer to "refutation(s) of the cosmological argument" you are not specifically referring to the work of Aquinas. For most of Bertrand Russell's life, the steady-sate model of the universe prevailed. With the discovery of background radiation in the 1960s, the Big Bang model ascended. The cosmological argument has reemerged NOT because theologians assume the universe necessarily began to exist, but because science now tells us it did; therefore, Russell's objection is completely irrelevant to our modern discussion.

Very often I think New Atheists misunderstand the cosmological argument. The rigors of logical necessity sometimes render the argument incapable of simply conveying the underlying idea. Aristotle's original idea was, essentially, that, according to his observations, every movement (to Aristotle "movement" was much broader than simply motion; things like evaporation or combustion would have been considered "motion") was preceded in some manner by a mover. He saw only two options: either the succession of compelled motions preceded our current state for ever, which would lead to an infinite regress and, thus, irrationality, or there must have existed, at some point, an "unmoved mover." The argument, even in its most modern iteration, rarely mentions "God." The argument was never meant to demonstrate the identity of any particular entity, but rather to demonstrate the intelligibility of the universe.

But again, the major difference now is that the scientific data suggests the universe did, in fact, begin to exist; thus, there is no way for the assumption to be considered a fallacy in the manner Russell was suggesting in the early 20th Century. Surely, you can understand this.

You must forgive me for doubting your interpretation of Kant. Because first cause/cosmological arguments rarely mention God, and ontological arguments explicitly mention Him always, I find it dubious that Kant would ever suggest interchangeability unless he was referring to the wording of one cosmological argument in particular. Additionally, I find it unlikely that Kant would suggest that the ontological argument for God involved an "a priori assumption of God's existence," which would make it a clear and obvious instance of question begging that would have escaped notice for centuries. I also find it unlikely because the ontological argument assumes not that God exists, but that one can conceive of Him irrespective of His existence. So at best you have excluded the majority of Kant's logical burden or, at worst, grossly misinterpreted him. Because you present Kant's objection to the ontological argument without really demonstrating a grasp of his reasoning, it ends up looking an awful lot like an argument from authority.

And just as a fun question: if we know all of a car's constituent parts began to exist, is it a fallacy of composition to assume that the car, itself, began to exist?

[krymsonkyng]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacy_of_composition

For the car question, no. We know ALL the parts began to exist, therefore the whole began to exist by definition. It doesn't fall under the fallacy.

As for dismissing Russel's argument outright for being scientifically out of date... What were the conventions of Aquinas's time period and how were they more accurate?

Some interesting videos on the topic: http://www.aquinasonline.com/Topics/5ways.html

[stuntpickle]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacy_of_composition

For the car question, no. We know ALL the parts began to exist, therefore the whole began to exist by definition. It doesn't fall under the fallacy.

As for dismissing Russel's argument outright for being scientifically out of date... What were the conventions of Aquinas's time period and how were they more accurate?

Some interesting videos on the topic: http://www.aquinasonline.com/Topics/5ways.html

Krymson,

Your question is an interesting one. And to answer it, I will have to come clean about something. My reply to Russell's argument wasn't the ideal answer, but rather the easiest one. My experience has been that many New Atheists object to, say, the cosmological argument not because they have sincere intellectual issues with it, but because they are predisposed against any notion of God and will draw upon a repertoire of objections that are so entirely unrelated that no coherent train of thought can be gleaned from the assemblage. It seems that sometimes they are simply trying to confound the discussion at any cost. I, for instance, find it unlikely that one could be convinced simultaneously that the cosmological argument commits a question begging fallacy and a compositional fallacy. They seem like two unrelated wrenches thrown without much thought into the gears so as to avoid the conclusion.

First, the statement that the cosmological argument commits a compositional fallacy is obviously false. Consider this modern iteration of the argument:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

The reason the cosmological argument CANNOT be guilty of committing a fallacy of composition is because it isn't arguing on the basis of composition. Now Bertrand Russell was no idiot, so I doubt he was really trying to say that the argument itself was fallacious, but rather was attacking the argument's second premise on the assumption that the justification for this premise committed a fallacy of composition. The important thing to note, however, is that the cosmological argument is not synonymous with logical justifications for its premises. So is the logical justification for the arguments second premise fallacious in the manner Russell claims?

Well, the problem is that there are any number of possible justifications of the second premise. So which one was Russell referring to? I can't be sure, but I suspect his objections had more to do with his scientifically inaccurate perspective than whatever non-scientific perspective Aquinas might have had.

Now, let me just clarify here that I am not certain that Russell believed in the steady-sate model of the universe. I am only certain that it was the prevailing model after the 1920s. It does, however, give us some insight on what he might have been thinking.

First, the notion of an eternal material universe is entirely distinct from a steady-state universe, which is perhaps more clearly understood as a universe of continuous generation seeking an equilibrium in an ongoing cycle of creation and destruction. I am no expert in antiquated theories of the universe, but it is my understanding that there was some difficulty in reconciling eternal matter with relativity; thus, the steady-sate model ascended, and here the matter was finite, but the process of its generation eternal.

It seems to me that Russell was suggesting that the second premise was wrong because it stated that since matter was finite then the static mechanisms of the universe, itself, were also. Now, I'm not sure if this was ever an actual justification of the second premise. But I do find it interesting that the steady-sate model implies a bifurcation between the content of the universe and the surrounding mechanisms--a sort of duality in which the actual content is ephemeral, but the "machine" that makes it eternal. Of course, now we believe that the universe along with its governing properties came to exist together, which makes all this pontification pointless.

So is it a fallacy of composition? I couldn't say unless I knew which justification he was referring to. I can, however, confidently say that the argument itself never makes such an error of thought (unless Russell was referring to a drastically different wording) and, moreover, doesn't even contain the variety of argument that would make such a fallacy possible.

I'm not sure what you're getting at by asking me about the conventions and accuracy 13th Century Cosmology since science didn't exist at that point in history. So Aquinas's notions about the material mechanisms of the universe could never be considered scientifically accurate or scientific at all. I would say that the conventions in the West following Aquinas's writing owed mostly to him, as he accomplished the integration of classical philosophy into Christian theology that has typified Western Civilization. I would, however, consider Aquinas's notion of the creation to be generally reconcilable to current cosmology. In fact, one of the most striking aspects of the Big Bang theory of the universe is how agreeable it is to Judeo-Christian notions of the universe. Consider, for instance, this description by the 13th century rabbinical scholar Nahmanides:

"At the briefest instant following creation all the matter of the universe was concentrated in a very small place, no larger than a grain of mustard. The matter at this time was very thin, so intangible, that it did not have real substance. It did have, however, a potential to gain substance and form and to become tangible matter. From the initial concentration of this intangible substance in its minute location, the substance expanded, expanding the universe as it did so. As the expansion progressed, a change in the substance occurred. This initially thin noncorporeal substance took on the tangible aspects of matter as we know it. From this initial act of creation, from this etherieally thin pseudosubstance, everything that has existed, or will ever exist, was, is, and will be formed."

So is that sort of conception accurate? I can't be certain, but I suspect you could replace modern descriptions of the Big Bang with the above passage and most persons wouldn't even know the difference.

[kla2]

Now, I've been looking through the forum and been thinking that'll I start a thread on WHY God exists. But, what fun would that be? So, I've put a link to Thomas Aquinas' 5 Proofs for God and I just wanted to hear the arguments against it from those who don't believe in "The Prime Mover"! :smile5:

Of course the the very concept of 'proof' whether from Thomas Aquinas or any other theologian, exposes the philosophical roots of theology and thus Christianity itself and the presumption, if not corruption, that natural reason is capable of comprehending the mind of God. A claim under sustained attack by militant atheists. But now that 'attack' is coming from a most unexpected quarter!

