William Lane Craig and the Kalam Cosmological Argument

[YesNo]

Is this the Krauss everyone is referring to?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9eNjmN9Xtmg

He got completely savaged by Craig in that debate and then had the gall to write a nasty blog about Craig afterward, one to which Craig responded with typical class. Seriously, of all Craig's debate opponents, Krauss was probably the worst--at the very least, one of the worst.

Excerpt from Krauss's blog:

I believe that if I erred at all, it was in an effort to consider the sensibilities of the 1200 smiling young faces in the audience, who earnestly came out, mostly to hear Craig, and to whom I decided to show undue respect. As I stressed at the time, I did not come to debate the existence of God, but rather to debate about evidence for the existence of God. I also wanted to demonstrate the need for nuance, to explain how these issues are far more complex than Craig, in his simplistic view of the world, makes them out to be.


For the record, I cannot recall a single thing the audience did to Krauss to make him think any respect he showed them was "undue." The truth is that Krauss was horribly unprepared, ended up making a fool of himself and used his blog to vent his narcissistic rage.

The following link is to Krauss's entire blog post and Craig's response.

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/lawre...nd-perspective

That looks like the Krauss I was referring to.

Just looking at the introductory arguments, I see that Craig has dealt with the multiverse as well. It also must have had a beginning based on a theorem provided by scientists themselves.

His first four arguments I accept. I have problems with the fifth argument since I suspect it leads to an acceptance of Jesus as the only possibility for the God he shows is likely to exist from the first four arguments. However, Jesus is certainly a candidate.

Craig doesn't win these debates simply because he is a good debater. He wins these debates because he is a good debater and the evidence is all on his side.

[stuntpickle]

The small changes over time seems to contradict the punctuated equilibrium arguments of Eldridge and Gould, but that is a side issue.

This is a very good point. I do not disbelieve the theory of evolution. But I do believe most evolutionists are dishonest with most Christians when they try to explain the mechanisms in terms of gradualism, but then turn around and defend the fossil record in terms of punctuated equilibrium. Evolution has been in a bit of a crisis for a while. And although I suspect it will pull through with a more refined theory, I think it's a shame that its proponents won't own the inherent problems.

[stuntpickle]

Craig doesn't win these debates simply because he is a good debater. He wins these debates because he is a good debater and the evidence is all on his side.

I agree. I think it's disingenuous at best to pretend Craig is simply a good debater and horrible where it counts. The fact is that developments in the sciences have made theism respectable again.

[MorpheusSandman]

No, the uniformity of physical laws is not an observation, but an inductive inference from an inconsequential amount of observation and a lot of philosophizing.

I realize science grew out of philosophy, I realize philosophy is still heavily studied, written, and read, I may disagree that science doesn't oppose philosophy concerning God, but that's neither here nor there, so I'm going to go ahead and only address the point you made that had anything to do with what I said, which is the above.

I'll agree that every physical law we call a law is based on inductive inference from observation, but I'm not sure where you think the "philosophizing" is necessary, or why you'd call such observations an "inconsequential amount". Laws are observations that have held 100% of the time in every tested observation. Now, of course, there will always be more trials, and there's always some probability that, for some completely unknown reason, a law may suddenly fail to hold. It's similar to the Newcomb Problem in Decision Theory this discusses a scenario that seems to contradict our model of how things work and, thus, destroys the model of decision theory itself. Popper's answer was that science wasn't about induction to begin with, but about attempts to falsify existing theories, and science simply chooses amongst those that haven't been falsified.

Either way, I never really saw what problem people had with this. All it's saying is that our knowledge is limited our models constructed based on the consistency of observing reality and certain causal relations in reality. I don't think scientists would have a problem saying that there's always a chance that one day those observations will stop holding and will upset every theoretical and conjectural and assumption base we have, but until then they don't feel the need to make any absolute claims about such things, or, at the least we can claim that laws are based on the consistency of our observations of reality and thus, we assume (even if we're prepared to be wrong), that it isn't simply limited to our subjectivity and finite observations.

The nothing Craig is referring to is not observable because it isn't A thing but NO thing... The word "nothing" is hardly incoherent... You are literally trying to impose the standards of empirical observation on nothing.

OK, we know you know something of philosophy, do you know something about semiotics? Saussure famously broke the study of signs into three categories:

Signifier (in language, the word itself as text or sound)
Signified aka Intension (the subjective concept of the word)
Referrent aka Extension (the external thing the word refers to)

If you analyze "nothing" under these three terms you can see that nothing clearly has a signified (in terms of our internal concept of what it means), but what I'm arguing is that since the discovery by physicists that empty space is not empty, "nothing" may no longer have an referent, an external "thing" it refers to. If empty space is not nothing, then what is nothing? I'm sorry, but Craig CLEARLY resorts to observations of the physical world when he argues that nothing can't come from nothing. All of his examples are observations, meaning he has a referent in mind when he uses the term. Unfortunately, he has already eliminated his referent from being nothing! So what I'm asking is: what is Craig's referent for "nothing" now? Because if it no longer corresponds to anything external in reality, like his examples are, then "nothing" is, indeed, incoherent on a referential level.

Put simply: How can one make the statement "nothing comes from nothing" if "nothing" has not been observed to exist, much less nothing coming from it?" It's very much like saying "blutaks can't come from blutaks." Well, what's a blutak? What's nothing? If you say "the absence of any thing," then I ask you "is 'the absence of any thing' possible?" I don't see how you think that "nothing comes from nothing" isn't based on empirical observation. The ancients observed empty space, noticed nothing spontaneously appeared in it, and said "nothing comes from nothing." Their notion of nothing (empty space) isn't nothing (according to Craig and physicists), so the entire basis for the original statement is demolished.

"Cogito ergo sum" does not come from observing the physical world.

Our brains are part of the physical world.

The only reason you've only heard Craig talk about Eskimo villages and Beethoven is because you haven't read his scholarly material...

So he's knowingly lying and being manipulative then?

In fact, the most common example he uses is that he (I) came into existence, and he is talking about the Cartesian I.

Fine, but the Cartesian I comes into existence out of the reordering of material that already exists. It's not evidence for nothing comes from nothing, it's evidence that something comes from something.

Craig has never claimed to have actually observed an actual phenomenon of nothing coming from nothing.

What he has done is used arguments based on observations of the physical world (Eskimo villages and Beethoven and...) to support that nothing comes from nothing, but why would he do this unless he was referring to some aspect of the physical universe as nothing? Otherwise, I repeat, it's not argument that nothing comes from nothing, it's an argument that things come from something.

When you make the ridiculous demand to be "shown nothing", you must understand that everyone in the world just complied with your request.

Nope, they complied with a request to show me something not physically observable, which is not the same nothing Craig is referring to, since he's already stated that's not nothing. Try again.

The only thing we know about quantum fluctuations is that we don't know what's going on. There are any number of theories about what is happening, and no one knows for sure. Craig isn't required to demonstrate how this is caused since it's your point. You are asserting that these particles come into being without a cause, and we do not know that to be the case.

