Does the end justify the means?

[Sionn Harrow]

A couple scenarios concerning morality and ethics...

An airliner carrying 120 passengers is hurtling out of control towards a densely populated area. There is not time to evacuate the area and the impact of the pland is certain to kill thousands. The only possible move is to shoot down the plan. Should you do it?

Conjoined twins are both certain to die within months unless they are surgically separated. The necessary operation offers excellent prospects of one twin living a reasonably healthy and fulfilled life but will result in the death fo the other twin. Do you proceed? And if you do, do you do so even if the parents do not give their consent?

Patient A is terminally ill and certain to die within a week. His heart and kidneys are a perfect match for patients B and C, who are certain to die before him if they do not get the transplants they need but have good prospects of recovery if they do. No other donors are available. Do you kill patient A in order to save patients B and C? If you do, do you do it with his permission, or without his permission?

A Gestapo officer rounds up 10 children and threatens to shoot them unless you reveal the identity and whereabouts of a spy. As it happens, you didn't know that there was a spy, let alone his or her identity, but you are quite certain both that the officer won't believe you if you plead ignorance and that he will carry out his threat. Do you name someone--anyone--to save the children? How do you decide who?

[Neo_Sephiroth]

Wow...Those are quite the scenarios you have there...Anyway, I don't mean to be taking any of these lighly so, please, forgive me if I should say anything to offend.

The plane scenario, I'll have to shoot it down.

The twins scenario, I must have the parents consent. It is their children after all.

The spy scenario, I'll name someone to save the kids. Who? Someone that's believable but doesn't exist.

That's what I'll do...Of course, my mind can change. I'm assuming you have some answers of your own?

[hoope]

An airliner carrying 120 passengers is hurtling out of control towards a densely populated area. There is not time to evacuate the area and the impact of the pland is certain to kill thousands. The only possible move is to shoot down the plan. Should you do it?


I don't think so .. i am sure there is a way out with less deaths.. And if we try to find out a way probably there would be options.. like a near by play ground to empty it .. or to let it come down at a football field.
But to have the idea of shooting it from the first place i don't think any would .. and it could sound like a crime. I mean if we lose life coz of accident .. people would say it was a tragedic acciedent.. but we lose them because of our judgment - many won't accept it. I won't take that such action. Because the people in the plan has a chance to live ( at least one of them ) and there is someone waiting for them. Maybe coz i put myself in their position .


Conjoined twins are both certain to die within months unless they are surgically separated. The necessary operation offers excellent prospects of one twin living a reasonably healthy and fulfilled life but will result in the death fo the other twin. Do you proceed? And if you do, do you do so even if the parents do not give their consent?



I will do it with consent .. without a concent = NO.. Its their kids and their decision to make.


Patient A is terminally ill and certain to die within a week. His heart and kidneys are a perfect match for patients B and C, who are certain to die before him if they do not get the transplants they need but have good prospects of recovery if they do. No other donors are available. Do you kill patient A in order to save patients B and C? If you do, do you do it with his permission, or without his permission
No ! with or without permission. Unless if the relative give a consent to donate his parts .. then okay... And it has to be a case of brain death.. other than that i don't think any one would donate when there is chance for the person to live even if its 1 % .. But in cases of brain death.. donation is an first option.


Sionn HarrowA Gestapo officer rounds up 10 children and threatens to shoot them unless you reveal the identity and whereabouts of a spy. As it happens, you didn't know that there was a spy, let alone his or her identity, but you are quite certain both that the officer won't believe you if you plead ignorance and that he will carry out his threat. Do you name someone--anyone--to save the children? How do you decide who?

aaaa.. dunno.. ! i can name someone but not unless i am sure of who he might be.. or try to find a way to save kids and get down this Gestapo.. I think a cop can answer this better.

In conclusion.. i think there are many moments that could confuse us of what to do and how to do it. But what matters is to do the right thing as much as we can . And use good judgment in order to create a difference. The end of can sometimes justify our means but not always.

[Ecurb]

"Certainty" is not given to us measely humans. If it were (as posited hypothetically in the situations posed) the answers would be clear. However, to propose an answer based on such hypothetical certainty would be misleading. Nobody knows "for certain" what the future will bring in ANY situtation, let alone in one so frought with uncertainty as those proposed.

[Alexander III]

The end only justifies the means if the end is a success.

I have always taken that as one of the golden rules of human morality.

[workaholic]

For me the end does not justify the means. Because sometimes there are people who are able to get what they want but their means towards that aim is not really good. So that statement for me is not true..

[cyberbob]

The end only justifies the means if the end is a success.

I have always taken that as one of the golden rules of human morality.

I assume you define success as achieving a certain end.

Is working 100 hours to produce 1 unit of food justified if it means not starving?

It does, but if there's a more efficient ways of achieving a certain end in which you only have to work 50 hours to produce 1 unit of food, are both equally justified? After all, they are both successful since they both achieve the mean of producing 1 unit of food.

Or let's say that it will take you 100 hours to produce the 1 unit of food, but if you wait 101 hours without working someone will deliver 1 unit of food to you. Is each unit of time more valuable than the labor done to produce the food so as to not make waiting for the delivery of the 1 unit of food worthwhile?


I'm just trying to illustrate how your golden rule is too simplistic/vague to have any significant value.

[anzki4]

I have sometimes thought about the end justifying the means. And to make it even harder I have though following scenario:

You are alone in a room with two screens and two buttons. From both screens, you see room with ten people you have never seen before. There is no way you, or any of these other people can escape. There is a bomb in both these rooms with other people. If you press either of these buttons, the corresponding bomb will explode. If you press neither one in one hour, they both explode. What do you do?

EDIT: I forgot to mention this; neither you or them have no way of communicating anyone outside the room they are in. They don't see you or know they are being watched, and they don't know about the bombs.

[Oniw17]

A couple scenarios concerning morality and ethics...

An airliner carrying 120 passengers is hurtling out of control towards a densely populated area. There is not time to evacuate the area and the impact of the pland is certain to kill thousands. The only possible move is to shoot down the plan. Should you do it?Can you redirect the plane or not? Then, it depends on who I know. If I know(and give a **** about) someone in the plane and no one in the densely populated area, I'd do nothing and give them a better chance, no matter how slight, to survive. Otherwise, I'd shoot the plane down, it's pretty intuitive.

Conjoined twins are both certain to die within months unless they are surgically separated. The necessary operation offers excellent prospects of one twin living a reasonably healthy and fulfilled life but will result in the death fo the other twin. Do you proceed? And if you do, do you do so even if the parents do not give their consent?How old are these twins? I'm assuming you mean newborn conjoined twins. If they were my children, I'd proceed. Otherwise, I don't care either way. Both ways are equally moral imo.

Patient A is terminally ill and certain to die within a week. His heart and kidneys are a perfect match for patients B and C, who are certain to die before him if they do not get the transplants they need but have good prospects of recovery if they do. No other donors are available. Do you kill patient A in order to save patients B and C? If you do, do you do it with his permission, or without his permission?
That's a good one. Do I know and love B or C? If so, let's get to killing A off. Otherwise, I would let A decide.