As a humanity, we have all been conditioned or indoctrinated, for all of history by 'theological' exegesis, particularly by those with their own 'religious' claims and agendas, to accept that a literal proof of God is not possible for faith. And thus all discussion and apologists 'theodicy' is contained within this self limiting intellectual paradigm and bubble of presumption, especially evident in the frictions between science and religion. It would now appear that all sides squabbling over the God question, religious, atheist and history itself have it wrong! That bubble could now burst at any time!

The first wholly new interpretation for two thousand years of the moral teachings of Christ is published on the web. Radically different from anything else we know of from history, this new teaching is predicated upon a precise and predefined experience, a direct individual intervention into the natural world by omnipotent power to confirm divine will, command and covenant, "correcting human nature by a change in natural law, altering biology, consciousness and human ethical perception beyond all natural evolutionary boundaries." So like it or no, a new religious claim testable by faith, meeting all Enlightenment criteria of evidence based causation now exists. Nothing short of a religious revolution is getting under way. More info at http://www.energon.org.uk

[WyattGwyon]

First, the statement that the cosmological argument commits a compositional fallacy is obviously false. Consider this modern iteration of the argument:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.


Why, might I ask, do you think the big bang theory presupposes a beginning of the universe? It could be cyclical, it could be an eruption from one part of a multiverse into another—pick your favorite among any number of possibilities. Just because our laws of physics cease to hold in the extreme conditions of the first few microseconds doesn't mean they were not in effect before the event you call the bang. Until you establish a reason for believing in an actual beginning, there is no fundamental basis for any of the arguments you offer.

[stuntpickle]

Why, might I ask, do you think the big bang theory presupposes a beginning of the universe? It could be cyclical, it could be an eruption from one part of a multiverse into another—pick your favorite among any number of possibilities. Just because our laws of physics cease to hold in the extreme conditions of the first few microseconds doesn't mean they were not in effect before the event you call the bang. Until you establish a reason for believing in an actual beginning, there is no fundamental basis for any of the arguments you offer.

Everything you say here has nothing at all to do with whether the cosmological argument contains a fallacy of composition, which was the subject of the post. So perhaps you could try again. Moreover, the Big Bang doesn't propose the accumulation of matter in one central point for an arbitrary purpose, but rather the beginning of time and space, themselves. Since the theory posits the beginning of time, talking about the first few micro-seconds before doesn't make sense. And any atheist suggesting a multiverse in favor of a prime mover, is actually advocating the grandest multiplication of needless entities every proposed anywhere. SO as a card carrying New Atheist, I will suppose you brought your Occam's razor with you.

[Hallword]

Very often I think New Atheists misunderstand the cosmological argument. The rigors of logical necessity sometimes render the argument incapable of simply conveying the underlying idea. Aristotle's original idea was, essentially, that, according to his observations, every movement (to Aristotle "movement" was much broader than simply motion; things like evaporation or combustion would have been considered "motion") was preceded in some manner by a mover. He saw only two options: either the succession of compelled motions preceded our current state for ever, which would lead to an infinite regress and, thus, irrationality, or there must have existed, at some point, an "unmoved mover." The argument, even in its most modern iteration, rarely mentions "God." The argument was never meant to demonstrate the identity of any particular entity, but rather to demonstrate the intelligibility of the universe.

But again, the major difference now is that the scientific data suggests the universe did, in fact, begin to exist; thus, there is no way for the assumption to be considered a fallacy in the manner Russell was suggesting in the early 20th Century. Surely, you can understand this.

You must forgive me for doubting your interpretation of Kant. Because first cause/cosmological arguments rarely mention God, and ontological arguments explicitly mention Him always, I find it dubious that Kant would ever suggest interchangeability unless he was referring to the wording of one cosmological argument in particular. Additionally, I find it unlikely that Kant would suggest that the ontological argument for God involved an "a priori assumption of God's existence," which would make it a clear and obvious instance of question begging that would have escaped notice for centuries. I also find it unlikely because the ontological argument assumes not that God exists, but that one can conceive of Him irrespective of His existence. So at best you have excluded the majority of Kant's logical burden or, at worst, grossly misinterpreted him. Because you present Kant's objection to the ontological argument without really demonstrating a grasp of his reasoning, it ends up looking an awful lot like an argument from authority.

And just as a fun question: if we know all of a car's constituent parts began to exist, is it a fallacy of composition to assume that the car, itself, began to exist?

Hi. I'm just curious as to how you'd respond to developments in quantum physics, M-Theory vis-a-vis the Cosmological Argument.

The problem with this argument is that it assumes that general relativity can account for the singularity. That it is to say that general relativity holds at the sub-atomic level - which it 100% doesn't (indeed, we have recently discovered particles that travel faster than light!).

And this is avoiding the fascinating realm of string-theory which, briefly put, explains that the universe big bang is not unique, has no singularity or beginning of time.

[stuntpickle]

Hi. I'm just curious as to how you'd respond to developments in quantum physics, M-Theory vis-a-vis the Cosmological Argument.

The problem with this argument is that it assumes that general relativity can account for the singularity. That it is to say that general relativity holds at the sub-atomic level - which it 100% doesn't (indeed, we have recently discovered particles that travel faster than light!).

And this is avoiding the fascinating realm of string-theory which, briefly put, explains that the universe big bang is not unique, has no singularity or beginning of time.

The cosmological argument for God makes no such assumption about relativity or the singularity, which is fairly easy to discern since it doesn't mention anything remotely close and was first developed thousands of years prior to knowledge of such things; thus, it would be hard to assume them. So rather than phrasing your assertion as a straw man, why don't you just try to assemble your point into a coherent series of statements.

As far as string theory goes, it looks a lot like metaphysics in positing "uni-dimensional" strings. In fact, a number of scientists criticize it as being simply metaphysics and not actual science. Because the theory, itself, posits structural impediments to ever testing it, the theory will most likely remain some quaint variety of math. Of course, it could be true, but as an explanation, an infinity of universes is the grandest multiplication of entities ever proposed anywhere in science. As an ultimate explanation, it seems less likely than a theistic mover simply because it requires such a gratuitous framework and proposes actual physical infinities, which have been throughout history considered scientifically unviable.

[WyattGwyon]

Everything you say here has nothing at all to do with whether the cosmological argument contains a fallacy of composition, which was the subject of the post. So perhaps you could try again. Moreover, the Big Bang doesn't propose the accumulation of matter in one central point for an arbitrary purpose, but rather the beginning of time and space, themselves. Since the theory posits the beginning of time, talking about the first few micro-seconds before doesn't make sense. And any atheist suggesting a multiverse in favor of a prime mover, is actually advocating the grandest multiplication of needless entities every proposed anywhere. SO as a card carrying New Atheist, I will suppose you brought your Occam's razor with you.

Everything I wrote bears directly on the issue of "whether the cosmological argument contains a fallacy of composition," since your rebuttal of the fallacy relied on (1) the universe having a beginning and (2) your claim that modern cosmology confirms such a beginning. These claims are not supported, so your rebuttal is undercut (see below).


But again, the major difference now is that the scientific data suggests the universe did, in fact, begin to exist; thus, there is no way for the assumption to be considered a fallacy in the manner Russell was suggesting in the early 20th Century. Surely, you can understand this.

If indeed space and time emerged from a singularity, knowing the history and nature of this singularity would be essential to any claim for evidence of a beginning. Absent evidence this singularity emerged ex nihilo, there is simply no rationale for claiming a beginning for the universe. I have not heard of any such evidence.