1. I'm not saying they don't have a cause.

2. Craig is the one claiming everything has a cause.

3. The cause of virtual particles is unknown

4. Craig's "everything has a cause" proposition fails until we know what that cause is.

5. What we do know about quantum fluctuations is they appear to be purely probabilistic. We know what they are contingent on, but the closer we get to measuring mass or velocity, the farther we get from being able to measure the other, thus making their position impossible to predict.

QP presents a very real problem to our classical notions of causality, because causality is very much based on predictably observable consistency. When dealing with something that seems purely probabilistic, how does causality apply? What's more, even without this problem, how does Craig apply the notion of causality prior to the universe and, hence, prior to spacetime? (FWIW, if you don't know, look up his arguments on atemporal causality. Every scientist I've shown them to has called them rather laughable and, at best, a distortion of what we know of as causality).

No, that's not all anyone can do. One can actually try to adjudicate the issues, and I believe Craig is capable of doing that.

Yes, that's why he's not even listed here.

The irony of bringing up Godel's incompleteness theorems is awesome. So we agree truth does not entail provability and that the more precise a system is the more incomplete it is? So you admit that God could exist regardless of what reason has to say about it?

What does any of this have to do with the incompleteness theorems being related to understanding the infinite through finite models like the natural numbers?

I've never denied that God could exist regardless of anything. But if God exist it must exist out there somewhere in the unknown, and arguing about whether God is out there is as productive as arguing if anything else is out there.

But when you actually render the round pie of the infinite into a physical world of knives, it all goes to crap. People can simply start cutting pieces. Observation is a knife. We are subtracting from your supposed infinite all the time.

Observation is a knife, but it's only cutting in our mind, not in reality. The fact that we see a plane and its parts as distinct from each other and everything around it doesn't change the fact that it's actually just a collection of quanta that we can't see. Likewise, the fact that we can mentally draw lines through the infinite and keep them in compartments in our mind that make them seem/feel separate doesn't mean they actually are. We're just engaging in the mind-projection fallacy, no different than saying that the sun must move around the earth because we observe it moving in the sky.

When I sit down in a chair, I expect the chair not to dissolve into nothingness, which is a metaphysical intuition.

When I see the sun moving across the sky, I expect that the sun is actually moving across the sky.

Look, you sound like a really smart guy who has done a lot of research on his own, but I think there are some unfortunate deficiencies that make the conversation very weird.

Perhaps. But it's no different than when I (and others) try to discuss science or math or probabilities with theists who have unfortunate deficiencies that make those conversations weird too. Ever tried to explain to people how Bayes works?

You make it sound as though Krauss would fare better in written format.

Krauss would fare better if he and Craig actually sit down to discuss the science that Craig bases his first premise on in any format, because Krauss knows the science infinitely better than Craig. It's like how so many theists want to see Craig debate Dawkins but, for the life of me, I don't know why, because, AFAIK, Craig has never really debated on the subject of evolutionary biology.

Krauss's problem ...(was) that he doesn't know the first thing about how to properly frame the discussion.

Right, which is a debate tactic.

He was ridiculing Bayesian probability during the debate and tried to say Craig was attempting to obscure the conversation with some ludicrous equations. And the truth is Bayesian probability is the only way to approach the issue of the debate, which Krauss, himself, chose.

Carrier has dismantled some of Craig's arguments using Bayesian probabilities in print before. I don't recall Krauss ridiculing Bayesian probability; what I think he was ridiculing was Craig's usage of it. Maybe I'm wrong... what part of the video are you referring to?

FWIW, I'm very skeptical that Craig really understands how to apply Bayes' Theorem. The Krauss debate isn't a good example because all he's doing is talking about it abstract terms but not actual probabilities. IIRC, it was in the context of Jesus' Resurrection, and this is really a relatively new area of investigation (in fact, Bayesian application to historical studies is new, in general). Carrier discusses this in depth in many of his books, but reading arguments on both sides of this issue is a bit like wading through mud, because figuring out the correct priors to assign to events from thousands of years ago that we only have limited access to through what writings have remained is very, very difficult and very, very complex.

Certainty died with logical positivism. All premises are now only probable.

Then stick with discussing probabilities. There's no reason for syllogisms.

I rightly pointed out that Craig was talking about the same nothing that was in orthodox Big Bang cosmology, which is NOT ambient energy.

I actually looked up Craig's argument on this matter, just to see what you were referring to. All I can figure is that either Craig is referring to the singularity itself as nothing, or he's saying that there was a point when space-time didn't exist, and that was nothing. Either way, he's wrong. Firstly, because we can only trace the origin of the universe back so far, and we simply intuit that the universe with a diameter of 0 actually happened. Problem is that general relatively breaks down before we start to get there and enter Planck time, and then we're into quantum events. Thus far, those quantum events are as far back as we can look, and if they were always there (a possibility), the singularity may never have happened. Quantum gravity is one attempt to reconcile QM and GR, and if it proves successful, we may come to conclusion that everything, including space-time, formed from that. So, I'm still not sure this "nothing" is actually "nothing" in any meaningful sense of the word. An infinitely dense point, if it actually happened, isn't nothing, and we're not sure what was there before planck time and the point where (if) QM breaks down.

Maybe I'm missing something, but feel free point me out to a full argument from Craig about how the earliest known points in the universe are actually supposed to be "nothing," because I'm not sure how a singularity (again, if that's something that's an actuality, rather than just an intuitive extension of what we know from expansion) is "nothing".

[MorpheusSandman]

The small changes over time seems to contradict the punctuated equilibrium arguments of Eldridge and Gould, but that is a side issue.

FWIW, Eldridge and Gould's boldest claims have been widely criticized, and I would say the majority of evidence and evolutionary biologists are still on the Neo-Darwinist's side. Of course, that's ad populum and authority again but, again, it's hard for folks like us to go on much else.

We know how long life existed on the planet. We know the rate of random mutations. I don't know how many random changes are necessary to go from the simplest DNA to the most complicated DNA (which may not be human DNA). I don't know what a unit of such change would be in the DNA. Can anyone provide a link that would help with information on this?

I'll ask some evolutionary biologists I know and get back to you...

Craig doesn't win these debates simply because he is a good debater. He wins these debates because he is a good debater and the evidence is all on his side.

No, he wins because he's a good debater. Consider this: The time limit on most presentations is usually about 20-minutes. A normal person speaks at a rate of 200-250 words-per-minute, and that amounts to 5000 words, maybe 6000 words if they talk fast. That's the size of a mid-sized written essay.

In most of these debates, Craig is dealing with subjects on which mountains have been written, including tons of various theories, all of which has their evidence, arguments, and detractors. Do you REALLY think one can cover such a controversial subject as the origin of the universe in the span of a live formal debate? One can summarize, but then we're talking about the ability to cherry-pick through summaries that support your side. Craig is very good at this, and he frequently cherry-picks sources that outright state they disagree with his conclusions (Guth & Vilenkin, eg).