A Gestapo officer rounds up 10 children and threatens to shoot them unless you reveal the identity and whereabouts of a spy. As it happens, you didn't know that there was a spy, let alone his or her identity, but you are quite certain both that the officer won't believe you if you plead ignorance and that he will carry out his threat. Do you name someone--anyone--to save the children? How do you decide who?
Who's to say he won't kill the children anyway? The altruistic thing to do is say that you're the spy. Assuming I don't know any of the children, I didn't have anyone who I would be willing to sacrifice for them, and I thought I could escape afterwards, let him kill the kids. If any of those things change, I'd pretend to snitch. If I had love for one of the children and didn't have anyone I would be willing to sacrifice, I'd say I was the spy(if I'm not allowed to say me, I'll give up my paternal grandfather). If I didn't think I could escape, I'd say it was me(if I can't, then some near-stranger who's believable).

I have sometimes thought about the end justifying the means. And to make it even harder I have though following scenario:

You are alone in a room with two screens and two buttons. From both screens, you see room with ten people you have never seen before. There is no way you, or any of these other people can escape. There is a bomb in both these rooms with other people. If you press either of these buttons, the corresponding bomb will explode. If you press neither one in one hour, they both explode. What do you do?
Judge the people, pick one at ~ 59 minutes in, then live(or die if you die with the room you pick) with your decision. Also, can they see you(can you communicate?)?

[Oniw17]

No ! with or without permission. Unless if the relative give a consent to donate his parts .. then okay... And it has to be a case of brain death.. other than that i don't think any one would donate when there is chance for the person to live even if its 1 % .. But in cases of brain death.. donation is an first option.
.

So if patient A and his family are down to save the two others, and A's not brain dead, you don't do it? Why not? Even if B is one of your parents and C is one of your children?

[anzki4]

Judge the people, pick one at ~ 59 minutes in, then live(or die if you die with the room you pick) with your decision. Also, can they see you(can you communicate?)?

I forgot to mention this; neither you or them have no way of communicating anyone outside the room they are in. They don't see you or know they are being watched, and they don't know about the bombs.

Also I don't think I would be able to judge in such short time, no matter how I would try, and probably would just at the last minute push a random button...

[anzki4]

So if patient A and his family are down to save the two others, and A's not brain dead, you don't do it? Why not? Even if B is one of your parents and C is one of your children?

Sorry about the double post, but his got me thinking. What if it was my above scenario, and in the other cage would be your parents, and in other ten people you have never seen before?

[Alexander III]

I assume you define success as achieving a certain end.

Is working 100 hours to produce 1 unit of food justified if it means not starving?

It does, but if there's a more efficient ways of achieving a certain end in which you only have to work 50 hours to produce 1 unit of food, are both equally justified? After all, they are both successful since they both achieve the mean of producing 1 unit of food.

Or let's say that it will take you 100 hours to produce the 1 unit of food, but if you wait 101 hours without working someone will deliver 1 unit of food to you. Is each unit of time more valuable than the labor done to produce the food so as to not make waiting for the delivery of the 1 unit of food worthwhile?


I'm just trying to illustrate how your golden rule is too simplistic/vague to have any significant value.


You sir are clearly not aquatinted with irony.

Besides, succes is not achieving a certain end it is achieving what you wanted to achieve.

Your entire response was nonessential as this is an ethical question and you answered as if it were a question of logic.

[cyberbob]

You sir are clearly not aquatinted with irony.

Besides, succes is not achieving a certain end it is achieving what you wanted to achieve.

Your entire response was nonessential as this is an ethical question and you answered as if it were a question of logic.

My point was that your supposed golden rule isn't really saying anything. Certainly nothing useful.

[Alexander III]

My point was that your supposed golden rule isn't really saying anything. Certainly nothing useful.

My supposed golden rule was an ironical statement....

[hoope]

So if patient A and his family are down to save the two others, and A's not brain dead, you don't do it? Why not? Even if B is one of your parents and C is one of your children?

If the patient is not a brain death .. then they r alive.. So we can't end his life.and doctors won't.. ! I don't know.. coz maybe he is breathing and maybe coz we don't recognize them as dead man , then how can we donate his body.. Its like you wanna end someone to let another live.. That is not our choice to make.. Dunno.
But am sure that even if my child would need it .. or any relative . I wouldn't ask them to end a life of someone in order to get an organ . Ethically maybe i don't find it appropriate.

[JuniperWoolf]

For me, the end never justifies the means because it's a lazy way to think and it puts our humanity in jeopardy. Such a statement just means that I wasn't smart enough to think of an alternative. There's always another way. Communicate to the town's people that there's a plane about to hit their block and tell them to run (if you have a weapon capable of shooting down the plane then surely you have a radio). Find an operation that gives both twins a chance at life, even at reduced odds of success. Find another donor, scour Emergency rooms like a vulture. Tell the gestapo that you're the spy and jump him so that he kills you before he has a chance to ask questions.

It might be idealistic, but I'm willing to give it a try anyway. You can see where "the end justifies the means" mindsets have led people in the past, and it's never good. Where do you draw the line? No, if you find yourself in that situation then think harder and come up with something better.

[Baudolina]

Do the ends justify the means? It depends on how the moral calculus comes out at the end of the day. If the good ends are worth, say, 100 "virtue" points, and all the bad things you did during the "means" phase was worth -200 virtue points, then at the end of the day you are 100 points in the hole, so in this case, no. So the answer to this question is, Not always. The proper question to ask when confronted with one of these situations is: Do the ends outweigh the means? If yes then do it, if not then don't. But it is a mistake to give special weight to the ends just because they come later in time.

[Ecurb]

Suppose that a beautiful Russian spy has secret knowledge. The only way to save the world is to seduce her and trick her into revealing the secret. However, in order to obtain this vital knowledge, you would have to make love to Natasha using lies, deceit, and secret sex tricks known only to the CIA.

As horrible as this would be for me, I'd do it.

[Dodo25]

The end does justify the means. Everything else creates unnecessary suffering.

The plane would have to be shot down (let's assume it's flown by terrorists so the scenario becomes more plausible).

It really does depend on the age of the twins. If they're infants, let the parents decide. Unless they suffer for some reason, and the parents 'want' them to keep suffering, in that case ignore the parents and stop the suffering, even if it results in the death of one. (There will probably legal problems with that, but I'm arguing ethics only here)

Kidney transplant: You do need consent, even for utilitarian reasons. If patients in hospitals are killed against their will, people will become afraid of hospitals, and the policy would have overall implications that are much worse than two deaths. However, the doctors should definitely inform the patient objectively about the situation and ask the dreaded question.

And yeah, in extreme circumstances, indirectly endangering one person to save ten is better.

About 'certainty': People who don't understand statistics might be tempted to dismiss any intrusive, damaging action if the end result is not to 100% predictable. That's irrational, ideally one just adds the certainty levels to the whole prediction. If 1 million people have a 70% chance of dying (and the other 30% they all live), then that equals, on average, 700'000 deaths, so shoot down that plane!