[stuntpickle]

Everything I wrote bears directly on the issue of "whether the cosmological argument contains a fallacy of composition," since your rebuttal of the fallacy relied on (1) the universe having a beginning and (2) your claim that modern cosmology confirms such a beginning. These claims are not supported, so your rebuttal is undercut (see below).

You need to read my other post. I also explained how the cosmological argument CANNOT commit a fallacy of composition because it does not make an argument of composition. Perhaps Russell thought that the second premise assumed some compositional fallacy, but we know that the second argument assumes that an infinite regress is irrational, so even if you don't agree with that, it doesn't make a compositional argument. The cosmological argument cannot make a fallacy of composition without first making an argument from composition which it does not do.

The Big Bang theory overthrew the steady-state model which proposed that matter was ephemeral and the mechanisms for its creation eternal. The Big Bang theory is different in that it proposes a beginning for the mechanisms. When atheists state otherwise they are being intellectually dishonest.


If indeed space and time emerged from a singularity, knowing the history and nature of this singularity would be essential to any claim for evidence of a beginning. Absent evidence this singularity emerged ex nihilo, there is simply no rationale for claiming a beginning for the universe. I have not heard of any such evidence.

It never ceases to amaze me how desperate atheists are to obscure the facts. The singularity is by definition a ZERO VOLUME entity. The singularity results in an infinite curvature to space and an infinite density of matter, which are not descriptions of objects but an expression of how our mechanisms of understanding vanish. We can't describe the singularity in terms of space because space is no longer an extant mechanism. By definition, the singularity is spaceless. If space does not exist at the point of the singularity, then space must have begun to exist. We have plenty of evidence, but what you fail to understand is that the singularity is what the evidence suggests. This is how an expansionary universe in combination with relativity must have emerged.

You seem to misunderstand what a singularity is. The singularity describes precisely what everyone means by "ex nihilo." We're not trying to argue about the existence of the singularity, but the existence of the universe. The "singularity" is not synonymous with the universe.

There are other minor controversial models being proposed, but they do NOT include the singularity. Once you grant the singularity, you grant the genesis of space and time by DEFINITION. Stephen Hawking has been desperately trying to demonstrate how no cause is required for the universe by trying to show that a singularity is unnecessary. Even Stephen Hawking has stated that the model with the singularity requires a cause outside time and space. Read it and weep:

Penrose and Hawking; The Singularities of Gravitational Collapse and Cosmology, Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. A. 314, 529-543 (1970): “If the universe contains mass and if general relativity reliably describes cosmic dynamics, then space and time must be created by a Causal Agent transcending space and time”.

Of course, Hawking has his own model that has no singularity. If you grant the singularity, you concede the argument. If you agree that time and space were caused by a "Causal Agent transcending space and time," you agree with the Kalam Cosmological argument.

[OrphanPip]

We're talking about Aquinas' cosmological argument, which does state that God was the prime mover, I don't really have issue with whether or not the cosmological argument is sound otherwise. It is sound as long as the premises are sound, which they may or may not be. We don't really know if everything must have a cause, we don't know what causes quantum fluctuations after all.

Russel's argument has nothing to do with whether or not the universe had a beginning. His argument is that even if the universe had a beginning, it does not follow that because everything in the universe must have a cause that the universe itself must have a cause. We have no reliable way to know that the universe had a cause because everything we know of existence has been within the universe. This argument goes all the way back to Hume, who said that the premise of causality is based on inductive reasoning, so that it is impossible to know if it extends beyond the known world.

Kant argument in more detail is that something to have qualities it must exist. This lead Kant to conclude that in the ontological argument, the term "God exists" is not a real predicate. Since the ontological argument argues from certain qualities a God must have, it automatically assumes the existence of God in proposing that a God must have those qualities. This renders the argument tautological. Kant believed the cosmological argument of Aquinas relied on the ontological argument to formulate it's premises about the necessary conditions of God to be that prime mover. Of course, Kant's position was that the question of God's existence was unanswerable, either for or against.

[cacian]

Ok well why does the word GOD exist?
If a word exist then it has tobe justified in the dictionary.
a word is an entity and means something.
If God did not exist why does the word exist?
Or vice versa
if the word did not exist then there is nothing to talk about.

[krymsonkyng]

First, the statement that the cosmological argument commits a compositional fallacy is obviously false. Consider this modern iteration of the argument:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.



Would it be possible to call it a fallacy of composition if the first premise was not entirely correct? The first premise seems to be a generalization based on something that isn't as readily apparent as people think. What if there was something which came to exist without a cause (the theorized prime mover, for example)? If not all things within the set came to exist with a cause, then a fallacy of composition may occur.

As for my question regarding the accuracy of 13th century cosmology, it was to make the point that an argument should not be outright dismissed based on a sweeping "inaccurate information" statement. To dismiss Russel's argument outright for being out of date would mean another person could dismiss Aquinas's argument for being even further back in history in the same manner: Which is wrong on both accounts.

[WyattGwyon]

You need to read my other post. I also explained how the cosmological argument CANNOT commit a fallacy of composition because it does not make an argument of composition. Perhaps Russell thought that the second premise assumed some compositional fallacy, but we know that the second argument assumes that an infinite regress is irrational, so even if you don't agree with that, it doesn't make a compositional argument. The cosmological argument cannot make a fallacy of composition without first making an argument from composition which it does not do.

The Big Bang theory overthrew the steady-state model which proposed that matter was ephemeral and the mechanisms for its creation eternal. The Big Bang theory is different in that it proposes a beginning for the mechanisms. When atheists state otherwise they are being intellectually dishonest.



It never ceases to amaze me how desperate atheists are to obscure the facts. The singularity is by definition a ZERO VOLUME entity. The singularity results in an infinite curvature to space and an infinite density of matter, which are not descriptions of objects but an expression of how our mechanisms of understanding vanish. We can't describe the singularity in terms of space because space is no longer an extant mechanism. By definition, the singularity is spaceless. If space does not exist at the point of the singularity, then space must have begun to exist. We have plenty of evidence, but what you fail to understand is that the singularity is what the evidence suggests. This is how an expansionary universe in combination with relativity must have emerged.

You seem to misunderstand what a singularity is. The singularity describes precisely what everyone means by "ex nihilo." We're not trying to argue about the existence of the singularity, but the existence of the universe. The "singularity" is not synonymous with the universe.

There are other minor controversial models being proposed, but they do NOT include the singularity. Once you grant the singularity, you grant the genesis of space and time by DEFINITION. Stephen Hawking has been desperately trying to demonstrate how no cause is required for the universe by trying to show that a singularity is unnecessary. Even Stephen Hawking has stated that the model with the singularity requires a cause outside time and space. Read it and weep:

Penrose and Hawking; The Singularities of Gravitational Collapse and Cosmology, Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. A. 314, 529-543 (1970): “If the universe contains mass and if general relativity reliably describes cosmic dynamics, then space and time must be created by a Causal Agent transcending space and time”.

Of course, Hawking has his own model that has no singularity. If you grant the singularity, you concede the argument. If you agree that time and space were caused by a "Causal Agent transcending space and time," you agree with the Kalam Cosmological argument.

If I provisionally accept all of the physics and cosmology here—the one physicist/cosmologist among my friends is in Antarctica working on a telescope sensitive to variations in the universe's background radiation, so it is inconvenient to fact check—what you write obviates the need for a supreme being. Clearly, in this singularity you will have found the first cause and prime mover required by the argument without postulating a god. So, why is it you think this supports the argument for a deity?

