Ok, I am currently re-reading Milton's Paradise Lost along with Dante's Divine Comedy for the first time. I had been considering posting this in the Milton sub-forum but decided it'd probably have a better chance of being seen here.
My copy of PL is the 2003 Penguin Classics edition which has an introduction by John Leonard. The part I want to discuss can be found in the intro on pages xxvi & xxvii in this edition. For those of you without this edition I'll post the relevant parts here:
Firstly the free-will argument:
Now the Fortunate Fall:How can Adam & Eve be free when God foresees their every act and speaks of their Fall as a certainty before it has even happened (iii 93-7)? Milton addresses this in De Doctrina Christiana. He there draws a distinction between certainty & necessity. Because God has foreseen the Fall from all eternity, and because his knowledge is infallible, the Fall was always a certainty. But it was not necessitated by any divine decree. It was a free act in the moment of its occurence. God foresaw the Fall, and permitted it, but he did not make it happen. He therefore has every right to hold Adam & Eve responsible for their disobedience.
/SNIP/
So long as Adam & Eve are free to resist Satan's temptation, his act of tempting them does not necessitate their fall. One might even argue that God aids and abets Satan's arrival into paradise for the benign reason that he respects Adam & Eve's freedom, and does not want to censor their experiences
Answering Empson:In an influential article published in 1937, Arthur Lovejoy invoked the medieval notion of a felix culpa or Fortunate Fall to argue that Adam & Eve's sin is paradoxically a cause for celebration. Lovejoy sees Milton's God as working for the Fall all along. God wants humankind to fall so that he can show us his goodness by restoring us. Our final state will be happier than that from which we fell. God contrives the Fall, then, but his motives are benign. Empson siezes on this argument - If God contrives the Fall he must be what Milton says he is not: the author of sin. The doctrine of the Fortunate Fall would place God in the awkward position of secretly wanting Adam & Eve to do what he tells them not to do, and condemns them for doing. Worse, the doctrine would make all God's warnings hypocritical.
So what am I interested in finding out:Danielson questions Empson's assumption that the Fall is forunate.
/SNIP/
God brings good out of evil, but that is not enough to make the Fall fortunate. The fall can be fortunate only if the good that comes out of it could not have come about in any other way. The key question is whether God needs evil. Does God require Adam & Eve to eat the apple as a necessary pre-condition for the ultimate and supreme happiness of those few human beings who will enjoy it?
Well firstly I am not particularly interested in another "free-will" discussion, they tend to go round in circles.
I would like opinions on the following:
Do you agree with Empson that the idea of a Fortunate Fall implicates God?
Could the goodness of God come from any way other than the original Fall?
Does God need evil?





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