Craig gets away with making all kinds of claims and quote-mining because his opponents are not equipped and capable of spouting off the most concise counter-argument summations to many of his various claims, sometimes because they're honest enough to do like Krauss and repeatedly say "we don't know," which is really all any honest person can say when it comes to the earliest point of the universe's existence. In the meantime, Craig "wows" by making all kinds of "points" (summary conclusions) that his opponents don't address, either because they are unaware of the available objections and arguments (perhaps because they're outside their specialty), or because they feel there's simply too much to go into and not enough time. I'm pretty sure that's the case when it comes to Krauss, because instead of going into the many theories that exist to explain QM or the earliest cosmology, he talks about what we DO know and how that is currently presenting us with even MORE questions. What's going to sound more convincing: someone making summarized, concise, positive arguments, or someone repeatedly saying "everything we learn just seems to confirm how much we don't have a clue"?

FWIW, Craig has stumbled in debates where he's been with opponents that are equally equipped as he is. Stenger finally got him to go almost fully on the subject of early cosmology and I think Stenger, if he loses at all, is only on speed and organization (as LukeProg noted). I actually thought Craig got beat by Kagan on the subject of morality without God in their debate. Craig, to my complete surprised, seemed quite unprepared for many of Kagan's points and rebuttals (I also thought Craig lost to Sinnott-Armstrong in their debate on morals in their book-long debate, actually; I think Craig has a pretty pitiful response to the Problem of Evil, which is basically "we can't know God's plans," or the retreat to ignorance and the possible). I also think Craig lost on pure logic (another rarity) to Parsons, but that debate was a bit technical for my tastes, actually.

One thing that I'm disturbed that nobody has ever mentioned when Craig uses the resurrection as a basis for arguing for God is that Craig often switches from making the circumstantial evidence surrounding the resurrection as evidence for it, but then admits that the resurrection is only unlikely if we "presume" naturalism, but that it would be perfectly reasonable if we "presume" God. But you can't, on the one hand, use the resurrection as an inductive evidence for God, but then presume God and the supernatural to argue for the likelihood of the resurrection! That's ACTUAL question begging. Likewise, using naturalistic bases for Bayesian priors, I don't think any circumstantial evidence could ever overcome the initial improbability of a resurrection. As I see it, the only way to get over that problem is to first presume God, but then that doesn't help us either because we would then lose any basis for a prior if we're not using naturalism with regards to resurrections!

[YesNo]

FWIW, Eldridge and Gould's boldest claims have been widely criticized, and I would say the majority of evidence and evolutionary biologists are still on the Neo-Darwinist's side. Of course, that's ad populum and authority again but, again, it's hard for folks like us to go on much else.

One point I'm trying to make with bringing up Eldridge and Gould is that punctuated equilibrium (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punctuated_equilibrium) is a currently valid alternative to phyletic gradualism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phyletic_gradualism). Contrast that with the Standard Model of Cosmology (aka, the Big Bang) where there is no surviving alternative since the results of the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe came in.

Craig gets away with making all kinds of claims and quote-mining because his opponents are not equipped and capable of spouting off the most concise counter-argument summations to many of his various claims, sometimes because they're honest enough to do like Krauss and repeatedly say "we don't know," which is really all any honest person can say when it comes to the earliest point of the universe's existence.

Everyone should know by now what Craig's arguments are going to be especially the core argument that the universe--space, time, matter and energy--had a beginning 13.73 billion years ago. If you want to stop him, you have to show that something is eternal besides God, but with the confirmation of the big bang that is difficult to do.

He mentioned one thing in the debate that I was unaware of, and apparently so was Krauss. It seems that the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem also requires the multiverse to have a beginning. So the multiverse is not an alternative to God either. It was crucial that Krauss address this, but he really had nothing to say except to repeat that the multiverse was "eternal". I would have expected more from him than that.

It seems that Craig backed Krauss into a corner by using evidence coming right out of Krauss' field. It's no wonder Craig wins these debates.

[stuntpickle]

Morpheus, I want to take a second to get the conversation back on track. This is not an argument about the existence of God, but rather one concerning whether the Kalam has "serious flaws". You seem to think we're engaged in an argument over God and are conducting this discussion in that manner.

What I dislike so much about debating whether God exists is that such discussions generally end up like this one--with a preponderance of problems that mount faster than they can be addressed. We both end up writing increasingly longer posts, and the result is something like a high school Lincoln-Douglas debate in which the participants are not particularly invested in their assertions and are just trying to exhaust the opposition with superfluous statements. In light of this, I'm going to try and limit myself to covering a few basic points, rather than going line by line.

First, logic is a mode of discourse that occurs only once any number of things have been taken for granted--even if only logic, itself. For any discussion to take place, we have to agree on something so that we may have a foundation from which to begin. The notion that the theist has the explanatory onus since he's making all the assertions is a sort of half-truth perpetuated by popular atheism. The whole truth is that most philosophical disagreements involve differing world views, both of which imply a number of assertions that cannot be proved with certainty.

Our major disagreement does not concern the existence of God. The disagreement is not one primarily of atheism vs. theism, but one of metaphysical naturalism vs. metaphysical dualism. Your atheism isn't simply a lack of belief in God, but rather an entailment of a naturalistic worldview that assumes any number of metaphysical and epistemological premises with which I do not agree and which are easily attacked. The same can be said for my dualism.

The strategy for our discussion must be one that provides some common ground from which to start, but unfortunately, many of your objections wrongly assume naturalistic assertions that trespass on our ability to even discuss the issue. The most glaring example of this was when you tried to deny metaphysics altogether, which was ironically a variety of metaphysical statement (in which you seem to be claiming that metaphysics didn't exist). This is a poor objection for any number of reasons, but mostly because you have, after making it, the monstrous task of defending it. And I can't think of a single philosopher, atheist or theist, who would defend this assertion.

Your objection about Craig admitting to the probabilistic nature of the Kalam's premises is so wildly off-base that it's hard to address. Consider the following argument that is used as the classic example of the syllogism:

1. All men are mortal.
2. Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

This is the strongest type of argument because it is forcing. If the premises are true, then the conclusion follows necessarily. No one has any doubt about whether this argument is a forcing syllogism. That is, however, not to say that its premises are certain. We don't have a total knowledge about the mortality of men. The statement is an inductive inference. Humanity could have developed an earlier Civilization, departed the Earth, conquered aging with genetics and now be living in the vicinity of Alpha Centauri as immortals. This, of course, is not likely, but it is logically possible. Socrates might have been a woman living in disguise, or the name of Plato's dog, or simply a fictional construct. This, of course, isn't likely, but it is possible.