[stuntpickle]

We're talking about Aquinas' cosmological argument, which does state that God was the prime mover, I don't really have issue with whether or not the cosmological argument is sound otherwise. It is sound as long as the premises are sound, which they may or may not be. We don't really know if everything must have a cause, we don't know what causes quantum fluctuations after all.

First of all, Aquinas does not state "the prime mover was God." Consider the following:

"Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God."

Saint Aquinas Thomas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) / From the Complete American Edition (Kindle Locations 395-396).

"Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God."

Saint Aquinas Thomas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) / From the Complete American Edition (Kindle Location 403).

"This all men speak of as God."

Saint Aquinas Thomas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) / From the Complete American Edition (Kindle Locations 412-413).

I think Aquinas is justified in assuming that everyone calls this prime mover God. You, like a lot of atheists, seem to pretend that the idea of a creator beyond the creation is some Johnny-come-lately justification of fundamentalists, when, in fact, it is one of the foundational ideas of Western culture. You do understand that there are secular scholars of the Bible, right? It is not controversial to say that practically all of Biblical scholars agree that the major contribution of the Hebrews, whose only historical accomplishment was to be conquered by Rome, was the idea of a creator who, unlike various genii inherent in natural phenomena, rivers gods, spirits of the forest, etc, was distinct from the creation. This is a fairly powerful idea--even if it is untrue. The reconciliation of Yaweh with Aristotle's prime mover is not difficult, but fairly easy since they are fundamentally the same idea. Of course, no cosmological argument ends with Yahweh because none aspires to identify the deity; however, this is what everyone generally assumes because that's essentially the definition of God--especially in the time of Aquinas.


Russel's argument has nothing to do with whether or not the universe had a beginning. His argument is that even if the universe had a beginning, it does not follow that because everything in the universe must have a cause that the universe itself must have a cause. We have no reliable way to know that the universe had a cause because everything we know of existence has been within the universe. This argument goes all the way back to Hume, who said that the premise of causality is based on inductive reasoning, so that it is impossible to know if it extends beyond the known world.

You know, Pip, you seem like a fairly intelligent person (I use the world “fairly” not as an attempt to boorishly moderate my statement, but because our interactions limit my assessment), but I think you’re relinquishing much of that intelligence in this discussion because you have an a priori presupposition that no God is possible; thus, you seem blind to some obvious problems with what you’re saying.

There isn’t ONE cosmological argument, nor is there even ONE VARIETY. There are several different varieties—arguments from cause, essence, becoming, and contingency—which exist in nearly innumerable historical iterations. The idea that Bertrand Russell accused every single argument ever having existed or to possibly yet exist of containing the same fallacy is absurd and untrue. When I present you the Kalam cosmological argument and you offer Russell’s assertion of a fallacy, you don’t seem aware that Russell’s criticisms aren’t applicable, and because the Kalam is about as simple an argument as one can make, I’m led to believe you either have a fundamental misunderstanding of deduction or that you are so opposed to the even the idea that you must unreasonably resist.

First, you can’t claim, as you do, to have no problems with the premises but then take issue with the conclusion. The Kalam is the strongest variety of argument one can make, which is to say that it is FORCING: if the premises are true, so is the conclusion. One of the main criticisms of the New Atheists is how ridiculous it has been to witness them constantly assuming any number of worldviews to deny the conclusions.

Let’s get down to the problem. I have spent some time actually investigating what Russell said, and the actual problems are quite different than how you represent them. In relying on Russell, one of the architects of logical positivism, you again demonstrate your reliance on a thoroughly refuted worldview.

I think the issues Russell had are exemplified in his debate with Fredrick Copleston in 1948. You can find a transcript of the debate at the following link http://www.philvaz.com/apologetics/p20.htm.

The first thing you’ll realize is that the only cosmological argument being presented is one from contingency. I have rendered Copleston’s argument in standard form here. I have been especially faithful to what was actually said.

1. There are some beings in the world that do not contain in themselves the reason for their existence.
2. The world is the real or imagined totality or aggregate of individual objects, none of which contain in themselves alone the reason of their existence. There isn’t any world distinct from the objects that form it.
3. Objects or events exist.
4. No object of experience contains within itself the reason of its existence.
--------------------------
 Therefore, the totality of objects must have an external reason that must be an existent being.

You see, Russell claims this contains a fallacy of composition, and I see what he’s talking about because the argument explicitly contains compositional elements in the second premise.

I think you might misunderstand what a fallacy is. A fallacy concerns a formal arrangement of assertions. The reason Russell can make the accusation here is because the argument explicitly contains statements of composition. To try and apply Russell’s criticism to the Kalam cosmological argument is to take issue with the second premise: “The universe began to exist.” Moreover, it is to make an argument that the universe does not exist at all as a thing. See, the Kalam does not make the compositional statements Copleston does, but rather metaphysical judgments about “things”. The only way to apply Russell’s statement is to suggest that the only way the arrive at an idea of the universe is to commit a compositional fallacy, and if you make that assertion, you also indict current cosmology, which, itself, makes the same assumption. You see, as we will see later, Russell would argue that the statement “the universe exists” isn’t rational.

Russell counters with the following:

“Every man who exists has a mother, and it seems to me your argument is that therefore the human race must have a mother, but obviously the human race hasn't a mother”

This is a telling example. I’ve read elsewhere an example of this that suggests that five immigrants arriving in the US all do so for individual reasons and that it is wrong to ascribe one unified reason to all the immigrants. Of course, everyone now assumes a unified universe.

You see, Russell’s comments make sense in the proper context. To suggest that Russell, who was a serious logician, would make the same comments about the Kalam cosmological argument, which is entirely different in what it says, is to make Russell look like an amateur logician in junior high school.

I think we have in this same debate a clue as to how Russell would have responded to the Kalam cosmological argument. Consider the following statements made by Russell:

“The word "necessary" I should maintain, can only be applied significantly to propositions. And, in fact, only to such as are analytic -- that is to say -- such as it is self-contradictory to deny. I could only admit a Necessary Being if there were a being whose existence it is self-contradictory to deny.”

And:

“ But, to my mind, a ‘necessary proposition’ has got to be analytic. I don't see what else it can mean. And analytic propositions are always complex and logically somewhat late. ‘Irrational animals are animals’ is an analytic proposition; but a proposition such as ‘This is an animal’ can never be analytic.”

You see, Russell reveals his true nature as an architect of logical positivism. The only statements he’s willing to admit are analytic. He would completely reject synthetic statements such as “science is beneficial” or “one should not murder homosexuals.”

The funny thing is that history has vindicated Copleston, not Russell. Current philosophy completely rejects Russell’s insistence on analytic statements. The obvious problem is that one can’t arrive at an insistence on analytic statements using analytic statements. The only types of statements that Russell is willing to admit are statements which are true by definition such as “a bachelor is not married.” Russell would never accept the truth of “Bob is a bachelor” unless it could be empirically justified, but the problem is that he wouldn’t accept “Empiricism is justifiable”. His position refutes itself.

You’ve got the same problem with Hume. Yes, Hume indicts induction, but Hume uses induction liberally. His assertion that all knowledge is extrapolated from sensory experience is, itself, an inductive inference. The entire basis of Hume’s worldview is based on inductive inference. And I know that you don’t believe Hume because you’re a scientist, or claim to be. If you really believed Hume, you would abandon science as a completely useless endeavor, as experimentation is, itself, an inductive endeavor. The best radical skepticism has come up with is Popper’s assertion that science does not attempt truth but a constantly revising description, which none can justify. If you really want to debar induction, then you assert that every field of human inquiry has no capacity for truth.

