I want to start reading Philosophy

[Stewed]

Here's paragraph one, chapter 3, from On liberty:

SUCH being the reasons which make it imperative that human beings should be free to form opinions,
and to express their opinions without reserve; and such the baneful consequences to the intellectual,
and through that to the moral nature of man, unless this liberty is either conceded, or asserted in spite of prohibition;
let us next examine whether the same reasons do not require that men should be free to act upon their opinions
— to carry these out in their lives, without hindrance, either physical or moral, from their fellow-men,
so long as it is at their own risk and peril. This last proviso is of course indispensable. No one pretends
that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity,
when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression
a positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor,
or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press,
but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house
of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard. Acts of whatever
kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others, may be, and in the more important cases
absolutely require to be, controlled by the unfavorable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active
interference of mankind. The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself
a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely
acts according to his own inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons
which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry
his opinions into practice at his own cost. That mankind are not infallible; that their truths, for the most part,
are only half-truths; that unity of opinion, unless resulting from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite
opinions, is not desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good, until mankind are much more capable than at
present of recognizing all sides of the truth, are principles applicable to men's modes of action, not less
than to their opinions. As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so
is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of
character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically,
when any one thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern others,
individuality should assert itself. Where, not the person's own character, but the traditions of customs of other
people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite
the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.

[Stewed]

Here's the beginning of Practical Ethics by Peter Singer. He hasn't truly got into it yet, but it should give you a sense of his style.

This book is about practical ethics, that is, the application of ethics or morality - I shall use the words interchangeably - to practical issues like the treatment of ethnic minorities, equality for women, the use of animals for food and research, the preservation of the natural environment, abortion, euthanasia, and the obligation of the wealthy to help the poor. No doubt the reader will want to get onto these issues without delay; but there are some preliminaries that must be dealt with at the start. In order to have a useful discussion within ethics, it is necessary to say a little about ethics, so that we can have a clear understanding of what we are doing when we discuss ethical questions. The first chapter therefore sets the stage for the remainder of the book. In order to prevent it from growing into an entire volume itself, I have kept it brief. If at times it is dogmatic, that is because I cannot take the space properly to consider all the different conceptions of ethics that might be opposed to the one I shall defend; but this chapter will at least serve to reveal the assumptions on which the remainder of the book is based.