Yet the reason of some people's revulsion against 'ends justify means' thinking are not that bad. 'Greater good' calculations are indeed often dangerous. Utopia visions like Communism risked the lifes of millions for a noble goal, the problem: the planned society doesn't work. It's the same with extremist suicide bombers, they have a highly noble goal, but since their facts are wrong it ends in disaster. So one should better make sure to be right about the facts, 'I didn't know about that' doesn't count as an excuse when one makes ends justify the means decisions.

[Baudolina]

About 'certainty': People who don't understand statistics might be tempted to dismiss any intrusive, damaging action if the end result is not to 100% predictable. That's irrational, ideally one just adds the certainty levels to the whole prediction. If 1 million people have a 70% chance of dying (and the other 30% they all live), then that equals, on average, 700'000 deaths, so shoot down that plane!

Yet the reason of some people's revulsion against 'ends justify means' thinking are not that bad. 'Greater good' calculations are indeed often dangerous. Utopia visions like Communism risked the lifes of millions for a noble goal, the problem: the planned society doesn't work. It's the same with extremist suicide bombers, they have a highly noble goal, but since their facts are wrong it ends in disaster. So one should better make sure to be right about the facts, 'I didn't know about that' doesn't count as an excuse when one makes ends justify the means decisions.

I agree with the first paragraph. But doesn't the second paragraph contradict the first? We can never "make sure to be right about the facts," that is, have 100% certainty that the ends we envision are what will in fact happen. The mistake the Communists made was assigning 100% probability to the outcome "ideal society," when in fact it was less than this. That is, they did an improper calculation.

And, even if they had done it correctly (assuming this is possible lol), it may have been that it came out with net positive virtue points. So, the revolution was the right thing to do then, even if it ultimately failed. It's like gambling from the casino's point of view: things are biased in their favor, so the "expected value" of each slot machine crank is positive (for them)--but, they could lose and have to pay out.

[Dodo25]

I agree with the first paragraph. But doesn't the second paragraph contradict the first? We can never "make sure to be right about the facts," that is, have 100% certainty that the ends we envision are what will in fact happen. The mistake the Communists made was assigning 100% probability to the outcome "ideal society," when in fact it was less than this. That is, they did an improper calculation.

And, even if they had done it correctly (assuming this is possible lol), it may have been that it came out with net positive virtue points. So, the revolution was the right thing to do then, even if it ultimately failed. It's like gambling from the casino's point of view: things are biased in their favor, so the "expected value" of each slot machine crank is positive (for them)--but, they could lose and have to pay out.

Gambling is the perfect analogy, variance evens out eventually and the right decisions pay off in the long run. The contradiction is only superficial because there's nothing impossible about being right IN PRINCIPLE. Of course, practically, people do have biases and wrong world views, but since our goal is to act ethically, and since a huge component of that is to be well informed about issues regarding human nature and human well-being, we should just try to educate ourself in philosophy, science, and whatever else has got something to do with it.

One important future issue where utilitarian reasoning clashes with common sense intuitions is 'transhumanism', the artificial improvement of the human genome. If we can make people happier, healthier, more balanced, more intelligent, less aggressive and all that, why not do it? Prohibiting this would cause a huge amount of unnecessary suffering, yet for some reason many people are appalled by the mere thought of it. There might be side effects, sure, but that doesn't mean we should dismiss the idea a priori. A lot of research into these subjects will have to be done, and eventually people will reach an informed conclusion. By the way, don't think of 'Brave New World' right now, there are much smarter ways to improve human nature, ones that actually produce fulfilling happiness, not some drug induced numbness..

The hardest question in my opinion deals with the value of democracy. If the experts agree that some policy is feasible, and the uneducated public is against it, who wins? While I do think the danger of upheavals, violence and simple angryness of the public (or dictatorship on the other side) is something to be weighed into the equation, I'm not sure whether we should allow such matters to be decided democratically. I mean, people vote against genetically engineered food production, thereby condemning hundreds of millions of starving Africans to death which could be saved by more efficient agriculture. How many deaths are justifiable in the name of democracy? What about patients whose life could be saved by transplants, but since the country doesn't allow stem-cell research they'll die?

In the end, it's always a matter of discussion and rational arguments. While there might not always be one best solution (after all, it's possible that two actions are about equally bad / good), there definitely are some actions that enhance people's (or animals, let's not be speciesist) well-being (meet their preferences) and others that diminish it. And if whoever makes the decisions also presents a well-reasoned and peer-reviewed argumentation, what else could there be wrong with it?

[Ecurb]

What about patients whose life could be saved by transplants, but since the country doesn't allow stem-cell research they'll die?

I hate to belabor the obvious, but they'll die if their country does allow stem cell research, too.


In the end, it's always a matter of discussion and rational arguments. While there might not always be one best solution (after all, it's possible that two actions are about equally bad / good), there definitely are some actions that enhance people's (or animals, let's not be speciesist) well-being (meet their preferences) and others that diminish it. And if whoever makes the decisions also presents a well-reasoned and peer-reviewed argumentation, what else could there be wrong with it

Rational arguments rarely settle any arguments about morality. That's because the most desirable outcome is one of the key matters for debate. There's no "right" or "wrong" to what people see as a desirable outcome, although there may be more effective and less effective ways of attaining said outcome. Which outcome we prefer is a matter of taste, just like which novel we prefer.


As for 'what else could be wrong with it" -- everything!!! Peer-reviewed? Why is peer-reviewed argumentation of any value in such matters as these? I'll grant that peer-review is reasonable in cases where non-experts don't have the background to judge an argument (say in sub atomic physics) -- but that's not the case here.

[Baudolina]

@Dodo: Just want to say I am very sympathetic to your views on GM foods and transhumanism.

[billl]

One important future issue where utilitarian reasoning clashes with common sense intuitions is 'transhumanism', the artificial improvement of the human genome. If we can make people happier, healthier, more balanced, more intelligent, less aggressive and all that, why not do it? Prohibiting this would cause a huge amount of unnecessary suffering, yet for some reason many people are appalled by the mere thought of it. There might be side effects, sure, but that doesn't mean we should dismiss the idea a priori. A lot of research into these subjects will have to be done, and eventually people will reach an informed conclusion. By the way, don't think of 'Brave New World' right now, there are much smarter ways to improve human nature, ones that actually produce fulfilling happiness, not some drug induced numbness..


Who would choose to become less aggressive? Some people with anger management issues, I'd guess. But not all of them. Out of the rest of us, who would go for it? And who would choose it for their children?

More balanced? Again, there might be some extreme cases, but when you start talking about changing the genome, the first thing that comes to mind is changes before birth, and I don't see how anyone could presume to promote policies (or even commonly chosen options) that would involve lots of parents changing genes of their (perhaps yet to be born) children--not when it simply comes to making them 'more balanced'.

To be clear here, I'm fine with fixing some extreme genetic problem, like one that might make Lou Gherig's disease 90% likely or whatever. But to make someone less aggressive? To make them more balanced? Those would have to be some pretty rare and extreme genes doing crazy stuff. And Transhumanism isn't just about helping those rare extreme cases. A lot of the Transhumanist stuff is about the wide and serious transformation of humanity. And it seems like a movement towards homogenization, some sort of set of ideals, and my guess is that the set of ideals they are going to be shooting for is going to largely consist of things that some certain people--some scientists, futurists, tech 'gurus', businessmen, and people who like to imagine engineering the human species and society--are interested in.