Neither Hume nor Russell has been regarded as useful for nearly a century. They are only useful pedagogically in the same historical sense of Descartes. Opposing a currently viable syllogism based on Russell’s requirements for analytic logic would not be much better than opposing it based on Aristotle’s elementalism.

Whatever the case, it’s safe to assume that Russell would never have accused the current cosmological arguments of compositional fallacies because they don’t make compositional arguments. The current arguments make metaphysical statements that Russell never would have allowed, but then again no one takes his objections seriously today.

If I find the time, I will address your equally odd comments about Kant later.

[stuntpickle]

If I provisionally accept all of the physics and cosmology here—the one physicist/cosmologist among my friends is in Antarctica working on a telescope sensitive to variations in the universe's background radiation, so it is inconvenient to fact check—what you write obviates the need for a supreme being. Clearly, in this singularity you will have found the first cause and prime mover required by the argument without postulating a god. So, why is it you think this supports the argument for a deity?

I take it you don't understand what an "agent" means. We're talking about something with AGENCY. The problem with a cause having no agency is thus: a timeless cause is a permanent cause, and if the universe is the consequence of a permanent entity without agency, then the universe would, itself, be permanent as it would result coincidentally with the existence of its permanent cause; thus, the universe would be eternal. The only way for a permanent entity to cause a finite effect would be to choose to cause it. The Kalam cosmological argument results in a timeless, spaceless, PERSONAL cause. And if you claim that it does not name a deity, then I applaud you for being able to understand the argument. However, if you agree that there is a timeless, spaceless, personal cause of the universe, then you don't sound like an atheist. If you claim to agree with the Kalam and insist on atheism, then I suggest that there has never been a more ridiculous atheism in the history of the world.

[YesNo]

We don't really know if everything must have a cause, we don't know what causes quantum fluctuations after all.

I'm not trying to argue here as to understand.

I think Aquinas claimed in the First Cause argument that "some" things have a cause. I assume the only thing that doesn't have a cause is God from Aquinas' perspective, but I don't know.

However, vacuum fluctuations do not seem to have a cause. They would be spontaneous. The same would go for radioactive decay. One might then use a probabilistic model to describe these events. However, even if one uses a probabilistic model that does not mean that chance is the cause of these events. It only means we don't know what causes them.

So when a scientist says the universe or radioactive decay occurs by chance it only means that the scientist has reached a limit in his or her ability to explain what happened.

[stuntpickle]

I'm not trying to argue here as to understand.

I think Aquinas claimed in the First Cause argument that "some" things have a cause. I assume the only thing that doesn't have a cause is God from Aquinas' perspective, but I don't know.

However, vacuum fluctuations do not seem to have a cause. They would be spontaneous. The same would go for radioactive decay. One might then use a probabilistic model to describe these events. However, even if one uses a probabilistic model that does not mean that chance is the cause of these events. It only means we don't know what causes them.

So when a scientist says the universe or radioactive decay occurs by chance it only means that the scientist has reached a limit in his or her ability to explain what happened.

The claim that we know vacuum fluctuations do not have a cause is simply untrue. There are a number of conflicting theories concerning this and no real consensus. The truth is we don't know what causes them or if they have causes. Not knowing something is hardly the same thing as knowing something to the contrary of a proposition. Try deriving the conclusion "Therefore some things have no cause" from the premise "we don't know what causes vacuum fluctuations." This is an example of how impoverished the atheist position is: they have to distort the truth in a desperate attempt to deny the conclusion of the Kalam.

[OrphanPip]

First of all, Aquinas does not state "the prime mover was God." Consider the following:

"Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God."

Saint Aquinas Thomas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) / From the Complete American Edition (Kindle Locations 395-396).

"Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God."

Saint Aquinas Thomas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) / From the Complete American Edition (Kindle Location 403).

"This all men speak of as God."

Saint Aquinas Thomas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) / From the Complete American Edition (Kindle Locations 412-413).

I think Aquinas is justified in assuming that everyone calls this prime mover God. You, like a lot of atheists, seem to pretend that the idea of a creator beyond the creation is some Johnny-come-lately justification of fundamentalists, when, in fact, it is one of the foundational ideas of Western culture. You do understand that there are secular scholars of the Bible, right? It is not controversial to say that practically all of Biblical scholars agree that the major contribution of the Hebrews, whose only historical accomplishment was to be conquered by Rome, was the idea of a creator who, unlike various genii inherent in natural phenomena, rivers gods, spirits of the forest, etc, was distinct from the creation. This is a fairly powerful idea--even if it is untrue. The reconciliation of Yaweh with Aristotle's prime mover is not difficult, but fairly easy since they are fundamentally the same idea. Of course, no cosmological argument ends with Yahweh because none aspires to identify the deity; however, this is what everyone generally assumes because that's essentially the definition of God--especially in the time of Aquinas.

That all doesn't matter though, I never said anything of the like. I just said that Aquinas' assumption that the first cause must be a deity, imbued with conscience, omniscience, benevolence, and revealed to Abraham and subsequent prophets, is based on nothing. The ease of reconciliation with the notion of an ever existing being outside of causation doesn't demonstrate anything. Clearly he is not justified in assuming that, since not everyone has, Kant disagreed for example.



There isn’t ONE cosmological argument, nor is there even ONE VARIETY. There are several different varieties—arguments from cause, essence, becoming, and contingency—which exist in nearly innumerable historical iterations. The idea that Bertrand Russell accused every single argument ever having existed or to possibly yet exist of containing the same fallacy is absurd and untrue. When I present you the Kalam cosmological argument and you offer Russell’s assertion of a fallacy, you don’t seem aware that Russell’s criticisms aren’t applicable, and because the Kalam is about as simple an argument as one can make, I’m led to believe you either have a fundamental misunderstanding of deduction or that you are so opposed to the even the idea that you must unreasonably resist.

He didn't, he accused the arguments from contingency, like Aquinas', of it. I presented Russell as a response to Aquinas, not as a response to the Kalam argument. I don't even necessarily agree with Russell.



First, you can’t claim, as you do, to have no problems with the premises but then take issue with the conclusion. The Kalam is the strongest variety of argument one can make, which is to say that it is FORCING: if the premises are true, so is the conclusion. One of the main criticisms of the New Atheists is how ridiculous it has been to witness them constantly assuming any number of worldviews to deny the conclusions.

Read what I said carefully, I said the premises may or may not be sound. My objection to the conclusion was then based off of the possibility of the premises being unsound. Also, the Kalam argument is substantially different from Aquinas', which brings it the notion of the Judeo-Christian God. In general, I don't think the premises are necessarily sound, because it has been demonstrated that quantum fluctuations may have caused the Big Bang, which means that at least some things that exist existed prior to the singularity. This leads to two possibilities, either the QF are not causal, but they may still be, or if they are causal then it does not follow that causal chains do not extend beyond the singularity, thus it may be possible that some sort of universe existed prior to the singularity.



I think you might misunderstand what a fallacy is. A fallacy concerns a formal arrangement of assertions. The reason Russell can make the accusation here is because the argument explicitly contains statements of composition. To try and apply Russell’s criticism to the Kalam cosmological argument is to take issue with the second premise: “The universe began to exist.” Moreover, it is to make an argument that the universe does not exist at all as a thing. See, the Kalam does not make the compositional statements Copleston does, but rather metaphysical judgments about “things”. The only way to apply Russell’s statement is to suggest that the only way the arrive at an idea of the universe is to commit a compositional fallacy, and if you make that assertion, you also indict current cosmology, which, itself, makes the same assumption. You see, as we will see later, Russell would argue that the statement “the universe exists” isn’t rational.