It is nearly impossible to ascertain the truth of most statements. This does not at all affect the nature of the deduction. When Craig calls the Kalam "the strongest type of argument", he is correct in doing so, simply because it is obviously one in which the conclusion follows necessarily IF the premises are true. And Craig always adds "if the premises are true" simply because that's the correct qualification one encounters in most introductory logic texts. What Craig is saying is not at all controversial, but you seem to think it's a knockout refutation. No philosopher would be willing to make the same refutation you did, because the refutation is demonstrably wrong. One need only check out a logic primer to discover this.

Like this:

http://web.cn.edu/kwheeler/documents/Syllogisms.pdf

You seem to think that because you can reasonably question the premises that the argument isn't forcing. And frankly, that's just wrong.

Look, you seem like an exceptioanlly bright guy. I think you would be well served by actually taking a look into logic. There have to be some open courses online that you can take for free. Not only will it help you in discussing arguments for the existence of God, but it will also greatly increase your appreciation of philosophy in general.

I hope this doesn't seem like a personal attack. I certainly don't intend it that way. I have actually enjoyed the conversation even though it was at times frustrating. Good luck and have fun debating God's existence in the future.

[Mutatis-Mutandis]

That was actually a very interesting and informatice post, stuntpickle. Thanks.

I watched parts of the debate, and while I agree with Krauss's position, he struck me as an all around a-hole who gives atheists a bad name--his arrogance, his dress, the very way he would slouch back in his chair as if he was above it all. Craig had class.

I don't pretend to know logic. It seems like its purpose is to complicate what would otherwise be simple things. The above post made it a little clearer.

[KillCarneyKlans]

The MetaCosmoBio - The use of creation, ie origins and re-creation, ie evolution in a justapostioned argument against

http://www.historum.com/blogs/killca...d-origins.html

You just say there is a correlation. That is a meaningless statement without demonstrating there is a mechanism that allegedly connects them, much less how this mechanism works

© 1993-2003 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Correlation - [Looks a lot what I'm talking about doesn't it]

When two social, physical, or biological phenomena increase or decrease proportionately and simultaneously because of identical external factors, the phenomena are correlated positively; under the same conditions, if one increases in the same proportion that the other decreases, the two phenomena are negatively correlated. Investigators calculate the degree of correlation by applying a coefficient of correlation to data concerning the two phenomena. The most common correlation coefficient is expressed as

E(x/o°(x).y/o°(y))/n

in which x is the deviation of one variable from its mean, y is the deviation of the other variable from its mean, and N is the total number of cases in the series. A perfect positive correlation between the two variables results in a coefficient of +1, a perfect negative correlation in a coefficient of -1, and a total absence of correlation in a coefficient of 0. Intermediate values between +1 and 0 or -1 are interpreted by degree of correlation. Thus, .89 indicates high positive correlation, -.76 high negative correlation, and .13 low positive correlation.



http://www.historum.com/blogs/killca...ml#comment1148
As has been implied above, the Creation may be treated as a three-dimensional event - which suggests that the application of simple principles of coordinate geometry will best lead to a satisfactory conceptual realisation. We proceed accordingly.

Fig.1 depicts a standard left-handed coordinate system in the region of the origin (O). Proceeding from O, the progression of events in time is recorded along each axis: the 6 days of earth's creation along x, and the 6 days of heaven's creation along z. The suggestion is that the square OLMN (shaded blue) lying in the xz-plane is a fair geometrical expression of the week's creative activi

In Fig.2, the 'day of rest' that follows the 6 days of activity is similarly represented by an identical square, O'L'M'N', lying in a plane parallel to the xz-plane and displaced 1 unit in y.

Interestingly, two of its principal defining characteristics, the diagonals M'O and M'L, are, respectively, the square roots of 73 and 37 - prime factors of the 73rd triangular number, 2701, and of Genesis 1:1!

http://www.craigdemo.co.uk/geneticpatterns.htm
The mathematical patterns found in the genetic code indicate Intelligent Design. They suggest that life came from some Cause that possessed arithmetical ability, that enjoyed harmony and balance and perfect order. Even scientists like Shcherbak are forced to admit that arithmetic seems to have preceded life itself. To quote Shcherbak. In February 2010, prompted by Steve Coneglan to carry on the genetics research, I made a careful study of the work of another geneticist - M. M. Rakocevic. The resemblance between Rakocevic's genetic patterns and those in the creation narratives is astounding. These findings have been submitted to Vernon Jenkins, Steve Coneglan and Richard McGough. Steve Coneglan has peer reviewed them and confirmed the accuracy of these startling patterns. Most recently, in early December 2010, I became aware of the extraordinary research of Jean Claude Perez, a French geneticist and mathematician. This very year he published a very interesting discovery that shows some very remarkable symmetries within the genetic code. ][divisibility of 37 as it relates to bio-systems, the Genesis narrative, rib/DNA syntax/structures]

http://whatabeginning.com/Breastplat...ael/Star_2.htm
In his recent book, Is God a Mathematician?, astrophysicist and author Mario Livio explores the question of how it is that mathematics has evolved over the last few thousand years to so accurately describe and predict nearly all aspects of the physical world in which we live. In casting his learned eye over the subject, one domain that appears to have escaped his attention is the burgeoning field of bioinformatics, although he does muse on the possibility of its having a mathematical underpinning:

The astounding success of the physical sciences in discovering mathematical laws that govern the behavior of the cosmos at large raised the inevitable question of whether or not similar principles might also underlie biological, social, or economic processes. Is mathematics only the language of nature, mathematicians wondered, or is it also the language of human nature?

http://www.unexplained-mysteries.com...135&p=3692161&
The kabbalist whose studies of the creation account in Genesis are the most precise and authoritative was Nechunya ben HaKanah. Among other matters in which he was expert, Nechunya specifically asserted that the 42-lettered name allowed one to deduce from the creation account the correct age of the universe. because in his day this kind of information was considered religiously sensitive (as it is today), Nechunya's own explanation of the numbers involved was somewhat sketchy. But another kabbalist who followed closely in Nechunya's footsteps -- Rabbi Yitzhak deMin Acco -- laid out the calculations precisely. These make it doubly clear that the calculations of the synodical "starting date" for the first new moon and of the "primordial year" (which values both Nechunya and deMin Acco used) were to be understood literally only insofar as the numbers produce accurate results. They were not meant to be taken literally as indicating the age of the world.

Did Nechunya (or deMin Acco) obtain this number from some other source and then retrofit the information into complicated "permutations" of Genesis? It's hard to imagine how: DeMin Acco lived in the thirteenth century A.D.; Nechunya himself in the first century A.D.