Really, I don't want to appear too much in the opposition, but it is pretty alarming that the list of beneficial changes you chose to present is almost half* about maybe making people less unique and assertive, followed by an "and all of that". I am very skeptical of any behavior modifications that transhumanists might want to effect on humanity at large.


*I'll allow some wiggle room on the "more happy", but maybe I shouldn't. I hope you aren't suggesting some genetic change that would make people more easily convinced that things are OK in their life so that, for example, they could adapt to whatever technologists and tech companies think we should be adapting to--rather than focussing on the design and use of non-invasive tech to create more comfortable surroundings and lifestyles for humans (and better for animals, Nature, etc.).

[Baudolina]

Don't want to hijack this thread into a transhumanism thread, but I'll briefly state that I personally am simply advocating that people be able to alter their own bodies and psychological nature using whatever technology becomes available. You want wings? You got 'em. You want to be straight and not gay, for whatever reason? OK. I am not saying it is OK for technocrats to alter other pre-existing humans to their liking, or to tinker with the DNA of other people's children.

[billl]

How about this: Someone else wants to have increased intelligence and enough stamina to be able to work 21 hours per day, at the job that you (or your spouse) love and are best at.

However, this genetic modification will reduce the recipient's sense of humor by 30% and cause them to care significantly less than they normally would about spending time with friends and family. This hypothetical other person won't mind the trade-off, because they don't have a spouse, and just want the money (from your job).

[Dodo25]

Rational arguments rarely settle any arguments about morality. That's because the most desirable outcome is one of the key matters for debate. There's no "right" or "wrong" to what people see as a desirable outcome, although there may be more effective and less effective ways of attaining said outcome. Which outcome we prefer is a matter of taste, just like which novel we prefer.

I don't think so. The whole concept of 'ethics' comes from the realization that other people also have a 'self', they too have interests and the capability to suffer. Ethics takes on an objective perspective, weighing the interests of all involved. While you certainly can't derive ethics from scratch (as in 'cogito ergo sum'), you can formulate nearly tautological axioms and then base the rest of the reasoning on them (as in mathematics). I must say I've never met anyone that objects to the goal of promoting well-being. Even people in favor of deontological ethics ultimately justify their choice with utilitarian reasons; where else would the maximes come from (with the exception of theological ethics of course)?




As for 'what else could be wrong with it" -- everything!!! Peer-reviewed? Why is peer-reviewed argumentation of any value in such matters as these? I'll grant that peer-review is reasonable in cases where non-experts don't have the background to judge an argument (say in sub atomic physics) -- but that's not the case here.

Why can't there be ethical experts? Ethical geniuses? Once the basic axioms are defined (and as I said most reasonable people actually do agree on them), everything else is just a matter of finding the conclusions. And some people happen to be better at this than others for various reasons including intelligence, education and the capacity to empathize with others. If I make that statement about math, biology or physics, people would agree, so why does it suddenly differ because the issue is morality?

To prevent misunderstandings, I'm not saying such experts would be 'better' people (in a moral sense). It's about the theoretical reasoning BEHIND morality, about justifying certain policies or rules, or arguing against them. It's ethical theory, not applied morality. The people might not even 'live what they preach' in that sense, they might be nasty hypocrites. This isn't about 'good-heartedness'.



More balanced? Again, there might be some extreme cases, but when you start talking about changing the genome, the first thing that comes to mind is changes before birth, and I don't see how anyone could presume to promote policies (or even commonly chosen options) that would involve lots of parents changing genes of their (perhaps yet to be born) children--not when it simply comes to making them 'more balanced'.

There's nothing special about genes, there aren't any bad consequences if we modify them INTELLIGENTLY. At least not that I know of. And yes, I'm mostly talking about yet to be born children. While I don't see anything wrong with people wanting to change their own character, I can imagine that people wouldn't really want it because they can't imagine themselves 'being' otherwise. Are they right to not want it? Maybe not, but if we focus on babies we circumvent that peculiarity. Additionally, changes in living humans would have to be implemented in the brain rather than in the genes, and that would probably be harder and less predictable.




To be clear here, I'm fine with fixing some extreme genetic problem, like one that might make Lou Gherig's disease 90% likely or whatever. But to make someone less aggressive? To make them more balanced? Those would have to be some pretty rare and extreme genes doing crazy stuff. And Transhumanism isn't just about helping those rare extreme cases. A lot of the Transhumanist stuff is about the wide and serious transformation of humanity. And it seems like a movement towards homogenization, some sort of set of ideals, and my guess is that the set of ideals they are going to be shooting for is going to largely consist of things that some certain people--some scientists, futurists, tech 'gurus', businessmen, and people who like to imagine engineering the human species and society--are interested in.

You raise important objections. But let me point out that your argument goes against specifics, not the general idea. My premise is that transhumanism is good if it makes people happier (the other attributes were my momentary and imperfect guess of what would contribute towards that). What exactly that is is an empric question. If the changes don't make people happier overall, then they're not what transhumanists want after all! Concerning homogenization, diversity is okay, but not by all means, and also not simply by virtue of itself. If we get rid of a lot of unpleasant character traits we won't miss them in people. It goes without saying that a lot of research on 'happiness' needs to be done first, and on the genes and their effects of course. This is a long-term project. And by the way I forgot possibly the most important goal: make people live longer, significantly. Death causes a lot of suffering, why should we simply accept that?

One objection towards the 'abolition of suffering' is that some people insist that suffering is important. I myself am skeptical about this aspect, and intuitively I don't agree with the abolitionists who want to abolish all suffering. To put it in the words of Emily Dickinson 'what is love -- without memorial mold'. But here again, the premise is that the people modifying the genes know what they're doing, and they'll do so intelligently. The goal is not to create a species of mindless pleasure machines.

[billl]

There's nothing special about genes, there aren't any bad consequences if we modify them INTELLIGENTLY. At least not that I know of. And yes, I'm mostly talking about yet to be born children. While I don't see anything wrong with people wanting to change their own character, I can imagine that people wouldn't really want it because they can't imagine themselves 'being' otherwise. Are they right to not want it? Maybe not, but if we focus on babies we circumvent that peculiarity. Additionally, changes in living humans would have to be implemented in the brain rather than in the genes, and that would probably be harder and less predictable.


I want to point out that I didn't anywhere raise objections to the intelligent modification of genes, so I'd like to share in any rhetorical profits that stem from taking that position. And I'd like to again say that genetically changing one's character might seem like a good idea for people in certain extreme circumstances, But I still think you are portraying those others who wouldn't jump on the behavior-modification bandwagon unfairly. (Perhaps you mistyped with that "probably not"?) If you are indeed inclined to believe that people would do best to make the changes, I want to point out that you seem to be struggling to envision what these changes might amount to.