No, the fallacy of composition is an informal fallacy, dealing not with the formal structure of the syllogism but with deduction. I didn't apply it to the Kalam argument, since I assumed we were discussing Aquinas' use of the cosmological argument to prove the existence of God. That's why I brought up Kant, Kant did not have a problem with the cosmological argument either, only the theistic conclusion of certain forms of it.



You’ve got the same problem with Hume. Yes, Hume indicts induction, but Hume uses induction liberally. His assertion that all knowledge is extrapolated from sensory experience is, itself, an inductive inference. The entire basis of Hume’s worldview is based on inductive inference. And I know that you don’t believe Hume because you’re a scientist, or claim to be. If you really believed Hume, you would abandon science as a completely useless endeavor, as experimentation is, itself, an inductive endeavor. The best radical skepticism has come up with is Popper’s assertion that science does not attempt truth but a constantly revising description, which none can justify. If you really want to debar induction, then you assert that every field of human inquiry has no capacity for truth.

I'm only a scientist in the sense that I'm a microbiologist, my own beliefs are only in the pragmatic usefulness of the scientific method's ability to refine and reach increasingly useful conclusions about certain subjects. However, even if we do not take Hume to the extreme, his criticism can be nuanced to cover the fact that we really do not know if the rules of empiricism extend to the beginning of the universe. Quantum mechanics holds that space, time, and matter are interdependent and cannot exist without the other, so what would the physics of a point without space, time and matter really be like? We do not need to reject the value of induction to understand that there are problems with extending induction about our universe as it is now to the time of its formation.



If I find the time, I will address your equally odd comments about Kant later.

I don't know what there is odd about it.

1 - Kant rejects the ontological arguments for God. On the basis that he thinks "God exists" is not a real predicate.
2 - Kant thinks that cosmological arguments for God assume a definition of God based on the ontological argument.
3. - Thus, Kant rejects Aquinas' and others cosmological arguments for the existence of God.

Despite Kant himself being a theist.

[stuntpickle]

He didn't, he accused the arguments from contingency, like Aquinas', of it. I presented Russell as a response to Aquinas, not as a response to the Kalam argument. I don't even necessarily agree with Russell.



Read what I said carefully, I said the premises may or may not be sound. My objection to the conclusion was then based off of the possibility of the premises being unsound. Also, the Kalam argument is substantially different from Aquinas',


Forgive me Pip, but this seems a little squirrely to me. We did seem to be having a discussion about the Kalam at some point. If we're simply discussing Aquinas, then why are you talking about Kant's refutation of the ontological argument? As far as I know, Aquinas criticized the ontological argument. Do you agree with Kant's assessment of the ontological argument, or is this simply an historical discussion we're having?

[OrphanPip]

Forgive me Pip, but this seems a little squirrely to me. We did seem to be having a discussion about the Kalam at some point. If we're simply discussing Aquinas, then why are you talking about Kant's refutation of the ontological argument? As far as I know, Aquinas criticized the ontological argument. Do you agree with Kant's assessment of the ontological argument, or is this simply an historical discussion we're having?

My posts got a little jumbled, because my first response about Russell and Kant was only directed at Aquinas, and then I continued that response while discussing the Kalam argument separately in the same post, so I can see why it wasn't clear.

Aquinas criticized the ontological argument, but Kant maintained that Aquinas' unintentionally based his argument for God as the prime mover on ontological arguments for God. I think most people have problems with ontological arguments for God, I don't know whether I agree with Kant or not about Aquinas committing implicitly to it in his proof of God. I think there are other problems with assuming God as the first mover, particularly to the point of specify the Judeo-Christian God. Aquinas didn't admit the possibility, but his proof is more about Deism than really proving God.

[stuntpickle]

My posts got a little jumbled, because my first response about Russell and Kant was only directed at Aquinas, and then I continued that response while discussing the Kalam argument separately in the same post, so I can see why it wasn't clear.

Aquinas criticized the ontological argument, but Kant maintained that Aquinas' unintentionally based his argument for God as the prime mover on ontological arguments for God. I think most people have problems with ontological arguments for God, I don't know whether I agree with Kant or not about Aquinas committing implicitly to it in his proof of God. I think there are other problems with assuming God as the first mover, particularly to the point of specify the Judeo-Christian God. Aquinas didn't admit the possibility, but his proof is more about Deism than really proving God.


Okay then, maybe there was some confusion.

As far as Aquinas goes, I think there's reason to believe he didn't make a fallacy of composition in his prime mover argument. I'll provide here a rough distillation of the argument:

1. Some things are in motion.
2. Nothing can move unless it first has the potential for that movement.
3. It is an act, when motion occurs.
4. Motion is the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.
5. Whatever is in motion is put in motion by another.
6. A thing can only be put in motion by something in a state of actuality.
7. A thing cannot be in potentiality and actuality at the same time in regards to the same type of motion, but can be in regards to different types of motion. (Something that is actually hot cannot be potentially hot, but it is potentially cold.)
8. Therefore, it is impossible for something to move itself.
9. Since a thing can only be put in motion by something else in motion and that thing too must be put in motion by another, and that by another, then there must be an infinite regress of movers moving things or there must be a first mover put in motion by no other.
10. An infinite regress of movers would have no first mover and, consequently, no other mover, since subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover.
---------------
Therefore, it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, itself unmoved, and this everyone calls God.

I have taken some liberties with the language, which was a bit archaic, but I have tried to stay faithful to the original meaning.

The part Russell would have called a compositional fallacy is:

"that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover;"

Saint Aquinas Thomas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) / From the Complete American Edition (Kindle Locations 394-395).



And honestly I read that as meaning that there are things in motion only insofar as the first mover has begun initial motion. Obviously, it can be understood as a fallacy of composition, but I don't think one must interpret it that way.

[krymsonkyng]

Okay then, maybe there was some confusion.

As far as Aquinas goes, I think there's reason to believe he didn't make a fallacy of composition in his prime mover argument. I'll provide here a rough distillation of the argument:

1. Some things are in motion.
2. Nothing can move unless it first has the potential for that movement.
3. It is an act, when motion occurs.
4. Motion is the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.
5. Whatever is in motion is put in motion by another.
6. A thing can only be put in motion by something in a state of actuality.
7. A thing cannot be in potentiality and actuality at the same time in regards to the same type of motion, but can be in regards to different types of motion. (Something that is actually hot cannot be potentially hot, but it is potentially cold.)
8. Therefore, it is impossible for something to move itself.
9. Since a thing can only be put in motion by something else in motion and that thing too must be put in motion by another, and that by another, then there must be an infinite regress of movers moving things or there must be a first mover put in motion by no other.
10. An infinite regress of movers would have no first mover and, consequently, no other mover, since subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover.

---
1. If not all things are in motion, may I suggest that some are not in motion? It sorta jumps past the argument and describes an "unmoved" mover, right?

I'm going to suggest that an object not in motion is at absolute zero in terms of energy and mass, meaning it cannot in any real sense exist.

Observing such an object would prove impossible (since observation is an act upon it).

Being at absolute zero, the object would have no possible motion with which to act upon others, otherwise it would not, by definition, be truly still/unmoved.

It would not have a mass (since mass exerts a force) nor any energy (magnetic/weak/strong forces must be null for it to be truly inert/unmoved).

If such an object has no physical/observable qualities with which to act on others does it exist anywhere beyond the imagination? Even more importantly, does it possess the capability to act upon other objects ever again?