The "meaning" of Genesis 1:1 is to be found at a deeper level of the text. The Torah according to Jewish Rabbi's is said to be written on 4 different and meaningful levels.

http://www.fixedearth.com/HB%20179%2...T.EVIDENCE.htm

“Nechunya ben HaKana, a 1st century Kabbalist asserted that if you know how to use the 42 letter name for God you could decipher a lengthy time between the creation of the universe and man. He estimated the age of the Universe at 15.3 billion years, some 2000 years ago, the very age modern astrophysics have just arrived at….”

http://sites.google.com/site/oldshep...ologicalwisdom

According to modern Kabbalists: Kabbala and physics “…work together to draw a picture of the Mysteries of such phenomena as The Big Bang, Parallel Universes, Relativity Theory, and The Superstring Theory. Kabbala can explain the mathematics of physics as well as providing a deeper spiritual comprehension of religion’s literal teachings….” (Kabbalah Centre http://www.kabbalah.com/ k/index.php/p=life/science? p. 3 of 11)

According to modern Kabbalist physicist Dr. Gerald L. Schroeder: “the development of time, day by day, based on the expansion factor [1 million times 1 million from start till now]. The calculations come out to be as follows:

The first Biblical day lasted 24 hours … But…from our perspective it was 8 billion years.

The second day of 24 hours…was 4 billion years.

Posted December 1st, 2011 at 01:39 PM by KillCarneyKlansman
http://www.christianityboard.com/top...tive-material/

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencete...iscovered.html
Scientists say that they have found evidence that our universe was 'jostled' by other parallel universes in the distant past. The incredible claim emerged after they studied patterns in the cosmic microwave background radiation (CMB) – the after-effects of the Big Bang. They say they may have found evidence that four circular patterns found in the CMB are 'cosmic bruises' where our universe has crashed into other universes at least four times. The findings, by Stephen Feeney from the Department of Physics and Astronomy at University College London, are likely to be controversial.

The paper, published online yesterday, comes just a month after a similar study of the background radiation claimed to have discovered evidence that the universe existed before the Big Bang. They say they have discovered 12 examples of concentric circles, some of which have five rings, meaning the same object has had five massive events in its history. [This can also be linked to Geometric forms and Gematria, within the Genesis Narrative] The rings appear around galaxy clusters in which the variation in the background radiation appears to be strangely low. The research appears to cast aside the widely-held 'inflationary' theory of the origins of the universe, that it began with the Big Bang, and will continue to expand until a point in the future, when it will end. They believe the circles are imprints of extremely violent gravitational radiation waves generated by supermassive black hole collisions in a previous aeon before the last big bang.

http://www.fixedearth.com/HB%20179%2...T.EVIDENCE.htm

Attachment of Evidence for HB or SB # Sections 2, 3, & 4 “Evidence Confirming ‘Establishment Clause’ Rulings Against ‘Creation Science’ In County And State Courts And The Supreme Court Of The United States”

“According to kabbalistic wisdom, there are two parallel universes; one highly ordered; the other; random and chaotic ....Author Ziman tells us that Kabbalah and physics “…work together to draw a picture of the mysteries of such phenomena as the big bang, parallel universes, relativity theory, and the superstring theory.” All of evolution’s essential concepts (15 billion years, relativity, heliocentricity, big bang, expanding universe)--which are now textbook “science”--are the same concepts that were formulated by Kabbalist(s) ... as far back at least as the 1st century A.D and expanded in the 12th, 13th, 16th and 20th centuries.

The third day of 24 hours…was 2 billion years.
The fourth day of 24 hours…was 1 billion years.
The fifth day of 24 hours…was ½ billion years.
The sixth day of 24 hours…was ¼ billion years.

Then you add it up and you get 15 ¾ billion years … the same as modern cosmology allows….” (Web Article Entitled: “The Age of the Universe”. (Issues - Age of the universe - Aish Hatorah), pp.15, 16.) [Amplified version of all this: The Science of God by physicist Gerald L. Schroeder. Broadway Books, New York, 1998.]

Ed. Note: How was it possible for ancient and medieval Kabbalah rabbis to inscribe conclusions of what are apparently the premises of modern cosmology in their holy book (long before Copernicus formulated his heliocentricity hypothesis) and for those premises to hold the exact same conclusions agreed to by modern cosmologists?

Without going into more detail about the philosophical side of these argument, the evidence from a scientific dogmatic point of view, points to it being less than honest, in determining the sources of there criteria and explaining them. The distain of science for the religious right, and young earth creationists are the basic fuel for this fire. neither of which I am.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga
In Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism, he argues that the truth of evolution is an epistemic [study of knowledge, info systems, how's it acquired, what do we know] defeater for naturalism (i.e. if evolution is true, it undermines naturalism). His basic argument is that if evolution and naturalism are both true, human cognitive faculties evolved to produce beliefs that have survival value (maximizing one's success at the four F's: "feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing"), not necessarily to produce beliefs that are true. Thus, since human cognitive faculties are tuned to survival rather than truth in the naturalism-evolution model, there is reason to doubt the veracity of the products of those same faculties, including naturalism and evolution themselves. On the other hand, if God created man "in his image" by way of an evolutionary process (or any other means), then Plantinga argues our faculties would probably be reliable.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientism
Scientism refers to a belief in the universal applicability of the systematic methods and approach of science, especially the view that empirical science constitutes the most authoritative worldview or most valuable part of human learning to the exclusion of other viewpoints. "Scientism" can apply in either of two equally pejorative senses:

1. To indicate the improper usage of science or scientific claims. This usage applies equally in contexts where science might not apply, such as when the topic is perceived to be beyond the scope of scientific inquiry, and in contexts where there is insufficient empirical evidence to justify a scientific conclusion. It includes an excessive deference to claims made by scientists or an uncritical eagerness to accept any result described as scientific. In this case the term is a counter-argument to appeals to scientific authority.
2. To refer to "the belief that the methods of natural science, or the categories and things recognized in natural science, form the only proper elements in any philosophical or other inquiry,"[10] or that "science, and only science, describes the world as it is in itself, independent of perspective"[6] with a concomitant "elimination of the psychological dimensions of experience."

Standard dictionary definitions include the following applications of the term "scientism":

* The use of the style, assumptions, techniques, and other attributes typically displayed by scientists.
* Methods and attitudes typical of or attributed to the natural scientist.
* An exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation, as in philosophy, the social sciences, and the humanities.
* The use of scientific or pseudoscientific language.[36]
* The contention that the social sciences, such as economics and sociology, are only properly sciences when they abide by the somewhat stricter interpretation of scientific method used by the natural sciences, and that otherwise they are not truly sciences.
* "A term applied (freq. in a derogatory manner) to a belief in the omnipotence of scientific knowledge and techniques; also to the view that the methods of study appropriate to physical science can replace those used in other fields such as philosophy and, esp., human behaviour and the social sciences."
* "1. The collection of attitudes and practices considered typical of scientists. 2. The belief that the investigative methods of the physical sciences are applicable or justifiable in all fields of inquiry."
* As a form of dogma: "In essence, scientism sees science as the absolute and only justifiable access to the truth."