We can take faith in empiricism to deliver best results and provide guidance--but we have to know what we're looking for, as ECurb pointed out earlier, and simply asserting that you've got confidence in the whole thing isn't enough to counter other people's viewpoints and experience looking at these things. I think that this discussion (and countless others in various places) should be enough to show that humans are varied, and have differing ideas about "well-being" and things like that. Saying that people would all want to promote well-being can buttress your position only if we would all ever agree on what it would be in regards to behavior modification on a very large scale. There's a personality test thread that's been popping up on LitNet recently, and it might be useful to take a look at when considering this issue. At the risk of being glib (but to still, maybe, get across the basic gist) the only way to get real agreement on this behavior modification thing seems to be the artificial consolidation of all of us into one category (perhaps the one Ray Kurzweil fits in?) or to leave us as we are (some outgoing, some sensitive to assertive types, some intuitive, some introspective, some very sociable, etc.) and just *maybe* use the new genetics-based techniques to take care of some small number that we've traditionally regarded as severely mentally ill. I really can't see a move to genetically modify behavior in large numbers of us--even (especially!?!) gestating infants--catching on at all.

Regarding the point about this genetic behavior-modification being applied predominantly to children: I want to point out that it doesn't dispense with this whole issue at all. Those children would have parents, and they'd have an interest in their children's future, and I don't think they'd too often be choosing a lot of the things that the empiricists might be pushing on them. We can say that they would be "happier". What does that mean, though? By whose metrics, and compared to what? All we're left with is the same changes the parents might object to according to their own values, or the empiricists that are trying to impose some sort of broad outcome that they can measure and describe with their imperfect techniques. If you spend some time in a different culture, you'll eventually be surprised by cases in which people commonly find comfort and happiness in (for us) surprising behaviors and attitudes. The idea that empiricists will decide on much of anything universal that humanity doesn't already have a handle on seems doubtful, and the reductionist nature of the enterprise is plenty cause for concern.




You raise important objections. But let me point out that your argument goes against specifics, not the general idea. My premise is that transhumanism is good if it makes people happier (the other attributes were my momentary and imperfect guess of what would contribute towards that). What exactly that is is an empric question. If the changes don't make people happier overall, then they're not what transhumanists want after all! Concerning homogenization, diversity is okay, but not by all means, and also not simply by virtue of itself. If we get rid of a lot of unpleasant character traits we won't miss them in people. It goes without saying that a lot of research on 'happiness' needs to be done first, and on the genes and their effects of course. This is a long-term project.

I don't think my argument (regarding the arbitrary set of values and homogenization) was against specifics, although I did use two examples of behavior (that you had introduced) early on in that quote you selected. Skipping over a return to the issue of happiness experiments, you next offer a sort of defense of homogenization. I think it is indeed useful when one wants to start engineering things and deciding how everything is going to work out. Of course, weeding out the mental illnesses like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and so on would seem like a good idea (and we already realize that such things should be treated, and our medical field reflects this). Beyond that sort of thing, what negative behaviors would you suggest we get rid of? And why nip them in the bud when we might be able to prune them into something beautiful or interesting, as we so often have and still do?





And by the way I forgot possibly the most important goal: make people live longer, significantly. Death causes a lot of suffering, why should we simply accept that?

One objection towards the 'abolition of suffering' is that some people insist that suffering is important. I myself am skeptical about this aspect, and intuitively I don't agree with the abolitionists who want to abolish all suffering. To put it in the words of Emily Dickinson 'what is love -- without memorial mold'. But here again, the premise is that the people modifying the genes know what they're doing, and they'll do so intelligently. The goal is not to create a species of mindless pleasure machines.

Living longer and staying healthy (and having enough food!), great, yes. Maybe we'd all finally relax and think about making more room and try to figure out how to enjoy it, possibly without recourse to artificial behavior modification among infants. Maybe not, though--really, we probably should work on some other things before the longevity thing gets too far ahead of us.
Suffering: well of course less of that would be great, all things being equal--but a lot of it, as you note, comes simply as the price of being creatures that are remarkably creative and flexible, that can live on various levels and interact in various ways, and have aspirations, form bonds, and do things that sometimes bring about conflicts within ourselves and with others along the way. Bees have it simpler, right? Everything's standardized. Same answers to the same problems, and not much complaining.

[Baudolina]

How about this: Someone else wants to have increased intelligence and enough stamina to be able to work 21 hours per day, at the job that you (or your spouse) love and are best at.

However, this genetic modification will reduce the recipient's sense of humor by 30% and cause them to care significantly less than they normally would about spending time with friends and family. This hypothetical other person won't mind the trade-off, because they don't have a spouse, and just want the money (from your job).

This is no different from issues we currently face: some coworker is willing to do what we are not, such as have no life outside of work, and puts the rest of us at a competitve disadvantage. The only difference here is one of scale. I would say this. I may enjoy the job, and it may be what I am best at, however, can I really say I am more entitled to it than this person who is willing to sacrifice so much (including their sense of humor!) to get it? No, I cannot. I believe all I am entitled to is food and shelter. Rather than outlawing human modification because of the increased competition it will cause, let's pass a law giving everyone the right to free food and shelter. BTW I am glad you presented practical problems, rather than saying "That's just wrong and unnatural, etc."

[Ecurb]

First, axioms are generally not “tautological”. A tautology is a statement that is true by virtue of its own structure (i.e. “either it is raining or it is not raining”). An axiom is a statement that one accepts as true in order to derive further truths, but that doesn’t make it “tautological”.

Second, perhaps we should conflate this discussion with the one on post modernism. Dodo is making the classical “modernist” argument. She says:


Why can't there be ethical experts? Ethical geniuses? Once the basic axioms are defined (and as I said most reasonable people actually do agree on them), everything else is just a matter of finding the conclusions. And some people happen to be better at this than others for various reasons including intelligence, education and the capacity to empathize with others. If I make that statement about math, biology or physics, people would agree, so why does it suddenly differ because the issue is morality?

The modernist thinks we can reason our way to a better world. But on what basis does she think so? Have the “ethical geniuses” who have arisen in the past used this method? Jesus? Mohammed? Francis of Assissi? Some have, but most haven’t. That’s because the hidden assumption here is that reason and rationality are the ideal driving forces behind ethical improvements. But that’s certainly questionable.

First, Dodo says that reasonable people agree on the outcomes for which we should strive. Balderdash! Religious people, for example, disagree with atheists. Most Christians think that we should try to emulate Christ, and act in accordance to God’s will. Does Dodo think the Pope is one of the “ethical experts” who should “peer review” ethical arguments before passing them along to the hoi polloi? If she does, at least she’s in agreement with the Catholic Church on the issue.

Second, why is finding conclusions based on logical derivation from axioms the only way to approach ethics? Surely many people (for example) use analogical reasoning to define their ethical code (for Christians, “What would Jesus do?”). Modernist approaches have certainly worked to further math, biology and physics. But it doesn’t follow that they are the best way to develop ethical systems. That’s one prejudice that the post modernists have largely debunked. And the Transhumanism projects that Dodo supports are specifically based on the notion that rational, purposeful human design will always move us toward a better world – a notion questioned by global warming, nuclear war, and other byproducts of scientific modernism.

[Dodo25]

First, axioms are generally not “tautological”. A tautology is a statement that is true by virtue of its own structure (i.e. “either it is raining or it is not raining”). An axiom is a statement that one accepts as true in order to derive further truths, but that doesn’t make it “tautological”.