I would say no: All objects must have some level of motion with which to exist. An unmoved object can not exist. If you accept an unmoved mover as god, you're essentially saying god no longer exists (or at least no longer plays the active role various religions suggest).

---
2. In having that potential it is, in some small way, in motion.
---
3. An unnecessary point for this discussion really, but I suppose it could serve some overall purpose.
---
7. A falling object has both potential and kinetic energy in regards to its fall: Potentially more than it has in actuality. right? As for the hot and cold reference, those are both along the same scale (the level of excitement and activity of the atoms within a substance).

Also, to speak in absolutes, an unmoved mover is another example of an object with suggested potentiality and actuality. Any action between two objects inherently involves action upon both objects.
---
Also, I'm interested in your take on my earlier post regarding a fallacy of composition in the first premise, rather than the second. We do not know that all things came into existence: some (to include a prime mover, right?) may have always been, meaning we cannot assume the whole came to be.

[stuntpickle]

---
1. If not all things are in motion, may I suggest that some are not in motion? It sorta jumps past the argument and describes an "unmoved" mover, right?

I'm going to suggest that an object not in motion is at absolute zero in terms of energy and mass, meaning it cannot in any real sense exist.

Observing such an object would prove impossible (since observation is an act upon it).

Being at absolute zero, the object would have no possible motion with which to act upon others, otherwise it would not, by definition, be truly still/unmoved.

It would not have a mass (since mass exerts a force) nor any energy (magnetic/weak/strong forces must be null for it to be truly inert/unmoved).

If such an object has no physical/observable qualities with which to act on others does it exist anywhere beyond the imagination? Even more importantly, does it possess the capability to act upon other objects ever again?

I would say no: All objects must have some level of motion with which to exist. An unmoved object can not exist. If you accept an unmoved mover as god, you're essentially saying god no longer exists (or at least no longer plays the active role various religions suggest).

---
2. In having that potential it is, in some small way, in motion.
---
3. An unnecessary point for this discussion really, but I suppose it could serve some overall purpose.
---
7. A falling object has both potential and kinetic energy in regards to its fall: Potentially more than it has in actuality. right? As for the hot and cold reference, those are both along the same scale (the level of excitement and activity of the atoms within a substance).

Also, to speak in absolutes, an unmoved mover is another example of an object with suggested potentiality and actuality. Any action between two objects inherently involves action upon both objects.
---
Also, I'm interested in your take on my earlier post regarding a fallacy of composition in the first premise, rather than the second. We do not know that all things came into existence: some (to include a prime mover, right?) may have always been, meaning we cannot assume the whole came to be.

First, you don't seem to understand that the prime mover argument is not about literal "motion," but about cause/change. The term "motion" is one Aquinas borrows from Aristotle. So the statements about kinetic energy are largely irrelevant. Moreover, the work of Aquinas is, by now, centuries old, and I have no interest in defending it, simply because the same arguments have much better modern articulations. The stuff about God not existing in any "real" sense is largely misguided as you don't seem to have a grasp on what "real" might mean. Is the number two real? Is love real? Is morality real? If you're a naturalist, you've got much bigger problems than the nature of God's existence.

Just to give you an idea of what sort of motion Aquinas is talking about:

"Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it."

Saint Aquinas Thomas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) / From the Complete American Edition (Kindle Locations 389-390).

The whole conversation about fallacies of composition in the Kalam cosmological argument has been ridiculous. There can't be any fallacy of composition in the first premise of the Kalam because it's a metaphysical statement in regards to "things." Moreover, you can't execute a fallacy of composition with a single statement. You have to deduce another statement.

The idea of a compositional component is so remote from the first premise that I can't believe you would even suggest it. If I say "stuff exists" I'm not talking about parts of something. The statement is so straight forward--everything that begins to exist has a cause--it blows my mind that it's such a problem for you to understand. This could only happen if you were trying to complicate the conversation. I mean, if the conclusion of the Kalam were "therefore, cupcakes have a cause" would you really suggest that the statement "everything that begins to exist has a cause" assumes a fallacy of composition because cupcakes are made from different components? The reason there can't be any fallacy about "the whole" of the universe in the first premise is because the first premise doesn't even explicitly reference the universe. If you were even going to mention it, it would have to be the second premise, but it still couldn't be a compositional fallacy because there's NO argument from composition.

Look, let me give you an example of a fallacy of composition.

1. The parts of airplanes are lightweight.
2. Therefore, airplanes are lightweight.

Try to compare that with the Kalam cosmological argument. There's nothing even remotely like that in it.

[WyattGwyon]

[QUOTE]Okay then, maybe there was some confusion.

As far as Aquinas goes, I think there's reason to believe he didn't make a fallacy of composition in his prime mover argument. I'll provide here a rough distillation of the argument:

1. Some things are in motion.
2. Nothing can move unless it first has the potential for that movement.
3. It is an act, when motion occurs.
4. Motion is the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.
5. Whatever is in motion is put in motion by another.
6. A thing can only be put in motion by something in a state of actuality.
7. A thing cannot be in potentiality and actuality at the same time in regards to the same type of motion, but can be in regards to different types of motion. (Something that is actually hot cannot be potentially hot, but it is potentially cold.)
8. Therefore, it is impossible for something to move itself.
9. Since a thing can only be put in motion by something else in motion and that thing too must be put in motion by another, and that by another, then there must be an infinite regress of movers moving things or there must be a first mover put in motion by no other.
10. An infinite regress of movers would have no first mover and, consequently, no other mover, since subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover.

Proposition 5 has no basis or support in the earlier propositions. Proposition 7 is just stupid. Something that is actually hot is obviously potentially hot or it wouldn't be actually hot. So you would say Vengerov does not have the potential to be a great violinist because he is in actuality a great violinist. Ha ha hah!

I've wasted enough time here. Bye now.

[BienvenuJDC]

Proposition 5 has no basis or support in the earlier propositions. Proposition 7 is just stupid. Something that is actually hot is obviously potentially hot or it wouldn't be actually hot. So you would say Vengerov does not have the potential to be a great violinist because he is in actuality a great violinist. Ha ha hah!

I've wasted enough time here. Bye now.

You obviously didn't understand the propositions. Maybe it's better that you have discontinued the discussion.

[stuntpickle]

Proposition 5 has no basis or support in the earlier propositions. Proposition 7 is just stupid. Something that is actually hot is obviously potentially hot or it wouldn't be actually hot. So you would say Vengerov does not have the potential to be a great violinist because he is in actuality a great violinist. Ha ha hah!

I've wasted enough time here. Bye now.

You seem to think that every argument is syllogistic when, clearly, that's not the case. That premise five is not an entailment of a previous premise does not affect the validity of the argument; in fact, it's fairly common in lengthy arguments for assertions to appear in the middle of things. The assertion in question is no more controversial than "everything that begins to exist has a cause."

There are always difficulties when rendering prose into standard logic form. You seem to think that Aquinas actually wrote his argument in the form I have provided when, really, he wrote a paragraph in prose. Anyone could do a better job arranging the argument, even Aquinas, but when you're transcribing the argument from an existing text, you should try to stay faithful to the meaning and order of the text. Aquinas isn't simply arguing in the passage but trying to explain, and if I had left out most of the explanation, you probably wouldn't even understand what was being said.

Your example of the violinist is, I think, bad. When I get sick, I am not in a state of potential sickness; to suggest that I am is just wrong. No, I am really sick. No one who had the flu would claim to be at risk of contracting the flu because risk would no longer be a factor. You would not approach a world class violinist and tell him that, with practice and determination, he could be a decent violinist; he's already a decent violinist!