E. F. Schumacher in his 'A Guide for the Perplexed' criticized scientism as an impoverished world view confined solely to what can be counted, measured and weighed. "The architects of the modern worldview, notably Galileo and Descartes, assumed that those things that could be weighed, measured, and counted were more true than those that could not be quantified. If it couldn’t be counted, in other words, it didn’t count." The term is also used to highlight the possible dangers of lapses towards excessive reductionism in all fields of human knowledge

http://www.unexplained-mysteries.com...post&p=3693694
Just to interject [but] a combo of proofs [are needed] -> examples:
[that] ... would tend to lend significant support to the Scriptures, as well as the Gen 1:1-5:32 narrative!
Also, to note: it would be highly unlikely anyone would be able to fully decipher this information, before the invention of computers & modern science.

http://www.historum.com/blogs/killca...d-origins.html
Mathematical Proofs that point to Intelligent Design in Information Systems Unknown until the Invention of the Computer (Brain)

(Note: What there saying here is that until the invention of computers, which use this very same type of encryption, especially Mersenne's, formulation of these numbers and or patterns would be difficult to reproduce in ancient times. 'Though I would say there are hints of it". Anyways, which leads us to, "If the Bible is encoded specific to topic in regional alphanumeric coordinates, which show specificity to the subject and a numerical, geometrical, etc ... permutation, this would be sufficent cause to suspect non-randomness, purpose, intelligence, information systems, or something to that effect, etc ,,,)

Other Sources
http://www.historum.com/blogs/killca...-big-bang.html
http://www.historum.com/blogs/killca...ins-page2.html
http://www.historum.com/blogs/killca...ins-page3.html
http://www.historum.com/blogs/killca...-response.html

[stuntpickle]

In case anyone's interested here's a link to an Austrialian physicist's blog that deals a lot with fine tuning. He's also an atheist, and he criticizes a lot of the atheist-theist debate in regards to fine-tuning. He has been critical of Craig, but his ultimate conclusion is that Craig is actually making good points and deserves to be read. His conclusions regarding PZ Myers, Krauss and Stenger are actually much harsher.

http://letterstonature.wordpress.com...01/of-nothing/

[KillCarneyKlans]

http://www.historum.com/philosophy-p...onalism-2.html
Empiricism, in philosophy, a doctrine that affirms that all knowledge is based on experience, and denies the possibility of spontaneous ideas or a priori thought.

Rationalism (Latin ratio,”reason”), in philosophy, a system of thought that emphasizes the role of reason in obtaining knowledge, in contrast to empiricism, which emphasizes the role of experience, especially sense perception.

The Age of Einstein Frank W. K. Firk Professor Emeritus of Physics Yale University

It is necessary for the scientist to have a conviction that Nature can be understood in terms of a small set of fundamental laws, and that these laws should provide a quantitative account of all basic physical processes. It is axiomatic that the laws hold throughout the universe. In this respect, the methods of Physics belong to Philosophy. (In earlier times, Physics was referred to by the appropriate title, “Natural Philosophy”). In one of Einstein's writings entitled “On the Method of Theoretical Physics”, he states:

“If, then, experience is the alpha and the omega of all our knowledge of reality, what then is the function of pure reason in science?” He continued, “Newton, the first creator of a comprehensive, workable system of theoretical physics, still believed that the basic concepts and laws of his system could be derived from experience.” Einstein then wrote “But the tremendous practical success of his (Newton’s) doctrines may well have prevented him, and the physicists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from recognizing the fictitious character of the foundations of his system”. It was Einstein’s view that “..the concepts and fundamental principles which underlie a theoretical system of physics are free inventions of the human intellect, which cannot be justified either by the nature of that intellect or in any other fashion a priori.” He continued, “If, then, it is true that the axiomatic basis of theoretical physics cannot be extracted from experience but must be freely invented, can we ever hope to find the right way? ... Can we hope to be guided safely by experience at all when there exist theories (suchas Classical (Newtonian) Mechanics) which to a large extent do justice to experience, without getting to the root of the matter? I answer without hesitation that there is, in my opinion, a right way, and that we are capable of finding it.” Einstein then stated “Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the physical utility of a mathematical construction. But the creative principle resides in Mathematics. ... I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed.”

[MorpheusSandman]

One point I'm trying to make with bringing up Eldridge and Gould is that punctuated equilibrium (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punctuated_equilibrium) is a currently valid alternative to phyletic gradualism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phyletic_gradualism). Contrast that with the Standard Model of Cosmology (aka, the Big Bang) where there is no surviving alternative since the results of the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe came in.

I think "valid alternative" is a wrong way of looking at in in this case, because there's nothing mutually exclusive about those two theories, really. That sometimes evolution happens abruptly in spurts has long been noted, even by Darwin, but there are also cases where it seems there is gradual change over a long period time. It simply seems to mean that PE and PG aren't either/or in general, but either/or in each specific case. So I still see one theory (evolution) split into two different methods (of which there is likely a long continuum between them).

Everyone should know by now what Craig's arguments are going to be... If you want to stop him, you have to show that something is eternal besides God

The problem with "everyone should know... Craig's arguments" is that it assumes most of the people that debate him have nothing better to do with the majority of their time. That's part of the problem; Craig mostly debates people who have spent their lives studying the things that he cherry-picks conclusions from to fit into his arguments. These people haven't been spending their time honing their arguments because they've been too busy figuring out the facts, or even how they CAN figure out the facts (which is often the real challenge itself). Krauss et al. go into these debates have a great depth of knowledge usually on a single subject, while Craig goes into these debates with a great breadth of knowledge on a variety of subjects. Craig works this to his advantage by keeping most debate subjects quite broad, which allows him to work in every element of his "5-point attack". But it's just common sense that, in the same format (like the time of live debates), the broader something is, the shallower it's going to be. And Craig punishes his opponents for not addressing the full breadth of his arguments when they usually choose (to their own detriment, in appearance, at least) to focus on just one thing. Watch the Krauss debate again: Craig is organized, he is broad, he is fast, he hits points like a gatling gun. What does Krauss do? He picks one subject (like nothing) and can stay with it almost for the entire length of one of his sections. Krauss doesn't address many of Craig's point (like the resurrection) because that's completely outside his area of expertise.

Now, as for showing that "something is eternal besides God," that's just plain incorrect. It's believed that time itself came into existence with the origins of the universe, and if that's the case, then we know the universe can't be eternal because that would imply there was never a time without time. What a term like "eternal" could possibly mean outside time is a real question mark. It's one reason Craig calls God "timeless" rather than "eternal," because he couldn't be limited by something that "begun to exist". So it's actually not up to an opponent to argue that something else can be eternal, but merely that something else that can create the universe can exist outside of time. It's very possible that such a description could fit quantum energy, because there's some theories of quantum gravity that state if you combine quantum mechanics and gravity you get something that brings spacetime and material into existence itself. The problem is that quantum gravity is a pain to test, although attempts are still being made.

Plus, why does God get a pass here? Why can God be timeless, spaceless, causeless, etc. and how does such a being bring space time, gravity, and matter into existence? The problem with God, speaking scientifically, is that it offers absolutely no testable predictions. People are hard at work trying to test quantum gravity, but who's at work trying to even find a way to test God? In the classic phrase: "it's not even wrong".