I know, that's why I said 'nearly'. Look at the axioms in math, they do make intuitive sense, don't they? Look at 'suffering is bad and should be avoided', makes intuitive sense too, right?



Second, perhaps we should conflate this discussion with the one on post modernism. Dodo is making the classical “modernist” argument. She says:

The modernist thinks we can reason our way to a better world. But on what basis does she think so? Have the “ethical geniuses” who have arisen in the past used this method? Jesus? Mohammed? Francis of Assissi? Some have, but most haven’t. That’s because the hidden assumption here is that reason and rationality are the ideal driving forces behind ethical improvements. But that’s certainly questionable.

Yes, i'm indeed making the 'modernist' argument. That's because I think postmodernism is nonsense. Don't accept all that relativity talk as given. There are objective facts about human nature. And as a side note, isn't postmodernism self-contradicting? After all, it's only a 'theory', right, so why should it be any more true than modernism? Hahaha

Muhammad an ethical genius? Are you kidding me? Read the Qu'ran..

(I'm a guy actually.)



First, Dodo says that reasonable people agree on the outcomes for which we should strive. Balderdash! Religious people, for example, disagree with atheists. Most Christians think that we should try to emulate Christ, and act in accordance to God’s will. Does Dodo think the Pope is one of the “ethical experts” who should “peer review” ethical arguments before passing them along to the hoi polloi? If she does, at least she’s in agreement with the Catholic Church on the issue.

Who says religious people are reasonable? If they have 'faith', defined as 'belief without evidence', then they're by definition unreasonable. If they think they have evidence for God, then let's assess that evidence and if they're right then eventually the open-minded atheists will come to the same conclusions. I've had my fair share of discussions with religious people, and I and many others have come to the conclusion that so far the religious DON'T have evidence for their religion being true.



Modernist approaches have certainly worked to further math, biology and physics. But it doesn’t follow that they are the best way to develop ethical systems. That’s one prejudice that the post modernists have largely debunked. And the Transhumanism projects that Dodo supports are specifically based on the notion that rational, purposeful human design will always move us toward a better world – a notion questioned by global warming, nuclear war, and other byproducts of scientific modernism.

Postmodernism itself is debunked. I recommend the following three books on 'modernism':

Infidel - Ayaan Hirsi Ali
Not a technical book on philosophy but actually a memoir. Sometimes real life stories are best to get a point across. 'Infidel' is an eye opener for everyone who thinks morality is relative. Ayaan grew up as a Muslim in Somalia, was oppressed, circumsized and forced into a marriage. She managed to flee to the Netherlands, where she came into contact with 'Western ideals'. The passages of her arrival and acculturation in the Netherlands are the most moving passages I've ever read in a book.

Practical Ethics - Peter Singer
The classic book on utilitarian ethics that actually deals with real-life problems instead of trolley problems. It deals with poverty, euthanasia, abortion (and infanticide), meat eating, immigration and civil (dis)obedience. It also makes quite a convincing case for an 'objective' (or 'collectively subjective' if we want to play semantics) justification of ethics.

The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values - Sam Harris
After the other books, this one is a bit less important but still pretty powerful and well argued. The title says it all.

[Dodo25]

[...] Saying that people would all want to promote well-being can buttress your position only if we would all ever agree on what it would be in regards to behavior modification on a very large scale. There's a personality test thread that's been popping up on LitNet recently, and it might be useful to take a look at when considering this issue. At the risk of being glib (but to still, maybe, get across the basic gist) the only way to get real agreement on this behavior modification thing seems to be the artificial consolidation of all of us into one category (perhaps the one Ray Kurzweil fits in?) or to leave us as we are (some outgoing, some sensitive to assertive types, some intuitive, some introspective, some very sociable, etc.) and just *maybe* use the new genetics-based techniques to take care of some small number that we've traditionally regarded as severely mentally ill. I really can't see a move to genetically modify behavior in large numbers of us--even (especially!?!) gestating infants--catching on at all.

I'm not sure there exists an empirical correlation between personality types and overal happiness. If we find out that for instance INTJ people (what I got) are ON AVERAGE less happy than others, why not try to make people less INTJ? I really doubt such a correlation exists by the way, but if it does, why 'keep' the bad ones?

I concede that I used misleading attributes with 'unbalanced' and 'aggressive'. These attributes can be positive in certain circumstances. I thought about it again, and came up with some basic changes that are of great ethical importance:

1) Health. Whatever makes people healthier is good, and no one should object to changing genes. This includes wiping out genes that increase the risk of getting obese.

2) Longevity. If people don't want to die, they shouldn't have to.

3) Happiness. There are brain chemicals that make people prone to depressions. Many forms of depressions, even mild ones, have genetic factors that increase their likelihood. Away with all of that.

Those three are obvious. There are more attributes that are less obvious but definitely are worth researching.

4) Xenophobia. Evolution has equipped us with an in-group / out-group distinction. That's good for certain purposes, but the exagerated hostility towards the 'out-group' only creates conflict and violence (and racism in general). We can do just fine without it. Doesn't mean we'll have to love everyone..

5) Intelligence

6) Communication skills

7) Beauty (not towards everyone looking the same, haven't you noticed how very different looking people qualify as 'beautiful'?)

8) ...

[Ecurb]

Well, a billion or so people consider Muhammed an ethical genius (or at least a prophet expressing the genius of God), so, benighted as they might be by your modernist standards, they would not agree with you about the basic axioms.

Post modernism, by the way, is not a philosopy. It is a diverse and varied critique of modernism. In those terms, it has been very successful. I'll grant that it has been less successful (and perhaps cannot by its nature be successful) at replacing modernism with some other coherent philosophical approach.


I've had my fair share of discussions with religious people, and I and many others have come to the conclusion that so far the religious DON'T have evidence for their religion being true.

Obviously, religious people have plenty of evidence for their religion, including, but not limited to, personal testimonies, historical written accounts, their own experiences, etc., etc., etc. The evidence may not be persuasive to you (or to me, for that matter), but to say it is not evidence is simply to betray you modernist, scientific prejudices. How are written, eye witness accounts not "evidence"? We may not believe them, but we can hardly throw them out of court for failing to be "evidentiary".

One more general point about planned genetic modification. As with other scientific advances, there will doubtless be unintended consequences. In general, genetic DIVERSITY has adpative value -- genetic HOMOGENEITY does not. A genetically diverse poplulation is more likely to survive plagues, climate shifts, and other dangers than a genetically homogenius one. Indeed, many biologists posit that the major Darwinian advantage of sexual reproduction is that it dramatically diversified the genetic makeup of the population, because genetic diversity was a result even without any mutations.

(Sorry for thinking you were a woman, which I only did because Dodo is a common nickname for Dorothy.)

[cyberbob]

Besides, things aren't as simple as "wiping out" an obesity gene.

A gene that makes eyes blue, for example, could be the obesity gene. It regularly makes eyes blue but in people who live in a certain environment will likely become obese.

That's obviously not true but the reality could be similar. WE call it an obesity gene because that's what we're concentrating on. A biochemist might call the same gene an enzyme producing gene because it's that effect of that gene that's relevant to him.