More importantly, it's absurd to dismiss a text that everyone, even secularists, agree is a major text in western culture. You seem to think that because the Summa doesn't demonstrate modern standards of logical rigor that you are justified in dismissing it out of hand. You could, on similar grounds, dismiss Plato's The Republic, which, in case you forgot, describes a proto-fascistic hell no modern person would consider a viable society. You could dismiss nearly all of literature according to your standards. The truth is that, regardless of whether you believe in God, Aquinas was smarter than you and I, and we can both learn from him by seeing how he thought. Your dismissal is fairly typical of a university freshman who thinks that, since he knows it all already, his attendance at class is purely a formality.

[Rores28]

"The only way for a permanent entity to cause a finite effect would be to choose to cause it."

I don't understand how you come to this conclusion. I can see that it would be possible. But why must it necessarily be so.

Doesn't the ability to choose preclude it from being a permanent entity... whatever exactly that might mean.

[krymsonkyng]

First, you don't seem to understand that the prime mover argument is not about literal "motion," but about cause/change. The term "motion" is one Aquinas borrows from Aristotle. So the statements about kinetic energy are largely irrelevant. Moreover, the work of Aquinas is, by now, centuries old, and I have no interest in defending it, simply because the same arguments have much better modern articulations. The stuff about God not existing in any "real" sense is largely misguided as you don't seem to have a grasp on what "real" might mean. Is the number two real? Is love real? Is morality real? If you're a naturalist, you've got much bigger problems than the nature of God's existence.

Just to give you an idea of what sort of motion Aquinas is talking about:

"Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it."

Saint Aquinas Thomas. Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) / From the Complete American Edition (Kindle Locations 389-390).

The whole conversation about fallacies of composition in the Kalam cosmological argument has been ridiculous. There can't be any fallacy of composition in the first premise of the Kalam because it's a metaphysical statement in regards to "things." Moreover, you can't execute a fallacy of composition with a single statement. You have to deduce another statement.

The idea of a compositional component is so remote from the first premise that I can't believe you would even suggest it. If I say "stuff exists" I'm not talking about parts of something. The statement is so straight forward--everything that begins to exist has a cause--it blows my mind that it's such a problem for you to understand. This could only happen if you were trying to complicate the conversation. I mean, if the conclusion of the Kalam were "therefore, cupcakes have a cause" would you really suggest that the statement "everything that begins to exist has a cause" assumes a fallacy of composition because cupcakes are made from different components? The reason there can't be any fallacy about "the whole" of the universe in the first premise is because the first premise doesn't even explicitly reference the universe. If you were even going to mention it, it would have to be the second premise, but it still couldn't be a compositional fallacy because there's NO argument from composition.

Look, let me give you an example of a fallacy of composition.

1. The parts of airplanes are lightweight.
2. Therefore, airplanes are lightweight.

Try to compare that with the Kalam cosmological argument. There's nothing even remotely like that in it.

Let me try and spell out my argument more clearly:

1. Some things came to exist. (some things, or "stuff" being parts.)
2. Therefore, the universe came to exist. (The Universe, or reality being the whole)

Hey look, it lines up fairly well with your airplane example. Funny that.

Further trouble is, there may exist within all of reality objects that have always existed (the proposed prime mover, for example), meaning, like airplane parts that are relatively heavy (the black box, hydrolics, etc.) they throw off the unified idea of the whole.

Also, the airplane is a poor example because it relies on the totaled weight of each part to provide the false conclusion: "lightweight" is a property that is not truly independent.

Here's a better example:
1 Human cells are invisible to the naked eye. (property of parts).
2 Humans are made up of human cells. (Parts add up to equal the whole).
3 Therefore, humans are invisible to the naked eye (false conclusion regarding the whole through fallacy of composition).

What I'm arguing is that step two of the above example does not have an equivalent within Kalam's proposition. Even if it did, there would exist composition and a fallacy.

---

As for God being in the same class as a symbol for entirely human constructs, like "Two", "Love", "Morality", sure. I can believe that. In fact, that's likely the most accurate assessment of any conceivable divinity. Without human perception, they are not real. They're real enough to the people who understand them, sure.

Ultimately, for me, it's the difference between software and hardware: Hardware being reality, software being an application of said hardware. Prime mover or not, gods are real enough for humans to act on. Just like the number 2. The trouble with software is that it means different things to the hardware working it. 2 in binary (10) has a whole different meaning to different viewers. Things that are real (2 apples for example) do not suffer from such variation.

[YesNo]

Let me try and spell out my argument more clearly:

1. Some things came to exist. (some things, or "stuff" being parts.)
2. Therefore, the universe came to exist. (The Universe, or reality being the whole)

Hey look, it lines up fairly well with your airplane example. Funny that.

Further trouble is, there may exist within all of reality objects that have always existed (the proposed prime mover, for example), meaning, like airplane parts that are relatively heavy (the black box, hydrolics, etc.) they throw off the unified idea of the whole.

I don't think I'm following all the arguments about composition in this thread, but this is my take on what is at stake.

The first statement is: "Everything that begins to exist has a cause." If something doesn't begin to exist then I think it should be called "eternal" and so doesn't need a cause.

The second statement is not a conclusion from the first, but a statement of fact assuming the big bang theory is correct: "The universe began to exist."

So if one accepts current science, the conclusion follows: "The universe had a cause".

My take on the conclusion is that there is more to reality than the stuff that came out of the big bang.

Of course, one can come up with a competing theory to the big bang. That competing theory would test the current theory and either replace it or make the current theory stronger.

---------------

Regarding a post I made earlier about vacuum fluctuations, since they involve particles that come to exist until they annihilate each other, these particles that began to exist must have a cause which I take is the vacuum space. Then I wonder why did the vacuum make these particles come into existence at some particular point in time? Was it chance? Or is chance just a short-hand way of saying: "We don't know."

[krymsonkyng]

I don't think I'm following all the arguments about composition in this thread, but this is my take on what is at stake.

The first statement is: "Everything that begins to exist has a cause." If something doesn't begin to exist then I think it should be called "eternal" and so doesn't need a cause.

The second statement is not a conclusion from the first, but a statement of fact assuming the big bang theory is correct: "The universe began to exist."

So if one accepts current science, the conclusion follows: "The universe had a cause".

My take on the conclusion is that there is more to reality than the stuff that came out of the big bang.

Of course, one can come up with a competing theory to the big bang. That competing theory would test the current theory and either replace it or make the current theory stronger.

---------------

Regarding a post I made earlier about vacuum fluctuations, since they involve particles that come to exist until they annihilate each other, these particles that began to exist must have a cause which I take is the vacuum space. Then I wonder why did the vacuum make these particles come into existence at some particular point in time? Was it chance? Or is chance just a short-hand way of saying: "We don't know."

Ok, that makes sense then. The second is a premise independent of the first. There is no composition then. Thanks for clearing all that up :)

[Rores28]

---------------

Regarding a post I made earlier about vacuum fluctuations, since they involve particles that come to exist until they annihilate each other, these particles that began to exist must have a cause which I take is the vacuum space. Then I wonder why did the vacuum make these particles come into existence at some particular point in time? Was it chance? Or is chance just a short-hand way of saying: "We don't know."

Chance is always a short hand way of saying "we don't know."

If you flip a coin, you say the chance of it landing it heads is %50. In actuality the chance is 100% that it lands on what it will land on. If you knew the strength of the flick, the weight of the coin, the humidity, wind, acceleration due to gravity, initial angle of coin, etc etc ... you would be able to tell precisely how the coin would fall.

The chance is merely a way of averaging all the variables of which we are unsure.