It seems that the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem also requires the multiverse to have a beginning. So the multiverse is not an alternative to God either.

That's because "beginning" can simply mean "point that time itself began," but that doesn't mean there can't be something natural that can't create spacetime itself.

[MorpheusSandman]

stuntpickle,

There isn't much in your last post I have a problem with, but I'll try to restrict my own reply to the points I think are directly relevant to the Kalam, even though I feel most of my last post WAS directly related to the argument.

1. The Problem of Nothing

Most of my last post was related to Craig's definition of "nothing" in his "ex nihilo nihil fit" argument that he has stated argues for the first premise. My argument is that Craig seems to be equivocating when he talks about this, from using observational examples from natural reality, to talking about the singularity, to talking about everything prior to spacetime. In all cases, his nothing doesn't seem to be nothing in absolute sense, so his entire basis for using that classic argument crumbles, as does his basis for accepting P1 as true.

2. The Problem of Everything

Another objection that could be made that I haven't brought up is that it's unclear what Craig means by "everything" in "everything that begins to exist." Similar to the above, when he talks about this everything he always uses examples from natural reality. But if he's using examples that are part of the "universe" set, he can't go from arguing from things in the set (everything) to the set itself (the universe), the same way you can't go from arguing about observations made concerning Socrates to being applicable to all mortals. Sets can't be part of themselves. Craig has insisted before he's not doing this, but then, for the life of me, I can't figure out what he means by "everything," because to use it in a way that would allow "the universe" to be a subset of "everything," "everything" would have to address things outside the universe and, currently, we have no examples of anything outside the universe beginning to exist. Again, at this point, Craig always brings up "ex nihilo," which is why I was focusing so much on that.

3. The Problem of Ignorance, Induction and Syllogisms

When I say the argument is flawed, I mean it's flawed in that we cannot accept its premises as true because there are still too many question marks. I'm not talking about "are all humans mortal" question marks, I'm talking about "we simply have no clue" question marks. There is a ginormous gap between the assumption that's made when we say "all humans are mortal" and "everything (including things outside the universe) that begins to exist has a cause." In the former case, we have no examples to refute it, and many examples that support it; in the latter case, we have no examples outside the universe to refute OR support it, and some examples in the universe (virtual particles) that seem to frustrate it, if not refute it. These two arguments are clearly not on equal grounds.

Yudkowsky once said that because logic is valid in all possible worlds, it doesn't tell you what world you're in. The idea is that pointing out that an argument is valid does nothing if the observations of reality do not support it. The "All men are mortal" syllogism works in terms of its valid inferences, but we only accept the premises as true because our observations of reality continue to support them. If at some time we find a human who is immortal, we may have to rethink that. But, see, scientists are always prepared to do this, we're prepared to let the world TELL US what premises to "assume as true" based on the consistency of our observation.

I addressed you earlier when you mentioned Hume's problem of induction, both with Popper's theory that it wasn't really about induction, but about our inability to refute, which means that we don't have to say that something like "All men are mortal" is some eternal, metaphysical fact, all we have to say is that "we accept it because so far we aren't able to refute it."

My problem with using such syllogisms is likely innate to my distaste for much of (not all of, mind) philosophy in general. There's so often too much of a tendency to obscure ontological complexity through linguistic simplicity. "A syllogism is logically sound if its premises are true and its inferences are valid." Fine and dandy, until one gets to talking about what truth is. It's not enough to state that everything is innately induction and then act as if everything we choose to assume as truth is equal. That's the same as saying all assumptions of truth made from any observations are equal, which is absurd.

To me, using syllogisms is worse when the person using them realizes that there there are issues with the arguments on which the premises rest. It's not that I disagree that the Kalam is a forcing argument, that if its premises are true then the conclusion must be true, but rather that everybody recognizes that there is major doubt concerning the truth of one (if not both), so why are we wasting time stating the argument at all? It's putting the cart before the horse.

This really shouldn't be controversial either, and it's not in science. In science, when there's a theory nobody feels the need to say "If all of X is true, then the theory is true." No, they simply find ways of testing it, and, if necessary, they say "there may be a problem here," and then ALL attention goes on figuring out the case of what's wrong, because it could turn out to be nothing or minor, or it could completely upset the paradigm. Nobody would feel the need to say "well, if light doesn't bend around a gravitational field then Newtonian physics is true." No, they waited for the results of Einstein's eclipse measurements to come in, which proved general relativity right and Newton wrong.

Applied to the Kalam, one can see these kinds of problems all over. Besides "nothing" and "everything" I'll add two more:

3. What is the cause of virtual particles? It must be something predictable or else it's unclear what we mean by "cause" anymore, since cause has always been connected to the consistency of predictions of one (ideally) variable acting upon something else. A distinction must be made between "contingency" and "cause."

4. How does causality work outside of spacetime? Because it's unclear how we get from "cause" as events in spacetime to an event that brings spacetime into existence.

Conclusion: Towards a Bayesian Approach

To me, these are just four big, honking question marks. Not a question mark like "are all humans mortal?" But question marks to which we have no observational answers to. We've seen humans die (every one so far that we know of), we have not seen nothing come from nothing, or spacetime itself come into existence, or what, exactly, causes virtual particles, or anything outside the universe come into existence. With these enormous gaps in our knowledge, it is not reasonable to accept the premises as true.

If we agree that there's no reason to accept them as true (and we should agree; again, there's a major difference in the problem of induction when we have one premise that has never been refuted and is consistently supported and another that has many possible refutations and some that aren't supported at all), then we should really be talking about probability, Bayesian reasoning for their likelihood of truthfulness. In doing this, we could save a lot of time and hassle from continuing to mention the argument itself, and just focusing on the parts that are in question.

[YesNo]

I think "valid alternative" is a wrong way of looking at in in this case, because there's nothing mutually exclusive about those two theories, really. That sometimes evolution happens abruptly in spurts has long been noted, even by Darwin, but there are also cases where it seems there is gradual change over a long period time. It simply seems to mean that PE and PG aren't either/or in general, but either/or in each specific case. So I still see one theory (evolution) split into two different methods (of which there is likely a long continuum between them).

I agree that the good points of both will merge into something better overall. At the moment they enjoy the fight. I'm no expert in the area, but I like the way change is presented by the punctuated equilibrium group. The extinction event stimulates speciation, if I have it correct. I think that is how change occurs in general during some crisis. They also have the fossil record on their side.