There is no 1 obesity gene that turns anyone who has it obese. Even if we do find one there is no guarantee that wiping it out will be good for us.

[Baudolina]

Here's a thought I just had on moral relativism: if you are really going to be a consistent moral relativist, then you are under no obligation to respect the moral codes in your or others' cultures. If I had the power to do so, it would be OK for me to forcibly abolish slavery, female genital mutilation/assorted sundry oppression in the Muslim world, etc., and if anyone questioned me I could say: Look, my personal moral code says that this is what I should do, and your belief that I should respect the traditions of others is no superior--it's all relative, right?

It seems to me that moral relativism is a form of "might makes right." We don't have to feel guilty for imposing our way (if we can), but we also don't get to feel wronged or indignant if others are stronger and impose their way on us. I'm not a moral relativist, but I just wanted to point out that if you are consistent about it, it certainly does not mean "We should respect the traditions and moral codes of other cultures." There is no place for "should" in this worldview.

[Dodo25]

Well, a billion or so people consider Muhammed an ethical genius (or at least a prophet expressing the genius of God), so, benighted as they might be by your modernist standards, they would not agree with you about the basic axioms.

If millions of people believe having sex with children is okay that doesn't make it right!



Obviously, religious people have plenty of evidence for their religion, including, but not limited to, personal testimonies, historical written accounts, their own experiences, etc., etc., etc. The evidence may not be persuasive to you (or to me, for that matter), but to say it is not evidence is simply to betray you modernist, scientific prejudices. How are written, eye witness accounts not "evidence"? We may not believe them, but we can hardly throw them out of court for failing to be "evidentiary".

'Modernist, scientific prejudices' -- LOL. Those aren't prejudices. It's the scientific method, the most successful achievement of the human species. It brought us the computer you write on, it brought us to the moon (and to Tschernobyl and Hiroshima). We now understand the interferences of freaking sub-atomic particles! When did religion ever do such a thing? Or any other kind of 'worldview' that supposedly is equally valid than science? There are good reasons for why we shouldn't accept the evidence of religious people, one is for instance that their 'piecies of pseudo-evidence' are often mutually contradicting!



One more general point about planned genetic modification. As with other scientific advances, there will doubtless be unintended consequences. In general, genetic DIVERSITY has adpative value -- genetic HOMOGENEITY does not. A genetically diverse poplulation is more likely to survive plagues, climate shifts, and other dangers than a genetically homogenius one. Indeed, many biologists posit that the major Darwinian advantage of sexual reproduction is that it dramatically diversified the genetic makeup of the population, because genetic diversity was a result even without any mutations.

True but it wouldn't matter anymore. If we know what every gene is for, and if we can modify them as we want, we will overcome plagues and viruses easily. I'm surprised by the way that you seem to have a basic understanding of science (biology), makes me wonder where the 'scientific prejudices' attitude originated..



(Sorry for thinking you were a woman, which I only did because Dodo is a common nickname for Dorothy.)

No problem. I didn't even think of that... I meant the bird though haha.

[Baudolina]

Yes, I don't understand what people mean when they talk about science as if it were some kind of worldview or attitude. The scientific method is simply the application of common sense to the natural world. The only thing separating it from everyday applications of reason, such as determining what kind of animal is getting into the garbage bin at night by examining footprints, is that we are more careful and rigorous in going about it.

[Ecurb]

'Modernist, scientific prejudices' -- LOL. Those aren't prejudices. It's the scientific method, the most successful achievement of the human species. It brought us the computer you write on, it brought us to the moon (and to Tschernobyl and Hiroshima). We now understand the interferences of freaking sub-atomic particles! When did religion ever do such a thing? Or any other kind of 'worldview' that supposedly is equally valid than science? There are good reasons for why we shouldn't accept the evidence of religious people, one is for instance that their 'piecies of pseudo-evidence' are often mutually contradicting!.

Well... nobody can possibly deny that computers are at least comparable to, if not superior to, God......

I'm not an expert on post modernism -- but from a philosophical point of view it has questioned the epistomology of science. Karl Popper (the great modernist philosopher of science) developed the notion that science moves forward through "falsification". That's how he tries to deal with the "problem of induction" -- an epistemological problem science has never fully dealt with. In other words, because we have never seen a pig fly, can we say that pigs don't fly? There is, of course, no logical way to come to that conclusion. However, Popper thought that by repeatedly experimenting and investigating to try to falsify the theory that pigs cannot fly, the theory gains credibility.

Post modern philosophers of science (Kuhn being the earliest, and the only one I know much about) think that science is affected not only by a methodological search for some kind of truth, but by politics, intellectual investments, and any number of other social and cultural factors (and he's obviously right). That's why I don't understand why so many people despise post modernism -- I think what they either find it threatening because it criticizes modernism, or because they don't understand it. Of course I don't understand most of it either -- but I like that. If I can't understand something, I always think it must be complicated enought to possibly be correct.

One more thing: I'll grant that science has been instrumental in creating massive technological advances. It's very good at that. It's practical (if epistemologically flawed). But the notion that because certain methods are good at developing technology those same methods would be good at developing ethics is a leap of faith. You can't chop down a tree with a steak knife, and I wouldn't want to cut my steak with a chainsaw, either.

[Dodo25]

Post modern philosophers of science (Kuhn being the earliest, and the only one I know much about) think that science is affected not only by a methodological search for some kind of truth, but by politics, intellectual investments, and any number of other social and cultural factors (and he's obviously right). That's why I don't understand why so many people despise post modernism -- I think what they either find it threatening because it criticizes modernism, or because they don't understand it. Of course I don't understand most of it either -- but I like that. If I can't understand something, I always think it must be complicated enought to possibly be correct.

I'm quite familiar with postmodernism, I just think it's nonsense. Postmodernist reasoning goes something like this:

"SOMETIMES, the ideology of a scientist or a culture MIGHT affect the findings TO A SMALL EXTENT, therefore all truth is relative and we can't ever know anything!! So let's be agnostic about everything there is, except agnosticism itself which we dogmatically accept. Gödel is our god for he showed that nothing can ever be proven for sure. Kuhn is a hero because he showed that Newton was just as right as Einstein!"

And so forth, and then these postmodernists hypocritically turn on a TV without having the faintest idea of the science and 'theories' behind it.

I'm caricaturing, yeah, but the sad thing is only a little actually..

[Ecurb]

What if all truth IS relative and we can't ever really know anything? Do you still object?

[Oniw17]

Just because you can't know anything doesn't mean that you can't have a good reason for believing the way you do. I don't know the sun's going to rise in the east tomorrow 100%, but I have a pretty firm belief that it will, and for a good reason.

[efdaney]

But lets just go back to the original question for a second and think about this in terms of the ends justifying the means. We currently do not understand everything about the human genome, not even close. So we are not yet able to engineer ourselves in terms of happiness, intelligence, beauty, etc. We may have that capability in the future, but that is not certain. Even if it were, tampering with evolution would be extremely risky, for obvious reasons. Right now, what we are able to do, is eliminate some of the actual CAUSES of suffering. MOST of the suffering in the world today is caused by environmental and cultural factors such as poverty and war, rather than genetically low levels of serotonin in the brain. Lets take obesity for example. America has a problem with obesity, in large (no pun intended), because capitalism and our culture tells people they need foods which are not healthy for them. So right now, we can try to change that perception and educate people about making healthy food choices. It would be a mistake to assume that one day we will be able to just wave a wand, and 'poof,' problems like obesity are gone. Nothing is that simple. All actions have repercussions, and engineering the human genome will as well. Plus, people having an obesity gene would be less succeptible to starvation, which is still a problem, even in first world nations. So we need to deal with that first, then worry about eliminating the gene for obesity.
So my point is, it is okay to talk about ethical repercussions of changing the genome, for when that time comes. However, we are still expending energy in investigating how to do that. And we must consider that tampering with life on such a basic level is extremely risky, simply in that it has never been done before. I just think that we could focus more on changing socioeconomic factors that impact quality of life, rather than one day creating human beings without flaws. We may be able to eliminate some of these problems through other means, and not have to remove a gene from the species which could be advantageous in some situations.

[Cunninglinguist]

Hm. So we ask the question: do the ends justify the means? What about the antithetical question: do the means justify the ends?

The problem with these kinds of thought experiments is that they polarize people and place them into either consequentialist and deontological camps. Both have their criticisms that seem incorrigible, and in many instances both are morally counter-intuitive (my favorite example is Phillipa Foot's trolley-problem and variations thereof). I beg to ask, if a moral theory tells you to do what seems obviously wrong, what is that theory really worth, should it not be rectified? In the end, our moral theories are based on our intuitions and will end with our intuitions.

Consequentialism and deontology are in limbo between being theories of practical ethics and metaethics. Not only do they fail to guide us through every situation, relatively few people actually apply them in daily life.

In the end, these kinds of thought experiments are quite unanswerable because they do not grant any kind of situational appreciation. They do not let the agent practice any kind of "wisdom" she has.



Do the ends justify the means? It depends on how the moral calculus comes out at the end of the day. If the good ends are worth, say, 100 "virtue" points, and all the bad things you did during the "means" phase was worth -200 virtue points, then at the end of the day you are 100 points in the hole, so in this case, no. So the answer to this question is, Not always. The proper question to ask when confronted with one of these situations is: Do the ends outweigh the means? If yes then do it, if not then don't. But it is a mistake to give special weight to the ends just because they come later in time.

So who decides how many virtue points are assigned to the ends and to the means? It's still measured by intuitions, which vary from person to person. Seems like you're just trying to use numbers as "virtue points" to give your "virtue" facile or ostensible objectivity, which you have not established. Of course you can assert that there is objective goodness, but without adequately defining it and giving a sufficient proof for it, what you've said is meaningless.

[Cunninglinguist]

I think this debate about postmodernism can be remedied with a healthy dose of Kant.

We cannot have a universal test of truth, because then we would have to test it against itself, which would be circular and thus an inconsistent argument.

Logic is the negative form of the truth. What is illogical cannot be true. What is logical might be true. But since we can never know objects in themselves (following transcendental idealism) we can never be certain of our premises, that is, we can never have well grounded facts about things, unless these things are revealed to us a priori (that is, necessarily true). To function sensibly, we must assume or imagine (through induction) that our sense impressions and the conceptions that we surmise from them correspond to real things, notwithstanding the (a priori) fact that we cannot prove their existence.

As for the defense of the existence of a priori knowledge, we may be brains in a vat, yet the laws that govern mathematics would be the same unconditionally. That is, math would be the same if we were or if we were not. Same goes for the laws of logic. The reason for this, according to Kant, is because they are presented to us in space and time, without which experience is impossible.

Unfortunately one would be hard pressed to reject Kant on this. Those who feel the need to give reasons to denounce logic fall into a patent hypocrisy.

[Dodo25]

I beg to ask, if a moral theory tells you to do what seems obviously wrong, what is that theory really worth, should it not be rectified? In the end, our moral theories are based on our intuitions and will end with our intuitions.

Hopefully not. Our intuitions evolved in order to make us survive and reproduce, not in order to perfectly judge ethical situations. Trolley problem surveys have shown that things like 'race of the to-be-killed' affects the choices, so much for intuition..

[Cunninglinguist]

Hopefully not. Our intuitions evolved in order to make us survive and reproduce, not in order to perfectly judge ethical situations. Trolley problem surveys have shown that things like 'race of the to-be-killed' affects the choices, so much for intuition..

Our moral intuitions are probably a result of our genes and our conditioning, not just our genes.

At any rate, there is no measure to determine whether or not something is unconditionally good. This is for the same reason that there is no test to determine positive truth. We must subject the test to itself, which renders it circular, logically inconsistent and thus meaningless.

Since there is no measure of unconditional goodness, goodness (and therefore morality) must be measured by subjective intuitions. Of course, one can define an objective measure, such as "the overall well-being of the human race," but this definition is only assumed because it conforms with ones prescribed intuition of goodness. In other words, the objective measure is still contingent on intuitions. One can suppose that if an alien race came to our planet, they might not share the same measure of goodness that we do.

With that said, I do think one can argue that one intuition is more consistent (not logically but with the rest of the intuitions one has) than another, and assuming that we all share a base set of intuitions, in this way the human race can achieve some level of moral unification. But nevertheless, morals and goodness still start with intuitions and end with them.

[cyberbob]

Dodo25 have you read the Moral Landscape by Sam Harris?

Some of your ideas remind me of it.

I also wonder if there's any definite answers about morality that we can find through neuroscientific research. Personally, I think we can.

Like Harris says, there is no ONE right food, but that doesn't mean that the question of nutrition is purely subjective.

[Baudolina]

So who decides how many virtue points are assigned to the ends and to the means? It's still measured by intuitions, which vary from person to person. Seems like you're just trying to use numbers as "virtue points" to give your "virtue" facile or ostensible objectivity, which you have not established. Of course you can assert that there is objective goodness, but without adequately defining it and giving a sufficient proof for it, what you've said is meaningless.

I was using numbers to draw a parallel with the concept of expected value in probability. By virtue points I mean the "amount of utility." Of course it is somewhat silly to make this quantitative and do calculations, and of course the assessment of utility is subjective. My only point is to emphasize that any bad things occuring as part of the "means" phase of some project need to be taken into account in deciding whether it is the right thing to do. For example, what if killing 1 million animals would ultimately result in the perfection of lipstick? Lipstick that lasted all day, looked great, etc. If the ends justified the means, then we should embark on this project. Saying "The ends justify the means" without qualification is effectively saying that, provided the end has even marginal utility, any means are justified, even ones with tremendous negative utility.

[Dodo25]

Dodo25 have you read the Moral Landscape by Sam Harris?

Some of your ideas remind me of it.

I also wonder if there's any definite answers about morality that we can find through neuroscientific research. Personally, I think we can.

Like Harris says, there is no ONE right food, but that doesn't mean that the question of nutrition is purely subjective.

Good point. Yeah I've read it, I think I even recommended it somewhere in this thread. I like Harris' approach a lot. Yet the most important book on ethics still remains Singer's 'Practical Ethics', mostly because it makes a lot of actual suggestions, unlike Harris' book which is quite general and doesn't really tell you 'what to do' after all.