The problem with "everyone should know... Craig's arguments" is that it assumes most of the people that debate him have nothing better to do with the majority of their time. That's part of the problem; Craig mostly debates people who have spent their lives studying the things that he cherry-picks conclusions from to fit into his arguments. These people haven't been spending their time honing their arguments because they've been too busy figuring out the facts, or even how they CAN figure out the facts (which is often the real challenge itself). Krauss et al. go into these debates have a great depth of knowledge usually on a single subject, while Craig goes into these debates with a great breadth of knowledge on a variety of subjects. Craig works this to his advantage by keeping most debate subjects quite broad, which allows him to work in every element of his "5-point attack". But it's just common sense that, in the same format (like the time of live debates), the broader something is, the shallower it's going to be. And Craig punishes his opponents for not addressing the full breadth of his arguments when they usually choose (to their own detriment, in appearance, at least) to focus on just one thing. Watch the Krauss debate again: Craig is organized, he is broad, he is fast, he hits points like a gatling gun. What does Krauss do? He picks one subject (like nothing) and can stay with it almost for the entire length of one of his sections. Krauss doesn't address many of Craig's point (like the resurrection) because that's completely outside his area of expertise.

The problem is that cosmology is what Krauss studies. If he feels overwhelmed, he should stick to the first two of Craig's points. He only needs to prepare a response to the Kalam argument in a professional manner. That is the main reason there is an audience in the room.

Now, as for showing that "something is eternal besides God," that's just plain incorrect. It's believed that time itself came into existence with the origins of the universe, and if that's the case, then we know the universe can't be eternal because that would imply there was never a time without time. What a term like "eternal" could possibly mean outside time is a real question mark. It's one reason Craig calls God "timeless" rather than "eternal," because he couldn't be limited by something that "begun to exist". So it's actually not up to an opponent to argue that something else can be eternal, but merely that something else that can create the universe can exist outside of time. It's very possible that such a description could fit quantum energy, because there's some theories of quantum gravity that state if you combine quantum mechanics and gravity you get something that brings spacetime and material into existence itself. The problem is that quantum gravity is a pain to test, although attempts are still being made.

To me eternal means timeless rather than something that existed throughout all time since time itself is finite. Being within time and being infinite (eternal) is where, I suspect, the mathematical contradictions of infinity arise.

Krauss claims that he uses infinity in his profession but what he is really using is the limit process in the calculus. He never actually counts an infinite number of things, nor is any proof that the algorithms he uses are correct based on an actual infinite computation. I noticed that he didn't seem to understand that in the debate.

Plus, why does God get a pass here? Why can God be timeless, spaceless, causeless, etc. and how does such a being bring space time, gravity, and matter into existence? The problem with God, speaking scientifically, is that it offers absolutely no testable predictions. People are hard at work trying to test quantum gravity, but who's at work trying to even find a way to test God? In the classic phrase: "it's not even wrong".

That's because "beginning" can simply mean "point that time itself began," but that doesn't mean there can't be something natural that can't create spacetime itself.

Well, the Judeo-Christo-Islamic religions predicted that God created the universe, even "out of nothing" as I recall Catholics claiming. The Kalam argument provided the reasoning that if something begins to exist it has a cause. So there has been for some time a "theory" within these various religions about the origin of the universe.

Others felt secure that the universe was eternal in time and no one could test the prediction anyway. But then came relativity, the expanding universe and quantum mechanics in the 20th century and a cosmological theory of the universe coming out of nothing. The Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe, in the 21st century, provided the confirming scientific data that our universe--yes--had a beginning. And not only did it have a beginning, the standard model of cosmology insisted it came out of nothing and so did space and time. So, whatever caused it is not in space or time. Apply the Kalam argument and a core component of the Judeo-Christo-Islamic theory receives a major confirmation.

Although the Kalam argument doesn't give you any specific God, it gives you the existence of something capable of starting off the universe outside of space and time since that was created as well. Craig's other points try to fill in the details with his Christian perspective of what that God is.

Ironically, Krauss is an atheistic cosmologist whose very work is validating a religious position he does not support.

[MorpheusSandman]

In case anyone's interested here's a link to an Austrialian physicist's blog that deals a lot with fine tuning.

I actually read that, and while I agree about the essential idea of nothing bein an equivocation, I think he's wrong to put the blame on Krauss. Here's why:

Now let’s look at Krauss’ claims again. Does it make sense to say that there are different types of not anything? That not anything is not stable? This is bollocks. What Krauss is really talking about is the quantum vacuum. The quantum vacuum is a type of something... The quantum vacuum is not nothing.

This suggests a very simple test for those who wish to talk about nothing: if what you are talking about has properties, then it is not nothing. It is pure equivocation to refer to the quantum vacuum as nothing when a philosopher starts asking the question “why is there something rather than nothing?”.

Luke is confusing semiotics with ontology; this is what I brought up to you earlier. It's not exactly outrageous to recognize that we utilize the same word to mean different things; nothing is simply one of those words. Let me simplify this as much as possible:

Ancient man looked at empty space (empty space meaning "empty of tangible sensible matter") and they said "nothing comes from nothing" because they defined "nothing" as "absence of tangible, sensible matter" and they never saw something come out of it. This should not be a controversial claim. They didn't realize that there was even a difference between "nothing" (absence of any thing at all) and "nothing" (absence of tangible, sensible matter).

Luke quotes Rees who states: "We’ve realised ever since Einstein that empty space can have a structure such that it can be warped and distorted. Even if shrunk down to a ‘point’, it is latent with particles and forces – still a far richer construct than the philosopher’s ‘nothing’."

Yes, "WE'VE" realized that empty space isn't actually empty, but nobody, at the time of that discovery, seemed to bother with asking whether "nothing" was still a coherent concept. Remember, the referent of "nothing" began as "empty space," suddenly, we see SOMETHING in "empty space" and we keep the word "nothing," but perhaps not everybody updates it from being a word that has an observational referent ("empty space") to a word that has a theoretical concept ("the complete absence of something.") with no observational referent.

I agree that Krauss et al. are "equivocating," but it's not their original equivocation, it's the philosophers'! The word began its existence referring to space people THOUGHT was absent anything, but which turned out not to be. The word transformed, observationally, to having a definite referent, to being a concept, an idea, a possibility, (I won't call it a theory). The fact that Craig still discusses nothing AS IF it has an obvious, unambiguous, factual referent is disturbing to me. When he mentions nothing he doesn't qualify that by saying "it's possible that nothing can't exist, it's possible that there can't be a complete absence of anything". No. When he mentions nothing he moves on to giving examples from the observational, physical world, which clearly isn't nothing, or he mentions the singularity, which isn't nothing, or he mentions the universe before spacetime, which may be nothing, but we have no clue because we can't go that far back yet.

So Craig's "nothing" has no definite referent any more. It's, at best, a hypothesis. But it should be worrisome that Craig acts as if this nothing has a real-world referent that is "metaphysically intuitive" when he's admitted that people's initial metaphysical intuition of nothing (empty space) isn't nothing at all. You did the same thing when you said "When you make the ridiculous demand to be "shown nothing", you must understand that everyone in the world just complied with your request." The nothing you talk about here is the "metaphysically intuitive" type of nothing that even the person in that link you provided me with is calling equivocation. If I request someone to show me nothing, and they "comply", all they've done is shown me an absence of tangible, sensible matter, not a complete absence of any thing.